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Journal articles on the topic 'Cognitivisme'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 31 January 2023

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1

Fenske, Wayne. "The Advantage of an Empirically Minded Conception of Non-cognitivism." Dialogue 39, no. 3 (2000): 513–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300007538.

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RésuméUn argument standard contre le non-cognitivisme va comme suit. Les non-cognitivistes, dit-on, sont théoriquement commis à endosser la doctrine de l'internalisme; or la doctrine de l'internalisme requiert que l'amoraliste soit inconcevable; comme l'amoraliste est concevable, l'internalisme doit être faux; le non-cognitivisme, par conséquent, n'est pas plausible. C'est ce que nous pouvons appeler l' «argument de l'amoraliste». J'essaie de montrer dans cet article que l'argument de léamoraliste ne constitue pas la réfutation décisive du non-cognitivisme que plusieurs réalistes en morale pensent y voir. Mon approche à ce sujet est de développer les implications sémantiques d'une conception d'inspiration empirique du non-cognitivisme.

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2

Marie, Pierre. "Psychanalyse versus Cognitivisme." Essaim 9, no. 1 (2002): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ess.009.0053.

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3

Legrand, Michel. "Du behaviorisme au cognitivisme." L'année psychologique 90, no. 2 (1990): 247–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/psy.1990.29399.

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4

McDowell, John. "Non-cognitivisme et règles." Archives de Philosophie 64, no. 3 (2001): 457. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.643.0457.

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5

Richelle, M., E. Freixa I Baque, A. Pélissolo, and J. Van Rillaer. "Du comportementalisme au cognitivisme." Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive 15 (December 2005): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1155-1704(05)81271-6.

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6

Steiner, Pierre. "Introduction cognitivisme et sciences cognitives." Labyrinthe, no. 20 (April 20, 2005): 13–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/labyrinthe.754.

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7

Marmion, Jean-François. "L'inconscient, de la psychanalyse au cognitivisme." Les Grands Dossiers des Sciences Humaines N°10, no. 3 (March 1, 2008): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gdsh.441.0008.

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8

Spector, Benjamin. "Linguistique générative et cognitivisme : bref aperçu." Labyrinthe, no. 20 (April 20, 2005): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/labyrinthe.756.

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9

Cellérier, Guy. "La psychologie génétique et le cognitivisme." Le Débat 47, no. 5 (1987): 116. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/deba.047.0116.

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10

Chazaud, Jacques. "Organodynamisme et cognitivisme de Robert Michel Palem." L'information psychiatrique 82, no. 6 (2006): 515. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/inpsy.8206.0515.

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11

Roy, Olivier. "Intentions rationnelles et acceptations en délibération." Hommage à Joseph Nicolas Kaufmann 35, no. 2 (March 10, 2009): 525–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/000441ar.

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Résumé Dans cet article, je montre que quatre normes de rationalité associées aux intentions peuvent être déduites de normes similaires s’appliquant aux acceptations en contextes délibératifs, un type d’état mental apparenté mais irréductible aux croyances par lequel un agent tient certains faits pour acquis lorsqu’il délibère. Je montre que cette approche, que je nomme le pragmatisme hybride, évite certaines limitations de l’approche la plus prisée dans la littérature, le cognitivisme, et qu’en comparaison avec les approches purement pragmatistes, principales rivales du cognitivisme, le pragmatisme hybride rend mieux justice à nos intuitions relatives aux normes associées aux intentions. Je montre enfin que le pragmatisme hybride permet d’expliquer comment les intentions influencent le raisonnement pratique, et de ce fait, comblent un vide important dans les théories contemporaines.

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12

Courtois, Stéphane. "Le cognitivisme moral de Habermas fait-il face au problème de Frege-Geach?1." Hommage à Joseph Nicolas Kaufmann 35, no. 2 (March 10, 2009): 561–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/000443ar.

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Résumé L’article cherche à fournir une défense de la théorie discursive de la morale de Habermas contre une critique importante formulée récemment par J. G. Finlayson, lequel soutient que Habermas rejetterait ce qu’il appelle le « cognitivisme métaéthique » et qu’un tel rejet le confronterait au problème de Frege-Geach. L’article démontre en détail que cette critique est non fondée. Il montre de plus que la seule forme de cognitivisme rejetée par Habermas est le descriptivisme moral en ce que cette approche serait contre-intuitive eu égard à l’usage normal de nos expressions morales. L’article cherche finalement à répondre à certaines objections majeures que les philosophes descriptivistes pourraient soulever à l’endroit de la théorie habermassienne de la morale, en particulier contre sa thèse de l’analogie entre vérité propositionnelle et justesse normative.

