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Journal articles on the topic 'Communist Party (China)'
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1
Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik. "China’s Communist Party: From Mass to Elite Party." China Report 54, no. 4 (October 17, 2018): 385–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0009445518806076.
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The Communist Party of China (CPC) is not withering away as predicted by some Western scholars. On the contrary, in recent years, the party has centralised and strengthened its rule over China. At the same time, party membership has changed. Today, workers and farmers only account for only one-third of the total party membership compared to two-thirds when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. Instead, new strata and groups such as technical and management personnel have evolved. The composition of the party’s cadre corps has changed accordingly, and cadres today are younger and much better educated than during Mao’s time. The leading cadres form an elite which is at the heart of a ranking-stratified political and social system. This article discusses how the CPC has evolved from a mass to an elite party. It argues that in this process, the party has taken over the state resulting in a merger and overlap of party and government positions and functions, thereby abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s ambidextrous policy goals of separating party and government. Centralisation and reassertion of ranking-stratified party rule is Xi Jinping’s answer to the huge challenges caused by the economic and social transformation of Chinese society—not a return to Mao’s mass party.
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STANCIU, CEZAR. "Autonomy and Ideology: Brezhnev, Ceauşescu and the World Communist Movement." Contemporary European History 23, no. 1 (January 6, 2014): 115–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777313000532.
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AbstractOne of Leonid Brezhnev's primary goals when he acceded to party leadership in the Soviet Union was to restore Moscow's control over the world communist movement, severely undermined by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania was determined to prevent this, in order to consolidate his country's autonomy in the Communist bloc. The Sino-Soviet dispute offered the political and ideological framework for autonomy, as the Romanian Communists claimed their neutrality in the dispute. This article describes Ceauşescu's efforts to sabotage Brezhnev's attempts to have China condemned by an international meeting of Communist parties between 1967 and 1969. His basic ideological argument was that unity of world communism should have a polycentric meaning.
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Utomo, Satriono Priyo. "Indonesia, Tiongkok dan Komunisme, 1949-1965." Indonesian Perspective 2, no. 1 (August 8, 2017): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ip.v2i1.15539.
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During the leadership of President Sukarno, China had an important meaning not only for the people of Indonesia but also as a source of political concept from the perspective of Sukarno. In addition, China also had significance for the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as a meeting room prior to communist ideology. The paper employs literary study method and discusses about diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China during the Guidance Democracy ( 1949-1965). The relationship between two countries at that time exhibited closeness between Sukarno and Mao Tse Tung. The political dynamics at that time brought the spirit of the New Emerging Forces. Both leaders relied on mass mobilization politics in which Mao used the Chinese Communist Party while Sukarno used the PKI.Keywords: Indonesia, China, diplomacy, politics, ideology, communism
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Terskikh, M. "The Ideological Influence of the Communist Party of China on the Communist Party of Vietnam." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 7 (2021): 64–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-64-70.
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The article focuses on the peculiarities of Vietnam’s position in the orbit of the ideological and theoretical influence of China. The author examines the most important party documents of both states, reveals their main similarities and differences. The author concludes that Hanoi scrupulously studies, critically assesses, and actively uses the experience of Chinese economic and political reforms. The party and state leadership of Vietnam, when carrying out major transformations of recent decades, was directly guided by the successful experience of their Chinese colleagues. This led to the situation where today’s political systems of Vietnam and China are quite similar, but still are not (and will never be) twin brothers. At the same time, the countries developed a wide network of inter-party contacts which is used not only as an instrument of exchanging views on adapting Marxism-Leninism to current realities, but also as an additional and mutually beneficial channel of communication on a wide range of issues. Despite this, the similarity of the political systems does not necessarily lead to a change in foreign policy. China has an impressive array of tools to influence its southern neighbor, but their ideological closeness is definitely not the most important of them. It is concluded that the role of ideology in Vietnam’s policy, although it remains noticeable, is significantly inferior to the role of national interests and pragmatic views.
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Garver, John W. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism." China Quarterly 133 (March 1993): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000018178.
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The collapse first of Communist rule of the USSR and then of the USSR itself was without question one of the pivotal events of the era. Since China's 20th-century history has been so deeply influenced by Soviet developments, it is important to examine the impact of these events on China. This article asks, first, whether the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), had a deliberate policy towards the decline of Soviet Communism, and if so, what was the nature of that policy? Did the CCP attempt to assist their comrades in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the latter battled for survival during 1990 and 1991?
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Lam, Willy. "China´ s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation." Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (August 2008): 348–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs30-2n.
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Duncanson, Dennis. "All about China in Communist Party projection." Asian Affairs 20, no. 3 (October 1989): 315–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068378908730356.
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Burov, Vladilen G. "A hundred-year-long story (for the anniversary of the Сommunist party of China)." Asia and Africa Today, no. 9 (2021): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750016627-1.
