Relevant bibliographies by topics / Compensations and incentives

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Compensations and incentives'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 11 September 2021
Last updated: 18 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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Ohnuma, Hiroshi. "Does executive compensation reflect equity risk incentives and corporate tax avoidance? A Japanese perspective." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 2 (2014): 60–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2p5.

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This study examines corporate tax avoidance as a determinant of executive compensation on the basis of equity risk incentives. Previous research shows that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make more risky, but positive net present value—investment decisions. Through correlation analyses, this study demonstrates that the tax risk measures adopted in this study are negatively associated with both the adoption of stock options and tax aggressive measures. Through multivariate analyses, this study demonstrates that executive compensations are significantly associated with our measures of tax risk positions despite the inclusion of several control variables. Moreover, this study finds consistent evidence that executive equity risk incentives are significantly associated with aggressive tax positions, regardless of the estimation method and the strength of the corporate governance function, and across several tax risk measures.
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Xue, Jiao, Heng Fan, and Zhanxun Dong. "Compensations of Top Executives and M&A Behaviors: An Empirical Study of Listed Companies." International Journal of Financial Studies 8, no. 4 (October 23, 2020): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijfs8040064.

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This study empirically examines the relationship between executive compensation and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) behaviors by identifying the influence of short- and long-term incentive on the propensity and scale of M&A. When the short-term incentive is insufficient, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial compensation mechanism. Thus, lack of executives’ incentive promotes the propensity to engage in M&A and significantly affects the scale of M&A. With regard to long-term incentives, M&A behaviors serve as a beneficial creation mechanism. Shareholding of executives promotes M&A propensity, and does not significantly affect the scale of M&A. This study significantly contributes to research in M&A behaviors by revealing the beneficial distribution mechanisms of M&A behaviors.
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Matović, Ivana Marinović. "Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries." Economic Themes 57, no. 2 (June 1, 2019): 181–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ethemes-2019-0011.

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AbstractExecutive compensations have a strong motivation role in contemporary business organizations. Adequate models of compensation enable attracting and retaining the high-capacity managers. This way, business organization conquers and maintains the competitive position in the context of globalization. It is necessary to align the executive compensation with the business organization’s strategy, which requires careful process of planning, done by the highest levels of management and ownership. The main objective of the paper is to explore and compare the structure and the level of executive compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU countries. The paper focuses on executive compensation components, primarily long-term and short-term incentives, as well as sallary and benefits. A comparative analysis of executive compensation models was performed to explain the differences in the observed countries.The study found large and disproportionate differences in the executive compensation levels, conditioned mostly by the economic development of the observed economies.
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Park, Soo Yeon, and Kwan Hee Yoo. "CEO Career Concerns And Voluntary Disclosure." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 32, no. 6 (November 2, 2016): 1603. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v32i6.9811.

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This paper investigates the relation between Chief Executive Officers (CEO) career concerns and voluntary disclosures using listed firm (KOSPI) data in Korea. Prior research suggests that explicit incentives in the form of CEO stock-based compensation or CEO’s equity ownership mitigate the agency problems of reluctance to make voluntary disclosure. In addition, implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are as important as explicit incentives for mitigating agency problems.The labor market assesses CEOs ability and CEO reputation in the market is a valuable asset that is associated with many long-term benefits, such as better future compensation, reappointment in the position, and greater managerial autonomy. CEOs are concerned about such an assessment and these concerns are referred to as career concerns. However, the market has incomplete information about CEOs’ ability especially when the CEOs have short tenures as a CEO position. Hence, CEOs with short tenures have more strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market so that they can build proper reputation.Implicit incentives arising from CEO career concerns are measured by CEO tenure. I assume that short-tenured CEOs are more career-concerned than long-tenured CEOs. I find that CEOs with short tenures tend to more likely disclose management forecasts. I interpret this result that more career-concerned CEOs have strong incentives to signal their ability to the labor market in order to build their reputations which affect their future payoffs such as compensations and reappointment. In addition, management forecasts, means of voluntary disclosure, are used as effective mechanism. I also find that CEOs with short tenures tend to disclose more accurate management forecasts. This result implies that CEOs with more career concerns have more pressure to provide accurate forecasts because of their reliability in the labor market. Based on these empirical results, I infer that CEOs’ implicit incentives affect their voluntary disclosure decision.This study will contribute to academics and disclosure-related practitioners by documenting about CEOs’ career concerns and their voluntary disclosure decisions.
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Bolfek, Berislav, Perina Torbarina, and Lucija Surać. "Struktura i faktori koji utječu na utvrđivanje kompenzacija izvršnih menadžera." Oeconomica Jadertina 6, no. 2 (November 12, 2017): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15291/oec.1343.

