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Journal articles on the topic 'Common pool resource'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Brudney, Jeffrey L., and Lucas C. P. M. Meijs. "Our Common Commons: Policies for Sustaining Volunteer Energy." Nonprofit Policy Forum 4, no. 1 (2013): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/npf-2012-0004.

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AbstractBrudney and Meijs (2009) conceive of volunteer energy as a social resource that constitutes the basis for (organizationally based) volunteering. They show that volunteer energy can be compared to a human-made, renewable resource that can be grown and recycled – but likewise one that is subject to misuse and misappropriation that can imperil the vitality of the resource. They explain that to a certain extent, volunteer energy is a common pool resource with free access for all volunteer-involving organizations, especially given the trend that people are less committed to one organization

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2

Ward, Peter, Andrei Lankov, and Jiyoung Kim. "Common-Pool Resource Depletion and Dictatorship." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 55, no. 1 (2022): 183–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2022.55.1.183.

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This article seeks to explain the dynamics of resource depletion in North Korea’s fishery. We utilize insights from the common-pool resource (CPR) literature and show how theories from comparative politics that explain why states sometimes do not formalize property rights but prefer their informal exercise can be fruitfully applied to North Korea’s fishery. Utilizing a process tracing methodology, we demonstrate that the North Korean state possesses the necessary capacity to limit resource depletion, but has largely failed to do so. We argue that broad access to the commons maintains relations

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3

Johnson, Matthew William, Esther Han Beol Jang, Frankie O'Rourke, Rachel Ye, and Kurtis Heimerl. "Network Capacity as Common Pool Resource." Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 5, CSCW1 (2021): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3449135.

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4

Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 48, no. 2 (2004): 811–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2003.12.002.

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5

Carpenter, Stanley R. "Sustainability and Common-Pool Resources Alternatives to Tragedy." Society for Philosophy and Technology Quarterly Electronic Journal 3, no. 4 (1998): 170–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/techne19983420.

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The paradox that individually rational actions collectively can lead to irrational outcomes is exemplified in human appropriation of a class of goods known as "common-pool resources" ("CPR"): natural or humanly created resource systems which are large enough to make it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries. Appropriations of common-pool resources for private use tend toward abusive practices that lead to the loss of the resource in question: the tragedy of the commons. Prescriptions for escape from tragedy have involved two institutions, each applied largely in isolation from the other: pr

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6

GARDNER, ROY, ELINOR OSTROM, and JAMES M. WALKER. "The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems." Rationality and Society 2, no. 3 (1990): 335–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463190002003005.

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7

De Geest, Lawrence R., John K. Stranlund, and John M. Spraggon. "Deterring poaching of a common pool resource." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 141 (September 2017): 254–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.006.

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8

Sadowski, Jathan, Susan G. Spierre, Evan Selinger, Thomas P. Seager, Elizabeth A. Adams, and Andrew Berardy. "Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas." Science and Engineering Ethics 21, no. 5 (2014): 1197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9575-3.

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9

Freeman, Matthew A., and Christopher M. Anderson. "Competitive Lobbying over Common Pool Resource Regulations." Ecological Economics 134 (April 2017): 123–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.031.

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10

McCarthy, Nancy, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Alain de Janvry. "Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42, no. 3 (2001): 297–309. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1164.

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11

Mavi and Quérou. "COMMON-POOL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND RISK MISPERCEPTIONS." Annals of Economics and Statistics, no. 156 (2024): 115. https://doi.org/10.2307/48804183.

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12

Poggioli, Nicholas. "Extending the Resource-based View Beyond Private Resources to Common-pool Resources." Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (2018): 18222. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.18222abstract.

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13

Moritz, Mark, Roy Behnke, Christine M. Beitl, et al. "Emergent sustainability in open property regimes." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 51 (2018): 12859–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1812028115.

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Current theoretical models of the commons assert that common-pool resources can only be managed sustainably with clearly defined boundaries around both communities and the resources that they use. In these theoretical models, open access inevitably leads to a tragedy of the commons. However, in many open-access systems, use of common-pool resources seems to be sustainable over the long term (i.e., current resource use does not threaten use of common-pool resources for future generations). Here, we outline the conditions that support sustainable resource use in open property regimes. We use the

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14

Rickels, Wilfried, Jonas Dovern, and Martin Quaas. "Beyond fisheries: Common-pool resource problems in oceanic resources and services." Global Environmental Change 40 (September 2016): 37–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.06.013.

