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Journal articles on the topic 'Collective action problems'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Singleton, Sara. "Commons Problems, Collective Action and Efficiency." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11, no. 3 (July 1999): 367–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692899011003006.

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2

Schneider, Anna-Claire, Alicia P. Melis, and Michael Tomasello. "How chimpanzees solve collective action problems." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 279, no. 1749 (October 17, 2012): 4946–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1948.

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We presented small groups of chimpanzees with two collective action situations, in which action was necessary for reward but there was a disincentive for individuals to act owing to the possibility of free-riding on the efforts of others. We found that in simpler scenarios (experiment 1) in which group size was small, there was a positive relationship between rank and action with more dominant individuals volunteering to act more often, particularly when the reward was less dispersed. Social tolerance also seemed to mediate action whereby higher tolerance levels within a group resulted in individuals of lower ranks sometimes acting and appropriating more of the reward. In more complex scenarios, when group size was larger and cooperation was necessary (experiment 2), overcoming the problem was more challenging. There was highly significant variability in the action rates of different individuals as well as between dyads, suggesting success was more greatly influenced by the individual personalities and personal relationships present in the group.
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3

Talbot, Brian. "Collective action problems and conflicting obligations." Philosophical Studies 175, no. 9 (August 30, 2017): 2239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0957-7.

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4

Gorin, Moti. "Collective Action Problems, Causal Impotence, and Virtue." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 2 (2019): 27–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201935231.

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5

Orbán, Annamária. "How to Solve International Collective Action Problems?" Society and Economy 25, no. 1 (August 1, 2003): 97–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/socec.25.2003.1.7.

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6

Alexander, Benjamin N. "Leading collective action to address wicked problems." Nonprofit Management and Leadership 30, no. 3 (November 6, 2019): 445–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nml.21394.

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7

Struben, Jeroen, Brandon H. Lee, and Christopher B. Bingham. "Collective Action Problems and Resource Allocation During Market Formation." Strategy Science 5, no. 3 (September 2020): 245–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2020.0105.

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Collective action is critical for successful market formation. However, relatively little is known about how and under what conditions actors overcome collective action problems to successfully form new markets. Using the benefits of simulation methods, we uncover how collective action problems result from actor resource allocation decisions interacting with each other and how the severity of these problems depends on central market- and actor-related characteristics. Specifically, we show that collective action problems occur when actors undervalue the benefits of market-oriented resource allocation and when actors contribute resources that are imperfectly substitutable. Furthermore, we show that collective action problems occur when actors are embedded in networks with others sharing a similar role in market formation. Collectively, our findings contribute new insights to organization theory regarding collective action and market formation and to strategy on value creation and strategic decision making regarding resource allocation.
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8

Kenkel, Brenton. "The efficacy of cheap talk in collective action problems." Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 3 (June 12, 2019): 370–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629819850625.

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Incomplete information exacerbates the problems inherent in collective action. Participants cannot efficiently coordinate their actions if they do not know each other’s preferences. I investigate when ordinary communication, or cheap talk, may resolve mutual uncertainty in collective action problems. I find that the efficacy of communication depends critically on the relationship between contributions and the value of the joint project. The incentive barriers to honesty are highest when every contribution increases the project’s value. Participants then have a strict incentive to say whatever would induce others to contribute the most, so cheap talk lacks credibility. By contrast, when contributions may be marginally worthless, such as when the project has no value unless contributions hit a certain threshold, communication may help participants avoid wasted effort. Using these findings, I identify which collective action problems in politics might benefit from communication and which require more expensive solutions to overcome uncertainty.
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9

Galvin, Richard, and John Harris. "Collective Action Problems and the Ethics of Virtue." Southwest Philosophy Review 35, no. 1 (2019): 139–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201935114.

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10

Jones, Peter J. S. "Collective action problems posed by no-take zones." Marine Policy 30, no. 2 (March 2006): 143–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2004.10.003.

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11

Olsher, Daniel J. "COLLEX: Solving Collective Action Problems in Development Contexts." Procedia Engineering 107 (2015): 293–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2015.06.084.

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12

Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer. "Tests of Leadership Solutions to Collective Action Problems." Simulation & Gaming 28, no. 2 (June 1997): 181–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878197282003.

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13

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. "Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ASEAN." Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 28, no. 1 (2006): 115–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/csa.2006.0013.

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14

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. "Collective Action Problems and Regional Integration in ASEAN." Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 1 (April 2006): 115–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs28-1f.