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On July 1, 2021, celebrations were held in Beijing on the occasion of the centenary of the formation of the Communist Party of China. Its history is full of various tragic and heroic events. After a five-year period of cooperation with the Kuomintang (the National Party of China), due to the betrayal of the latter, a fifteen-year armed struggle between the two parties for power begins, interrupted for the time of Japan's aggression against China. In 1949, the People's Republic of China was created under the leadership of the Communist Party. The period of socialist construction is replaced by the time of the “great leap forward” and the people's communes, and then by the years of “the cultural revolution”. After 1976, the country gradually begins to implement a policy of reform and openness, which continues until the present time. The Communist Party comes to its anniversary with huge achievements, China has become the second most economically powerful power in the world. The General Secretary of the Communist Party Xi Jinping made a speech at the celebrations. First of all, he recalled the time when, as a result of the opium wars, China turned into a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and paid tribute to the memory of the revolutionaries of the older generation who ended this condition. Then he listed the majestic tasks that the Chinese state faces in the field of domestic and foreign policy. The experience of the Chinese Communists in implementing the modernization of their country attracts attention all over the world and certainly deserves to be studied.
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Hartono, M. Paulina. "“A Good Communist Style”." Representations 151, no. 1 (2020): 26–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rep.2020.151.2.26.
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This essay focuses on the history and politicization of radio announcers’ vocal delivery in China during the mid-twentieth century. It explores how Chinese Communist Party leaders used internal party debates, national policies, and broadcasting training to construct an ideal Communist voice whose qualities would ostensibly communicate party loyalty and serve as a sonic representation of political authority.
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Pieke, Frank N. "The Communist Party and social management in China." China Information 26, no. 2 (June 17, 2012): 149–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0920203x12442864.
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Mandle, Jay R. "Economic reform and the communist party in China." Socialism and Democracy 3, no. 2 (July 1987): 71–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08854308908427985.
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Bian, Y., X. Shu, and J. R. Logan. "Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics in China." Social Forces 79, no. 3 (March 1, 2001): 805–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0006.
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Rigdon, Susan. "Communism or the Kingdom: 'Saving' China, 1924-1949." Social Sciences and Missions 22, no. 2 (2009): 168–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187489309x12517973174365.
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AbstractThis paper identifies commonalities between Marxian economic principles and the socio-economic goals of Social Gospel missionaries in China in the quarter century between 1924 and 1949. It argues that the unbreachable divisions between missionaries, including those who advocated for a "Christian communism," and the communist party were rooted, on the Christian side, in a rejection of violence and coercive methods of policy implementation rather than in opposition to socialism. On the communist side opposition was not to specific tenets of Christianity but to foreign-funding and leadership and to the perception of American Christians as agents of an imperialist country.
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Rothenberg, Mel. "Who Rules China?" Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 14, no. 1-2 (January 5, 2015): 26–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341331.
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A new and powerful capitalist class has arisen in China since 1976. Has this capitalist class achieved sufficient domination of Chinese social, economic and political life to qualify as a ruling class? We attempt to clarify this question within the context of current Chinese reality that has resulted from the turbulent historical events and processes shaking China over the last 28 years. The question is difficult to settle definitively because of the atypical, even peculiar, basis of the emergence of capitalism in China, and in particular the crucial, guiding role of the Chinese Communist Party. Given the control of political life in China by the Party, it appears that command of the Party by the new capitalist class would be a pre-requisite for capitalist class rule. A brief examination of the composition, leadership, and politics of the Chinese Communist Party suggests that while a line promoting capitalism has great influence within the Party, such command has not yet been fully achieved.
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CHEN, Gang. "The Chinese Communist Party and Politics 2019/2020." East Asian Policy 12, no. 02 (April 2020): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930520000100.
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In September 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to gear up in countering imminent “struggles” and in achieving the ambitious “two centennial” targets amid the US–China trade war, Hong Kong unrest and a slowing economy. A novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak that erupted in Wuhan in October 2019 had scuppered China’s timeline to achieve its targets. While China successfully curbed the spread of COVID-19 within its border, enormous challenges lie ahead for China to maintain its economic growth and social stability. The daunting combat against the COVID-19 pandemic marks the beginning of the testing time.
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Paltiel, Jeremy T. "PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition." China Quarterly 143 (September 1995): 784–800. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000015046.
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Civil-military relations in China demonstrate a unique fusion of military and political leadership within the Communist Party. Variously described as a “symbiosis,” “dual-role elite” or “the Party in uniform,” this feature rooted in the guerrilla experience of the Chinese Communist Party was sustained over six decades by the political longevity of the Long March generation. The civil war experience formed political leaders skilled in both civil affairs and military command. Analysts of civil-military relations in China must therefore define the scope of “civil” in relation to the Chinese Communist Party.