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Executive managers represent a small precentage of one companies workers but they are the most important group of employees. The ideal compensation management policy ensures that the best talent will remain with the organization while attracting new talent and minimizing turnover. Executive compensation normally combines base salary, short-term and long-term incentives, benefits and bonuses. The purpose of this paper is to explore and analyse data about stucture and factors that affect executive compensation determination of top five global brands. The collected data on the hight of executive compensations refer to the period from 2010 to 2015. Selected executives are leaders of the companies that are ranked as the top five global brands on Interbrands 2015 list. CEO pay in the U.S. has grown exponentially since the 1970s. The CEO-to-worker pay ratio trend indicates that the ratio keeps rising over the years, with some CEOs making more than 400 times the median salary of their employees. Some analyst recommend that every company's compensation system should include implementing certain regulatory actions, using different metrics for determining CEO compensation, making board member-CEO relationships transparent to all company stakeholders.
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Croci, Ettore, Eric Nowak, and Olaf Ehrhardt. "The corporate governance endgame – minority squeeze-out regulation and post-deal litigation in Germany." Managerial Finance 43, no. 1 (January 9, 2017): 95–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-01-2016-0032.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique hand-collected data, the authors carry out the first detailed analysis of the German squeeze-out offers from the announcement to the outcome of post-deal litigation, examining also the determinants of the decision to squeeze-out minority investors. Design/methodology/approach Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, the authors analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011 to carry out the first detailed analysis of the squeeze-out procedure and the post-deal litigation. The authors employ the event study methodology to assess the stock market reaction around the announcement of the squeeze-out. Findings Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Post-deal litigation is widespread: nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders. Additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time. Overall, the evidence suggests that starting post-deal litigation by challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors. Research limitations/implications The lack of data concerning the identity of minority shareholders in firms undergoing a squeeze-out does not allow a proper investigation of the incentives of the different types of investors. Practical implications The paper provides evidence about the incentives of the different players in a squeeze-out offer. The findings of the paper could be helpful in assessing the impact of the squeeze-out rule. The results also contribute to the understanding of minority investors’ incentives to start post-deal litigation. Originality/value This paper provides new evidence about post-deal litigation, in particular how investors use the procedures that the system provides them to protect themselves against controlling shareholders. The paper examines all the phases of the squeeze-out procedure and challenges.
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McConaughy, Daniel L. "Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance." Family Business Review 13, no. 2 (June 2000): 121–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-6248.2000.00121.x.

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This study examines CEO compensation in 82 founding-family-controlled firms; 47 CEOs are members of the founding family and 35 are not. It tests the family incentive alignment hypothesis, which predicts that family CEOs have superior incentives for maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives. Univariate and multivariate analyses show that family CEOs' compensation levels are lower and that they receive less incentive-based pay—confirming the family incentive alignment hypothesis and suggesting the possible need for family firms to increase CEO compensation when they replace a founding family CEO with a nonfamily-member CEO.
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Chee, Seungmin, Wooseok Choi, and Jae Eun Shin. "The Non-Linear Relationship Between CEO Compensation Incentives And Corporate Tax Avoidance." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 33, no. 3 (April 28, 2017): 439–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9935.

