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Kim, Doyoung. "Essays on information acquistion and incentive compensation in organizations /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/7459.
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Stanley, Brooke Winnifred. "Two essays on incentives." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/85932.
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I examine two sets of incentives faced by corporate CEOs to determine how they
respond to those incentives. I compare firms that restate financial statements to firms
that do not restate to test the hypotheses that bank monitoring should provide incentives
to deter misreporting. For relatively less (more) severe misreporting, I find the
likelihood of misreporting is positively related (unrelated) to bank borrowing, and that ex
ante changes in bank debt are positive (unrelated) for misreporting firms versus control
firms. These results suggest that bank monitoring is insufficient to deter or detect
misreporting, rather that it may provide incentives for managers to engage in relatively
less severe misreporting, consistent with the "debt covenant hypothesis".
I next examine the incentives that CEOs have to increase firm value that result
from their compensation packages and opportunities for advancement in the managerial
labor market. Traditional methods for estimating pay-performance sensitivity exclude
incentives that derive from opportunities for advancement in the managerial labor
market and assume a linear relation between changes in pay and changes in
performance. But results in recent literature imply that advancement opportunities may
be a significant source of incentives and that the relation between changes in pay and changes in performance may depend upon the level of performance. I estimate payperformance
sensitivities that incorporate these results. I find that although performance
may be positively related to opportunities for advancement, the contribution to a CEO's
total pay-performance sensitivity is too small to be economically significant. I also find
that pay-performance sensitivities vary depending on the level of performance and may
be higher or lower than estimates from linear models suggest. In sum, observed CEO
pay packages may not be as suboptimal as some prior studies suggest.
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Wang, Shun Linda 1980. "Incentive compensation : bonusing and motivation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28634.
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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-81).
Management is often frustrated by the lack of motivation generated by end of the year bonuses. Currently, there are two compensation ideals, merit-based versus incentive-based. Merit based compensation correlates compensation to one's job performance, whereas incentive based on set goals and correlates bonus rewards before the time frame used to evaluate the performance. An effective incentive program contributes to a company's overall competitiveness by encouraging superior performance as well as improving the company's earning and cash flow. An incentive compensation program is not a substitute for lack of staff accountability, rather it should be used to motivate individuals and align the goals of individuals with those of the company. The purpose of this study is three-fold. First to determine current incentive package in A/E/C firms and comparing them with other industries' compensation. Second, research how more fitting incentive packages will help to make the industry more efficient, and transform the industry to a non-zero sum situation for all parties. Lastly, determine factors needed to have a complete incentive package, as well as explore possible ways of implementation of the incentive programs. In conclusion, not all A/E/C firms will benefit from incentive programs, but those that are in certain fields of the industry will see an increase in productivity and overall competitiveness of the firm.
by Shun Linda Wang.
S.M.
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Zhou, Xianming. "Essays on executive compensation and managerial incentives." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape16/PQDD_0006/NQ27761.pdf.
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White, Derek Ronald. "Compensation design, incentives, and the portfolio manager /." Digital version accessible at:, 1998. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Amadeus, Musa. "Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104367.
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Thesis advisor: Ronnie SadkaThis dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay, I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm's unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation between compensation convexity and a firm's idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally, I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity compensation portfolios do not augment a firm's future idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of a firm's equity. In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatility is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the same frictions it was intended to reduce. In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25\% decrease in a firm's unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
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Leake, Stacie. "Sales incentive program design and compensation." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2000. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1707.
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"This project provides a blueprint that will allow Arrowhead Credit Union to clarify and confirm the new sales accountabilities associated with sales jobs within the organization, and to design and implement compensation plans that are successful and aligned with the company's objectives."
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Lu, Yiqing. "Essays on adaptation, innovation incentives and compensation structure." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2015. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3186/.
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This thesis explores both theoretically and empirically how firms design employees’ compensation contracts to motivate them to work and to adapt to external changes under an informed principal framework. The first chapter analyzes how a principal, privately informed about the changing market condition, structures the agent’s incentive contract to inform and motivate her to adapt. The results show that a failure to overturn employees’ belief about the changing market condition could lead to insufficient adaptation. Further, a more pressing market condition induces earlier adaptation and greater information revelation. Finally, the compensation structure underpinning insufficient adaptation imposes a legacy problem due to excessive use of long-term incentives, which restrains the reconfiguration of the contract in place. Based on the first chapter, the second chapter aims to explain asymmetric contractual adjustment of CEO compensation, only upward but not downward. I argue that a principal, privately informed about the firm’s changing productive efficiency, uses contracts to provide the agent with not only working incentives but also information about her productivity. The principal commits to a back-loaded compensation plan with an increasing salary or with an increasing short-term performance pay. Such rigid contracts achieve greater efficiency by inducing more efforts from the agent through profit sharing. The third chapter, co-authored with Peggy Huang and Moqi Xu, finds CEO contracts explicitly account for subjective reviews in a new dataset of CEO contracts and stated reasons for compensation changes. Our results suggest that firms prefer to keep early R&D successes from the public and thus raise salaries for early R&D success not yet realized in performance measures. Consistent with this explanation, standalone salary increases predict better long-run portfolio and stock returns, but only following positive subjective evaluations and in firms with high R&D investment.
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Noguera, Magdy Carolina. "CEO incentive-based compensation and REIT performance." Diss., Mississippi State : Mississippi State University, 2007. http://sun.library.msstate.edu/ETD-db/ETD-browse/browse.
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Gaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.
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I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.
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Imes, Matthew Douglas. "Essays In Executive Incentives." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/596467.