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13

Chassaing, Jean-Louis. "Le cognitivisme ou le miroir de la « connaiscience »." La revue lacanienne 3, no. 3 (2007): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/lrl.073.0042.

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14

Lorino, Philippe. "Herbert Simon : pour un bilan raisonné du cognitivisme." Projectics / Proyéctica / Projectique 24, no. 3 (2019): 79. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/proj.024.0079.

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15

Lipiansky, Edmond Marc. "Le soi entre cognitivisme et phénoménologie : réflexions épistémologiques." Recherche & Formation 41, no. 1 (2002): 11–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/refor.2002.1771.

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16

Imberty, Michel. "Langage, musique et cognition : quelques remarques sur l’évolution nécessaire des problématiques psychologiques des vingt dernières années." Circuit 13, no. 2 (February 22, 2010): 93–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/902275ar.

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L’application par Lerdahl et Jackendoff du modèle linguistique génératif de Chomsky à la musique tonale bute sur le postulat de l’innéité des compétences et pose le problème crucial de sa propre généralisation à toute musique. Le cognitivisme neurophysiologique propose des éléments de solution à travers le modèle de la modularité notamment, mais la dichotomie fodorienne entre périphérie et niveau central ne tient pas à l’observation des faits complexes. De manière générale, il convient de substituer à une ontologie des objets celle des événements. L’auteur montre comment, dans ses propres travaux, il est parti d’une réactivation de la notion piagétienne de « grammaire d’enfants » pour proposer une « grammaire musicale évolutive »; ce modèle engendre des structures dynamiques, globales, orientées temporellement, qui sont antérieures aux notions d’intervalles de hauteur et de durée — déplaçant ainsi les apories du cognitivisme précédemment décrites et fournissant un substrat à toute approche de la musique intégrant prioritairement sa qualité temporelle.

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17

Harribey, Jean-Marie. "Le cognitivisme, nouvelle société ou impasse théorique et politique ?" Actuel Marx 36, no. 2 (2004): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/amx.036.0151.

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18

Vittet, Daniel. "Du cognitivisme aux neurosciences, au regard de la psychanalyse." Cahiers jungiens de psychanalyse 130, no. 3 (2009): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/cjung.130.0011.

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19

Ravon, D. "L’introduction faussement simple du cognitivisme dans la thérapie comportementale." PSN 8, no. 4 (October 29, 2010): 207–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11836-010-0150-y.

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20

Froissart, Josiane. "La psychanalyse et le cognitivisme peuvent-ils faire bon ménage ?" Journal français de psychiatrie 25, no. 2 (2006): 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/jfp.025.39.

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21

Le Bars, Alain. "Comment le cognitivisme mêle ses origines à l’histoire des sciences." Cliniques méditerranéennes 100, no. 2 (2019): 259. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/cm.100.0259.

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22

Balacescu, Ioana, and Bernd Stefanink. "La didactique de la traduction à l’heure allemande." Meta 50, no. 1 (March 31, 2005): 277–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/010674ar.

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Résumé C’est en Allemagne que la discussion traductologique a été la plus intense. C’est là aussi qu’elle a été centrée primordialement sur l’élaboration d’une didactique. On peut y distinguer deux grands courants : l’approche analytique et l’approche intuitive. La première entretient des liens étroits avec une linguistique qui a évolué du structuralisme au cognitivisme. La seconde se situe dans la tradition des philosophes allemands, comme Wittgenstein, Heidegger et Gadamer, dont elle se réclame dans son herméneutique.

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23

Olson, Jonas. "Hume's sentimentalism: Not non-cognitivism." Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1, no. 34 (2021): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bpa2134095o.

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This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions-between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism-are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume's so-called 'motivation argument' and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called 'modally weak' motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.

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24

Grzankowski, Alex. "Navigating Recalcitrant Emotions." Journal of Philosophy 117, no. 9 (2020): 501–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117931.

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In discussions of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgments or beliefs. But more recently, it has been argued that the very theories that emerged from the failure of cognitivism (perceptual theories and other neo-cognitivist approaches) face trouble as well. One gets the sense that the theory that can accomplish this will win a crucial point over its competitors. In the present paper I offer a new approach to making sense of the normative tension to which recalcitrant emotions give rise. Interestingly, the approach is one that can be adopted by anyone willing to grant that emotions are themselves governed by norms.