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This study examines the effect of CEO compensation incentives on corporate tax avoidance. Unlike prior literature that assumes a monotonic relation between executive compensation incentives and tax avoidance, we find a non-linear relation between the two. Specifically, we find that CEO compensation incentives exhibit a positive relation with corporate tax avoidance at low levels of compensation incentives, whereas they show a negative relation at high levels of compensation incentives. We further find that the non-linear relationship between CEO compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance does not exist for the subsample of S&P500 firms. Collectively, we provide evidence of the two counter effective forces, namely, - the incentive alignment effect and the risk-reducing effect, - that help explain the effect of CEO compensation incentives on tax avoidance.
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Chance, Don M., and Tung-Hsiao Yang. "The Tradeoff Between Compensation and Incentives in Executive Stock Options." Quarterly Journal of Finance 01, no. 04 (December 2011): 733–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010139211000225.

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Because stock options have a dual role as both compensation and incentives, a portion of option value represents compensation and a portion represents incentives. We develop a model that measures the tradeoff between the compensation and incentive values of options. Empirical estimates over a 14-year period show that the median option contains $1.08 of incentives for every $1.00 of compensation and that option compensation is around 30% of total compensation. We also find that firms that use options more as a compensation device use fewer options and reduce other cash payments suggesting a resourceful and not abusive use of options.
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Gittoes, Elise, Elias Mpofu, and Lynda R. Matthews. "Rehabilitation Counsellor Preferences for Rural Work Settings: Results and Implications of an Australian Study." Australian Journal of Rehabilitation Counselling 17, no. 1 (June 1, 2011): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/jrc.17.1.1.

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AbstractThis study sought to identify influences on rehabilitation counsellors' preference to work in rural areas, including their recruitment to, and retention in, rural work settings. Participants were 38 practicing rehabilitation counsellors (31% males) recruited through the Australian Society of Rehabilitation Counsellors and the Rehabilitation Counselling Association of Australasia. The mean age of participants was 38.67 years (SD= 12.9 years, age range, 25 to 65 years). Nineteen (50%) were working in rural areas at the time of the survey. A specifically designed survey, the Work Setting Preference Inventory (WSPI), which incorporated both quantitative and qualitative response options, was used to collect data. Analysis involved open coding of data into themes that emerged from the participants' responses. Descriptive statistical analysis was applied to quantify the prevalence or salience of particular themes. Results suggest that participants perceived preference to work in rural area to be influenced by the unique lifestyle of rural communities and family friendly employer policies. They perceived the availability of employment and training opportunities and supplemental financial compensations as incentives to attract rehabilitation counsellors to work in rural areas. Programs to recruit rehabilitation counsellors to rural areas should address employee lifestyle preferences in the context their overall career development.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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Kim, Doyoung. "Essays on information acquistion and incentive compensation in organizations /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/7459.

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Stanley, Brooke Winnifred. "Two essays on incentives." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/85932.

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I examine two sets of incentives faced by corporate CEOs to determine how they respond to those incentives. I compare firms that restate financial statements to firms that do not restate to test the hypotheses that bank monitoring should provide incentives to deter misreporting. For relatively less (more) severe misreporting, I find the likelihood of misreporting is positively related (unrelated) to bank borrowing, and that ex ante changes in bank debt are positive (unrelated) for misreporting firms versus control firms. These results suggest that bank monitoring is insufficient to deter or detect misreporting, rather that it may provide incentives for managers to engage in relatively less severe misreporting, consistent with the "debt covenant hypothesis". I next examine the incentives that CEOs have to increase firm value that result from their compensation packages and opportunities for advancement in the managerial labor market. Traditional methods for estimating pay-performance sensitivity exclude incentives that derive from opportunities for advancement in the managerial labor market and assume a linear relation between changes in pay and changes in performance. But results in recent literature imply that advancement opportunities may be a significant source of incentives and that the relation between changes in pay and changes in performance may depend upon the level of performance. I estimate payperformance sensitivities that incorporate these results. I find that although performance may be positively related to opportunities for advancement, the contribution to a CEO's total pay-performance sensitivity is too small to be economically significant. I also find that pay-performance sensitivities vary depending on the level of performance and may be higher or lower than estimates from linear models suggest. In sum, observed CEO pay packages may not be as suboptimal as some prior studies suggest.
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Wang, Shun Linda 1980. "Incentive compensation : bonusing and motivation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28634.