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Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
My dissertation consists of three chapters which explores various aspects of executive incentives. In the first chapter, I examine the relation between executive equity pay and stock returns. By compensating CEOs and CFOs differently, shareholders can create incentive conflicts between the firms’ top two managers that potentially affects shareholder wealth. On the one hand, incentive conflict potentially benefits shareholders by improving information exchange and establishing checks and balances in decisions made jointly by the CEO and CFO but alternatively, can harm shareholders by increasing risk through impeding the decision-making processes. I examine the relation between CEO-CFO incentive conflict and stock returns. The analysis indicates that an investor who routinely buy firms with the least incentive conflict and shorts firms with the greatest incentive conflict between CEO and CFOs will outperform the market by 475 basis points per year. I investigate whether risk, firm performance, or market inefficiency explain the excess returns and provide evidence that shareholders demand higher returns for bearing risk associated with CEO-CFO incentive similarities. Next, I explore the impact of executive incentives on bondholder wealth through looking at bond yields. Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. I investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. My findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. Instrumenting equity pay using CEO heritage, I find support for a curvilinear relation. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders. Finally, I study the affect of board gender diversity on CEO and director compensation. Females occupy only about 12% of director positions on corporate boards. I find that boards with more female’s onboard tend to give CEOs larger fractions of equity in their compensation packages while incentivizing directors with lower fractions of equity pay. This evidence is consistent with the notion that female board members are superior monitors yet also possess greater risk-aversion than male board members.
Temple University--Theses
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Zaro, Cláudio Soerger. "Efeito tributário na configuração do sistema de remuneração gerencial." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12136/tde-05052015-101612/.
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O presente trabalho busca verificar qual a influência da tributação sobre os incentivos dos sistemas de remuneração e se o efeito da tributação e de incentivos diferencia-se entre níveis hierárquicos. A literatura de teoria de agência sugere que maior ênfase nos propósitos de incentivo da remuneração culminará em maior proporção de pagamentos via bônus anuais. A consulta da legislação tributária, por sua vez, cria a expectativa de que a priorização de propósitos tributários na determinação das formas de remuneração refletirá em maior proporção de participação nos lucros. Essa ordenação diferenciada é adequada a perspectiva da teoria do trade-off, que argumenta que a ênfase em um fator gera um efeito inverso em outro, e que diante disso, as organizações procuram equilibrar as dimensões consideradas. Além disso, é esperado que, em função de mais níveis de monitoramento e também em função da menor precisão de opções de ações para níveis hierárquicos mais baixos, apresente-se ênfase em propósitos de incentivo na remuneração executiva enquanto se priorize propósitos tributários na remuneração de média gerência. Para a análise empírica destas relações, os dados foram coletados por meio de questionário enviado para as empresas que publicaram balanços no ano de 2012 e participaram da base da Revista Exame, Melhores e Maiores, bem como, numa segunda análise empírica, coletou-se dados disponíveis no relatório de referência, disponibilizado pela Comissão de Valores Mobiliários. A principal expectativa do trabalho é de que efeitos tributários sejam importantes na determinação da forma como se dá a remuneração, principalmente no que tange a escolha pela Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados. Os resultados suportam essa expectativa. Quanto a importância de incentivo, identificou-se que todas as formas de remuneração citadas são usadas com esse propósito, no entanto, participação nos Lucros ou Resultados foi a que apresentou um efeito significativamente inferior às demais. Já em relação ao efeito tributário, a hipótese é confirmada, sugerindo a ênfase no uso de Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados. Além disso, especificamente em relação a Participação nos Lucros ou Resultados, verificou-se uma interação significante entre incentivos e tributação o que sugere a existência de um trade-off na escolha entre esses propósitos, ou seja, ao priorizar o propósito tributário está-se sacrificando o propósito de incentivo, em relação a Participação no Lucros ou Resultados. No que se refere a diferenças quanto a níveis hierárquicos, não foram identificados resultados significantes.This study seeks to evidence the influence of tax considerations on incentives in compensation systems, as well as establish whether tax and incentive effects differ across the organization\'s structure. Agency theory literature suggests that a greater emphasis on incentive purposes leads to a higher proportion of annual bonuses in compensation packages. Tax legislation, on the other hand, presents the expectation that a prioritization of tax purposes will be reflected in a greater proportion of profit and gain sharing when determining compensation packages. These differing orders are congruent with the perspective based in trade-off theory, which posits that a greater emphasis on one factor creates an opposite effect on another, and in light of this, companies seek to set a balance between various items under consideration. Beside this, an emphasis on incentive-based goals is expected in executive compensation when tax considerations take precedence over that of middle management, as a result of increased supervision and the lesser need for stock options at lower levels of the organization\'s structure. In order to analyze these relationships, empirical data were gathered using a questionnaire submitted to the companies that both reported balance sheets in 2012 and participated in the Biggest and Best (Melhores e Maiores) ranking published by Exame magazine in 2013, following which data were also gathered from the companies\' reference forms for a secondary empirical analysis, as provided by the CVM (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários). The main expectation of this study is that tax effects are significant in the determination of how compensation is structured, particularly in respect to the decision to use Profit and Gain Sharing. The results support this claim. Regarding the importance of incentives, it was shown that all of the types of compensation in question are used pursuing this aim; however, profit and gain sharing displayed a significantly lesser effect than the others. Concerning tax effects, the hypothesis is confirmed, suggesting more intense use of Profit and Gain Sharing. Further, and in relation to Profit and Gain Sharing specifically, a significant interaction between incentive and tax considerations was shown, suggesting the existence of a trade-off inherent to the selection of the same, or rather, when tax considerations take priority, incentives purposes are sacrificed in the case of Profit and Gain Sharing. No significant results were established regarding differences across the organization structure.
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Leisner, Wulf. "The Influence of Incentive Compensation on Firm Value." St. Gallen, 2008. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/03602927002/$FILE/03602927002.pdf.
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Muslu, Volkan. "Effect of board independence on incentive compensation and compensation disclosure : evidence from Europe." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33660.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 39-42).