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25

Hymers, Michael. "The Dignity of a Rule: Wittgenstein, Mathematical Norms, and Truth." Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2003): 419–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300004741.

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RésuméPaul Boghossian soutient contre Wittgenstein que le normativisme au sujet de la logique et des mathématiques est incompatible avec le fait de tenir les énoncés logiques et mathématiques pour vrais et que le normativisme entraîne une régression indue. Je soutiens, pour ma part, que le normativisme n'entraîne pas une telle régression, parce que les normes peuvent être implicites et que le normativisme peut bien être «factualiste» si l'on rejette ce que Rockney Jacobsen appelle le «cognitivisme sémantique». Je tiens en outre que la position de Boghossian repose sur la façon trompeuse dont il découpe le terrain conceptuel.

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26

Maranda, Pierre. "Masque et identité." Anthropologie et Sociétés 17, no. 3 (September 10, 2003): 13–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/015272ar.

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Résumé Masque et identité Ce texte suit un parcours à incidences sémiotiques sommairement tributaires de la philosophie, de la science des religions, de la psychologie, de la linguistique et du cognitivisme. En s'appuyant de diverses façons plus ou moins insistantes sur l'anthropologie comme approche maîtresse, il a comme objets de réflexion l'identité et la performance sociale par le nom propre, le masque, le costume et certains autres phénomènes relevant de la même iconique. Une considération de la mode et de la représentation sociale du corps permet de traiter du masque comme effigie définie par la frappe dont chaque société marque ses membres.

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27

Ridge, Michael. "Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's ‘Do so as well!’." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 4 (December 2003): 563–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716555.

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Meta-ethical non-cognitivism makes two claims—a negative one and a positive one. The negative claim is that moral utterances do not express beliefs which provide the truth-conditions for those utterances. The positive claim is that the primary function of such utterances is to express certain of the speaker's desire-like states of mind. Non-cognitivism is officially a theory about the meanings of moral words, but non-cognitivists also maintain that moral states of mind are themselves at least partially constituted by desire-like states to which moral utterances give voice. Non-cognitivists need a plausible account of what distinguishes whims, addictions and cravings from genuinely moral judgments. For while non-cognitivists maintain that in a suitably broad sense moral judgments just are constituted by desire-like states they also insist that not any old desire constitutes a genuinely moral judgment. Since the challenge is to demarcate what is distinctive about moral attitudes we might usefully call this the demarcation challenge.

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28

In-Ryeong CHOI and 오정호. "Cognitivisme et culture de fermentation - approche cognitive sur la relation entre langage et culture." Etudes de la Culture Francaise et de Arts en France 30, no. ll (November 2009): 551–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.21651/cfaf.2009.30..551.

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29

Guan, Chengying. "The Wishful Thinking Problem for Non-cognitivism: Does It Really Make Sense?" KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 28 (January 1, 2014): 30–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2014-012804.

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Abstract This paper concerns the Wishful Thinking Problem for non-cognitivism, which has recently been raised by Cian Dorr. Contrary to Dorr’s claim that the Wishful Thinking Problem is a new crucial objection to non-cognitivism in addition to the well-known Frege- Geach Problem, I argue that recent research has shown that the Wishful Thinking Problem is not independent of the Frege-Geach Problem and therefore it is not lethal to non-cognitivism. However, the Wishful Thinking Problem is still a problem for noncognitivism, for it reveals that the Frege-Geach Problem may be even more troublesome than non-cognitivists originally thought

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30

Courtois, Stéphane. "L'éthique du discours et le problème de la connaissance morale." Dialogue 41, no. 2 (2002): 251–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300013895.

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ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to assess the coherence of the metaethical positions on which discourse ethics as developed by Habermas and Apel rests. After showing that one is faced here with a non-descriptivist, anti-realist but cognitivist moral theory, I examine whether a non-descriptivist cognitivism, on the one hand, and an anti-realist cognitivism, on the other hand, can consistently be held. I maintain that the problem of the relation between cognitivism and non-descriptivism is adequately solved by the two authors, but that the problem of the relation between cognitivism and anti-realism is still waiting for an appropriate answer, which I put forth in my article.

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31

Dammann, Guy, and Elisabeth Schellekens. "Aesthetic Understanding and Epistemic Agency in Art." Disputatio 13, no. 62 (December 1, 2021): 265–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0014.