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Pearson, Margaret, Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S. Tsai. "Party-State Capitalism in China." Current History 120, no. 827 (September 1, 2021): 207–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2021.120.827.207.
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China’s economic model, commonly described as “state capitalist,” is now better characterized as party-state capitalism, in which the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China’s entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line, as are foreign corporations operating in the country. The shift is fueling a backlash from foreign governments that view the fusion of state and private interests in China as a threat to their own national security.
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Zhang, Shaoying, and Derek McGhee. "Governing through ‘the family’ in China: cultivating ethical political subjects through officials’ ‘nearest and dearest’." Families, Relationships and Societies 8, no. 3 (November 1, 2019): 495–510. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204674318x15271465130398.
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In this article we argue that the families of Communist Party members are increasingly being seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution to eradicating corruption in contemporary China. Our findings reveal how families are being investigated as well as co-opted by the party as a mechanism for encouraging its members to become ethical communist subjects. The current anti-corruption campaign in China is the context that has enabled this indirect governance of communist officials through the co-option of their ‘nearest and dearest’ in the party’s power structures. We argue that ‘the family’ in China is a privileged site for the remoralisation of society and the party through the process of facilitating what we call the ‘ethical subjectivities’ of officials. The contribution we make in this article is to analyse the continuum between the formal agencies of socialisation within the communist system and the informal but equally important institution of socialisation, namely, Communist Party members’ families.
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KING, AMY. "Reconstructing China: Japanese technicians and industrialization in the early years of the People's Republic of China." Modern Asian Studies 50, no. 1 (August 25, 2015): 141–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x15000074.
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AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party was confronted with the pressing challenge of ‘reconstructing’ China's industrial economy when it came to power in 1949. Drawing on recently declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, this article argues that the Party met this challenge by drawing on the expertise of Japanese technicians left behind in Northeast China at the end of the Second World War. Between 1949 and 1953, when they were eventually repatriated, thousands of Japanese technicians were used by the Chinese Communist Party to develop new technology and industrial techniques, train less skilled Chinese workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites in the Northeast. These first four years of the People's Republic of China represent an important moment of both continuity and change in China's history. Like the Chinese Nationalist government before them, the Chinese Communist Party continued to draw on the technological and industrial legacy of the Japanese empire in Asia to rebuild China's war-torn economy. But this four-year period was also a moment of profound change. As the Cold War erupted in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party began a long-term reconceptualization of how national power was intimately connected to technology and industrial capability, and viewed Japanese technicians as a vital element in the transformation of China into a modern and powerful nation.
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Nikolov, Plamen, Hongjian Wang, and Kevin Acker. "Wage premium of Communist Party membership: Evidence from China." Pacific Economic Review 25, no. 3 (January 28, 2020): 309–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12318.
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KADEER, REBIYA. "The Internet vs. the Communist Party in Western China." New Perspectives Quarterly 27, no. 3 (July 20, 2010): 64–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2010.01189.x.
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Wiktor, Zbigniew. "MARXISM AND CONFUCIANISM IN IDEOLOGY OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA." Nowa Krytyka 42 (2019): 109–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/nk.2019.42-03.
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Muas, Tuty Enoch. "Kasus Wang Renshu: Sebuah Kegagalan Diplomasi RRC terhadap Indonesia." Paradigma, Jurnal Kajian Budaya 3, no. 1 (February 15, 2016): 54. http://dx.doi.org/10.17510/paradigma.v3i1.33.
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<p>The Chinese-Indonesian relations in 1951 was in tension due the actions of Ambassador Wang Renshu. As China was not favored in the international arena for its communist stand, the Chinese citizens in Indonesia became important factor in the relations between China and Indonesia where they were divided into taking side with either the communists or the capitalists. Wang Renshu, a senior member in the China Communist Party, has recruited between six and seven hundred thousand Indonesians of Chinese ancestry to adopt Chinese citizenship, of which it became a threat to the Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic relations. The withdrawal of Ambassador Wang Renshu marked the failure of the Chinese-Indonesian diplomatic relations.</p>
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Pham, Vinh Phuc. "Process of normalizing the relation with China under the reform of foreign policy of The Communist Party of Vietnam (1986-1991)." Science and Technology Development Journal 19, no. 1 (March 31, 2016): 28–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdj.v19i1.553.
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At the 6th National Congress (from Dec. 5, 1986 to Dec. 18, 1986), the Communist Party of Vietnam pointed out a new policy of fundamental renovation for the whole country, among which foreign diplomacy was one issue. Particularly for China, the Communist Party of Vietnam aimed to accelerate the normalization process of Vietnam-China relationships. To successfully carry out the policy, Vietnamese Communist Party had been taking actions proposing negotiations to normalize relationships and to ease tensions between the two countries since 1986; however, China then did not want to. Until 1989, the world faced many changes. As a result, tense relationships between Vietnam and China were no longer suitable with the trends of peace and cooperation in international and regional relationships. China then continued peace talks with Vietnam, and in November 1991, the two countries set up normal relationships with each other.