My thesis examines how the lack of board-of-director independence affects the structure and disclosure of executive compensation. I find that European companies with more insiders on their boards grant their executives more incentive compensation, after controlling for the level and economic determinants of executive compensation. This effect is more pronounced in countries with less protection for outside shareholders. The companies with more insiders on their boards also disclose more transparent information about executive compensation. Overall, my evidence supports the contracting hypothesis, in which capital market investors understand potential detrimental effects of insiders and drive companies to mitigate these effects through greater incentive compensation and improved compensation disclosure. The evidence is inconsistent with the opportunism hypothesis, in which risk-averse insiders grant themselves more fixed pay and disclose less transparent information about their compensation.
by Volkan Muslu.
Ph.D.
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Reis, Ebru. "Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2006. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/8.
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ABSTRACT MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND TAKEOVER WEALTH GAINS By EBRU REIS DECEMBER 5, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale Major Department: Finance This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers’ incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers’ incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their firms’ stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target managers’ incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments.
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Chen, Yuhui. "Issues in executive compensation." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16776.
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Diese Dissertation stellt empirische Evidenz zu den Fragen der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften. Analyse der Daten der US-Firmen auflistet, finde ich eine umgekehrte U-foermige Beziehung zwischen Management Ownership und Unternehmensperformance, aber diese Beziehung verschwindet, wenn Unternehmensperformance von den letzten Jahr kontrolliert wird. Ich finde auch, dass die Executive Option Awards positiv auf Unternehmensperformance bezogen, während Executive Stock Awards hat keinen statistischen signifikanten Einfluss auf den Unternehmensperformance. Statistische Evidenz zeigt auch, dass die Struktur der Verguetung von Fuehrungskraeften Vertraege zu Unternehmen Eigenschaften und Executive persoenlichen Merkmalen zusammenhaengt.This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the issues of executive compensation. Analyzing data of U.S. listing firms, I find an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, but this relation vanishes when firm performance from last period is controlled. I also find that executive option awards is positively related to firm performance, while executive stock awards has no statistically significant impact on firm performance. Evidence also indicates that the structure of executive compensation contracts is related with observable and unobservable firm attributes and executive personal characteristics.
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Bonestroo, Jelle. "CEO incentive-based compensation, investment opportunities and institutional heterogeneity." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-317867.
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Using international data (15,786 obs.) from industrial companies from 28 countries over an 11-year period (2003–2014), this research contributes to the area of institutional heterogeneity, CEO compensation and investment opportunities. More precisely, we use three perspectives in order to investigate whether investment opportunities explain CEO compensation structures. We compare (i) U.S. and non-U.S. firms, (ii) Common law and Civil law firms, and (iii) firms operating with similar cultural characteristics. Overall, after controlling for firm governance and board characteristics, we find that investment and growth opportunities in terms of book-to-market ratio, research and development (R&D), and capital expenditures (CAPEX) explain the percentage equity and non-salary CEO compensation. These findings suggest that firms with higher information asymmetries associated with their growth opportunities pay CEOs higher incentive-based compensation.
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Shabeeb, Ali Mohamed A. "Equity compensation incentives, earnings management, and corporate governance : the UK evidence." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599994.
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The current thesis aims to answer the following three research questions: 1) What is the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management in the UK context? 2) Do equity incentives motivate UK executives to engage in opportunistic earnings management practices? 3) Can corporate governance mechanisms moderate the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management? To answer the first research question, a panel data set drawn from 215 UK FfSE-350 index companies and 1675 firm years for the period 2004-20 11 has been used to examine the effect of large set of corporate governance mechanisms on constraining earnings management. Based on the agency theory, we hypothesise that corporate governance mechanisms can inhibit managers from engaging in opportunistic earnings management practices. We use two proxies for earnings management: current discretionary accruals measured by performance adjusted model developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and total discretionary accruals as measured by the modified Jones model developed by Dechow et al. (I995). We find that audit related mechanisms, such as audit committee's size, independence, and expertise as well as external audit efforts and quality (measured through audit fees), have a significant negative relationship with earnings management. Moreover, we find that non-audit fees have a significant positive effect on earnings management - supporting the argument that non-audit fees negatively affect an auditor's independence. Conversely, we find that board size and independence have moderate negative relationship with earnings management. To answer the second and third research questions, a panel data set drawn from 1675 Chief Executive Officer (CEO) year observations and 1540 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) year observations has been used to examine the relationship between CEO and CFO equity incentives and earnings management. In addition, we examine the moderation effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between executives' equity incentives and earnings management. Based on the managerial power approach, the current thesis hypothesises a positive association between executives' equity incentives and earnings management.
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Hsieh, Chialing. "CEO Equity-Based Incentives And Managerial Opportunism Behavior." Available to subscribers only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1878999051&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=1509&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009."Department of Business Administration." Keywords: CEO compensation, CEO stock option awards, Layoff, Managerial opportunism. Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-71). Also available online.
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Brandenburg, Scott W. "A study identifying factors associated with incentive pay plans." Online version, 1998. http://www.uwstout.edu/lib/thesis/1998/1998brandenburgs.pdf.
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Knott, Danielle M. "Friends in High Places: Measuring the Effects of Compensation Committee Characteristics on CEO Pay Packages in 2013." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1050.
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In the past decade, public scrutiny surrounding rising levels of executive compensation has led to more stringent independence requirements for compensation committees. However, there is little research studying the effects of compensation committees on executive pay from the time these new requirements were implemented. My paper studies the effects of compensation committee chair personal ties to the CEO, economic interests, and group committee characteristics on both the level and structure of CEO compensation. My findings suggest that certain committee chair personal ties to the CEO are associated with both a higher level of CEO compensation and a higher percentage of CEO salary compensation. I also find that the more compensation committee chairs are paid, the less likely they are to create CEO pay plans with strong incentive provisions, but the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation. The higher the committee chair’s ownership percentage is in the company, the less likely they are to create low-risk CEO pay plans, and the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation.