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15

Hilman, Anton, and Ramadhan Pancasilawan. "Analisis Pandemi Covid-19 Dalam Presfektif Collective Action (Studi Kasus: Kecamatan Cariu Kabupaten Bogor)." Ministrate: Jurnal Birokrasi dan Pemerintahan Daerah 3, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 7–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/jbpd.v3i1.9401.

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In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, many people are affected by health, economic and social aspects. With the existence of a government policy regarding large-scale social restrictions to break the chain of the virus but it creates new problems in the community. Starting from the existing problems, social actions or social activities can help overcome covid-19. Collective actions taken by the community in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic are small things that can help overcome problems in the community. Community collective action in the form of preventive, curative and promotive actions. Collective preventive action is to distribute masks, hand sanitizers, and spray disinfectants. Collective action in a curative manner, namely by providing social assistance, working on the waqf land and fish ponds, then the visiting neighbor program. Collective action in a promotive manner, namely by disseminating information related to Covid-19 to the public and also by making a handbag made by a cariu student forum from betel leaf. Collective action fosters empathic norms and attitudes in society. Collective action works best when free riding is avoided. The large number of illegal riders made the collective action not maximal. Collective action will also run well if data data and information are well available. Collective action can work well if social capital in the form of a sense of belonging, human values, and empathy grows in individuals.
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16

Arponen, V. P. J. "The Human Collective Causing of Environmental Problems and Theory of Collective Action." International Journal of Applied Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2013): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ijap20132713.

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17

Glowacki, Luke, and Chris von Rueden. "Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370, no. 1683 (December 5, 2015): 20150010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0010.

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Observation of leadership in small-scale societies offers unique insights into the evolution of human collective action and the origins of sociopolitical complexity. Using behavioural data from the Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia and Nyangatom nomadic pastoralists of Ethiopia, we evaluate the traits of leaders and the contexts in which leadership becomes more institutional. We find that leaders tend to have more capital, in the form of age-related knowledge, body size or social connections. These attributes can reduce the costs leaders incur and increase the efficacy of leadership. Leadership becomes more institutional in domains of collective action, such as resolution of intragroup conflict, where collective action failure threatens group integrity. Together these data support the hypothesis that leadership is an important means by which collective action problems are overcome in small-scale societies.
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18

Magidimisha, H. H., and L. Chipungu. "Governance for development in Africa: Solving collective action problems." African Affairs 114, no. 454 (November 26, 2014): 152–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu073.

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19

Provost, Colin, and Marc Esteve. "Collective action problems in the contracting of public services." Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation 2, no. 3 (September 2016): 227–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2055563616678640.

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20

Siegal, Gil. "On Blind Spots, Moral Obligations, and Collective Action Problems." American Journal of Bioethics 16, no. 11 (October 17, 2016): 20–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2016.1222014.

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21

Grigg, Neil S. "Missouri River Governance: Collective Action and Basin-Wide Problems." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 146, no. 5 (May 2020): 02520002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0001196.

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22

Jagers, Sverker C., Niklas Harring, Åsa Löfgren, Martin Sjöstedt, Francisco Alpizar, Bengt Brülde, David Langlet, et al. "On the preconditions for large-scale collective action." Ambio 49, no. 7 (November 12, 2019): 1282–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-019-01284-w.

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Abstract The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity’s most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for large-scale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and large-scale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.
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23

Budolfson, Mark Bryant. "Self-Defense, Harm to Others, and Reasons for Action in Collective Action Problems." Ethics, Policy & Environment 17, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 31–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2014.885162.

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24

Scholz, John T., Ramiro Berardo, and Brad Kile. "Do Networks Solve Collective Action Problems? Credibility, Search, and Collaboration." Journal of Politics 70, no. 2 (April 2008): 393–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608080389.

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25

Woolman, Stu. "South Africa’s aspirational Constitution and our problems of collective action." South African Journal on Human Rights 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 156–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02587203.2016.1162443.

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26

Groenendyk, Eric W., and Antoine J. Banks. "Emotional Rescue: How Affect Helps Partisans Overcome Collective Action Problems." Political Psychology 35, no. 3 (June 12, 2013): 359–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12045.

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27

Buchanan, Allen. "Perfecting Imperfect Duties: Collective Action to Create Moral Obligations." Business Ethics Quarterly 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 27–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857239.