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15

Hall, Daniel M., and Marcella M. Bonanomi. "Governing Collaborative Project Delivery as a Common-Pool Resource Scenario." Project Management Journal 52, no. 3 (2021): 250–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/8756972820982442.

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When collaborative project delivery models such as integrated project delivery (IPD) combine project resources, share decision-making rights, and distribute risk-and-reward among participants, the project can be conceptualized as a common-pool resource scenario. Multiple project appropriators have contractual rights to withdraw units from the shared resource system (i.e., the project budget). This theorization suggests project managers avoid the tragedy of the project by crafting effective self-governance structures in the face of pluralism. Using IPD as an example, this article suggests these

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16

Mao, Xuechen, and Anmin Li. "Unconscious priming shares a common resource pool with the manipulation subsystem." PeerJ 10 (April 19, 2022): e13312. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.13312.

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Background Working memory can be subdivided into two relatively independent subordinate systems, the maintenance subsystem and the manipulation subsystem. Although the two subsystems are quite heterogeneous, research thus far has not adequately distinguished the resource pools of the two subsystems. Additionally, previous research on the relationship between working memory and unconscious priming is paradoxical. Different subsystems leading to different effects on unconscious priming might be the reason for the paradoxical research. Therefore, the current article aimed to distinguish the resou

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17

Agrawal, Arun. "Studying the commons, governing common-pool resource outcomes: Some concluding thoughts." Environmental Science & Policy 36 (February 2014): 86–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.08.012.

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18

Ellis, Christopher J. "Common Pool Equities: An Arbitrage Based Non-cooperative Solution to the Common Pool Resource Problem." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42, no. 2 (2001): 140–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1154.

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19

Raheem, Nejem. "A common-pool resource experiment in acequia communities." International Journal of the Commons 9, no. 1 (2015): 306. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.491.

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20

Cárdenas, Juan, César Mantilla, and Rajiv Sethi. "Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games." Games 6, no. 3 (2015): 299–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g6030299.

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21

Brandt, Gunnar, Agostino Merico, Björn Vollan, and Achim Schlüter. "Human Adaptive Behavior in Common Pool Resource Systems." PLoS ONE 7, no. 12 (2012): e52763. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0052763.

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22

Ambec, Stefan, and Carine Sebi. "The distributional impact of common‐pool resource regulations." Indian Growth and Development Review 4, no. 2 (2011): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17538251111172032.

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23

Gehrig, Stefan, Achim Schlüter, and Peter Hammerstein. "Sociocultural heterogeneity in a common pool resource dilemma." PLOS ONE 14, no. 1 (2019): e0210561. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210561.

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24

Larkin, Kevin T. "Behavioral contingencies involved in common pool resource management." Training and Education in Professional Psychology 5, no. 4 (2011): 213–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0026282.

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25

Schnier, Kurt Erik. "Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource mechanism." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, no. 1-2 (2009): 402–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.004.

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26

Chávez, Carlos A., James J. Murphy, Felipe J. Quezada, and John K. Stranlund. "The endogenous formation of common pool resource coalitions." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 211 (July 2023): 82–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.028.

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27

Bergmann, Nicolas T., Ian C. Burke, and Chloe B. Wardropper. "Herbicide-resistance management: a common pool resource problem?" Weed Science 72, no. 2 (2024): 117–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/wsc.2024.12.

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Bergmann, Nicolas T., Burke, Ian C., Wardropper, Chloe B. (2024): Herbicide-resistance management: a common pool resource problem? Weed Science (Cambridge, England) 72 (2): 117-124, DOI: 10.1017/wsc.2024.12, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/wsc.2024.12

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28

Rendueles, César. "Common-Pool Resources in Rock Climbing." Sociology of Sport Journal 32, no. 4 (2015): 436–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/ssj.2014-0152.

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Sport climbing relies materially on the existence of routes equipped with bolts: vertical itineraries with anchors that allow climbers a safe ascent. Without bolting, sport climbing simply would not exist. In many countries, bolting is an altruistic individual activity that is usually neither organized nor regulated. Sport climbing bolting requires expensive hardware and sophisticated technical skills. However, equippers earn no money or prestige for this effort, which benefits many climbers. This paper develops a sociological approach to rock climbing bolting as a common-pool resource facing

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29

Somasse, Gbetonmasse, Alexander Smith, and Zachary Chapman. "Characterizing Actions in a Dynamic Common Pool Resource Game." Games 9, no. 4 (2018): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9040101.