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Sabir, Mujtaba, and Kubanychbek Almatov. "Balanced Scorecard & Incentive Compensation System - Factors Influencing the Linkage." Thesis, Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-15699.
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Schieffer, John Kenneth. "Essays on Regulatory Takings Compensation and Formal and Informal Incentives in Contracts." The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1236109915.
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OLIVEIRA, I. G. S. "REMUNERAÇÃO Executiva e Desempenho. Evidências Empíricas no Brasil." Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2014. http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/2772.
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Previous issue date: 2014-10-24O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar a relação existente entre remuneração executiva e desempenho em companhias brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA. A linha teórica parte do pressuposto que o contrato de incentivos corrobora com o alinhamento de interesses entre acionistas e executivos e atua como um mecanismo de governança corporativa a fim de direcionar os esforços dos executivos para maximização de valor da companhia. A amostra foi composta pelas 100 companhias mais líquidas listadas em quantidade de negociações de ações na BM&FBOVESPA durante o período 2010-2012, totalizando 296 observações. Os dados foram extraídos dos Formulários de Referência disponibilizados pela CVM e a partir dos softwares Economática® e Thomson Reuters ®. Foram estabelecidas oito hipóteses de pesquisa e estimados modelos de regressão linear múltipla com a técnica de dados em painel desbalanceado, empregando como variável dependente a remuneração total e a remuneração média individual e como regressores variáveis concernentes ao desempenho operacional, valor de mercado, tamanho, estrutura de propriedade, governança corporativa, além de variáveis de controle. Para verificar os fatores que explicam a utilização de stock options, programa de bônus e maior percentual de remuneração variável foram estimados modelos de regressão logit. Os resultados demonstram que, na amostra selecionada, existe relação positiva entre remuneração executiva e valor de mercado. Verificou-se também que os setores de mineração, química, petróleo e gás exercem influência positiva na remuneração executiva. Não obstante, exerce relação inversa com a remuneração total à concentração acionária, o controle acionário público e o fato da companhia pertencer ao nível 2 ou novo mercado conforme classificação da BMF&BOVESPA. O maior valor de mercado influencia na utilização de stock options, assim como no emprego de bônus, sendo que este também é impactado pelo maior desempenho contábil. Foram empregados também testes de robustez com estimações por efeitos aleatórios, regressões com erros-padrão robustos clusterizados, modelos dinâmicos e os resultados foram similares. Desse modo, conclui-se que há indícios de que a remuneração executiva e os planos de incentivos estão relacionados com a maximização de valor da companhia, a despeito o desempenho operacional apresentou associação negativa com a remuneração executiva.
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Simões, Catarina Matias Rodrigues. "Long term incentives for executives : pay for performance." Master's thesis, FEUC, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10316/31838.
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Trabalho de projeto do mestrado em Economia (Economia do Trabalho), apresentado à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra, sob a orientação de Paulino Teixeira.Executive compensation in general, and Executive Variable Pay/Incentives in particular, have been subject to numerous discussions and analysis over the last decades. Especially after 2008-09 global financial crisis, Executives have been blamed for excessive risk-taking and “short-termism” in their decision making (i.e., pressure to produce short-term results) that led into extremely high Incentives payment (both short and long-term incentives) not connected with respective business results. In this project work I analysed how Executive Compensation, and more specifically, Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs), offered in a group of 10 listed companies have been evolving in the last five years towards the Pay for Performance principle, that is, alignment of LTIP payment and positive business results. LTIPs represent a significant portion of Executive Remuneration and as such the most scrutinized element in a company’s Proxy Statement (or Annual Report for companies not listed in the USA). As a result of this study, I am able to confirm that companies’ LTIPs design is increasing the focus on its alignment between Executives incentive payment and business results, specifically: over time, LTIPs’ structure present an higher weight of Performance Shares, one of LTIPs’ most prevalent metric is Total Shareholder Return (TSR) and Executives are paid mainly via variable pay which is dependent on business results.
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Kilpatrick, Donna J. "A test of the effects of incentive compensation plans, uncertainty, and perceptions of fairness on performance, pay satisfaction, and evaluations of incentive plans /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/8756.
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McPhee, Gregory P. "The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2013. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12.
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My study investigates whether the effects of non-cash incentives on employee performance depend on when the incentive is paid and what type of task is being performed. Although firms frequently use non-cash incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards, the effects of non-cash incentives, relative to cash incentives, are not well understood by researchers. Drawing on economic and psychology theories, I predict that the effects of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on performance depend on incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative). Specifically, for an analytic task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future is most effective. For a creative task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future are most effective. The results of my study should benefit theory and practice by identifying the most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing for a given task type.
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Wan, Hong. "Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯Are Local Directors Better Monitors, and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002494.
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Amiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.
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Society's awareness of the importance of environmental-, social- and economic issues has increased over the last decades. This increased interest has led to the development of the Corporate Social Responsibility concept (CSR) in which companies actively work simultaneously with environmental, social and economic issues that extend beyond what is legally required by these companies in order to achieve a more sustainable society. As the interest in CSR has increased, a debate whether CSR is value-creating or should be considered an agency cost has arisen. To approach this question previous researches have used the CEO compensation to examine if the engagement in CSR actually is an agency cost or a value creating activity and found that agency costs can be mitigated by tying incentives to performance. Based on these assumptions this study will examine the link between CSR and agency costs using the existence of a CSR related compensation incentives for CEOs related agency costs. This study is characterized to be positivistic and within the field of positive accounting research as it has deductive approach in which hypotheses are formulated that this study intends to test which are based on what fundamental economic theories and previous research have found that may affect agency costs. The empirical data are manually collected from companies’ on NasdaqOMX Stockholm 2016 annual reports followed by an analysis of the data using univariate t-test and multiple regressions in order to relate these findings to previous research. This study finds no direct evidence that CEO compensation incentives related to CSR affect agency costs which means that we have not closed the ongoing debate whether CSR engagement is creating shareholder value or should be considered an agency cost. Nonetheless, the results show indications that agency costs are higher for companies that use CEO compensation incentives related to CSR which indicates that CSR is not beneficial to shareholders but should instead be regarded as an agency cost at the expense of shareholders. The result also indicates that a positive accounting research is not particularly useful on a small stock market with reliable results because the findings can not be generalized in a broader perspective
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Zhang, Guochang. "Incentive compatible compensation mechanism for centrally planned industry with multiple agents and communiction." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/26114.
