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Wang, Chingning. "Theorizing strategic IT compensation decisions coping with certainty in organizations through IT compensation /." Related electronic resource:, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1407687901&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=3739&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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El, Diri Malek Taisir Mohammed. "Earnings management, management compensation, managerial ability and market competition." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15572/.
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As a result of the agency problem, earnings management may take place due to the high contracting costs, shareholders’ bounded rationalities, and information asymmetry. Therefore, three main groups of motives have been identified to explain earnings management behaviour at the contracting, capital market, and external levels. While the previous studies have individually examined those motives, this thesis provides evidence that they interact in determining earnings management behaviour. The first empirical chapter of this thesis focuses on the contracting factors and examines the impact of earnings management on executive compensation conditioned on managerial ability. It finds that managers who utilize accrual earnings management receive higher compensation than those who undertake real earnings management. However, high quality managers are rewarded less for accrual earnings management and punished less for real earnings management. The second empirical chapter examines the non-linear effect of market concentration as an external motive of earnings management. It documents that accrual earnings management increases in concentrated markets as the quantity of information decreases. However, the sophisticated real earnings management starts to substitute for discretionary accruals at higher levels of market concentration when the quality of information declines. The third empirical chapter combines factors from the contracting and external motives. It examines the effect of market competition on the relationship between managerial ability and earnings management. The results show that in the face of increased competition, high quality managers manipulate earnings via accruals rather than more costly real earnings management. Overall, the results of this thesis show that management compensation is a crucial factor in assessing the costs of earnings management at the firm level. An optimal level of market concentration exists and should be considered by the regulators. Finally, understanding how industry level factors influence managerial decisions at the firm level is essential to explaining earnings management behaviour.
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Muslu, Volkan. "Effect of board independence on incentive compensation and compensation disclosure : evidence from Europe." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33660.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2005.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-42).<br>My thesis examines how the lack of board-of-director independence affects the structure and disclosure of executive compensation. I find that European companies with more insiders on their boards grant their executives more incentive compensation, after controlling for the level and economic determinants of executive compensation. This effect is more pronounced in countries with less protection for outside shareholders. The companies with more insiders on their boards also disclose more transparent information about executive compensation. Overall, my evidence supports the contracting hypothesis, in which capital market investors understand potential detrimental effects of insiders and drive companies to mitigate these effects through greater incentive compensation and improved compensation disclosure. The evidence is inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, in which risk-averse insiders grant themselves more fixed pay and disclose less transparent information about their compensation.<br>by Volkan Muslu.<br>Ph.D.
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Prato, Michael V. "Reactive power compensation using an energy management system." Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43982.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited<br>A significant contributor to higher energy costs and reduced energy efficiency is the reactive power demand on the grid. Inductive power demand reduces power factor, increases energy losses during transmission, limits real power supplied to the consumer, and results in higher costs to the consumer. Compensating for a reactive power demand on the grid by providing reactive power support to the power distribution system creates energy efficiency gains and improves cost savings. One method of compensating for reactive power is by incorporating an energy management system (EMS) into the power distribution system. An EMS can monitor reactive power requirements on the grid and provide reactive power support at the point of common coupling (PCC) in the power distribution system in order to increase energy efficiency. The use of an EMS as a current source to achieve a unity power factor at the grid is demonstrated in this thesis. The power factor angle was determined using a zero-crossing detection algorithm. The appropriate amount of compensating reactive current was then injected into the system at the PCC and controlled using closed-loop current control. The process was simulated using Simulink and then validated in the laboratory using the actual EMS hardware.
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Silva, Samiria Maria Oliveira da. "Compensation and risk management mechanism in water allocation." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2015. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=14819.