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We conducted a dynamic common pool resource experiment and found large differences among groups in the total benefits (surplus) obtained from the resource. To shed light on the factors underlying the differences, we characterized individual appropriation decisions as irresponsible, sustainable, or constructive, and defined a measure of the intensity of such actions. We then examined the relationships between group-level success and the frequency and intensity of the individual actions, finding that the average intensity of irresponsible actions was the best predictor of group success. We inter

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30

Mirchevska, Alexandra. "Common-pool resource management: a new institutional economics perspective." Economic Thought journal 63, no. 4 (2018): 124–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.56497/etj1863404.

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The current paper introduces the theoretical approach of Common-pool resource management (CPRM). The paper summarizes the two dominant theoretical paradigms of CPRM theory – the traditional game-theoretic model, on one hand, and the new institutionalist approach mostly associated with the work of Elinor Ostrom, on the other. Through a theoretical comparison between the centralized and decentralized approaches to CPRM a focus on the main property rights distribution dilemma is provided. The paper provides a description of the role of internalization of externalities in achieving an efficient CP

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31

Harvey, Mark L., Paul A. Bell, and Andrej A. Birjulin. "Punishment and Type of Feedback in a Simulated Commons Dilemma." Psychological Reports 73, no. 2 (1993): 447–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1993.73.2.447.

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351 research participants in groups of three harvested resources from a slowly regenerating, shared pool in a computer-assisted game. Feedback after each round of play consisted of information about the status of the resource pool, information about the other participants' harvesting choices, or no feedback at all. Exploitation was either not punished or punished by individual or group. Analysis showed that either form of punishment improved harvests from the common resource but that feedback had no such influence.

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32

Penov, Ivan. "POST-SOCIALIST LABOR FORCE AS A COMMON-POOL RESOURCE." Trakia Journal of Sciences 17, Suppl.1 (2019): 352–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.15547/tjs.2019.s.01.058.

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The article is devoted to the challenges of the labour market in the post-socialist period. It discusses the issues related to the physical properties of the post-socialists labour force and the social and legal framework in which it operates. Labor traditionally is considered to be a private good in the economic literature, possessing the properties of high excludability and rivalry. We argue that in the post-socialist period, labour looks more like a common pool resource system rather than a private good. In the absence of appropriate legal and social structures, such a system is likely to o

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33

Huang, Ling, and Martin D. Smith. "The Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Common-Pool Resource Exploitation." American Economic Review 104, no. 12 (2014): 4071–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.4071.

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We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly in

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34

Pitt, Jeremy, Dídac Busquets, and Sam Macbeth. "Distributive Justice for Self-Organised Common-Pool Resource Management." ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems 9, no. 3 (2014): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2629567.

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35

Sandal, Leif K., and Stein I. Steinshamn. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 9 (2004): 1781–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2003.04.003.

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36

Tatlonghari, Gerlie, and Zenaida Sumalde. "Formation of Social Capital for Common Pool Resource Management." Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development 5, no. 2 (2008): 21–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.37801/ajad2008.5.2.2.

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A standard optimal investment model is used to analyze farmers' decision to accumulate social capital in terms of participating in collective activities for irrigation management. Several predictions borne out by the data are presented in this study. Social capital investment in small irrigation groups (1) decreases when the farmer's field is located at the downstream area where water is scarce; (2) increases when farmers have larger ricefields; (3) decreases when farmers pay the irrigation service dues; and (4) increases when the farmer belongs to a heterogeneous group which facilitates colle

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37

Duffy, Sarah, Roger Layton, and Larry Dwyer. "When the Commons call “Enough”, Does Marketing Have an Answer?" Journal of Macromarketing 37, no. 3 (2017): 268–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0276146717710703.

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How we use, or do not use our natural resources is a question that has been debated for millennia. Still an answer remains out of reach. It is a complex issue that often involves a social dilemma known as “the tragedy of the commons”. Many common pool resources, from fish stocks, to forests, to natural tourism destinations have an associated marketing system that may place pressure on the resource. If poorly managed, the resources sustainable future is questionable. This paper explains how commons and strategic action field theory can enhance a macromarketing analysis of marketing systems that

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38

Freeman, Jacob, Jacopo A. Baggio, and Thomas R. Coyle. "Social and general intelligence improves collective action in a common pool resource system." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 14 (2020): 7712–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1915824117.