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This thesis applies the existing agency theory into the problem of production planning in a centrally planned industry. The planner's objective is to maximize social welfare contributed by the industry, while the firms individually want to maximize utility over money compensation minus disutility over effort. The problem contains both moral hazard and adverse selection because each agent privately observes a predecision information about the production process. A model is built for determining the optimal incentive compatible scheme. The analysis starts with the problem of fixed proportions production. An optimal incentive compatible scheme is first derived in single agent settings. It is then extended to multiple agent settings. Under the optimal incentive scheme, the principal is able to derive all the rent. The solution is the first-best when the agents are all risk neutral, and strictly second-best otherwise. The subgaming issues amongst the agents are investigated. When the agents are not cooperative, a sufficient condition is given for the incentive scheme to be effective, i.e., the equilibrium induced by the scheme is implementable. It is also concluded that, if the agents are able to cooperate, there always exist some state realizations under which the scheme is not effective. Finally, a different type of production problem, namely, production with substitutable inputs, are studied. And an incentive compatible compensation scheme is again proposed.Business, Sauder School of
Graduate
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Gao, Jie, and 高洁. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43278656.
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Gao, Jie. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43278656.
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GAVER, JENNIFER JANE. "INCENTIVE EFFECTS AND MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF PERFORMANCE PLAN ADOPTIONS." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184001.
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This study provides evidence concerning the endogenous determination of managerial compensation contracts. To avoid the confounding effect of tax considerations, we limit our attention to the choice among long-term nonqualified incentive plans. Specifically, we consider a two-part decision faced by the firm: (1) whether to add an accounting-based "performance plan" to the existing portfolio of compensation contracts and (2) if the firm adopts a plan, the choice between a "relative" or an "absolute" performance measure. Based on some behavioral implications of performance plans which distinguish them from alternative contracts, we develop hypotheses which relate the adoption and design of a performance plan to the firm's general incentive contracting environment. We test these hypotheses using a choice-based sample, evenly divided between performance plan adopters and nonadopters. For the purposes of parameter estimation, we use the multinomial logit model to reflect the qualitative, hierarchical nature of the decision setting. Our results indicate that variables which proxy for the incentive environment can explain which firms will adopt a performance plan, and also the type of performance measure used by the adopting firms.
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Salmond, J. Nyles. "An incentive compensation option for a private educational system: A policy analysis." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185412.
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Teacher incentive systems are of relevance to public as well as private school systems. Educational theorists and practitioners have been striving for a method of motivating teachers to an optimal return on educational investments. Carol Bartell (1988) has outlined five different models of incentive systems, each of which center on factors of motivation. Two of the five models focus on non-monetary incentives, while the remainder hold monetary remuneration as the primary or sole incentive. This study was centralized upon a version of Bartell's (1988) model: the "Professional Responsibility" incentive. The core of this incentive was the attainment and sharing of professional attributes, as teachers assumed added roles within their profession. Multiple responsibilities assisted teachers to identify goals and aspirations, thereby helping teachers in expanding their abilities. The study used the Summer Employment Option Program of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as a basis for assessing the value of professional responsibility incentives in a private school setting. It was anticipated that if the study provided data which exhibited growth in the target areas provided by the sponsoring agency, then the incentive could be a professional responsibility incentive and of strong value to similar settings in the public as well as the private sphere. The study incorporated the Bush-Gallagher (1985) policy analysis approach to assess the viability of the professional responsibility incentive. Through the policy analysis model, research questions were generated, values were explored, goals and objectives were delineated, and major barriers to implementation were examined. It was discussed, through the policy analysis and the use of qualitative and quantitative measures, that the Summer Employment Option Program fit the model of a professional responsibility incentive. It was found that teachers using the Summer Employment Option Program were, (a) motivated to grow professionally, (b) were better satisfied with their work, and (c) worked harder at program goals. The study was designed to provide a model for other organizations so they can benefit from the mistakes and successes of the summer Employment Option Program's sponsoring agency.
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Fazio, Philip Louis. "TWO ESSAYS ON SMALL CAPITILIZATION PUBLIC FAMILY AND NONFAMILY FIRMS." NSUWorks, 2012. http://nsuworks.nova.edu/hsbe_etd/33.
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This research links together disparate literature on family and nonfamily firms, large and small firms, and risk for small firms. The literature is not coherent in one theme: whether family firms operate with greater risk relative to nonfamily firms. Yet the literature finds performance advantage to family firms without an explanation of why family firms on average generate better accounting returns and values relative to nonfamily firms other than for reduced agency costs translated into value. The first essay examines two measures of risk--debt ratio and idiosyncratic risk--of small publicly held family firms relative to nonfamily firms to investigate differences in financial risk between them. Using a unique hand-collected data set of small family and nonfamily firms, I analyze certain firm characteristics (family ownership, family member on the board, size, and dual class status) and find that family and nonfamily firms do not differ in their book-based debt ratios but do differ in their market-based debt ratios. Specifically, I find that family firms that tightly control voting rights through dual class status have higher debt ratios and hence have higher risk than nonfamily firms. Furthermore, I find a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and family ownership, and I find as the percentage of family ownership increases idiosyncratic risk increases.