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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico<br>The process of water allocation between different and competing uses in an uncertain climate scenario reinforces the motivation to study risk management of water systems. In this way, the purpose of this study is to propose the incorporation of a climate risk management mechanism in the process of water allocation, aiming an equitable and efficient management of these resources. For this, an aggregate model consisting of a reservoir of regulation and two users (urban supply and irrigation) was used to build and evaluate a financial mechanism. Afterwards, a disaggregation model consisting of multiple reservoirs was used to apply the concepts defined in the previous model. Initially, an indicator was chosen to be used as a trigger for the financial mechanism. This trigger started the mechanism whenever any rigorous state of drought in the water system was detected, which were classified in four different types: moderate drought, severe drought, extreme drought and exceptional drought. The amount of compensation was calculated based on the benefits achieved by the sector that lost water guarantee during the scarcity period. This evaluation was performed by the application of two methods for apportioning the water availability: linear apportionment and priority system. The available water flow for allocation was calculated using the reservoir operation strategy with inflows zero in the semester of the year. However, the incorporation of climate information in the process was also tested. Two triggers were proposed for the financial mechanism: Drought indices and Rationing level. The drought indices were built based on the average precipitation (standardized precipitation index), the inflow (standardized index flow) and the final volume of system operation (synthetic index). The rationing level mechanism is based on the available water flow for allocation and it was chosen due to its existing relation with the volume stored. This relationship allows the trigger to perform well both for the drought detection probability as for the false alarm. In addition, a conceptual framework for incorporating the financial mechanism to charge for the water use was elaborated, as well as an evaluation of the performance of the system as for the incorporation of the financial mechanism through two indicators: economic efficiency and equity (allocative justice). The performance evaluation showed that the payment of compensation in a period of drought due higher warranty (priority) of other uses operates to a greater equity and efficiency in water allocation. In order to keep the funds collected by the charge to cover the compensation, a regularization fund that has annual revenues of parcels carried out by the urban water supply and by the government was created. This regularization fund ensures the financial sustainability and also a good ability to adapt the incorporation mechanism to the collect instrument. Consequently, the financial compensation is a viable option for both water managers, who will have greater flexibility in their decisions, as well as for the water resources system, that will have more equity in their process of water allocation.<br>O processo de alocaÃÃo de Ãgua entre usos diferentes e conflitantes em um cenÃrio de incerteza climÃtica reforÃa a motivaÃÃo para estudar a gestÃo de riscos em sistemas hÃdricos. Dessta forma, o presente estudo propÃe a incorporaÃÃo de um mecanismo de gestÃo de risco climÃtico no processo de alocaÃÃo de recursos hÃdricos visando o gerenciamento equitativo e eficiente desses recursos. Para isso, utilizou-se um modelo agregado composto por um reservatÃrio de regularizaÃÃo e dois usuÃrios abastecimento urbano e irrigaÃÃo, para construir e avaliar o mecanismo financeiro. Em seguida, utilizou-se um modelo desagregado, com mÃltiplos reservatÃrios, para aplicar os conceitos definidos no modelo anterior. Inicialmente, foi definido um indicador para ser utilizado como gatilho do mecanismo financeiro. Esse gatilho acionou o mecanismo sempre que foi detectado algum estado de severidade seca no sistema hÃdrico, sendo utilizado quatro estados: seca moderada, seca severa, seca extrema e seca excepcional. O valor da compensaÃÃo foi calculado com base nos benefÃcios alcanÃados pelo setor que perdeu garantia hÃdrica no perÃodo de escassez. Essa avaliaÃÃo foi realizada por meio da aplicaÃÃo de dois mÃtodos de rateio das disponibilidades hÃdricas: rateio linear e sistema de prioridades. A vazÃo disponÃvel para alocaÃÃo foi determinada utilizando a estratÃgia de operaÃÃo do reservatÃrio com afluÃncias zero no semestre do ano. Entretanto, tambÃm testou-se a incorporaÃÃo da informaÃÃo climÃtica nesse processo. Foram propostos dois gatilhos para o mecanismo financeiro: Ãndices de seca e NÃvel de Racionamento. Os Ãndices de seca foram construÃdos com base na precipitaÃÃo mÃdia (Ãndice padronizado de precipitaÃÃo), na vazÃo afluente (Ãndice padronizado de escoamento) e no volume final da operaÃÃo do sistema (Ãndice sintÃtico). O nÃvel de racionamento possuiu como base a vazÃo disponÃvel para alocaÃÃo (retirada controlada). A escolha dessa variÃvel deu-se pela relaÃÃo existente entre ela e o volume armazenado Essa relaÃÃo permite que o gatilho obtenha um bom desempenho tanto para a probabilidade de detecÃÃo de seca quanto para o falso alarme. AlÃm disso, elaborou-se uma base conceitual para incorporar o mecanismo financeiro a cobranÃa pelo uso da Ãgua e avaliou-se o desempenho do sistema quanto à incorporaÃÃo do mecanismo financeiro por meio de dois indicadores, eficiÃncia econÃmica e equidade (justiÃa alocativa). A avaliaÃÃo de desempenho mostrou que o pagamento da compensaÃÃo em um perÃodo de seca devido à maior garantia (prioridade) de outros usos opera no sentido de uma maior equidade e eficiÃncia na alocaÃÃo de Ãgua. No intuito de guardar os recursos financeiros arrecadados pela cobranÃa para a cobertura das compensaÃÃes propÃs-se um fundo de regularizaÃÃo que possui parcelas de arrecadaÃÃo anual realizadas pelo abastecimento urbano e pelo governo. O fundo de regularizaÃÃo garante a sustentabilidade financeira e a incorporaÃÃo do mecanismo ao instrumento de cobranÃa uma boa capacidade de adaptaÃÃo ao sistema. Assim, a compensaÃÃo financeira à uma opÃÃo viÃvel tanto para os gestores de recursos hÃdricos que terÃo maior flexibilidade nas suas decisÃes quanto para o sistema de recursos hÃdricos que terà maior equidade no seu processo de alocaÃÃo de Ãgua.
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Kley, Friedrich [Verfasser]. "Executive Compensation : Three Essays on Managerial Risk-Taking, Long-Term Orientation, and Convergence in Executive Compensation / Friedrich Kley." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2017. http://d-nb.info/116048063X/34.
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HOLDER, ANTHONY DEWAYNE. "Earnings Management and Compensation: Do Compensation Committees Distinguish between Future Prospect Signaling and Opportunistic Accounting Choices?" University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1211908924.
