Academic literature on the topic 'Compellence'

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Journal articles on the topic "Compellence"

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Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail." International Organization 67, no. 1 (2013): 173–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818312000392.

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AbstractDo nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence. Compellent threats are more likely to be effective under two conditions: first, if a challenger can
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Fowler, Michael. "Comparing compellence strategies." Comparative Strategy 40, no. 3 (2021): 254–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.1912506.

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Kim, Taehyun. "North Korea’s aggressive Nuclear Strategy and General Nuclear Compellence." Korea Research Institute for Strategy 31, no. 3 (2024): 107–51. https://doi.org/10.46226/jss.2024.11.31.3.107.

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This paper aims to explain North Korea's aggressive nuclear strategy from the perspective of “general nuclear compellence.” “General nuclear compellence” refers to the signaling of “the risk of nuclear escalation” in non-crisis situations to create a favorable environment for “changing the status quo” by securing political concessions from both adversaries and allies. This concept is useful for understanding how nuclear-armed states seek to reduce their security dependence on allies, enhance their external autonomy over the long term, increase military deterrence against adversaries, and expan
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Schaub, Gary. "Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory." Political Psychology 25, no. 3 (2004): 389–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00377.x.

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Klein, Yitzhak. "Long defensives: Victory without compellence." Comparative Strategy 15, no. 3 (1996): 233–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01495939608403074.

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Altindag, Duha T., Naci Mocan, and Jie Zhang. "Deterrence and Compellence in Parliament." Journal of Law and Economics 66, no. 2 (2023): 333–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/722634.

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Volpe, Tristan A. "Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency." Security Studies 26, no. 3 (2017): 517–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306398.

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Dorussen, Han, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling. "Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union." International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009): 789–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990105.

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AbstractThis article compares European Union (EU) burden-sharing in security governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence policies. We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggregation technologies in each policy domain. Joint-product models predict equal burden-sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs. Prevention is also characterized by the technology of
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Carter, David B. "The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups." International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2015): 461–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12192.

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Petersen, Walter J. "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom." International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (1986): 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600418.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Compellence"

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Robinson, Esther R. "Iraq and failures in U.S. compellence policy 1990-2003." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2004. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/04Dec%5FRobinson.pdf.

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Matuschak, Nicholas N. "Coercion from Above: The Failed Compellence of Nixon's Linebacker II Bombings." Thesis, Boston College, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1201.

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Thesis advisor: Robert Ross<br>This paper discusses the Linebacker II bombing campaign of the United States in North Vietnam, more famously known as the "Christmas Bombings." It examines the campaign as an attempt to compel North Vietnam to accept changes to the peace agreement being negotiated in Paris by Henry Kissinger and others. Specifically, it looks at three aspects of compellence—capability, credibility, and clarity of goals—and analyzes how the United States did in each of these three areas, concluding that the United States ultimately failed to adequately compel North Vietnam<br>Thes
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Fraiman, Keren Eva (Fraiman Stieber). "Not in your backyard : transitive compellence, base states, and violent non-state groups." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/92081.

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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2014.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 429-440).<br>Violent non-state actors have consistently served as a destabilizing force within the international system. These groups create a base within a state's sovereign territory, the "base state," and utilize this platform to mount conventional attacks, insurgencies, and terrorist campaigns against other states, with or without the support of the base state. Coercion directed at base states has been declared
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Pennie, K. R. "Analysis of superpower nuclear strategy : compellence as a competing paradigm to that of deterrence." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1991. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1150/.

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This thesis centers on that aspect of superpower strategic nuclear systems that lies beyond pure deterrence. Much has been offered under the rubric of deterrence, but little analysis of compellence has been attempted. Considering the widespread criticisms of deterrence theory, this is surprising. A comprehensive look at nuclear strategy from the conceptual framework of compellence helps clarify the limits of deterrence and indicates that deterrence and compellence are increasingly interrelated. To demonstrate these assertions, this dissertation provides a quantitative and qualitative analysis
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Guggenberger, Johan H. "Deterring the Compeller : A study into the outcome of compellent threats." Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-9321.

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Scholars find that compellence and coercion tend to fail even when done by strong states against weaker states. Research suggests that such failure primarily rests with the initiator and that the target is successful. Does this mean that the weaker states have found the means to withstand threats? This study investigates compellence from the view of the target of such threats. In this study, we investigate resistance to compellence and their outcome by testing factors resting in both the initiator of threats and the target. We find that compellence does indeed tend to fail but so do attempts a
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Biverstedt, Lola. "Return Of An Empire Or Strike Of A Rogue? : Russia Proceeds With Tactical Nuclear Weapons." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-294616.

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The current political fraction between Russia and the West has led to the breakdown of the cooperative post-Cold War security order. Russia’s dramatic reliance on its tactical nuclear weapons arsenal is of concern for how Moscow might shape its foreign policy. Based on the gap in the existing literature on the role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) and regional influence, this paper aims to examine the role of TNWs for Russia’s regional influence by answering the following research question: What changes in the nuclear doctrines, with regards to TNWs, contribute to a nuclear state’s increased
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Goldstein, Seth Michael. "Images of Resolve: Motivated Schemata and the (In)Credibility of Domestic Dissent in Coercive Diplomacy." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343820525.

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Goodfellow, Troy Stephen. "Period, power and purpose, understanding compellent threats in the twentieth century." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ53847.pdf.

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Sechser, Todd S. "Winning without a fight : power, reputation, and compellent threats in international crises /." May be available electronically:, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.

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Chen, Yen-Pu, and 陳彥甫. "Feasibility study of Republic of China''s military compellence strategy in the South China Sea." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17485140221579365870.