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Yahuda, Michael. "Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman." China Quarterly 135 (September 1993): 551–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000013916.
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Alone of the world's Communist leaders, Deng Xiaoping has charted a course that has combined for his country rapid economic development, successful economic reform and openness to the capitalistic international economy with continued dictatorship by the Communist Party. Under his leadership Communist rule in China has survived the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union-the motherland of Communism. In the process the regime has weathered the ending of the Cold War and has become more engaged with the Asia-Pacific region. But Deng's reputation at home and abroad has been badly tarnished by his ruthlessness in masterminding the Tiananmen massacre of 4 June 1989. But that ruthlessness is absolutely central to Deng's political philosophy and strategy. For him it is the basis of order at home which alone ensures that the economic policies of reform and openness can be carried out without undermining Communist Party rule through the spread of liberal influences. In so far as statesmanship requires moral dimensions it will be necessary in assessing the quality of Deng's statesmanship to consider the meaning of statesmanship itself.
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Li, Peng. "Localization of Marxism in China: History, Theory and the Challenge." Journal of Politics and Law 11, no. 4 (November 30, 2018): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v11n4p89.
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Marxism is the science of universal standard. The truth, practicality, scientific of Marxism has been proved by history. But with the development of practice, the development of Marxist theory itself is facing a new opportunity, also faced with unprecedented challenges. How to effectively cope with the challenges？Such as: Is communism a utopia? The labor theory of value is effective? Socialist country is democracy? And so on. All these problems are the socialist system and Marxist must think and answer.
As a Marxist, how to truly stand in the position of Marxism, using the Marxist method and point of view to observe the social and economic development and the progress of human civilization and world history, is the problem of contemporary Marxists has to think about. Or it will lose vitality, and will be out of date, and possible failure. The most familiar example is the socialist power caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences.
As important heritage and development of Marxist theory, the Communist Party of China has always been guided by the Marxism theory, whether in revolution, construction and reform, or the governing principle politics today. Can say, not only accumulated a very valuable historical experience, but also enriched and developed Marxism, the Communist Party of China have a say in the history of Marxist development.
So, we need to discuss three questions, the effectiveness of the Marxist theory, and understanding of Marxist trajectory of the Communist Party of China, the challenge for the Marxism theory and how to deal with.
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Szelenyi, Ivan, and Péter Mihályi. "China, Eastern Europe and Russia compared." Acta Oeconomica 70, S (October 16, 2020): 85–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.2020.00027.
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AbstractAfter the collapse of the Berlin Wall it was conceivable that China would follow the path towards the cessation of communism, as it happened in the successor states of the USSR, Yugoslavia and the East European satellite states of the Soviet Union. But the Communist Party of China (CPC) managed to retain control and avoided the Russian and East European collapse, a full-fledged transition to capitalism and liberal democracy. For a while, China was on its way to market capitalism with the possible outcome to turn eventually into a liberal democracy. This was a rocky road, with backs-and-forth. But the shift to liberal democracy did not happen. The massacre at Tiananmen Square in 1989, approved by Deng Xiaoping, was a more alarming setback than the contemporary Western observers were willing to realize. This paper presents an interpretation of the changes under present Chinese leader, Xi Jinping in a post-communist comparative perspective.
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Li, Hua-yu. "The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948–1954." Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (May 2001): 28–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039701300373871.
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This article offers a fresh perspective on the establishment of a one-party constitutional structure in China from 1948 to 1954, using documents and first-hand accounts published in China over the past two decades. These documents suggest that the Stalinization of China cannot be understood outside the larger context of the political Stalinization of the rest of the Communist world. Stalin played a critical role in determining the pace of political reform in China, and he actively encouraged Mao to allow non-Communists to take part in the Chinese electoral process and in the writing of the Chinese constitution. Although Mao would have preferred to establish a Soviet-style one-party system right away, he readily yielded to Stalin's advice. Mao chose to obey Stalin's dictates for political reform so that he could gain greater independence in domestic economic policies.
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Tanner, Murray Scot. "The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China." China Quarterly 138 (June 1994): 381–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000035803.
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This article examines the organizational evolution of Communist Party control over lawmaking processes and institutions in post-Mao China. In particular, it charts the erosion and decentralization of Party control which has accompanied the rise of lawmaking since 1978. The unity of Party control over lawmaking has frayed and dissipated dramatically in these years, as more and more important policy issues are resolved outside the arena of the Party's central decision-making organs (such as the Politburo, the Secretariat, and so on). This decentralization has been matched by a corresponding increase in the institutional power, autonomy and assertiveness of the government (executive) lawmaking offices, and other more open policy-making arenas, most notably the National People's Congress, but also including the Supreme People's Court.