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Holder, Anthony Dewayne. "Earnings management and compensation do compensation committees distinguish between future prospect signaling and opportunistic accounting choices? /." Cincinnati, Ohio : University of Cincinnati, 2008. http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/view.cgi?ucin1211908924.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Cincinnati, 2008.<br>Committee/Advisors: Pradyot Sen PhD (Committee Chair), Davit Adut PhD (Committee Member), Christelle Viauroux PhD (Committee Member). Title from electronic thesis title page (viewed Aug.29, 2008). Keywords: Compensation; Earnings Management; Signal; Opportunistic. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.
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Grambo, Douglas. "The Effect of CEO Compensation on Real Earnings Management." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-172473.
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Real earnings management has been a subject of increasing debate ever since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the united states. As research has pointed towards real earnings management increasing this has sparked discussions on whether real earnings management is damaging to companies, or if it is benefiting them, or if it lies somewhere in between. Forthis paper we wanted to examine how the financial incentives of a CEO would affect the usage of real earnings management. Are CEO’s being poorly motivated, and as a result harming their companies? To guide the paper,we decide to formulate our research question thusly: How do different forms of CEO compensation affect real earnings management? In this paper we attempt to find correlations between indicators of realearnings management and threedifferent forms of CEO compensation. For our indicators we follow to a paper by Roychowdhury, titled “Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation”and calculate abnormal cash flow from operations, and abnormal production. These indicate usageof overproduction, reduction of discretionary expenses, and moving sales across periods (Roychowdhury, 2006). For forms of CEO compensation,we measure them as a ratio of total compensation. We track salary, bonuses, and stock ownership. In our results we can see that all three of these are significantly correlated to both of our real earnings management indicators. Bonuses have a positive correlation to abnormal production, and a negative correlation to abnormal cash flow from operations. Salary is positively correlated to both our indicators, and ownership is negatively correlated to both our indicators. Our final conclusion is that yes, the makeup of a CEO’s compensation has a significant effect on the usage of real earnings management within the company.
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Su, Yu. "Eco-compensation, water management and political power in China." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/276677.
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A growing number of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes are being implemented in developing and developed countries alike in order to effect some internalisation of environmental costs. In China schemes under the name of ‘eco-compensation’ are often considered to be similar to PES. Neither the term eco-compensation itself, nor the projects that are supposedly examples of eco-compensation have been subject to scrutiny. This thesis therefore aims to investigate eco-compensation in China, with particular emphasis on water-related programmes. The thesis begins with a comprehensive review of PES literature in order to establish the definition and essential characteristics of such schemes, and to enable an examination of how China’s eco-compensation differs from PES. The analysis of PES provides a framework for focusing on eco-compensation by examining voluntariness, project types, payment, actors, and scales. A broad-scale analysis of 19 Chinese schemes is then undertaken, and this reveals that eco-compensation projects predominantly involve government agents, often with different levels of government as service sellers and buyers; in China individual land users are only directly involved in a few cases. Literature suggests that PES schemes are not simply technical solutions, but are inherently political. Having undertaken this general survey, the political dimension of eco-compensation is then examined in two case studies in great detail, based on semi-structured interviews and project documents. The first case study is of the Xin’an River eco-compensation scheme in which an upstream provincial government is paid to protect water quality to benefit the downstream province. Drawing from studies of “scale”, this case explores the power relationships of central-provincial governments and intra-provincial governments in transboundary river water quality management, especially in the negotiation process of the eco-compensation scheme. It finds that the upstream government mobilises the concept of “eco-compensation” to persuade the downstream government to share the costs of protecting the river and to gain favourable terms in setting the water quality target, using the narrative of “climate change”. The central government adopts a tough stance on the issue of environment protection by the upstream government by setting water quality targets and by introducing basin management planning. This case suggests that eco-compensation is shaped by struggles and conflicts among different actors concerning their strategies in defining eco-compensation rules, and that eco-compensation can also reconfigure power dynamics among these actors. The second case study is of the Miyun Reservoir watershed scheme, in which farmers in the upstream of the contributing watersheds are paid to convert from growing paddy rice to less water-intensive crops, and to reduce fertiliser use. The declared purpose is to increase the water supply to Beijing city, and improve water quality. Applying a political ecology approach, the case examines the history of water provision to China’s capital city, showing that Beijing has been extracting water from its territory and beyond by using its political power. This eco-compensation scheme is just a part of this story. The case also shows that the eco-compensation is justified by framing the upstream agricultural water consumption as the cause of decreasing water flow, while ignoring that large-scale afforestation has significantly contributed to water shortages through the excessive consumption of water. Meanwhile, Beijing has ignored its own huge environmental impact on water quality. This case provides useful insights into how eco-compensation is shaped and framed according to certain priorities and interests, and that it can lead to control over access to water resources amongst the less powerful farmers in order to support water uses in the politically-dominant urban centre. This thesis suggests that although eco-compensation in some instances can be similar to PES, more often than not it is a mechanism used to adjust the relationships between different governments. It includes both incentive-based and regulatory components. That makes it a potentially effective arrangement for river basin water quality management, in spite of contested negotiations. But caution must be exercised, as it can also be used under the market logic by powerful actors to control water resources.
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Gao, Jie, and 高洁. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43278656.
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Gao, Jie. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43278656.