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Abstract Recently, cognitivist accounts about art have come under pressure to provide stronger arguments for the view that artworks can yield genuine insight and understanding. In Gregory Currie’s Imagining and Knowing: Learning from Fiction, for example, a convincing case is laid out to the effect that any knowledge gained from engaging with art must “be judged by the very standards that are used in assessing the claim of science to do the same” (Currie 2020: 8) if indeed it is to count as knowledge. Cognitivists must thus rally to provide sturdier grounds for their view. The revived interest in this philosophical discussion targets not only the concept of knowledge at the heart of cognitivist and anti-cognitivist debate, but also highlights a more specific question about how, exactly, some artworks can (arguably) afford cognitive import and change how we think about the world, ourselves and the many events, persons and situations we encounter. This paper seeks to explore some of the ways in which art is capable of altering our epistemic perspectives in ways that might count as knowledge despite circumventing some standards of evidential requirement. In so doing we will contrast two alternative conceptions of how we stand to learn from art. Whereas the former is modelled on the idea that knowledge is something that can be “extracted” from our experience of particular works of art, the latter relies on a notion of such understanding as primarily borne out of a different kind of engagement with art. We shall call this the subtractive conception and cumulative conception respectively. The cumulative conception, we shall argue, better explains why at least some insights and instances of knowledge gained from art seem to elude the evidential standards called for by sceptics of cognitivism.

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32

Jucquois, Guy. "« Vision du monde », vision et langage." Cahiers du Centre de Linguistique et des Sciences du Langage, no. 11 (April 9, 2022): 139–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.26034/la.cdclsl.1998.1844.

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Les nombreux travaux de linguistique générale de Mortéza Mahmoudian sont caractérisés par un sens remarquable de la nuance combiné à un don certain de la synthèse, conjonction peu fréquente et qui rend sans doute l’ami si attachant, le chercheur si fécond et le pédagogue si efficace. Dans ces quelques pages que je lui dédie amicalement, je m’interrogerai sur ce qui, scientifiquement, permet une telle « vision du monde » qui concilie des qualités habituellement isolées. Plus précisément, je tenterai d’établir que les théories relativistes rattachées à ce qu’on appelle la « vision du monde » sont moins éloignées qu’il n’y paraît des théories universalistes et rationalistes qui semblent s’y opposer. Dans ce domaine, le cognitivisme pourrait peut-être permettre dans les prochaines années une synthèse des deux courants.

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33

Copp, David. "A semantic challenge to non-realist cognitivism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 3-4 (2018): 569–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1432392.

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AbstractRecently, some philosophers have attempted to escape familiar challenges to orthodox nonnaturalist normative realism by abandoning the robust metaphysical commitments of the orthodox view. One such view is the ‘Non-Metaphysical Non-Naturalism’ or ‘Non-Realist Cognitivism’ proposed by Derek Parfit and a few others. The trouble is that, as it stands, Non-Realist Cognitivism seems unable to provide a substantive non-trivial account of the meaning and truth conditions of moral claims. The paper considers various strategies one might use to address the challenge. There is a rich field of views that are cognitivist and non-realist. But the paper is skeptical of the prospects of Non-Realist Cognitivism.

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34

Fischer, Jeremy. "Why are You Proud of That?" Southwest Philosophy Review 36, no. 2 (2020): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036240.

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Cognitivism about the emotions is the view that emotions involve judgments (or quasi-judgmental cognitive states) that we could, in principle, articulate without reference to the emotions themselves. D’Arms and Jacobson (2003) argue that no such articulation is available in the case of “possessive” emotions, such as pride and guilt, and, so, cognitivism (in regard to such emotions, at least) is false. This article proposes and defends a cognitivist account of our partiality to the objects of our pride. I argue that taking pride in something requires judging that your relation to that thing indicates that your life accords with some of your personal ideals. This cognitivist account eschews glossing pride in terms of one’s “possession” of what one is proud of and, so, escapes D’Arms and Jacobson’s critique. I motivate this account by critically assessing the most sophisticated possession-based account of pride in the literature, found in Gabriele Taylor (1985).

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35

Gomes, Rodrigo Benevides Barbosa. "HUBERT DREYFUS E O ANTICARTESIANISMO HEIDEGGERIANO." Revista Ideação 1, no. 38 (November 30, 2018): 304. http://dx.doi.org/10.13102/ideac.v1i38.4298.