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On a planet experiencing global environmental change, the governance of natural resources depends on sustained collective action by diverse populations. Engaging in such collective action can only build upon the foundation of human cognition in social–ecological settings. To help understand this foundation, we assess the effect of cognitive abilities on the management of a common pool resource. We present evidence that two functionally distinct cognitive abilities, general and social intelligence, improve the ability of groups to manage a common pool resource. Groups high in both forms of inte

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39

Schauf, Andrew, and Poong Oh. "Effects of uniform-allocation constraints in networked common-pool resource extraction games." Journal of Physics: Complexity 3, no. 1 (2022): 015004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/2632-072x/ac42e0.

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Abstract Communities that share common-pool resources (CPRs) often coordinate their actions to sustain resource quality more effectively than if they were regulated by some centralized authority. Networked models of CPR extraction suggest that the flexibility of individual agents to selectively allocate extraction effort among multiple resources plays an important role in maximizing their payoffs. However, empirical evidence suggests that real-world CPR appropriators may often de-emphasize issues of allocation, for example by responding to the degradation of a single resource by reducing extra

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40

Sarker, Ashutosh, Claudia Baldwin, and Helen Ross. "Managing groundwater as a common-pool resource: an Australian case study." Water Policy 11, no. 5 (2009): 598–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.2166/wp.2009.076.

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Over-appropriation and degradation of groundwater can result from lack of recognition of, and inappropriate arrangements for, managing groundwater as a common-pool resource. An irrigators group in the Lockyer Valley, South-East Queensland, Australia and the Queensland government are currently working together to address over-exploitation of groundwater through a co-management model designed to be nested within the state and national water reform framework. This paper applies Ostrom's design principles for common-pool resource governance to this proposed co-management framework to strengthen th

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41

Saunders, Fred P. "The promise of common pool resource theory and the reality of commons projects." International Journal of the Commons 8, no. 2 (2014): 636. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.477.

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42

PENNINGTON, MARK. "Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources." Journal of Institutional Economics 9, no. 4 (2013): 449–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137413000258.

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Abstract:This paper situates Elinor Ostrom's work on common-pool resource management in the tradition of ‘robust political economy’. Ostrom's analysis of bottom-up governance institutions is shown to recognise that such arrangements though imperfect are better placed to cope with bounded rationality and incentive compatibility problems in the management of smaller- and medium-scale common-pool resources. While Ostrom's work provides an analytical framework to explain the success of these arrangements, however, the paper argues that it lacks a robust account of when, if ever, top-down governanc

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43

Muñoz-Arriola, Francisco, Tarik Abdel-Monem, and Alessandro Amaranto. "Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Water Resources Planning for Hydrologically Connected Surface and Groundwater Systems." Hydrology 8, no. 1 (2021): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/hydrology8010051.

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Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex commo

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44

Gao, Liyan, Qiuhui Pan, and Mingfeng He. "Impact of dynamic compensation with resource feedback on the common pool resource game." Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 180 (March 2024): 114545. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114545.

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45

De Geest, Lawrence R., and David C. Kingsley. "Inequality and Peer Punishment in a Common-Pool Resource Experiment." Strategic Behavior and the Environment 9, no. 1-2 (2021): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000099.

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46

Baerlein, Tanja, Ulan Kasymov, and Dimitrios Zikos. "Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan." Sustainability 7, no. 1 (2015): 496–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su7010496.

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47

Fennewald, Thomas J., and Brent Kievit-Kylar. "Integrating Climate Change Mechanics Into a Common Pool Resource Game." Simulation & Gaming 44, no. 2-3 (2012): 427–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1046878112467618.

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48

Curran, Dara, Colm O’Riordan, and Humphrey Sorensen. "The evolution of donators in a common-pool resource problem." Artificial Intelligence Review 27, no. 4 (2007): 245–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10462-008-9077-2.

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49

Kimbrough, Erik O., and Alexander Vostroknutov. "The social and ecological determinants of common pool resource sustainability." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 72 (July 2015): 38–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2015.04.004.

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50

Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos, Ricardo Andrés Guzmán, and Juan Camilo Cárdenas. "Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 67, no. 1 (2008): 215–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.004.

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