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AbstractEthical problems in business include not only genuine moral dilemmas and compliance problems but also problems arising from the distinctive characteristics of imperfect duties. Collective action by business to perfect imperfect duties can yield significant benefits. Such arrrangements can (1) reduce temptations to moral laxity, (2) achieve greater efficiency by eliminating redundancies and gaps that plague uncoordinated individual efforts, (3) reap economies of scale and achieve success where benefits can be provided only if a certain threshold of resources can be brought to bear on a social problem, (4) solve assurance problems where voluntary compliance by some parties depends upon their perception that competitors are doing their fair share, and (5) produce higher levels of contribution than would occur through independent action in response to imperfect duties, stimulated by the perception that there is a fair distribution of burdens of contribution among all parties involved.
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28

Gross, Michael L. "The Collective Dimensions of Political Morality." Political Studies 42, no. 1 (March 1994): 40–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1994.tb01673.x.

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Collective moral action is analysed using two models: a deontological, non-strategic model emphasizing right moral judgment and individual action and a rational, strategic model emphasizing the need to overcome free-rider problems. While these models fail to explain satisfactorily collective moral action each provides valuable insights which are used to examine three case studies: successful collective action to rescue Jews in Europe and failed action to confront Japanese-American persecution during World War Two. Several striking conclusions emerge. First, enlightened moral judgment is not a necessary condition for collective moral action. Instead a complex structure of action emerges in which organizational leaders acting within parochial groups manipulate incentives and substitute public goods. Second, enlightened political actors are very often the most politically impotent. This emerging paradox severely attenuates the moral basis of political action which underlies normative theory.
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29

Héritier, Adrienne, and Sandra Eckert. "Self-Regulation by Associations: Collective Action Problems in European Environmental Regulation." Business and Politics 11, no. 1 (April 2009): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1250.

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How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do associations engage in self-regulation and how do they tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? When developing hypotheses, we first vary attributes of the information environment in which private actors interact; and, secondly, actors' preferences as a function of the problem type at hand. With respect to the environmental conditions, our findings show that a regulatory threat matters when developing associative action, whilst the evidence is less clear as regards NGO campaigns. In terms of the problem type, we find that redistributive issues and prisoner's dilemma situations are much more conflict prone than coordination/win-win type of problems. Industry actors recur to various governance devices such as flexible contract design and compensation mechanisms to solve redistributive problems. Prisoner's dilemma (PD) problems may only partially be addressed by governance devices to the extent that free-riding is controlled and sanctioned within an association. We conclude that private actors engaging in self-regulation will not successfully manage all types of conflicts. They lack powerful sanctioning tools to deal with PD situations, but prove to be able to flexibly handle redistributive problems.
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30

Jung, Young Hoon, and Seung-Hyun Lee. "When Collective Action Problems Suddenly Disspate: A Case of Antidumping Protection." Academy of Management Proceedings 2017, no. 1 (August 2017): 12125. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2017.12125abstract.

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31

Lacey, Robert. "Leaving the Stag Hunt: The Conservative Denial of Collective Action Problems." Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 (December 1, 2011): 68–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.25138/5.2.a.6.

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32

Ali Mohamed, Abdullahi, and Lihua Yang. "Collective Action, and the Problems of Short-Term Government of Somalia." Open Journal of Leadership 04, no. 03 (2015): 67–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojl.2015.43007.

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33

Tucker, Joshua A. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions." Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 03 (August 16, 2007): 535. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592707071538.

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34

Gerritsen, Rolf. "Collective Action Problems in the Regulation of Australia’s Northern Prawn Fishery." Maritime Studies 1987, no. 37 (November 1987): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07266472.1987.11733485.

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35

Weiss, Thomas G., and Peter J. Hoffman. "The Fog of Humanitarianism: Collective Action Problems and Learning-Challenged Organizations." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 1 (March 2007): 47–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502970601075915.

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36

Gyngell, Chris, and Thomas Douglas. "Stocking the Genetic Supermarket: Reproductive Genetic Technologies and Collective Action Problems." Bioethics 29, no. 4 (April 11, 2014): 241–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12098.

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37

Green, Donald P., and Jennifer K. Smith. "Professionalization of Campaigns and the Secret History of Collective Action Problems." Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, no. 3 (July 2003): 321–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951692803015003005.