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Trata-se aqui de demonstrar a utilização da obra heideggeriana no contexto do surgimento da inteligência artificial assim como encontra-se em Hubert L. Dreyfus. A crítica de Dreyfus se resume em apontar o cognitivismo - paradigma dominante dos primórdios da inteligência artificial - como a aplicação empírica do racionalismo filosófico, isto é, a abordagem cognitivista argumenta que a cognição humana pode ser reproduzida a partir da formalização de determinadas representações rigidamente fixadas que serviriam como fundamento para a efetivação de comportamento inteligente. Em vista disso, apresenta-se o anticartesianismo heideggeriano de Dreyfus como a antítese do cognitivismo.

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36

CIANCIARDO, JUAN. "A “Defense” of Cognitivism and the Law." Право України, no. 2021/01 (2021): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.33498/louu-2021-01-139.

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This paper consists of a journey marked by three important milestones: (i) an overview of the controversy between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, (ii) a review of the different theoretical positions around this controversy, and (iii) an assessment on the impact of such controversy in theory of law and in the way the work of the jurist is understood. The ultimate objective is to demonstrate that, if followed coherently, noncognitivism can only lead to the unintelligibility of the legal phenomenon. Jointly, and as corollary of the latter, it will be revealed that even highly convinced advocates of noncognitivism implicitly or unintentionally ground their legal theorization in cognitivisttype of assumptions. The author adds that a non-cognitivist judge has a serious risk of incurring in a certain type of professional hypocrisy that would consist in camouflaging the real reasons that led her to choose for the application of a norm instead of another, or to choose one method of interpretation over others, with empty formulas that have nothing to do with those real reasons. As we will see, a non-cognitivist jurist approaches legal norms from a very different perspective than a cognitivist. Although it may sound shocking, justice has little or nothing to do with the work of the non-cognitivist from his perspective. This means that laws can have whatever moral content, that their reasonableness and/or their justice value is defined by the legislator, and that most of the time there are no strict reasons that justify what is that the legislator did when passing a law.

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Batoréo, Hanna Jakubowicz, Mariangela Rios de Oliveira, and Milena Torres de Aguiar. "Apresentação "Funcionalismo e Cognitivismo: o viés cognitivista da gramática funcional"." SOLETRAS, no. 41 (January 12, 2021): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/soletras.2021.57032.

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38

Bronckart, Jean-Paul. "Une science du langage pour une science de l'humain." DELTA: Documentação de Estudos em Lingüística Teórica e Aplicada 27, no. 2 (2011): 337–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0102-44502011000200007.

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L'auteur de cet article propose d'abord une analyse de l'évolution des sciences du langage au cours des dernières décennies, qui fait apparaître la difficulté d'identifier un cadre épistémologique susceptible de se substituer au défunt programme chomskyen. Il soutient ensuite que l'enjeu central des sciences sociales est de comprendre comment s'est constitué, et comment se développe, l'espace gnoséologique proprement humain, et il examine à ce propos les apports des courants du cognitivisme, du constructivisme (de Piaget) et de l'interactionnisme social. L'auteur procède alors à une description détaillée de divers apports des sciences du langage: la conception saussurienne du statut des signes ainsi que les rapports entre textes et langues; la conception de Volochinov du rôle des discours dans le développement social; les approches de l'architecture des textes. Sur ces bases, il démontre enfin en quoi les sciences du langage peuvent fournir un appui décisif aux sciences de l'homme.

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39

Weil-Barais, Annick. "Comment le cognitivisme a-t-il contribué à l’abandon du concept de « débilité mentale » ? Apports et limites." psychologie clinique, no. 46 (2018): 71–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/psyc/201846071.

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Après avoir rappelé les différentes approches qui se sont développées au sein du courant cognitiviste, en référence à ses propres travaux concernant les apprentissages scolaires et les activités intellectuelles (uniquement évoqués pour indiquer ce qui fonde ses jugements), l’auteure se propose d’interroger la manière dont sont expliquées les difficultés persistantes d’apprentissage que les enfants rencontrent à l’école ainsi que les remédiations qui sont préconisées. Elle s’inquiète de la prolifération des dys (dyslexie, dyscalculie, dysgraphie, …), de la focalisation des études récentes sur les zones cérébrales impliquées dans les activités intellectuelles et de la réduction de celles-ci nécessitée par l’usage des appareils de l’enregistrement de l’activité cérébrale. Elle défend la nécessité de prendre en compte la diversité et la complexité des apprentissages scolaires et notamment les processus de conceptualisation.

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Sinnerbrink, Robert. "Guest Editor's Introduction." Projections 13, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/proj.2019.130201.

