Journal articles: 'Compliance enforcement'

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Robinson, Anne. "Enforcement and compliance." Probation Journal 61, no. 3 (September 2014): 265–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0264550514536759.

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Davis, Jon S., Gary Hecht, and Jon D. Perkins. "Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics." Accounting Review 78, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 39–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.1.39.

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We analyze the effect of social norms and enforcement on the dynamics of taxpayer compliance. Specifically, we develop two models to evaluate the movement between classes of compliant and noncompliant taxpayers. Our analysis suggests that the effect on compliance of changing enforcement levels depends on whether the taxpayer population is initially compliant or noncompliant. Compliant populations are insensitive to changes in enforcement policies until enforcement becomes sufficiently lax, when we observe a sudden shift to high levels of noncompliance in equilibrium. In contrast, relatively noncompliant populations respond to increased enforcement by gradually increasing compliance. Then, when enforcement becomes sufficiently harsh, we find a sudden shift in equilibrium to very high levels of compliance. After the taxpayer population shifts from compliance to noncompliance, or vice versa, our models predict that returning to the previous enforcement policy will not cause the population to return to its previous state. On the whole, our models' results help explain why taxpayer compliance varies across time and across geographic regions, even under similar enforcement regimes.

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Slemrod, Joel. "Tax Compliance and Enforcement." Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 904–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181437.

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This paper reviews recent economic research in tax compliance and enforcement. After briefly laying out the economics of tax evasion, it focuses on recent empirical contributions. It first discusses what methodologies and data have facilitated these contributions, and then presents critical summaries of what has been learned. It discusses a promising new development—the analysis of randomized controlled trials mostly delivered via letters from the tax authority—and then reviews recent research using various methods about the impact of the principal enforcement tax policy instruments: audits, information reporting, and remittance regimes. I also explore several understudied issues worthy of more research attention. The paper closes by outlining a normative framework based on the behavioral response elasticities now being credibly estimated that allow one to assess whether a given enforcement intervention is worth doing. (JEL H26, H30)

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Hansen, Fay. "FLSA Compliance and Enforcement." Compensation & Benefits Review 28, no. 4 (July 1996): 8–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/088636879602800402.

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Shimshack, Jay P., and Michael B. Ward. "Enforcement and over-compliance." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55, no. 1 (January 2008): 90–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2007.05.003.

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Bhargava, Rashmi. "ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT." International Journal of Research -GRANTHAALAYAH 3, no. 9SE (September 30, 2015): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.29121/granthaalayah.v3.i9se.2015.3159.

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Each country faces a unique set of challenges and capacities to implement its environmental laws. However, there are fundamental elements in all countries that form the basis of effective environmental compliance and enforcement programs and of legal systems. These common principles, based on the collective knowledge and experience of the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) and reflective of international good practice, may be used to improve national environmental compliance and enforcement programs. These principles are divided into five sections: (1) environmental results and shared responsibility, (2) goals and strategies, (3) good governance, rule of law and compliance, (4) structure and resources, and (5) continuous evaluation and improvement.

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Paniccia, John, Kassandra Barnes, and Terry Karda. "HAULED WASTE COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM." Proceedings of the Water Environment Federation 2004, no. 14 (January 1, 2004): 127–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2175/193864704784137279.

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Andarge, Tihitina, and Erik Lichtenberg. "Regulatory compliance under enforcement gaps." Journal of Regulatory Economics 57, no. 3 (June 2020): 181–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09405-0.

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Titus, Matthew J. "Benefits of Electronic Clearance for Enforcement of Motor Carrier Regulations." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 1522, no. 1 (January 1996): 64–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0361198196152200108.

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The transparent borders concept of the Federal Highway Administration's Intelligent Transportation System for Commercial Vehicle Operations program could enhance regulatory efficiency by improving motor carrier compliance and reducing the costs of compliance. Discussion focuses on the cost of enforcement for motor carriers, which is one of the components of compliance cost. Motor carrier regulations are typically enforced concurrently with weight and safety enforcement efforts. To determine the burden, the amount and value of time spent by motor carriers on enforcement activities was estimated. Recognizing that differences among trucking firms exist, burdens were estimated separately for truckload and less-than-truckload carriers. Values were based on labor and opportunity costs. Time requirements were taken from existing literature. Current weight enforcement efforts cost the industry between $167 and $283 million annually. Furthermore, over 99.4 percent of the burden is borne by compliant carriers. Technologies and enforcement strategies that would greatly reduce the proportion of compliant vehicles subjected to enforcement are currently available and should be pursued. Complying with current safety enforcement efforts costs the industry between $14 and $25 million annually. Compliant carriers bear over 44 percent of this cost. Analysis of safety data indicates that a statistical relationship exists between out-of-service rates and accident rates. Therefore, it is possible to develop a system that would increase the proportion of noncompliant vehicles subjected to inspection relative to compliant vehicles.