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38

Axelson, Mattias, Joakim Netz, and Christian Sandström. "Collective action problems in public sector innovation: A business model perspective." Creativity and Innovation Management 26, no. 4 (November 22, 2017): 370–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/caim.12250.

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39

Özler, Hayrettin, and Hüsamettin İnaç. "Problems of Collective Action and Institutionalization in the Turkish Policymaking Environment." Turkish Studies 8, no. 3 (August 15, 2007): 365–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840701489126.

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40

Baglioni, Guido. "Trade Union Action and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Trends and Problems." Labour 4, no. 2 (September 1990): 185–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9914.1990.tb00239.x.

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41

Ziker, John P., Joellie Rasmussen, and David A. Nolin. "Indigenous Siberians solve collective action problems through sharing and traditional knowledge." Sustainability Science 11, no. 1 (March 27, 2015): 45–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11625-015-0293-9.

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42

Wigger, Karin Andrea, and Dean A. Shepherd. "We’re All in the Same Boat: A Collective Model of Preserving and Accessing Nature-Based Opportunities." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 44, no. 3 (March 15, 2019): 587–617. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1042258719834014.

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This article explains how collective environmental entrepreneurship can ensure the sustainable exploitation of opportunities based on natural resources. We discuss the major threats entrepreneurial ventures face in pursuing potential nature-based opportunities and the collective action they take to preserve the associated natural resources while also providing access to them. This analysis adds to our understanding of environmental entrepreneurship by detailing the possible problems associated with exploiting potential nature-based opportunities, the ways ventures can come together to collectively address these exploitation challenges, and the benefits of such collective action (for both ventures and nature).
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43

Glannon, Walter. "Moral Enhancement as a Collective Action Problem." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (October 2018): 59–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000292.

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AbstractIn light of the magnitude of interpersonal harm and the risk of greater harm in the future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu have argued for pharmacological enhancement of moral behaviour. I discuss moral bioenhancement as a set of collective action problems. Psychotropic drugs or other forms of neuromodulation designed to enhance moral sensitivity would have to produce the same or similar effects in the brains of a majority of people. Also, a significant number of healthy subjects would have to participate in clinical trials testing the safety and efficacy of these drugs, which may expose them to unreasonable risk. Even if the drugs were safe and effective, a majority of people would have to co-operate in a moral enhancement programme for such a project to succeed. This goal would be thwarted if enough people opted out and decided not to enhance. To avoid this scenario, Persson and Savulescu argue that moral enhancement should be compulsory rather than voluntary. But the collective interest in harm reduction through compulsory enhancement would come at the cost of a loss of individual freedom. In general, there are many theoretical and practical reasons for scepticism about the concept and goal of moral enhancement.
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44

Levin, Simon. "Crossing scales, crossing disciplines: collective motion and collective action in the Global Commons." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1537 (January 12, 2010): 13–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2009.0197.

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Two conflicting tendencies can be seen throughout the biological world: individuality and collective behaviour. Natural selection operates on differences among individuals, rewarding those who perform better. Nonetheless, even within this milieu, cooperation arises, and the repeated emergence of multicellularity is the most striking example. The same tendencies are played out at higher levels, as individuals cooperate in groups, which compete with other such groups. Many of our environmental and other global problems can be traced to such conflicts, and to the unwillingness of individual agents to take account of the greater good. One of the great challenges in achieving sustainability will be in understanding the basis of cooperation, and in taking multicellularity to yet a higher level, finding the pathways to the level of cooperation that is the only hope for the preservation of the planet.
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45

Dubenko, Yu V. "ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF MULTI-AGENT REINFORCEMENT LEARNING PROBLEMS." Vestnik komp'iuternykh i informatsionnykh tekhnologii, no. 192 (June 2020): 48–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.14489/vkit.2020.06.pp.048-056.

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This paper is devoted to the problem of collective artificial intelligence in solving problems by intelligent agents in external environments. The environments may be: fully or partially observable, deterministic or stochastic, static or dynamic, discrete or continuous. The paper identifies problems of collective interaction of intelligent agents when they solve a class of tasks, which need to coordinate actions of agent group, e. g. task of exploring the territory of a complex infrastructure facility. It is revealed that the problem of reinforcement training in multi-agent systems is poorly presented in the press, especially in Russian-language publications. The article analyzes reinforcement learning, describes hierarchical reinforcement learning, presents basic methods to implement reinforcement learning. The concept of macro-action by agents integrated in groups is introduced. The main problems of intelligent agents collective interaction for problem solving (i. e. calculation of individual rewards for each agent; agent coordination issues; application of macro actions by agents integrated into groups; exchange of experience generated by various agents as part of solving a collective problem) are identified. The model of multi-agent reinforcement learning is described in details. The article describes problems of this approach building on existing solutions. Basic problems of multi-agent reinforcement learning are formulated in conclusion.
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46

Dubenko, Yu V. "ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF MULTI-AGENT REINFORCEMENT LEARNING PROBLEMS." Vestnik komp'iuternykh i informatsionnykh tekhnologii, no. 192 (June 2020): 48–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.14489/vkit.2020.06.pp.048-056.