The second essay utilizes the likelihood of incentive compensation presence and incentive compensation ratio of small publicly held family firms relative to nonfamily firms to investigate differences in CEO dividends and incentive compensation. The tools available for boards of directors to incentivize CEOs to act in accordance with diverse shareholder wishes, including risk-taking, investment selection, and the on-the-job consumption of resources, are stock options, stock grants, and cash bonuses. I argue that agency theory in practice is imperfect in incentive contracting. Specifically, CEO dividends and family ownership reduce the likelihood of the existence of an incentive compensation plan. I find in the presence of CEO dividends that family and nonfamily firms differ in their incentive compensation ratios and the likelihood of incentive compensation. In my sample, I find a significant negative relation between the CEO dividend income ratio and the incentive compensation ratio and between family ownership percentage and the incentive compensation ratio. Lastly, consistent with current literature, I find that growth opportunities positively influence both family and nonfamily firms' incentive compensation ratios.
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McDaniel, Sarah Curran. "Analyzing the Effects of a Performance Pay Plan on Manager Performance in an Accounting Firm." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2007. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc3641/.
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This study examined the effect of a score card¬-based performance pay plan in a professional services firm. The plan was implemented in response to a decreasing trend in productivity and a desire for a formal incentive compensation plan. Performance of manager and senior manager accountants were analyzed across two departments over a five year period. A definitive account of the effects of the intervention is limited by the case-¬study design, but the data does suggest that the performance pay plans used did not adversely affect performances. Design limitations of the plan and future research are also discussed.
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Castanheira, Tomás Cordeiro. "Implementação de melhorias na área dos recursos humanos : avaliação de desempenho na farmácia Gaia Jardim." Master's thesis, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/21782.
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Este trabalho foi realizado no âmbito das necessidades da Farmácia Gaia Jardim, com o objetivo de melhorar as práticas na área dos recursos humanos, nomeadamente no Sistema de Avaliação de Desempenho. Esta empresa opta por um sistema de avaliação de desempenho baseado num sistema de compensações e incentivos, para que os colaboradores se sintam motivados a melhorarem o seu desempenho. O trabalho de investigação é iniciado com a revisão de literatura nos diferentes temas que abrangem este trabalho, como a avaliação de desempenho, os sistemas de compensações e incentivos e a área dos recursos humanos em geral. Como se trata de uma farmácia de retalho com características diferentes das farmácias tradicionais, o estado da arte foi revisto com aplicação, sempre que possível, destes temas nas lojas de retalho e no setor farmacêutico. Por ser um estudo de caso de uma empresa analisou-se a situação atual da mesma, mais especificamente na área dos recursos humanos e o seu sistema de avaliação de desempenho vigente. Foram utilizadas metodologias como observação experimental em trabalho de campo no estabelecimento da farmácia, entrevistas e análise documental. Como principais conclusões do trabalho, verificou-se que o sistema de avaliação de desempenho da farmácia tem limitações como: comportamentos oportunistas, subjetividade nos padrões de avaliação, pouco aproveitamento de feedback, contagem sujeita a erros e parcialidade nos objetivos das diferentes áreas da farmácia, entre outros. O contraste entre a revisão de literatura e a análise da situação atual permitiu desenvolver e propor melhorias neste âmbito, assim como outras melhorias encontradas no sistema de avaliação de desempenho e na gestão de recursos humanos em geral.This research project was guided by the needs of Farmácia Gaia Jardim, in order to improve its practices in the human resources area, specifically in the Performance Appraisal System. This company uses a Performance Appraisal System connected to a compensation and incentive system, so that the workers feel motivated to improve their performance. This research work initiates by making a literature review on the different topics covered such as, the appraisal of performance, compensation and incentive systems, and the area of human resources in general. As the object of analysis is a retail pharmacy with some distinctive characteristics from traditional pharmacies, the state of art was revised taking into account, whenever possible, the above issues when applied to retail shops and to the pharmaceutical sector. Due to the fact that this research work is a case study, the actual company’s situation was analyzed, specifically its human resources area and its operative performance appraisal system. Methods such as experimental observations on the pharmacy’s work field, interviews and documental analysis were used. The main conclusions of this research project, point to some limitations of the current performance appraisal system related to: opportunistic behavior, lack of defined evaluation patterns, a scarce use of feedback, error-prone counting, bias in the objectives established by the different areas of the pharmacy, among others. The contrast between the literature review and the analysis of the actual situation of the company allowed to develop and propose improvements, as well as other enhancements that could be made on the performance appraisal system and the human resources overall.
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Jenter, Dirk. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk." 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/5068.
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This paper analyzes the link between equity-based compensation and created incentives by (1) deriving a measure of incentives suitable for both linear and non-linear compensation contracts, (2) analyzing the effect of risk on incentives, and (3) clarifying the role of the agent's private trading decisions in incentive creation. With option-based compensation contracts, the average pay-forperformance sensitivity is not an adequate measure of ex-ante incentives. Pay-for-performance covaries negatively with marginal utility and hence overstates the created incentives. Second, more noise in the performance measure implies that the manager is less certain about the effect of effort on performance, which in turn makes her less willing to exert effort. Finally, the private trading decisions by the manager have first-order effects on incentives. By reducing her holdings of the market asset, the manager achieves an effect similar to "indexing" the stock or option grant, making explicit indexation of the contract redundant.
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Shao, Shih-Yun, and 邵詩芸. "CEO Incentive Compensations and Financial Restatements." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/65725924885930186098.
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碩士國立中央大學
會計研究所
104
A proper incentive compensating system is beneficial for developing company’s operating performance and reducing the cost of agency. However, an overdriven incentive system may lead to manipulation of manager’s own interest, and a financial revision is necessary for restatement. In this way, this research is going to be the impact of downsizing earning and comparison of the financial restatement and motive of beautifying financial statement to the stock option and profit sharing of employee. The research is proven the employee option has a positive relationship to the financial restatement but not significant, in which may be because the non-fraud type of sample is established in the statement. On the one hand, the significant relationship is found when focusing on the beautify of financial restatement and downsizing earning restatement; in this case, senior management has higher motivation of beautifying financial statement and earning management, which lead the financial restatement afterward. On the other hand, the relationship between employee’s profit sharing to the beautifying of financial statement and downsizing earning restatement is negative significantly; in this case, compared with the stock option, certain incentive compensation of profit sharing has more mitigated effect to financial restatement.