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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-81).
Management is often frustrated by the lack of motivation generated by end of the year bonuses. Currently, there are two compensation ideals, merit-based versus incentive-based. Merit based compensation correlates compensation to one's job performance, whereas incentive based on set goals and correlates bonus rewards before the time frame used to evaluate the performance. An effective incentive program contributes to a company's overall competitiveness by encouraging superior performance as well as improving the company's earning and cash flow. An incentive compensation program is not a substitute for lack of staff accountability, rather it should be used to motivate individuals and align the goals of individuals with those of the company. The purpose of this study is three-fold. First to determine current incentive package in A/E/C firms and comparing them with other industries' compensation. Second, research how more fitting incentive packages will help to make the industry more efficient, and transform the industry to a non-zero sum situation for all parties. Lastly, determine factors needed to have a complete incentive package, as well as explore possible ways of implementation of the incentive programs. In conclusion, not all A/E/C firms will benefit from incentive programs, but those that are in certain fields of the industry will see an increase in productivity and overall competitiveness of the firm.
by Shun Linda Wang.
S.M.
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Zhou, Xianming. "Essays on executive compensation and managerial incentives." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape16/PQDD_0006/NQ27761.pdf.

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White, Derek Ronald. "Compensation design, incentives, and the portfolio manager /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.

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Amadeus, Musa. "Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104367.

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Thesis advisor: Ronnie Sadka
This dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay, I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm's unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation between compensation convexity and a firm's idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally, I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity compensation portfolios do not augment a firm's future idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of a firm's equity. In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatility is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the same frictions it was intended to reduce. In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25\% decrease in a firm's unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
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Leake, Stacie. "Sales incentive program design and compensation." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2000. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1707.

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"This project provides a blueprint that will allow Arrowhead Credit Union to clarify and confirm the new sales accountabilities associated with sales jobs within the organization, and to design and implement compensation plans that are successful and aligned with the company's objectives."
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Lu, Yiqing. "Essays on adaptation, innovation incentives and compensation structure." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2015. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3186/.

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This thesis explores both theoretically and empirically how firms design employees’ compensation contracts to motivate them to work and to adapt to external changes under an informed principal framework. The first chapter analyzes how a principal, privately informed about the changing market condition, structures the agent’s incentive contract to inform and motivate her to adapt. The results show that a failure to overturn employees’ belief about the changing market condition could lead to insufficient adaptation. Further, a more pressing market condition induces earlier adaptation and greater information revelation. Finally, the compensation structure underpinning insufficient adaptation imposes a legacy problem due to excessive use of long-term incentives, which restrains the reconfiguration of the contract in place. Based on the first chapter, the second chapter aims to explain asymmetric contractual adjustment of CEO compensation, only upward but not downward. I argue that a principal, privately informed about the firm’s changing productive efficiency, uses contracts to provide the agent with not only working incentives but also information about her productivity. The principal commits to a back-loaded compensation plan with an increasing salary or with an increasing short-term performance pay. Such rigid contracts achieve greater efficiency by inducing more efforts from the agent through profit sharing. The third chapter, co-authored with Peggy Huang and Moqi Xu, finds CEO contracts explicitly account for subjective reviews in a new dataset of CEO contracts and stated reasons for compensation changes. Our results suggest that firms prefer to keep early R&D successes from the public and thus raise salaries for early R&D success not yet realized in performance measures. Consistent with this explanation, standalone salary increases predict better long-run portfolio and stock returns, but only following positive subjective evaluations and in firms with high R&D investment.
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Noguera, Magdy Carolina. "CEO incentive-based compensation and REIT performance." Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2007. http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/ETD-browse/browse.