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Since the early 1990s, phenomenology and cognitivism have become influential strands of inquiry in film theory. Phenomenological approaches remain focused on descriptive accounts of the embodied subject’s experiential engagement with film, whereas cognitivist approaches attempt to provide explanatory accounts in order to theorize cognitively relevant aspects of our experience of movies. Both approaches, however, are faced with certain challenges. Phenomenology remains a descriptive theory that turns speculative once it ventures to “explain” the phenomena upon which it focuses. Cognitivism deploys naturalistic explanatory theories that can risk reductively distorting the phenomena upon which it focuses by not having an adequate phenomenology of subjective experience. Phenomenology and cognitivism could work together, I suggest, to ground a pluralistic philosophy of film that is both descriptively rich and theoretically productive. From this perspective, we would be better placed to integrate the cultural and historical horizons of meaning that mediate our subjective experience of cinema.

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Wagner, Frank. "Quand le narrateur boit(e)… (Réflexions sur le narrateur non fiable et/ou indigne de confiance)." Arborescences, no. 6 (September 23, 2016): 148–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1037508ar.

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Cet article consiste en une tentative de mise au point sur la question du narrateur non fiable et/ou indigne de confiance – « procédé » textuel susceptible de nous aider à formaliser indirectement la problématique de lapolyphoniedu texte littéraire. Y est tout d’abord esquissée une forme d’état des lieux métathéorique des thèses des tenants de l’approche « rhétorique » (Booth), de la narratologie structurale (Lintvelt, Jouve) et du cognitivisme (Fludernik, Nünning), dans l’espoir de clarifier lescritèresnécessaires à l’établissement du défaut de fiabilité de l’instance narrative. Sont ensuite évoquées, dans une perspective plus critique, quelques typologies poétologiques (Mercier et Fortier, Langevin) permettant de repérer les variantes textuelles du « procédé » ainsi que la diversité de ses fonctions et de ses effets. On espère ainsi qu’à l’issue de ce parcours, les tenants et aboutissants esthétiques autant qu’épistémologiques du récit à narrateur non fiable et/ou indigne de confiance auront pu être quelque peu clarifiés – de même, par la bande, que la question de la polyphonie du texte littéraire.

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SVENSSON, FRANS. "DoesNon-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake?" Utilitas 19, no. 2 (June 2007): 184–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002464.

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Philippa Foot has recently argued that non-cognitivism rests on a mistake. According to Foot, non-cognitivism cannot properly account for the role of reasons in moral thinking. Furthermore, Foot argues that moral judgements share a conceptual structure with the kind of evaluations that we make about plants and animals, which cannot be couched in non-cognitivist terms. In this article I argue that, in the form of expressivism, non-cognitivism is capable of accommodating most of what Foot says about reasons and morality. I then argue that the kind of evaluative judgements Foot suggests that we make about plants and animals, does not constitute a plausible alternative to an expressivist understanding of moral judgements. Finally I consider an account similar to Foot's, defended by Rosalind Hursthouse, which, I argue, suffers from an inconsistency, the avoidance of which leaves Hursthouse with a view that is either compatible with expressivism or shares the same problems as Foot's.

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Michaud, Clémence, and Yamina Bouchamma. "Processus de construction d’une communauté de pratique : l’expérience d’une formation continue en milieu scolaire." Éducation et francophonie 41, no. 2 (December 18, 2013): 196–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1021033ar.

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Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche sur le processus de construction de communautés de pratique menée dans une école francophone du Nouveau-Brunswick, dans le contexte de la réforme du secondaire renouvelé qui s’appuie sur les fondements du cognitivisme et du socioconstructivisme. L’expérimentation, d’une durée totale de 30 heures, a permis de recueillir des données auprès de deux communautés de pratique qui regroupaient huit enseignantes du secondaire et une directrice adjointe. Le cadre conceptuel choisi pour analyser les processus de changement et les mécanismes qui entrent en jeu dans les communautés de pratique est celui de la construction du collectif décrite par Latour (2004). La méthodologie de collecte et d’analyse des données est qualitative et l’analyse s’inspire de l’approche narrative (Clandinin et Connelly, 2000). L’analyse des données a permis de distinguer trois phases de la création des communautés de pratique : la mise en place de la diversité, la narration des expériences et la négociation du changement. Cet article précise en conclusion les défis du développement d’une culture de collaboration dans un contexte de réforme.