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Valentim, João Andrade e. Sousa Brito. "People management in the Portuguese nonprofits." Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/9859.
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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics<br>This study is focused on the People Management – Human Resources – in the
Portuguese nonprofit organizations. The objective of this research is to contribute to the
understanding of the nonprofit sector in terms of the human factor, and at the same time
intends to cast light on the factors that compensate and motivate employees.
Through a qualitative approach, after conducting a number of interviews to assorted
nonprofit organizations, we reach the result that more often than not these organizations
have fragile procedures in what concerns staffing, performance evaluation and training
& development. On the other hand, these organizations have an abundant human
acumen in what concerns compensation and motivation. The experience of volunteer
work supports this finding.
Given this, there is a vast array of knowledge that the social sector can transmit to the
private sector.
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Packard, Heidi A. "Why do firms disclose performance compensation targets?" Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105077.
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Thesis: S.M. in Management Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2016.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-81).<br>This paper analyzes the decision to disclose performance compensation targets that contain information about future profitability. I test the effect of factors expected to influence the decision to provide other expectation disclosures, e.g. management forecasts, as well as that of factors particular to the compensation setting. Results suggest that financial reporting concerns (as measured in Carter et al., 2007) along with pressure from the SEC influence performance target disclosure, and that the influence changes with the availability of management forecasts. I further test determinants of the level of performance target relative to a management forecast. I show institutional ownership is associated with higher performance targets relative to forecasts, while neither excess compensation, SEC pressure, nor financial reporting incentives appear to influence this difference.<br>by Heidi A. Packard.<br>S.M. in Management Research
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White, Derek Ronald. "Compensation design, incentives, and the portfolio manager /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Tian, Shu Banking & Finance Australian School of Business UNSW. "Executive compensation and firm performance." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. Banking and Finance, 2005. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/22417.
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This study considers the determination of the ex ante pay-performance relationship. A single-period partial equilibrium model is used to show that the executive income can be expressed as a function of the firm's return expressed in dollar terms. The executive income is jointly determined by the opening firm size and current return, which function as a managerial talent proxy and self-selection mechanism respectively. Comparing to Jensen and Murphy (1990) wealth-based Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS), this research presents an income-based PPS. The alternative PPS not only overcomes a misleading misspecification in Jensen and Murphy (1990), but also corrects Rosen's (1992) argument for only including return in the pay performance relationship. This research finds empirically that both the opening firm size and stock return play a significant role in determining executive income. This study provides supplementary evidence to Murphy's (1986) Learning Model. However, shareholder income may not be an ideal performance measure in capturing the multi-period pay-performance relationship.
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Kim, Hyondong. "Strategic impacts of compensation system on organizational outcomes an empirical study of the conceptualizations of fit and flexibility in the compensation design /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1141829742.
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Guzzetta, Judith T. "Executive compensation : performance for pay." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24519.
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Chang, Fong Long. "Computer-aided calibration for compensation maps of engine management systems." Thesis, University of Macau, 2008. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b1942994.
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Lindström, Anna, and Johanna Svensson. "Top Management Compensation and Firm Performance : A matter of context?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-298209.
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During the past decades, CEO and board compensation has increased substantially. Top management compensation and firm performance has been an extensively researched subject, and a large amount of previous studies have examined the relation of top management pay and firm performance. However, the findings and discussions have been contradictory and inconsistent. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if there is a relationship between the top management variable compensation and firm performance. We aim to explore this subject in further depth by focusing on the Swedish context and by studying if contextual issues, in terms of different industries, have an impact on this relation. In order to examine this relation multiple regression analysis were performed. The empirical evidence displays that on a general level, incentive systems of the top management have no significant effect on firm performance. We also conclude that the relation of variable pay and performance is contingent on industry. We therefore argue that the context in which the firm operates has an impact on the investigated relation in this thesis. Furthermore, the Swedish context and the Swedish governance model can be considered as one of the main explanations of the attained result.
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Kagumya, Elias. "Compensation Strategies That Support Commercial Banks’ Effective Risk Management Practices." ScholarWorks, 2020. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/7675.
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Compensation structures with relatively high levels of contingent pay encouraged managers to engage in excessive risk-taking behavior at financial institutions, which contributed to the global financial crisis of 2008. The purpose of this study, guided by the theory of the firm, was to explore compensation strategies that some executives in Uganda used to support effective risk-management practices. This multiple case study was an in-depth inquiry into compensation strategies that encouraged prudent risk-taking behavior. The target population comprised 5 risk-management executives from 5 separate commercial banks who had successfully implemented compensation strategies that supported risk management practices. Data were collected through semistructured interviews and a review of company documents. Data were analyzed using Yin’s approach and involved data coding, sorting, filtering, identifying relationships, confirming and linking emerging themes to the research question. Methodological triangulation and member checking were applied to ensure the credibility, validity, accuracy, and transferability of the results. Four themes emerged from data analysis: compensation challenges, financial and nonfinancial compensation, the effectiveness of compensation, and effective implementation of compensation strategies. The findings from the study may contribute to positive social change by driving the adoption of compensation strategies that motivate leaders to focus on the long-term objectives of the firm, including investing in socially responsive projects that improve the welfare of the communities in which the banks operate.