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This paper is devoted to the problem of collective artificial intelligence in solving problems by intelligent agents in external environments. The environments may be: fully or partially observable, deterministic or stochastic, static or dynamic, discrete or continuous. The paper identifies problems of collective interaction of intelligent agents when they solve a class of tasks, which need to coordinate actions of agent group, e. g. task of exploring the territory of a complex infrastructure facility. It is revealed that the problem of reinforcement training in multi-agent systems is poorly presented in the press, especially in Russian-language publications. The article analyzes reinforcement learning, describes hierarchical reinforcement learning, presents basic methods to implement reinforcement learning. The concept of macro-action by agents integrated in groups is introduced. The main problems of intelligent agents collective interaction for problem solving (i. e. calculation of individual rewards for each agent; agent coordination issues; application of macro actions by agents integrated into groups; exchange of experience generated by various agents as part of solving a collective problem) are identified. The model of multi-agent reinforcement learning is described in details. The article describes problems of this approach building on existing solutions. Basic problems of multi-agent reinforcement learning are formulated in conclusion.
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47

Damtew, Elias, Barbara van Mierlo, Rico Lie, Paul Struik, Cees Leeuwis, Berga Lemaga, and Christine Smart. "Governing a Collective Bad: Social Learning in the Management of Crop Diseases." Systemic Practice and Action Research 33, no. 1 (January 9, 2020): 111–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11213-019-09518-4.

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AbstractThere has been strong research interest in designing and testing learning approaches for enhancing and sustaining the capacity of communities to manage collective action problems. Broadening the perspective from well-known social learning approaches in natural resource management, this study explores how social learning as a communicative process influences collective action in contagious crop disease management. A series of facilitated discussion and reflection sessions about late blight management created the social learning space for potato farmers in Ethiopia. Communicative utterances of participants in the sessions served as the units of analysis. The study demonstrates how and to what extent social learning, in the form of aligned new knowledge, relations and actions occurred and formed the basis for collective action in the management of late blight.
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48

Duit, Andreas. "Patterns of Environmental Collective Action: Some Cross-National Findings." Political Studies 59, no. 4 (September 14, 2010): 900–920. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00858.x.

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Many environmental problems such as global warming, biodiversity loss and waste accumulation can be described as large-scale collective action dilemmas. Previous research on collective action in Common Pool Resource settings has demonstrated that institutional structures and social capital are important for successful management of natural resources. The objective of this article is to investigate the effect of such factors on large-scale environmental collective action. The analysis employs survey data and indicators of institutional quality for 22 countries. Two measurements of environmental collective action are used: (1) intermediate group collective action; and (2) latent group environmental action. Findings point to a dominating role for two factors – institutional quality and membership in voluntary organisations – as key determinants of participation in both latent and intermediate group environmental collective action. These results are interpreted as indications of a possible decoupling between trust and participation in large-scale collective action.
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49

Ostrom, Elinor. "Reflections on “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation”." American Economic Review 101, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 49–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.49.

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It is instructive to read the article that Katharine Coman published in the first issue of the American Economic Review to gain insight into the problems of collective action related to irrigation in the American West. One gains further understanding of the problems Coman identifies by using a social-ecological system (Ostrom 2007, 2009) to organize the diverse variables identified by Coman. One gains a general lesson from this analysis that changing the formal governance structure of irrigation is not sufficient to ensure efficient investment in facilities or that farmers are able to acquire property and make a reasonable living. Building knowledge and trust are, however, essential for solving collective-action problems. (JEL B31, N51, Q15, Q25)
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TAYLOR, MICHAEL, and SARA SINGLETON. "The Communal Resource: Transaction Costs and the Solution of Collective Action Problems." Politics & Society 21, no. 2 (June 1993): 195–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032329293021002004.

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