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Pennisi, Antonino. "Le Rôle Théorique de la psychopathologie du langage dans L’historiographie linguistique." Historiographia Linguistica 23, no. 3 (January 1, 1996): 405–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hl.23.3.08pen.

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Résumé Le but de ce travail est la reconstruction des lignes essentielles du débat sur la psychopathologie du langage et sur le rôle théorique qu’il a joué dans les sciences du langage d’aujourd’hui. Pour simplifier ce débat, qui commence à partir du XIXe siècle et continue encore aujourd’hui, on distingue ici deux grandes orientations. La première est représentée par les analyses du langage dans la psychiatrie clinique classique (de Emil Kraepelin jusqu’aux études récentes de Sergio Piro) et dans le cognitivisme (de Kurt Goldstein jusqu’à la neuropsychologie cognitive de la schizophrénie). La deuxième recueille les recherches de la psychiatrie philosophique: le bergsonisme (Eugène Minkowski, Pierre Janet), la phénoménologie et l’existentialisme (Heidegger et l’an-thropoanalyse de Ludwig Binswanger). De ce débat on examine surtout deux problèmes théoriques: le rapport entre régularité et liberté du langage et la définition des idées de ‘puissance’ et ‘complexité’. Dans la discussion on conclue l’impossibilité d’esquisser une théorie cognitive du langage en dehors de ses bases biologiques et, surtout, de la dimension ontologique de la conscience linguistique.

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Lobo, Lorena. "Current alternatives on perceptual learning: introduction to special issue on post-cognitivist approaches to perceptual learning." Adaptive Behavior 27, no. 6 (September 16, 2019): 355–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319875147.

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This special issue is focused on how perceptual learning is understood from a post-cognitivist approach to cognition. The process of perceptual learning is key in our cognitive life and development: we can learn to discriminate environmental aspects and hence adapt ourselves to it, using our resources intelligently. Perceptual learning, according to the classic cognitivist view, is based on the enrichment of passively received stimuli, a linear operation on sensations that results in a representation of the original information. This representation can be useful for other processes that generate an output, like a motor command, for example. On the contrary, alternative approaches to perceptual learning, different from the one depicted in the classic cognitivist theory, share the ideas that perception and action are intrinsically tied and that cognitive processes rely on embodiment and situatedness. These approaches usually claim that mental representations are not useful concepts, at least when portraying a process of perceptual learning. Approaches within post-cognitivism are not a unified theory, but a diversity of perspectives that need to establish a dialogue among their different methodologies. In particular, this special issue is focused on ecological psychology and enactivism as key traditions within the post-cognitivist constellation.

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Plantinga, Carl. "Cognitive Film Theory : An Insider’s Appraisal." Cinémas 12, no. 2 (October 31, 2007): 15–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/024878ar.

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ABSTRACT This article appraises the contributions of what has been called cognitivism or the cognitive approach to film studies, and suggests the means by which the cognitive approach can become more central to film studies than it has been so far. The author first shows that much of what has been called "cognitivist" film studies is only cognitivist in a broad sense, and could just as well be called "analytic." He then argues that the cognitive approach would be most useful when it is thus broadly applied, becoming then more a commitment to the rationality of discourse and human thought than a narrow project within psychology. The article then goes on to appraise the utility of the cognitive approach in our understanding of the psychological power of film and film aesthetics.

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Swaminathan, S. "Nothing ‘Mere’ to It: Reclaiming Subjective Accounts of Normativity of Law." Journal of Human Values 25, no. 1 (November 22, 2018): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971685818804957.

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If the bindingness of morality was to rest on something as ‘subjective’ as the non-cognitivist says it does, the grouse goes, and morality itself would come down crashing. Nothing less than an ‘objective’ (response-independent) source of normativity, it is supposed, could hold morality in orbit. Some of these worries automatically morph into worries about the projectivist model of normativity of law (based on a non-cognitivist meta-ethic) as well: one which understands the authority or normativity of law in terms of subjective attitudes taken towards the law. As well as the stock worries about non-cognitivism, there are some additional ones that the projectivist model brings in its wake that it cannot account for the ‘uniform’ bindingness of law and that a subjective source of normativity of law based on mental states is unintelligible. This essay makes the case for acquitting the projectivist model of normativity of law from the above charges. But the route to that necessarily leads through first acquitting the non-cognitivist model of moral bindingness from analogous charges.