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Chun, Jae Uk. "Close and distant charismatic and contigent reward leadership multiple levels-of-management and multiple levels-of-analysis perspectives /." Diss., Online access via UMI:, 2006.
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Fulkerson, James. "The effects of a multidisciplinary case management method on the costs of a workers' compensation plan." Online version, 2002. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/2002/2002fulkersonj.pdf.
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Pence, Jessica. "The Deadweight Loss of Equity-Based Compensation." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2014. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/947.
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In order to maximize shareholder value, firms attempt to align the incentives of the executives with those of the shareholders by giving them equity as a portion of their compensation package. The terms associated with this equity compensation forces the executives to hold undiversified portfolios, resulting in a sizeable deadweight loss. This paper uses the formula developed by Meulbroek (2001)1 to calculate the dollar value of this deadweight loss, in order to quantify the costs associated with equity-based compensation. We find that the 56 executives in our data set have a combined deadweight loss of $70 billion, and that on average they are losing $1.25 billion each. These results raise the question of whether the incentive alignment is worth the large costs associated with it, and why firms continue to use equity as a form of compensation.
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Jonas, Gregory A. "An Empirical Study of Executive Management Team Compensation and Company Performance." VCU Scholars Compass, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10156/2061.
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Lin, Eric. "Essays on Human Capital and Executive Compensation." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:16881895.
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The contemporary executive career looks different from the “company man” era of post World War II. At that time, executives rose almost exclusively within a single firm, learning the business over many loyal years of service. Since the 1970s, firms have progressively relied more on external markets for filling its leadership ranks. As a result, the value of executives has become increasingly defined by capabilities portable across organizational settings. External markets have less information about executive abilities compared to incumbent employers, which strengthens the influence of externally observable signals of quality on executive career opportunities and compensation. Across three studies, this dissertation empirically explores how external markets value executive human capital attributes. In particular, this work focuses on how external markets differ from incumbent employers and explores implications for executives building their careers across multiple organizations.
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Miller, Robert. "An Empirical Study on CEO Turnover and Compensation." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/424.
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This paper studies a sample of CEOs from companies listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1992 to 2010, and confirms the theory that board members rely more heavily on firm performance measures for turnover and compensation decisions when less is known about the CEO’s ability. In this paper, I make two contributions to the literature. First, I confirm the empirical findings of literature with a new data set showing that the effect of firm performance on CEO turnover declines over a CEO's tenure. Second, I introduce a new tool, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, for testing the effects of CEO tenure on board member decisions. The evidence indicates that the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation declines over a CEO's tenure. Collectively, the results of this paper support the theory that board members gradually learn the CEO's ability over his tenure, therefore their decisions for turnover and compensation depend more on firm performance for a new CEO.
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Pan, Lee-Hsien. "Two essays on dividend policy, managerial compensation, and corporate governance." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
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Shabeeb, Ali Mohamed A. "Equity compensation incentives, earnings management, and corporate governance : the UK evidence." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599994.
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The current thesis aims to answer the following three research questions: 1) What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in the UK context? 2) Do equity incentives motivate UK executives to engage in opportunistic earnings management practices? 3) Can corporate governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management? To answer the first research question, a panel data set drawn from 215 UK FfSE-350 index companies and 1675 firm years for the period 2004-20 11 has been used to examine the effect of large set of corporate governance mechanisms on constraining earnings management. Based on the agency theory, we hypothesise that corporate governance mechanisms can inhibit managers from engaging in opportunistic earnings management practices. We use two proxies for earnings management: current discretionary accruals measured by performance adjusted model developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and total discretionary accruals as measured by the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (I995). We find that audit related mechanisms, such as audit committee's size, independence, and expertise as well as external audit efforts and quality (measured through audit fees), have a significant negative relationship with earnings management. Moreover, we find that non-audit fees have a significant positive effect on earnings management - supporting the argument that non-audit fees negatively affect an auditor's independence. Conversely, we find that board size and independence have moderate negative relationship with earnings management. To answer the second and third research questions, a panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations has been used to examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives' equity incentives and earnings management. Based on the managerial power approach, the current thesis hypothesises a positive association between executives' equity incentives and earnings management.
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Smith, Gavin Stuart Banking & Finance Australian School of Business UNSW. "Corporate governance: issues related to executive compensation, corporate boards and institutional investor monitoring." Publisher:University of New South Wales. Banking & Finance, 2008. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/40820.