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"Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10388/ETD-2015-08-2209.
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We construct a measure of CEO concern for non-equity stakeholders based on corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, and we investigate how such incentives affect firm leverage and cash holding. In general, we find that non-equity stakeholder incentives decrease leverage and increase cash holding, after controlling for CEO managerial incentives and other firm characteristics. Our findings suggest that corporate social responsibility benefit non-equity stakeholders, which may come at the expense of shareholders.
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Yeh, Mei-Ling, and 葉美玲. "Performance Measures, Compensation Incentives and Future Performance." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/e72499.
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碩士中原大學
會計研究所
98
This study was to examine the relationship between performance measure, the compensation incentives and the future performance. The results show that the expected performance measure was positively correlated with compensation incentives, and compensation incentives could enhance the company's future performance. The study found that non-financial performance measure was positively correlated with the compensation incentives. Besides, short-term cash incentive bonus and long-term stock incentive could not necessarily enhance the staff’s future performance. Although the interactions between short-term cash incentive bonus and the tenure of the employee were not necessary to enhance the future performance, the interactions between long-term stock incentive and the tenure of the employee could enhance the future performance. Finally, the interactions between short-term cash incentive bonus and long-term stock incentive could increase the future performance.
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Chien, Wen-Ling, and 簡妏玲. "Executive Compensation Incentive and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32904018857021775723.
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碩士淡江大學
產業經濟學系碩士班
95
This paper takes the non-financial listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 1996 to 2004 as samples. We take the top executives'' wages as the research objective, investigating the relationship between the top executives'' wages and the companies’ performance. The empirical analysis includes two-stage research design. The first stage is the regression of the determination and adjustment of the top executives'' wages. The second stage is the regression of these companies’ financial performance considering several wages incentive variables and the cross effect among the top executives'' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables, we research into the relationship between the executives'' wages incentive and the company''s performance. Our main findings are as follows: The companies in Taiwan will take account the equilibrium wages of the external managerial labor market based on the companies’ characteristics and the executives’ personal characteristics to determine and adjust the executives’ wages,. The wages incentive variables mostly have positive influence on the rate of returns of assets (ROA) which proxies the accounting performance. However, the wages incentive variables mostly have negative influences on the rate of returns of common stock (RTN) which proxies the companies’ market performance. If the cross effect among the top executives'' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables are added to the RTN regressions, mostly wages incentive variables have positive influence on RTN, while mostly cross effects among the top executives'' tenure on their position and wages incentive variables have negative influences on RTN. Therefore the direction of the influence of the market performance to the wages incentive depends on the positive or negative strength which one is greater.
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Coronado, Freddy. "Choosing performance measures for incentive compensation." Diss., 2008.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Accounting and Information Systems, 2008.Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on July 23, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 74-77). Also issued in print.
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Yeh, Hsiao-Ching, and 葉筱靖. "Common Membership and CEO Incentive Compensation." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30686026069250574104.
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碩士國立中央大學
會計研究所
104
This paper is to investigate whether the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee affect the efficiency and effectiveness of CEO incentive compensation or not. This study uses a sample of 5,828 firm-year observation for the period 2003 to 2010 in the US firms. Including CEO related data, firm’s financial data and director data. We find a significantly negative relationship between common membership and CEO incentive pay and a significantly negative relation between common membership and reported and real performance on the full sample. The implication is that common membership may cause the CEO reduced the effort incentive and decreased risk-taking. Also, common membership may decline the firm’s reported performance and unmanaged performance on the whole sample. Furthermore, we distinguish the full sample and find that firms with good performance is a significantly positive relationship between common membership and reported and real performance, and significantly negative relationship between common membership and earnings management. That means firm with better performance has the compensation committee members who also serve on the audit committee is a good mechanism to ease the earnings management and increase unmanaged performance.
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Maia, Inês de Sottomayor da Cunha Sampaio. "SOGRAPE: Sales team incentive system." Master's thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/8519.
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ProjectThe purpose of this project is to provide Sogrape, a Portuguese wine producer and distributor, three different proposals for the new sales department incentive system in order to enable the company to reach the maximum potential out of the sales department employees, since they are uncertain about the motivational factor of the current system. The methodology of the project followed three phases. The first was an initial interview with Sogrape’s human resources to understand the major concerns about the actual incentives program in use and collect information on the company, and more specifically, information on the regulation of the career policy, performance appraisal and incentives system. Secondly, a detailed analysis was performed on the information and regulations provided by the company. Thirdly, an interview to two employees from the sales department was conducted. The information gathered enabled the identification of the weaknesses of the current incentive system, and consequently, the definition of the core objectives to be used as a basis for the proposals’ design. Regarding the three proposals, and supported by their comparison, decision making matrix and critical analysis on the potential to achieve the defined objectives, the company has to choose the one that better fits its interests based on the criteria that it most values. Regardless of the fact that the company should be the one to choose amongst the three different proposals, an implementation plan was also developed for the second proposal (the most complex) as an example to highlight the required actions and time.