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Graziani, Sofia. "Youth and the Making of Modern China." European Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 1 (2014): 117–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01301008.
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The beginning of the twentieth century marked in China the emergence of “youth” (qingnian) as a distinct analytical category associated with national modernity. As the term qingnian assumed unprecedented significance, a new generation of educated youth aware of its role as agent of social change also came into being. In fact, the May Fourth movement turned Chinese youth into a social force that could be organized and mobilized for effective action by nascent ideologically committed political parties. The historical analysis of the Socialist/Communist Youth League, the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated youth organization, is rather biased, as official historiography tends to overemphasize its role as well as the symbiotic nature of its relationship with the Party. Moreover, so far Western scholars have carried out little work on the topic. This paper makes use of largely unexploited documentary material to reconstruct the history of the Youth League from its inception to its disbandment on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, and to show how the League interacted with the party’s development in the early stage of the Communist movement. It argues that, in a political context of contestation over power, it was mainly conceived as a tool for Communist propaganda and mobilization of mass support. Yet, the League’s relationship with the party was not always one of symbiosis and subordination.
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Ghorbani, Majid, Morley Gunderson, and Byron Y. S. Lee. "Union and Communist Party Influences on the Environment in China." Relations industrielles 74, no. 3 (2019): 552. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1065172ar.
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Pieke, Frank N. "Party spirit: producing a communist civil religion in contemporary China." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 24, no. 4 (September 13, 2018): 709–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.12913.
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Li, Jieli. "Geopolitics of the Chinese Communist Party in the Twentieth Century." Sociological Perspectives 36, no. 4 (December 1993): 315–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1389391.
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Geopolitical theory is employed to address the question of why the Chinese Communist Party-state persists, despite Western pressures stemming from the suppression of student demonstrators in “Tienanmen Square” in 1989. As the theory postulates, macro dynamic forces revolving around the geopolitical processes are crucial to the resource mobilization and legitimacy of the state. The entire history of the Chinese Communist Party is reviewed in order to document the conclusion that changes in the geopolitical position of the Party are associated with periods of internal strength and weakness. Since 1979, the Chinese Communist Party-state has been increasingly favored by geopolitical circumstances, thereby facilitating its internal strength even in the face of Western pressures, potential for internal dissent, and collapse of the Soviet empire. As long as this favorable geopolitical trend continues, the Chinese Communist Party will likely exist as a ruling political force in China.
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FU, BOB. "Hope for Religious Freedom for All in China." Unio Cum Christo 6, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.35285/ucc6.2.2020.art10.
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What theological foundation can best procure, promote, and protect religious freedom for all? If obstacles to securing the peaceful public manifestation of religious faith in the context of the diverse worldviews in the “public square” depend on the state, however, what is next? In China, the Communist Party routinely uses persecution and other tyrannical tactics to eliminate the expression of religious beliefs, making religious freedom appear out of reach. Nevertheless, research projects the demise of communism in China and increased Christianization and democratization. If this transition takes place, a contextualization of principled pluralism, baorong duoyuan, offers the best theoretical, practical foundation for religious freedom for all faiths in China’s future. KEYWORDS: Religious freedom, persecution, China, principled pluralism, communism, Christianization, baorong duoyuan
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Zhu, Ling, and Tony Tam. "Have party premiums disappeared in post-2000 China? The influence of negative ability bias from position conditioning." Chinese Journal of Sociology 5, no. 1 (January 2019): 57–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057150x18817245.
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Communist Party membership is often associated with higher incomes in socialist regimes because it is an important credential for obtaining state-sector jobs and cadre positions. During the first two decades of marketization in China, the income returns to Communist Party membership (the party premium) clearly persisted. However, recent studies have documented an insignificant party premium in post-2000 China. Considering the persistent role of the state in resource allocation, this phenomenon is puzzling and lacks clear interpretation. Drawing on the knowledge of collider conditioning, we hypothesize that this phenomenon stems from a negative ability bias generated by conditioning on endogenous job positions. Using the China General Social Survey 2008, we re-examine the post-2000 party premiums. The results support this hypothesis and demonstrate that this negative ability bias overwhelms the usual positive ability bias and any residual party premiums. Party premiums persist after 2000 and are reflected in positions where the negative ability bias is less influential.
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Liu, Tianyuan. "The Political Legitimacy of the Communist Party of China From the Perspective of Constitution." Asian Journal of Social Science Studies 3, no. 1 (February 28, 2018): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.20849/ajsss.v3i1.353.