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Aakre, Stine, and Jon Hovi. "Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance enforcement." European Union Politics 11, no. 3 (September 2010): 427–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116510369265.

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Heyes, A. "Making things stick: enforcement and compliance." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14, no. 4 (December 1, 1998): 50–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/14.4.50.

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Liu, Nicole Ning, Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Xueyong Zhan, and Wei Wang. "Campaign-Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance." Public Administration Review 75, no. 1 (October 14, 2014): 85–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/puar.12285.

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Shimshack, Jay P., and Michael B. Ward. "Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 50, no. 3 (November 2005): 519–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2005.02.002.

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Pinera, Jomel. "Enforcement and Compliance with Traffic Rules in the Province of Cagayan." Journal of Advanced Research in Dynamical and Control Systems 12, SP8 (July 30, 2020): 962–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5373/jardcs/v12sp8/20202601.

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15

Feris, LA. "Compliance Notices – A New Tool in Environmental Enforcement." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 9, no. 3 (July 5, 2017): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2006/v9i3a2824.

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This note examines compliance notices, a new administrative remedy that has been created to assist in compliance and enforcement of environmental laws. The note considers the aim and scope of compliance and the process of issuing a compliance notice. In addition, it reflects on objections to compliance notices as well as the effect of non-compliance with compliance notices. It furthermore considers the mandate of Environmental Management Inspectors (EMIs) to issue compliance notices, the legislation in terms of which they may issue compliance notices and the ability of EMIs to issue compliance notices beyond the designated legislation. The note also assesses the overall effectiveness of compliance notices and the extent to which it is likely to be utilised by EMIs in the exercise of their mandate.

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Chang, Hung Hao, and D. Daniel Sokol. "ADVOCACY VERSUS ENFORCEMENT IN ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS." Journal of Competition Law & Economics 16, no. 1 (March 2020): 36–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhaa002.

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Abstract We focus on the question of why firms self-regulate to avoid more severe public regulation in the area of antitrust compliance. We distinguish the effects of an antitrust authority’s outreach and enforcement on firms’ adoption of antitrust compliance programs. Furthermore, we examine the mechanism that may drive an antitrust authority’s actions on firms’ decisions to adopt compliance programs. Using a 2-year survey of 432 firms drawn from the top 300 Taiwanese enterprises and applying mediation analysis, we find that “voluntary” self-regulation actions, encouraged by the antitrust authority to promote compliance programs through advocacy, significantly increase the creation of antitrust compliance programs. Moreover, “coercive” actions of the antitrust authority in terms of enforcement are less effective than voluntary actions for firms’ compliance program creation. Within “coercive” actions, large fines are more likely to lead to the adoption of antitrust compliance programs relative to other forms of government prosecution.

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Chayes, Abram. "Remarks by Abram Chayes: Compliance without Enforcement." Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 91 (1997): 53–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0272503700065253.

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Sharp, Alan, and Conan Fischer. "The Versailles Settlement: Enforcement, Compliance, Contested Identities." Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 3 (September 2005): 419–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290500245271.

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Seth Jones, David. "Enforcement in Singapore: Using the Compliance Strategy." Asian Journal of Public Administration 20, no. 1 (June 1998): 30–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02598272.1998.10800347.

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Silbey, Susan S. "Organizational Challenges to Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 649, no. 1 (August 2, 2013): 6–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716213493066.

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Rennuy, Nicolas. "Posting of workers: Enforcement, compliance, and reform." European Journal of Social Security 22, no. 2 (June 2020): 212–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1388262720931658.

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This article analyses the enforcement deficit plaguing the posting of workers. The rule subjecting posted workers to the social security system of their State of origin is enforced almost exclusively, but rather poorly, by that State. Because of its limited incentive and capacity to enforce the requirements for being posted, it often issues posting certificates without adequate verification. These rubber-stamped certificates bind the social security institutions and courts of the State of destination, thus hindering its enforcement machinery. The resulting gap in administrative enforcement enables employers to unilaterally choose the applicable social security legislation, quite possibly depriving their workers of the more generous social security protection of the State of destination while gaining an unfair competitive advantage over undertakings based there. Helpful though they may be, pending reforms of Regulation 883/2004 and Regulation 987/2009 are held back by an incomplete problem definition. Building on rationalist and managerial theories, I argue that the effectiveness of administrative enforcement depends on whether each posting requirement can be monitored by a State that is both willing and capable of doing so. The existing and envisaged allocation of administrative enforcement powers suffers from a misalignment between incentives, capacities and competences to monitor, which can be addressed by heightening incentives, by enhancing capacities, and by transferring competences to the State of destination.

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Wils, Wouter P. J. "Antitrust compliance programmes and optimal antitrust enforcement." Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, no. 1 (December 10, 2012): 52–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jns006.