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Ahufinger, Nadia, Laura Ferinu, Llorenç Andreu, and Mònica Sanz-Torrent. "La memòria implícita i el trastorn del desenvolupament de llenguatge." Llengua Societat i Comunicaci�, no. 18 (December 27, 2020): 6–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1344/lsc-2020.18.2.

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El trastorn del desenvolupament del llenguatge o TDL és un trastorn caracteritzat per una dificultat severa i persistent en l’expressió i la comprensió del llenguatge que afecta aproximadament un 7% de la població infantil. Tot i ser un trastorn molt prevalent, encara no en sabem la causa. Al llarg dels anys i amb les investigacions fetes per intentar-ne conèixer les possibles causes, s’han posat sobre la taula diferents teories explicatives sobre el trastorn passant des d’algunes de caire innatista fins d’altres de relacionades amb el cognitivisme. L’objectiu d’aquest article és exposar els avenços que s’han dut a terme a partir d’estudis amb infants amb TDL durant els darrers vint anys amb relació als possibles dèficits relacionats amb la memòria implícita en aquesta població. Aquests estudis es van començar a dur a terme després del sorgiment de l’anomenada hipòtesi del dèficit procedimental o PDH (Ullman i Pierpont 2005) en la qual se suggereix que els infants amb TDL presenten dificultats per portar a terme tasques que requereixen la memòria implícita. És a dir, en el procés d’extreure coneixements abstractes de patrons estadístics, càlculs probabilístics o procedimentals de manera inconscient que es relacionarien amb els dèficits lingüístics característics del trastorn.

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Lunardi, Giovani Mendonça. "A natureza do juízo moral em Hume." ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy 19, no. 1 (May 20, 2020): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p89.

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A interpretação padrão da teoria da motivação humeana considera que a mesma subscreveria um modelo conativista baseado em desejos (paixões), enquanto intrinsecamente motivadores, que nos comprometeriam com uma concepção de internalismo motivacional e, por conseguinte, com uma posição não-cognitivista. Basicamente, esta interpretação padrão de Hume, sustenta que os juízos morais são de natureza puramente conativa, fornecendo, assim, ao agente uma razão ou motivo intrínseco para agir (internalismo motivacional), não exprimindo, no entanto, nenhum conteúdo racional cognitivo (não-cognitivismo). Dada a aproximação entre verdade e conhecimento, os cognitivistas afirmam também a tese de que há autêntico conhecimento moral. Os juízos morais possuem conteúdo cognitivo e não apenas, como querem os não-cognitivistas, expressões de atitudes, de preferências, de desejos ou de prescrições. Desta forma, o contraste entre cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo gira primariamente em torno da questão sobre a natureza do juízo moral. E, na interpretação clássica de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral seria não-cognitiva. Com este trabalho exploro uma linha de argumentação alternativa, em defesa de uma posição que privilegia a possibilidade de um conhecimento moral, segundo a filosofia moral de Hume. Os fundamentos da moral em Hume examinam a exigência motivacional tendo como alvo, a ser criticado, não o conhecimento moral (cognitivismo) e sim o racionalismo moral. No entanto, essa linha alternativa, não representa uma adesão pura ao cognitivismo. A estratégia seguida por essa argumentação, consiste em apontar o aspecto “prático” dos juízos morais, ou seja, o seu papel na orientação e na motivação das ações morais, e, em seguida, argumentar que, dada essa função primordial dos juízos morais, repetindo, o seu caráter prático, orientador de ações, não exclui, também, um conhecimento moral. De certa forma, o argumento é que, segundo a teoria da motivação de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral teria uma dimensão objetiva e prática (aquilo que realmente nos move para a ação).

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Burdman, Federico Gabriel. "El post-cognitivismo en cuestión: extensión, corporización y enactivismo." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 19, no. 3 (March 8, 2016): 475. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n3p475In this paper I look into a problem concerning the characterization of the main conceptual commitments of the ‘post-cognitivist’ theoretical framework. I will firs consider critically a proposal put forth by Rowlands (2010), which identifie the theoretical nucleus of post-cognitivism with a convergence of the theses of the extended and the embodied mind. The shortcomings I fin in this proposal will lead me to an indepedent and wider issue concerning the apparent tensions between functionalism and the embodied and enactive approaches. I will then discuss the standing of embodied, enactive and extended approaches in the face of the dividing issue concerning functionalism, with an eye on the possibility of divorcing the thesis of the extended mind of its original formulation in functionalist terms. In this way, I shall consider the outlook of overcoming some of the conceptual tensions in post-cognitivism by thinking its theoretical framework as non-functionalist.

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