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The Communist Party of China’s political legitimacy is a result which is based on its unique advanced and excellent quality, combines the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of China, and gains the support of Chinese people because of leading Chinese people to overthrow the reactionary rule to establish a new completely people's political regime and putting forward the line and route which conform to the development direction and requirement of Chinese social history. That is to say, this is the objective result of the Chinese people's sincere choice and commitment, and then confirmed in the national Constitution, which condenses the fundamental will and interests of the Chinese people. The process of Chinese Constitution establishment and the Constitution’s ideas and norms, both of them provide sufficient legal basis for the political legitimacy of the Communist Party of China. In that way, the continuation of the Communist Party of China’s political legitimacy-leadership and governance-must adhere to the rule of Constitution.
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Gilley, Bruce. "Could China Be the Next Wave?" Current History 110, no. 739 (November 1, 2011): 331–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2011.110.739.331.
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Mrkić, Ivan. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics." Napredak 2, no. 2 (2021): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/napredak2-32948.
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The text speaks about the formation of the Communist Party of China, its beginnings and development, as well as the categorizations ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The new geopolitical reality has been explained, especially since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argumentation is made about the peculiarities of Chinese history and modern development. The immeasurable importance of the Communist Party of China in governing the most populous country is pointed out. A short section on the relations between Serbia and China has been included. The conclusion highlights the general views encompassing most of the claims presented in the previous text.
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Železný, Jan. "Bill Gertz: Deceiving The Sky: Inside Communist Chinaʼs Drive for Global Supremacy." Mezinárodní vztahy 56, no. 3 (July 28, 2021): 117–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32422/mv-cjir.1762.
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The United States' approach to China since the Communist regime in Beijing began the period of reform and opening in the 1980s was based on a promise that trade and engagement with China would result in a peaceful, democratic state. Forty years later the hope of producing a benign People's Republic of China utterly failed. The Communist Party of China deceived the West into believing that the its system and the Party-ruled People's Liberation Army were peaceful and posed no threat. In fact, these misguided policies produced the emergence of a 21st Century Evil Empire even more dangerous than a Cold War version in the Soviet Union. Successive American presidential administrations were fooled by ill-advised pro-China policymakers, intelligence analysts and business leaders who facilitated the rise not of a peaceful China but a threatening and expansionist nuclear-armed communist dictatorship not focused on a single overriding strategic objective: Weakening and destroying the United States of America. Defeating the United States is the first step for China's current rulers in achieving global supremacy under a new world order based an ideology of Communism with Chinese characteristics. The process included technology theft of American companies that took place on a massive scale through cyber theft and unfair trade practices. The losses directly supported in the largest and most significant buildup of the Chinese military that now directly threatens American and allied interests around the world. The military threat is only half the danger as China aggressively pursues regional and international control using a variety of non-military forces, including economic, cyber and space warfare and large-scale influence operations.
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Mikheev, V., and S. Lukonin. "Second Century of the Communist Party of China and New Bipolarity." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 7 (2021): 25–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-25-33.
Full textAbstract:
Linking the 100th anniversary of the CPC, celebrated in 2021, with long-term goals, the Chinese leadership is talking about the country’s entry into the next stage of development – the stage of the “second century of the CPC.” The 14th plan for the socio-economic development of the country for 2021–2025, adopted in March 2021 and long-range objectives through 2035 are seen as the first steps in a new round of China’s evolution. According to the Chinese leadership, the goals of the first century have been largely achieved. Now China faces more ambitious tasks: 1) achieve socialist modernization by 2035, doubling its GDP per capita to the level of an average developed country; 2) to reach the German or Japanese level of industrial and innovative development by 2050; 3) to ensure the innovative and scientific and technological self-sufficiency of China in order to get away from the current technological dependence on the United States and the West in general, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, poses a threat to the national security of the PRC; 4) to create by 2027 (100th anniversary of the PLA) a strong modern army; 5) Ensure China’s global leadership by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. The peculiarities of the new 14th five-year plan include the absence of targets for GDP growth rates for 2021–2025. The benchmark will now be set every year. For example, for 2021, this indicator is set in the highly redundant formulation “6 percent or more”. Beijing records the nearing transition from quantitative planning to qualitative planning. The aggravation of relations between China and the United States under the Biden administration and Beijing’s retaliatory, in a new way, actions in almost all areas, from ideology to security and defense, in the near future will change the global balance of power and lead to the formation of a “new bipolarity” implying in the context of globalization, that in addition to the two new planetary “poles” in the world, regional and subregional centers of power will persist and develop, forming, as saying in China, modern “polycentricity”. Against such a background, the “new bipolarity” will be characterized not only by a direct clash of Chinese and American interests, but also by a struggle for dominance, influence, and alliance with the leaders of the “polycentric world.” Within the framework of the “new bipolarity”, the United States is strengthening relations with allies, opposing the “democratic economy” of the West to the “authoritarianism of China”. The concept of financing by the West of the world transport infrastructure of a “democratic sense” as opposed to the “authoritarian” Chinese “Belt and Road” is put forward. In the reciprocal steps of China to attract partners to the “Chinese pole”, the main place is given to Russia, relations with which are characterized as “exemplary” for the whole world. At the same time, there is an opinion among Chinese experts that “excessive rapprochement” with Russia is unprofitable for China, since for Russia, as well as for the United States, China is not only a partner, but also a “strategic competitor.” China has become the main Russian trade and economic partner, in many directions it has turned into an uncontested supplier. At the same time, the “Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership in a New Era” contains many tactical and long-term problems.