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Gaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.

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I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
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Books on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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1946-, Maher Michael, and National Association of Accountants, eds. Management incentive compensation plans. Montvale, N.J: National Association of Accountants, 1986.

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Clark, Greg. Industrial injuries compensation: Incentives to change. [London]: Social Market Foundation, 1995.

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Jolls, Christine M. Stock repurchases and incentive compensation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.

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Arahood, Dale A. Community bank incentive compensation plans. Washington, D.C. (1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, 20036): American Bankers Association, 1993.

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Gross, Steven E. Compensation for teams: How to design and implement team-based reward programs. New York: AMACOM, 1995.

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Benmelech, Efraim. Stock-based compensation and ceo (dis)incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

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Zhou, Xianming. Essays on executive compensation and managerial incentives. Ottawa: National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997.

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M, Newman Jerry, and Milkovich Carolyn, eds. Compensation. 5th ed. Chicago, Illinois: Irwin, 1996.

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Milkovich, George T. Compensation. 2nd ed. Plano, Tex: Business Publications, 1987.

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M, Newman Jerry, and Milkovich Carolyn, eds. Compensation. 8th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005.

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Book chapters on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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Johnston, Mark W., and Greg W. Marshall. "Salesperson Compensation and Incentives." In Sales Force Management, 339–69. Thirteenth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY:Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003134688-11.

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Geiler, Philipp, and Luc Renneboog. "Executive Compensation: Incentives and Externalities." In Corporate Governance, 263–83. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439.ch14.

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Lahlou, Ismail. "Director Compensation Incentives and Acquisition Outcomes." In Corporate Board of Directors, 127–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05017-7_4.

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Schokkaert, Erik, Maureen Verhue, and Eddy Omey. "Unemployment Compensation Preferences: Insurance and Solidarity." In Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance, 73–101. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3_4.

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Milbourn, Todd T. "The winner-takes-all: an alternative view of CEO incentives." In Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value, 47–52. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_4.

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Kaplan, Steven N. "Top executive incentives in Germany, Japan and the USA: a comparison." In Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value, 3–12. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-5192-5_1.

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Schneider, T., and F. Fagnani. "Prevention and Compensation of Work-Related Injuries and Diseases in France: Contribution of Insurance Economics." In Incentives in Health Systems, 251–70. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76580-3_18.

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Fortin, Bernard, and Paul Lanoie. "Incentive Effects of Workers’ Compensation: A Survey." In Handbook of Insurance, 421–58. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0642-2_13.

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Xie, Huo-bao, and Chun-yan Chen. "Enterprise Compensation Incentive Theory on Principle-Agent Relation." In The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 677–82. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_72.

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Engesaeth, Eric. "Compensation and Benefits: Essentials of Long-Term Incentive Plans." In Handbook of Human Resources Management, 1–28. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40933-2_77-1.

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Conference papers on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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Kojo, Matti, and Phil Richardson. "Stakeholder Opinions on the Use of the Added Value Approach in Siting Radioactive Waste Management Facilities." In ASME 2013 15th International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2013-96068.