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This dissertation contains five research projects within the context of two distinctive issues that concern the effectiveness of executive compensation in aligning executive interests with shareholders and how institutional investors play a role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms. The objective of this dissertation is to first determine how institutions should exert their influence if they are serious about alleviating agency problems and improving firm performance. Second, the thesis seeks to determine whether institutional investors use their influence to shape executive compensation and corporate governance mechanisms in a manner consistent with aligning managerial interests with shareholders and increasing shareholder wealth. The thesis finds that CEOs with option incentives increase the likelihood that a firm will increase risk by undertaking both major real investments and acquisitions. Moreover, CEO option grants are positively related to measures of firm valuation and operating performance suggesting option incentives are an important mechanism to align CEO interests with shareholders. This is robust to alternative measures of firm valuation and operating performance, also various estimation techniques. Using these findings to motivate the direction of institutional influence on executive compensation, it is found that institutional investors, particularly smaller activist traders, significantly increase option grant incentives received by executives. Institutional influence also raises CEO pay which is consistent with preservation of reservation CEO utility levels. Addressing the role of institutional investors in the context of other corporate governance mechanisms, it is found that institutional investor influence is also negatively related to board size and positively related to board independence, which is achieved by removal of inside directors. Such actions are consistent with empirical studies that show smaller boards and increased levels of independent directors improve firm performance and board decision making. The main conclusion from this dissertation is that option incentives are an effective mechanism to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. Institutional investors appear to recognise this importance, and effectively use their influence to increase options received by executives. Combined with institutional investors putting in place corporate boards that provide better oversight of management, institutional investors appear to be effective monitors of the firms in which they invest.
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Zobal, Cheryl. "Team Compensation Systems: a Survey and Analysis." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1998. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278119/.
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The purpose of this project was to examine team compensation systems and to evaluate the impact of their critical elements--level (what to motivate), compensation mixture (what rewards motivate), and employee perceptions (how to motivate)--on team effectiveness. Twenty-three organizations, 108 teams, and 769 team members participated in this study. Project results found that teams that utilized team level rewards, especially when associated with a complete compensation mixture, had significantly higher team effectiveness scores compared to teams that utilized only individual level rewards. With respect to employee perceptions, results found that: (a) perceptions of system understanding, measure controllability, pay-for-performance, and payout frequency, particularly, were significant components of employee compensation system satisfaction; and (b) employee compensation system satisfaction and perceptions of compensation system effectiveness were significantly related.
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Yik, Po-on Stephen. "Organizational constraint on salary administration /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1997. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B18840164.
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Zargarian, Herand Ron. "CEO Compensation and Performance in Publicly-Traded Hospitals| 2011-2016." Thesis, Northcentral University, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10840268.
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<p>Average compensation of a CEO of publicly-traded hospitals was about $4 million a year for the period 2011 to 2016. Their compensation is growing while people have a hard time to pay the medical bills. The passage of the Affordable Care Act of 2010 has a significant effect on the healthcare system specifically on hospital operations. Hospitals account for 32% of the total healthcare costs. Through the passage of the ACA, lawmakers intended to reduce costs and increase the quality of care. Publicly-traded entities because of the separation of the management (agent) and ownership (principal) have conflicts of interest that lead to agency problems and costs such as the cost of monitoring and low return to shareholders. The publicly-traded hospitals are no exception. Hospitals provide incentives to the CEOs to reduce these costs and align their and shareholders? objectives. The purpose of the quantitative study was to examine the following question. What correlation, if any, existed between CEO compensation and financial performance of the U.S. hospitals post the ACA Act of 2010 for 2011-2016? The following metrics, operating margin, return on assets, return on equity, occupancy rate, length of stay, and profit per discharge, were used to perform multiple regression analysis. Initially, seven hospitals were selected, but one hospital was excluded because of missing data. Spearman?s rho correlation was used because data violated some of the parametric assumptions. The Operating margin, occupancy rate, and profit per discharge variables were statistically significant in explaining the CEO compensation. Other variables affected the CEO compensation but were not statistically significant. Finally, including all six variables explained less than 30% of CEO compensation, which would indicate agency problems exist in the hospitals. Future studies should identify what other variables explain the change in CEO compensations
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Subramanian, Ashwin Srinath. "Enhancing microprocessor power efficiency through clock-data compensation." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/54471.
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The Smartphone revolution and the Internet of Things (IoTs) have triggered rapid advances in complex system-on-chips (SoCs) that increasing provide more functionality within a tight power budget. Highly power efficient on die switched-capacitor voltage regulators suffer from large output voltage ripple preventing their widespread use in modern integrated circuits. With technology scaling and increasing architectural complexity, the number of transistors switching in a power domain is growing rapidly leading to major issues with respect to voltage noise. The large voltage and frequency guard-bands present in current microprocessor designs to combat voltage noise both degrade the performance and erode the energy efficiency of the design. In an effort to reduce guard-bands, adaptive clocking based systems combat the problem of voltage noise by adjusting the clock frequency during a voltage droop to avoid timing failure. This thesis presents an integrated power management and clocking scheme that utilizes clock-data compensation to achieve adaptive clocking. The design is capable of automatically con figuring the supply voltage given a target clock frequency for the load circuit. Furthermore, during a voltage droop the design adjusts clock frequency to meet critical path timing margins while simultaneously increasing the current delivered to the load to recover from the droop. The design was implemented in IBM's 130nm technology and simulation results show that the design is able to clock the load circuit from 30 MHz to 800 Mhz with current efficiencies as high as 97%.
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Mulle, Oliver. "Management Compensation Auswirkungen von IFRS 2 auf die SMI-Geschäftsberichte 2004/2005 /." St. Gallen, 2005. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/00635292001/$FILE/00635292001.pdf.
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Suter, Reto. "Corporate governance & management compensation : Wertsteigerung durch Lösung des Manager-Investoren-Konflikts /." Zürich : Versus, 2000. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=008843631&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Wallace, James S. "Adopting residual income-based compensation plans : evidence of effects on management actions /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8791.