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Liou, Chih-shian, and Chung-min Tsai. "The Dual Role of Cadres and Entrepreneurs in China." Asian Survey 57, no. 6 (November 2017): 1058–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.6.1058.
Full textAbstract:
By examining China’s state-monopolized industries, we explore the evolution of managerial behavior. With the party-state’s continued emphasis on meritocracy in elite management, managers of China’s state-owned enterprises play a hybrid role as both party cadres and business entrepreneurs. This also reflects the adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party in pursuing pro-market reform.
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Portyakov, V. "The Chinese Communist Party and the Policy of Foreign Economic Openness." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 7 (2021): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-34-44.
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The article analyzes the process of growing understanding in China of the need to turn from the primacy of “self-reliance” to the gradual opening of the country, seeing as the development of large-scale diversified economic relations with the outside world. The role of China’s leaders of various periods in this process is shown. It is revealed that the main pillars and “engines” of the policy of foreign economic openness of the People’s Republic of China were the course of modernization of the country and the active struggle against the leftist ideology. Deng Xiaoping played a prominent role in both trials. The main achievements of the People’s Republic of China in the field of foreign economic openness at various stages of the implementation of this policy are briefly shown. In contrast to expectations in the West, the turn to the market and foreign economic openness was not accompanied by political reform and democratization of the country in accordance with the Western model. Beijing often states, that China realizes her own model of consultative democracy which meets national characteristics. Under Xi Jinping, the role of the ruling Communist Party in all spheres of the country’s social and political life has been significantly strengthened, and the promotion of the “Chinese way of development” as a possible model for some developing countries has intensified. In the context of increasing Western pressure on China, Beijing, according to the author, can make some indirect concessions in the foreign economic sphere, but not in the political system. At the same time, China is building up its own development potential for key high technologies.
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Cass, Philip. "Review: The realities of authoritarian media in China." Pacific Journalism Review 22, no. 1 (July 31, 2016): 247. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v22i1.24.
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Review of: Stockman, D. (2012). Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01844-0 China can no longer be called Communist. It is an authoritarian state in which a party that likes to call itself Communist maintains a firm grip on the country. However much the party and the corrupt party princelings enjoy the benefits of capitalism (and let us be frank that it is a distinctively 19th century robber baron style of capitalism), the government usemethods of media control that have not changed since Mao took power in 1959. Censorship has always been part of the regime, but Mao and his direct successors were always clever enough to give the masses a chance to let off steam now and then through such projects as the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Democracy Wall movement.
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Smith, R. B. "China and Southeast Asia: The Revolutionary Perspective, 1951." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19, no. 1 (March 1988): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022463400000357.
Full textAbstract:
Controversy still surrounds the question whether the communist-led uprisings which developed across Southeast Asia during the months from March to September 1948 were the outcome of a deliberate international communist strategy or merely the product of coincidental decisions by individual communist parties. Equally controversial, although less frequently discussed, is the suggestion that during the early months of 1950 the Chinese Communist Party took on direct responsibility for sustaining those revolutionary armed struggles which were still continuing in Southeast Asia — in Vietnam, Malaya and the Philippines — and even provided material assistance to allow them to expand. The present paper will examine yet a third period at which it is necessary to consider the possibility of coordinated international decision-making on the communist side in Southeast Asia: the second half of 1951.
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Gorman, Patrick. "Flesh Searches in China." Asian Survey 56, no. 2 (March 2016): 325–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.2.325.
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This article explores the relationship between netizens and the Chinese Communist Party by investigating examples of “flesh searches” targeting corrupt officials. Case studies link the initiative of netizens and the reaction of the Chinese state to the pattern of management of social space in contemporary China.
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Wielink, Michael. "Women and Communist China Under Mau Zedong:." General: Brock University Undergraduate Journal of History 4 (May 6, 2019): 128–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.26522/tg.v4i0.2126.