O objectivo do projecto em causa é providenciar à Sogrape, uma produtora e distribuidora de vinho Portuguesa, três propostas diferentes para o novo sistema de incentivos do departamento comercial, que permitam à empresa atingir o máximo potencial dos trabalhadores deste departamento, já que o departamento de recursos humanos não está certo quanto ao potencial motivador do actual sistema. A metodologia do projecto seguiu três fases. A primeira centrou-se numa entrevista com o departamento de recursos humanos, para compreender as principais preocupações relacionadas com o actual sistema de incentivos, recolher informação sobre a empresa e sobre os regulamentos da política de incentivos, avaliação de desempenho e do próprio sistema de incentivos. Na segunda fase foi desenvolvida uma análise das informações e regulamentos fornecidos. Na última fase conduziu-se uma entrevista a dois trabalhadores do departamento comercial. A informação recolhida permitiu identificar os pontos fracos do actual sistema de incentivos, e consequentemente, estabelecer três objectivos principais a serem usados como ponto de partida na definição das propostas. Considerando as três propostas, com a ajuda da comparação entre elas, a grelha de tomada de decisão, e a análise crítica tendo em conta o potencial de cada uma para atingir os objectivos definidos, a empresa tem de escolher a proposta que mais se adequa aos seus interesses, dependendo dos critérios mais valorizados. Apesar da escolha entre as três propostas recair sobre a empresa, um plano de implementação foi desenvolvido para a segunda proposta (mais complexa) para destacar as acções e o tempo associado necessário.
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Guerra, Joana Machado. "Executive compensation in banking." Master's thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/6380.
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Executive compensation has raised, over the years, interest not only in the international
community, but also in researchers who try to understand which factors are behind this
“phenomenon”.
Is compensation of executives structured to encourage risk taking? Why do CEOs receive
higher compensation than other employees and a wide range of benefits?
In this paper, the main goal is to answer these questions, by analysing executive compensation
in banking, throughout a sample of the financial industry in the United States of America.
In the end, it will be possible to conclude about a likely relationship between executive
compensation and firm characteristics, as well as features of bank executives.A compensação de executivos tem suscitado, ao longo dos anos, muito interesse por parte não só da comunidade internacional mas também por parte de estudiosos, que procuram entender que efeitos estão por detrás deste “fenómeno”. Será que a compensação dos altos quadros das empresas está estruturada para promover a tomada de risco? Porque razão os CEO recebem valores tão elevados e tantos benefícios? Ao longo deste trabalho, procura-se responder a estas questões, analisando a compensação de executivos na banca, através de uma amostra do sector financeiro dos Estados Unidos da América. No final, será possível aferir sobre a eventual relação entre a compensação de executivos e as características da empresa, bem como as características dos executivos dos bancos.
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Liu, Tzu-Yu, and 劉子毓. "Managerial Overconfidence, Compensation Incentive and Share Repurchase." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79079243938983969836.
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碩士中原大學
會計研究所
102
Traditional explanations for investment distortions are information asymmetry, agency theory and overconfidence. According to these academic theories, this work investigates the link between compensation incentive, managerial overconfidence and share repurchase activity. Due to these, this work classifies compensation incentive as short-term performance bonus and equity incentive. Findings not only reveal a strong positive relationship between compensation incentive and share repurchase but also show a strong positive association between managerial overconfidence and share repurchase. Further analysis demonstrates the positive relation between compensation incentive and share repurchase, when overconfident managers have profit-sharing compensation or stock-option-based compensation.
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Lu, Wen-Chi, and 呂雯錡. "Compensation Incentives, Employment Incentives, and Risk Taking Behaviors: Evidence from the Taiwan Mutual Fund Industry." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78584463710054229859.
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碩士臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
98
This paper studies the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to compensation and employment risk within Taiwan domestic equity mutual funds from 2000 to 2009. Empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the compensation incentive but not employment incentive. When compensation incentive is more important than employment incentive, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to increase risk relative to leading managers to catch up with the midyear winners. However, when compensation incentive is low, employment incentive become more relevant, the Taiwan results do not find the decreasing risk taking among midyear losers. This paper also shows that fund managers react strongly to risk surprises. Most of fund managers are subject to risk limits. Fund managers will counterbalance risk surprises if they face a higher than expected risk realization; they do not react upon unexpectedly low risk. This indicates that risk limits play an important role in fund managers’ risk taking behavior.
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Chen, You-Fang, and 陳幼芳. "The research of employees’ promotion incentives and compensation contract." Thesis, 2000. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90227249513045628196.
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碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
88
Promotion-based incentives and within-job incentives are both effective ways for the employers to induce the employees’ hard working, and there exists substitution effect between them. A theoretical analysis of promotion-based incentives and within-job incentives for employees is presented. In the one-period game without punishment, when promotion- based incentives are strong, employees will always claim that they are high ability ones. However, when promotion-based incentives are weak, employees will always claim that they are low ability ones. By designing contracts, employer can ensure that employees will tell the truth and work hard when promotion-based incentives are weak. Yet this mechanism might not work due to minimum wage requirement when promotion-based incentives are strong. In this case the review strategy is introduced to solve this problem. For employees who pass over for promotion due to ability, employer must increase the degree of within-job incentives. But for those who pass over promotion because of organization reason, the degree increased must be higher than aforementioned. Besides, for employees who pass over for promotion, employer can adapt the following ways to solve the incentive problem: (1) strengthen the within-job incentives (2) select up-or-out strategy (3) expand organization structure.
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Pinto, Helena, and M. Widdicks. "Do compensation plans with performance targets provide better incentives?" 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/8409.
Full textAbstract:
YesGuided by academic literature, industry practice and policy recommendations, we analyze a wide range of option and restricted stock plans with exercise and vesting conditions that may be contingent on stock price performance. To assess the effectiveness of these plans at attracting and providing incentives to executives, we create compensation plans with fixed firm cost and executive valuation and calculate their expected total lifetime incentives. We show that performance vesting targets provide the least cost effective incentives, performance exercise targets provide the largest risk incentives, option plans are generally superior to restricted stock plans, and calendar vesting is only efficient up to a maximum of three years. Performance exercise targets can increase the expected total lifetime incentives provided by compensation plans, but in general, standard options with short vesting periods provide the most cost effective pay-for-performance incentives.