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Goil, Sarojni. "Compensation management." Thesis, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/2009/3225.
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Chen, Jun-Hua, and 陳君樺. "Compensation Committee, Governance Style and Abnormal Management Compensation." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/05475637542853840296.
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碩士<br>中國文化大學<br>會計學系<br>102<br>This study aims to examine the impact of compensation committee, governance style on managers’ abnormal compensation. To conduct this research, a sample consisting of listed companies trading in the Taiwan Stock Market in 2012 are used as investigated subjects and the abnormal compensation model developed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) is used to determine abnormal compensation. The findings indicate that abnormal management compensation is negatively associated with the ratio of committee members concurrently having professorship and professional credientials. Such a result shows that companies with higher professional qualificationns are less likely to allow their managers to have abnormal compensation. In addition, ths research finds that governace style is a moderating variable. The results demonstrate that companies adopting stewardship governance operations have less abnormal management compensation, compared to thoses with a agency governance style. Such results imply that governance styles affect the operations of the remuneration committee and that the committee under the seyle of stewardship governace gives less restrictions on their managemet compensation.
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Lee, Eddie, and 李仁豪. "Executive Compensation and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ctp6n8.
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碩士<br>東吳大學<br>會計學系<br>105<br>This paper examines the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management. The research sample includes all listed firms in Taiwan capital markets between year 2013 to 2015. The measures of the executive compensation, the accrual earnings management and the real earnings management follow the method developed by Albuquerque (2014), Kothari et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008). In order to test the executives using both accrued earnings management and real earnings management and considering the problem of endogenous variables in executive compensation and earnings management, a regression model of two-stage least squares (2SLS) is established. It is difficult to explain the complete earning management activities with only one single management tool
to know whether the executives will manipulate the surplus for their own salary. Therefore, this study explores how the executives use different kinds of management tools for earnings management, and analyzes their relationship to the executives.
When the executives use the earnings management tool, the empirical results show that the executive compensation and accrued earnings management are not significantly related. On the other hand, executive compensation and real earnings management showed a negative correlation, showing higher-level executive compensation higher, the lower the degree of real earnings management.
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Li, Zhi-Ling, and 李芷綾. "The Impact of Compensation Committee Characteristics on Exective Management Compensation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/31609107490349534475.
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碩士<br>中國文化大學<br>會計學系<br>104<br>This study is to examine the effects of independence, profession, and work involvement of compensation committees on abnormal executive compensation. To conduct this research, non-financial firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange are used as a sample, and independence is measured by the ratio of the number of independent directors relative to the total committee members, profession by the ratio of the number of members concurrently having professorship or professional credentials relative to the total committee members, work involvement by the attendance frequency and the number of meetings held by compensation committees. The results show that independence as well as profession do not individually affect abnormal executive compensation. However, the interaction variable of independence and profession is significantly associated with abnormal executive compensation, indicating that there exists the interactive effect of independence and profession on abnormal executive compensation. This study thus suggests that, in order to improve the rationality of executive compensation, independence and profession of compensation committees should be risen at the same time. In addition, the study demonstrates that the number of meetings is positively related to abnormal fixed executive compensation, showing that companies with more meetings have higher abnormal fixed executive compensation. Such a result implies that an overly high number of meetings may be caused by irrational executive reward policy.
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YEH, CHING CHYUAN, and 葉清泉. "THE RELATION OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING, COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT, AND COMPENSATION SATISFACTION --THE EMPLOYEES OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES." Thesis, 1994. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96941204095808120013.
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碩士<br>國立中山大學<br>企業管理研究所<br>82<br>In view of frequent confrontation between employers and labors,
of which the compensation was always the main struggling point.
this thesis therefore selected the employees of manufacturing
industries as sampling sample to study the relation of labor-
management bargaining, compensation management, and
compensation satisfaction, for seeking some practical proposals
to enable the both sides to improve the channel of bargaining
and compensation management system, resulting a harmonic
relationship between labor and enterprises. On the basis of
Modified Discrepancy Model develped by Heneman & Schwab, this
study established a theoretical framework by adding new
variable-labor management bargaining. Qestionaire examination
method was conducted to collect the data from subjects that was
randomly selected from one thousand biggest manufacturing
firms. According to the special booklet entitled " 1993 THE
LARGEST CORPORATIONS IN TAIWAN " published by CHINA CREDIT
INFORMATION SERVICE LTD. Main finding were: a.Most of labor
perceived the union as major bargaining channel for labor
management relation, by which, they can acquire a higher
compensation level as a result of a higher compensation
satisfaction. b.The labors are concerned very much about
employee benefits. Most of benefit programs are bargainned with
employers through welfare committee. The correlation between
benefit satisfaction and compensation satisfaction is positive.
c.The labor perceived a higher compensation level as well as a
higher compensation satisfaction if the employers can take
their opinions of compensation into consideration.
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Chen, Ya-Chi, and 陳雅琪. "Expatriate Compensation Management in Taiwan Industry." Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88310196458392579094.
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Fan, Yu-Mei, and 范玉梅. "Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/14051524220658902924.