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碩士<br>淡江大學<br>國際事務與戰略研究所碩士班<br>103<br>In the 1960s, the Union Nation claimed that the South China Sea (SCS) contains a huge of fossil resources, all the states around it then began to jump in the struggle with its sovereignty. Although the Republic of China has the most powerful evidences to show SCS as our territory, we don’t really working hard in it because of our overall policy. The threats become more and more intensified when those states who want to take over the right of speak in SCS, we still see the military means out of our diplomatic efforts. When our policy options became less and
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Books on the topic "Compellence"

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Arquilla, John. Extended deterrence, compellence, and the "old world order". Rand, 1992.

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Pfundstein, Dianne R. Credibility is Not Enough: The United States and Compellent Threats, 1945-2011. [publisher not identified], 2012.

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Kroenig, Matthew. Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190849184.003.0006.

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This chapter examines whether nuclear superiority matters for compellent threats. Drawing on the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) data set, the same data set used by nuclear irrelevance theorists, it finds that the nuclear balance of power is central to patterns of international coercion. Indeed, the evidence is clear and compelling in simple descriptive statistics. Since 1945, nuclear-armed states have issued forty-nine compellent threats against nuclear inferior states and zero compellent threats against nuclear superior states. For nuclear-armed powers, therefore, in this sample of data,
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Iraq and Failures in U.S. Compellence Policy 1990-2003. Storming Media, 2004.

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Avoiding war: The role of land forces in deterrence and compellence. Rand, 2004.

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Gordon, John. Avoiding War: The Role of Land Forces in Deterrence and Compellence. RAND Corporation, 2004.

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Compellence and the strategic culture of imperial Japan: Implications for coercive diplomacy in the Twenty-first Century. Praeger, 2003.

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Department of Defense. Rising Dragon: Deterring China in 2035 - Social, Political, Economic, and Military Landscape, Space and Cyber Attack Capabilities, Compellence and Coercion, People's Liberation Army , Air Force. Independently Published, 2017.

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Valeriano, Brandon. Conclusion. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190618094.003.0008.

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This book emerges from a critical gap in the cyber security literature. Scholars and policy makers alike have struggled to examine cyber coercion empirically. Despite limitations inherent in collecting data on covert action, without systematically examining cyber exchanges it is difficult to understand contemporary strategic competition. What is the purpose of cyber coercion? How do rival states align ends, ways, and means? Does it work? There are constraints and challenges in applying new methods of influence to coerce a target to change their behavior. Compellence is difficult and costly, re
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Treverton, Gregory F. Framing Compellent Strategies. RAND Corporation, 2000.

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Book chapters on the topic "Compellence"

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Lebow, Richard Ned. "Deterrence and Compellence." In A Democratic Foreign Policy. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21519-4_4.

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Hesse, Valeriia. "Russia’s Hybrid Nuclear Compellence: Intentions and Consequences." In NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics. Springer Netherlands, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-2266-5_17.

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Soesanto, Stefan, and Max Smeets. "Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future." In NL ARMS. T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_20.

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AbstractThe question on whether and how deterring an adversary in or through cyberspace is feasible has provoked the minds of scholars and practitioners for decades. Today, cyber deterrence remains a quintessential anchoring concept for the political debates on cyber policy. However, does the concept of deterrence in cyberspace have a future when for almost three decades little to no seemingly feasible practical solutions nor an academic consensus have emerged? The purpose of this chapter is to situate the current debate on cyber deterrence within the historical evolution of deterrence thinkin
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Preston, Thomas. "Deterrence, Compellence, and Containment in the Trump Foreign Policy: Comparing Present and Past Strategies of American Leadership." In The Trump Doctrine and the Emerging International System. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45050-2_6.

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Echevarria II, Antulio J. "Deterrence and compellence." In Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780197760154.003.0004.

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Abstract Compellence simply means compelling adversaries to do something, while deterrence is dissuading opponents from doing something. Together, these strategies constitute the fundamental dynamic driving most peacetime and wartime situations, at the highest echelons of diplomacy as well as the lowest levels of tactics. From the standpoint of military strategy, it is rarely sufficient to compel one’s foes to do something; usually one must also deter them from doing something else. Both strategies require similar conditions for success: reliable knowledge of one’s opponent, credible military
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Kirchner, Emil, and James Sperling. "Policies of compellence." In EU security governance. Manchester University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7765/9781526130945.00012.

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Perkovich, George, and Toby Dalton. "Non-Violent Compellence." In Not War, Not Peace? Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199467495.003.0007.

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Schaub, Gary. "Compellence: Resuscitating the Concept." In Strategic Coercion. Oxford University PressOxford, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198293491.003.0003.

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Abstract The use of force and threats to use force are standard fare in the practice and study of international politics. Assumptions that anarchy best characterizes the international system have directed theoretical attention to the potential use of force by any international actor against any other. Of course, both practitioners and scholars have realized, as did the Athenians at Melos, that it is much more cost effective to achieve their goals through the threat of force as opposed to using force. Given this, one may suspect that any basic textbook on international relations would have exte
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Mazarr, Michael J., Don M. Snider, and James A. Blackwell. "The Failure of Compellence." In Desert Storm. Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429034763-4.

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"Between Deterrence and Compellence." In Warriors in Washington. Cambridge University Press, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009626958.005.

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Reports on the topic "Compellence"

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Altindag, Duha, Naci Mocan, and Jie Zhang. Deterrence and Compellence in the Parliament. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28532.

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Plehn, Michael T. The Sharpest Sword: Compellence, Clausewitz, and Counterinsurgency. Defense Technical Information Center, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada477040.

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Grosner, Brian. Iraq - A Proposal for a Strategy of Compellence. Defense Technical Information Center, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada442514.

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