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In some countries nuclear waste facility siting programs include social and economic benefits, compensation, local empowerment and motivation measures and other incentives for the potential host community. This can generally be referred to as an ‘added value approach’. Demonstration of the safety of a repository is seen as a precondition of an added value approach. Recently much focus has been placed on studying and developing public participation approaches but less on the use of such incentive and community benefit packages, although they are becoming a more common element in many site selection strategies for nuclear waste management facilities. The primary objective of this paper is to report on an ongoing study of stakeholders’ opinions of the use of an added value approach in siting a radioactive waste facility in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. The paper argues that an added value approach should adapt to the interests and needs of stakeholders during different stages of a siting process. The main question posed in the study is as follows: What are the measures which should be included in ‘added value approach’ according to the stakeholders? The research data consists of stakeholders’ responses to a survey focusing on the use of added value (community benefits) and incentives in siting nuclear waste management facilities. The survey involved use of a questionnaire developed as part of the EU-funded IPPA* project in three countries: the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. (* Implementing Public Participation Approaches in Radioactive Waste Disposal, FP7 Contract Number: 269849). The target audiences for the questionnaires were the stakeholders represented in the national stakeholder groups established to discuss site selection for a nuclear waste repository in their country. A total of 105 questionnaires were sent to the stakeholders between November 2011 and January 2012. 44 questionnaires were returned, resulting in a total response rate of 41% (10/29 in the Czech Republic, 11/14 in Poland and in 23/64 in Slovenia).
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Liu, Xin-min, Xin-gang Wen, and Li-li Ding. "Incentive Compensation Based on Managerial Ability and Overconfidence Bias." In 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2009.5304815.

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Negash, Ahlmahz I., and Daniel S. Kirschen. "Compensation of demand response in competitive wholesale markets vs. retail incentives." In 2014 11th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2014.6861229.

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Musthag, Mohamed, Andrew Raij, Deepak Ganesan, Santosh Kumar, and Saul Shiffman. "Exploring micro-incentive strategies for participant compensation in high-burden studies." In the 13th international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2030112.2030170.

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Lu, Yong, and Wenmei Li. "Notice of Retraction: On the Compensation Incentive Effect of Human Resource." In 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.1061.

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Li, Wenqi, Zengmin Wang, Xiaofan Xu, and Yujing Liu. "The Executive Compensation Incentive Effectiveness Research of Listed Company of Beijing." In 2017 3rd International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ichssr-17.2017.50.

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Han, Xinliang. "Private Colleges Market-Oriented Incentive Mechanism of Teacher Compensation Characteristics Research." In 2016 2nd International Conference on Social Science and Higher Education. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icsshe-16.2016.86.

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Xiao Xianyu. "The empirical study on the executive compensation incentive of the Agricultural Bank." In 2011 International Conference on Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icbmei.2011.5920506.

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Xiang, Mingyin, and Li Li. "The Optimal Design of Hotel Staff Incentive Compensation Contract under Turnover Rate." In 2017 International Conference on Applied Mathematics, Modelling and Statistics Application (AMMSA 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ammsa-17.2017.51.

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Xiaolin, Sun, and Wang Sixue. "Is Executive Risk-Taking a Bridge Between Compensation Incentive and Innovation Intensity?" In 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.054.

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Reports on the topic "Compensations and incentives"

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Jolls, Christine. Stock Repurchases and Incentive Compensation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6467.

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Benmelech, Efraim, Eugene Kandel, and Pietro Veronesi. Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13732.

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Krueger, Alan. Incentive Effects of Workers' Compensation Insurance. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3089.

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Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6830.

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Bartel, Ann, Brianna Cardiff-Hicks, and Kathryn Shaw. Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19412.

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Coughlan, Peter J., William R. Gates, and Noah Myung. One Size Does Not Fit All: Personalized Incentives in Military Compensation. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada576035.

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Donaldson, John, Natalia Gershun, and Marc Giannoni. Some Unpleasant General Equilibrium Implications of Executive Incentive Compensation Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15165.

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Noble, Charles H. Role Structure, Non-Monetary Compensation, and Team Incentives as Motivators of Salesperson Performance. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada408988.

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Abowd, John, and Francis Kramarz. A Test of Negotiation and Incentive Compensation Models Using Longitudinal French Enterprise Data. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4044.

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Encinosa, William, Martin Gaynor, and James Rebitzer. The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5953.

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