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碩士<br>輔仁大學<br>會計學系碩士班<br>97<br>The thesis examines the relationship between executive stock option compensation and earnings management. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter non- financial companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2007. The empirical results are summarized as follows.
1. When the stock option will be granted to executive in the following year, the magnitude and the likelihood of negative earnings management will increase if the top executive also take the position of the chair of the board.
2. When the stock options granted to executive will be vested in the following year, the magnitude of positive earnings management will increase.
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Yu-Sheng, Wang, and 王佑生. "The Effects of Top Management Compensation and Compensation Dispersion on Organizations Performance." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/23302955319138369540.
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碩士<br>東海大學<br>企業管理學系碩士班<br>96<br>The thesis examines the influences of different forms of compensation on a firm’s performance on top management. In addition, it also takes the point of view from compensation theory based on economic and behavioral concepts to examine how compensation dispersion affects performance. With the higher degree of complexity and internationalization in modern business environment, the informational complexity that top management confronts with will certainly affect the relationships among compensation forms, compensation dispersion, and performance. The thesis collected data from TEJ and Market Observation Post System and chose top management’s compensation information from 2000 to 2005 from listed companies to proceed the pooled regression analysis. The result shows that different forms of compensation and compensation dispersion do have influences on a firm’s performance, which supports most of the hypotheses. However, the influence of informational complexity on performance is not significant.
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Lin, Jun-Ting, and 林俊廷. "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance,and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/yp5a5j.
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碩士<br>國立東華大學<br>企業管理學系<br>96<br>The purposes of this study are to investigate how do the structure of managers’ compensation, the characteristics of direct board and the proportion of ownership affect the managers’ behaviors in opportunistic earning management. This study will discuss the hypothesis by using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient, the statistics of description, the regression analysis, t-test, VIF etc. to verify the relations between all those variables.
The conclusions of this study are: (1) the relationship between compensation and earning management is positive. It means that if managers’ compensation plan is based on accounting numbers, managers will be more likely to manipulate discretionary accrual to earn more returns. So, managers’ compensation plan is unable to mitigate agency costs and becomes one of earning management incentives.(2) in order to let the managers be more consistent with shareholder's benefits, directors of boards will issue stocks to managers. But based on the results, when managerial ownership become higher, managers will become more easier to control directors of boards and pursue their self-interests. Consequently, agency costs will become more seriously.
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Chen, Chao-Jung, and 陳昭蓉. "Family control, debt, and top management compensation." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/88496050722419893445.
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博士<br>國立政治大學<br>會計研究所<br>97<br>This paper investigates the variable compensation of top management teams. Prior literature suggests that compensation policy can help firms reduce the agency problem between principals and agents. Most of these studies, however, emphasize the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and only a few examine those between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and debtholders. This study investigates the effects of family control and debt on top management compensation, respectively. The empirical results show that, on average, family-controlled firms are associated with a lower proportion of variable compensation, which is consistent with the alignment effect. However, family-controlled firms with greater control divergence and whose CEO is a family member, which gives rise to a central agency problem, pay higher variable compensation to family top management, as evident in the non-electronic industry. Furthermore, the empirical results find a U-shaped relationship between debt and top management compensation. In addition, the monitoring effect of long-term bank debt on top management compensation is greater than that of short-term bank debt and common bond. Finally, the monitoring effect of debt on top management compensation is weaker in family-controlled firms than in non-family-controlled firms.
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Pin-HsuanChiou and 邱品璇. "Impacts of Earnings Management on CEO Compensation." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68219042419495283186.
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Jaiteh, Fatoumatta, and 賈華瑪. "Top management team (TMT) compensation and innovation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70066490645177049925.
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碩士<br>元智大學<br>財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程)<br>104<br>This study examined the relationship between TMT different compensation packages and innovation. We provide evidence that both TMT cash and options compensation has a positive impact on corporate new product introduce (innovation). On the other hand we show that TMT stock compensation have a negative impact on innovation. We also find that unvested option is more effective in promoting innovation that vested options. We do further robustness’ test to control for endogeneity problem, the 2SLS result show that our previous findings are not affected by endogeneity issues.
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Yang, Chingyi, and 楊靜宜. "Corporate Governance and Compensation of Top Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70035190835335451225.
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碩士<br>靜宜大學<br>會計學系<br>101<br>In a decade year, public companies have suffered from operating loss due to financial crisis and economic recession. However, some executives of those companies have been overpaid compensation regardless of shareholders’ sufferings. To hinder a growing agency cost, authorities acclaim to mitigate executives’ self-interests with mechanism of corporate governance. This study examines the cause-effect relationship between corporate governance and overpaid executives’ compensation from perspectives of board structure, ownership structure and disclosure transparency, respectively. After investigating into 2,016 public companies during the period from 2005 to 2010, the study find that the busier the independent directors and/or the higher institutional shareholdings, the higher likelihood executives are overpaid. Controlling for industry characteristics, the study finds that the shareholdings of directors and supervisors is a significant factor resulting in overpaid executive compensation in the traditional manufacturing, chemical and biotech, and electronic industries. For public companies in the chemical and biotech and electronic industries, duality is another significant factor contributing to overpaid executive compensation.