Full textAbstract:
The mid twentieth century was a tumultuous and transformative period in the history of China. Mao Zedong and the Communist Party seized control and established the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949, which was the culmination of over two decades of civil and international war. Mao Zedong’s famed political slogan: “Women Hold Up Half The Sky[1],” was powerful rhetoric, with the apparent emphasis on gender equality and inferred concepts of equality and sameness. Women did not achieve equality with men, nor did they attain egalitarian self-determination nor social autonomy. Nevertheless, when Chinese Communism under Chairman Mao is analyzed we discover women, both rural and urban, were able to challenge social, cultural, and economic gender stratification. Mao envisaged “women’s equality” as a dynamic force with an indelible power to help build a Chinese Communist State. This essay illustrates the ways in which women inextricably worked within Mao’s Communist nation building efforts to slowly erode gender inequalities. Yet despite the inability of full gender equality to be realized, this era allowed women to experience a broad range of experiences which contained the seeds of change toward breaking down gender inequality. Ultimately, Chinese women under Mao created a more fertile environment so the seeds of equality may continue to grow, perhaps bearing fruit of full “gender equality” in the future.
[1] Xin Huang, The Gender Legacy of the Mao Era: Women's Life Stories in Contemporary China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2018): 14.
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Zhang, Wenzhuo. "Multicultural Ethnic Music Education in Communist China." International Journal of Multicultural Education 19, no. 3 (October 31, 2017): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.18251/ijme.v19i3.1359.
Full textAbstract:
The Central Communist Party (CCP) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) describes China as a unified multinational country. National policies advocate cultural diversity in the educational system with particular emphasis on the notion that diverse ethnic minorities contribute to zhonghua minzu—a single united Chinese nationality. Drawing upon the theoretical frameworks of musical authenticity as well as two tenets of liberalism theory, equal concern and cultural neutrality, the study aims to understand how government-designed national K1–9 music textbooks represent the Chinese ethnic minority’s musical and cultural traditions.
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Goodman, David S. G. "China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution. By Michael E. Marti. [Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002. xviii+265 pp. $27.95. ISBN 1-57488-416-6.]." China Quarterly 172 (December 2002): 1065–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009443902210621.
Full textAbstract:
In retrospect, 1991–1992 may well prove to be a pivotal period in the evolution of the People's Republic of China. The reform era ushered in by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Third Plenum of its 11th Central Committee in December 1978 had dramatically restructured the economy and the state, but in the aftermath of the events of June 1989, it appeared to falter. Partly through reactions from outside China, and partly because of resistance within (including elements within the leadership of the Party), the programme of ‘reform and openness’ seemed challenged and about to topple.
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Wu, Harry. "Classicide - Genocide in Communist China." Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 18, no. 1 (2006): 121–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jis2006181/27.
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The term "genocide" was first coined in the 1940s to describe the horrors of Nazi rule in occupied Europe. In Nazi Germany, the machine of oppression was the concentration camp; in the Soviet Union, the Gulag. In China, it is the Laogai, which means "reform through labor." In fact, Laogai is a brutal and inhumane system that enslaves millions of people throughout China. The govemment in conununist China divides people by class, politics, and religuious beliefs. Such divisions are based not on race, but individual economic status. If a person owns land, capital or property, he or she belongs to the landlord or capitalist classes. Both are considered "exploiting" classes, and their members, including their family, are subject to extermination, since they belong to "counter-revolutionary" classes. During the Cultural Revolution, many people were massacred for die sake of the "Red Revolution." Since 1949, when the Communist Party came to power, it sought to destroy all religjon in China, particularly Christian faiths. The Roman Catholic faith is still illegal in China today. It is common knowledge that people in China are not allowed to practice the religion of their choice Meanwhile, Laogai, or prison camps, throughout China, imprison countless people who belong to the "wrong" religion or hold "wrong* political ideas. The Chinese govemment uses the Laogai to control and eliminate those people. Yet, despite the prevalence of the Laogai and its multitude of victims, the world seems unwilling to acknowledge this widespread plague.
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Wang, Jianping. "Islam and State Policy in Contemporary China." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 45, no. 4 (October 13, 2016): 566–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0008429816667680.
Full textAbstract:
Since Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic policy of opening up and reforming the country in the late 1970s, Islam has witnessed a revival in China. Just as the Chinese nation has experienced rapid economic, political and social development, so too has Islam grown and diversified. Since Muslims generally enjoy the freedom to practice their religion and the benefit of China’s Preferential Program (a policy giving special privileges to minority Muslims) – if they obey the state law and keep harmonious relations with other social groups – some Chinese Muslims regard today as a “golden age” for Islam in the People’s Republic. This paper offers an overview of the major developments in Chinese Communist policy on religion and discusses the internal and external influences of domestic and international relations on Communist Party policy towards Chinese Muslims. It argues that Chinese Communist Party policy since the 1970s protects religious freedom but does so while maintaining state control over religion. Further, in the case of Islam in the People’s Republic, state protection and control are defined according to the domestic and international concerns of the State.