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Kotsogiannis, Christos, and Konstantinos Serfes. "Optimal performance reward, tax compliance and enforcement." Economic Theory Bulletin 4, no. 2 (February 4, 2016): 325–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0092-1.

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Bennett, Gary F. "1. Pretreatment compliance monitoring and enforcement guidance." Journal of Hazardous Materials 24, no. 1 (December 1990): 99–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-3894(90)80021-u.

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Kashyap, Vishal, and Brian R. Murtha. "The Joint Effects of Ex Ante Contractual Completeness and Ex Post Governance on Compliance in Franchised Marketing Channels." Journal of Marketing 81, no. 3 (May 2017): 130–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jm.14.0089.

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This study examines the heretofore neglected joint effects of ex ante contractual completeness and ex post governance on compliance in a franchise setting. In contrast to much of the extant literature that views contractual completeness in the aggregate, the present research disaggregates contractual completeness into ex ante monitoring and enforcement completeness, and additionally distinguishes between ex post monitoring and enforcement, allowing for a nuanced examination of the joint effects of different types of ex ante and ex post governance on compliance. Additionally, the authors advance the concept of consummate compliance, thereby complementing the literature, which tends to view compliance solely in terms of perfunctory compliance—an important distinction because the results suggest that perfunctory compliance has a negative relationship with customer satisfaction, whereas consummate compliance has a positive one. Drawing on multiple data sources, the authors demonstrate that ex ante monitoring completeness positively moderates the relationship between ex post monitoring and both types of compliance; however, ex ante enforcement completeness negatively moderates the relationship between ex post enforcement and both types of compliance.

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Akanmidu, Oludara. "The deterrence theory: A case for enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties." Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review 1, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 25–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cgobr_v1_i1_p3.

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This article is concerned with providing a justification for effective enforcement of directors’ duties. It aims to consider whether enforcement of directors’ duties is necessary. It argues that enforcement of directors’ duties is crucial to effective corporate governance. Drawing on the deterrence theory, it argues that there is a clear link between increased enforcement and increased compliance. Enhanced enforcement of directors’ duties is essential for securing compliance; countries, therefore, ought to put in significant effort to develop effective enforcement mechanisms.

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McCANNON, BRYAN C. "SOPHISTICATED ENFORCEMENT AND ADAPTIVE OFFENDERS." International Game Theory Review 13, no. 02 (June 2011): 235–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002976.

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The interaction between a sophisticated player and a fictitious player is analyzed and applied to the problem of optimal enforcement. An adaptive potential offender myopically responds to the history of past enforcement. How can a sophisticated enforcement official take advantage of this behavior? Will compliance with the law be attained? Conditions under which full compliance arises is derived and the optimal cycle of enforcing and not enforcing the law is presented. Welfare is shown to be greater than if the offender was sophisticated as well.

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Pelzman, Joseph, and Amir Shoham. "WTO Enforcement Issues." Global Economy Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2007): 1850105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1245.

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In theory, the WTO dispute settlement system is expected, via an elaborate system of sequential legal maneuvers to ensure the implementation of the dispute settlement body (DSB) recommendations. In reality when trade issues rise above some critical threshold to a respondent, the theory behind the DSU enforcement breaks down and the well meaning legal system only leads to prolonging the dispute rather than resolving it. Since 1995, more than 300 complaints have been filed through the WTO dispute settlement system. In most cases, the parties reach a mutually satisfactory solution in accordance with the WTO Agreements through consultations without having recourse to the panel and Appellate Body review. When the consultation process fails the resulting process of Panel reports and Appellate Body reports result in a removal or modification of the violating measures. In those cases where there is no removal or modification of the violating measures, the period of non-compliance tends to be very long and leads to core questions about the true intent of the DSU. In particular, was the DSU designed to ensure a legal process for the settlement of a dispute and to recommend a remedy to the offending violation but was not designed to secure compliance. The intent of this paper is to show that this is indeed the case. Moreover, if one treats the WTO as a contract, then the non-compliance issue may be viewed as an `efficient breach' and the only efficient remedy is a `fine' rather than the usual practice of suspension of concessions or other obligations to the offending Member. Under our suggested enforcement rules, it may be possible for a Member to continue to breach her obligation to the WTO contract while simultaneously compensating for damages created by the offending measure. The end result will be more efficient than the current system of diplomatic maneuvering designed to pressure the Member to remove or modify the offending measure.

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Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. "Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation?" International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300033427.

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Recent research on compliance in international regulatory regimes has argued (1) that compliance is generally quite good; (2) that this high level of compliance has been achieved with little attention to enforcement; (3) that those compliance problems that do exist are best addressed as management rather than enforcement problems; and (4) that the management rather than the enforcement approach holds the key to the evolution of future regulatory cooperation in the international system. While the descriptive findings above are largely correct, the policy inferences are dangerously contaminated by endogeneity and selection problems. A high rate of compliance is often the result of states formulating treaties that require them to do little more than they would do in the absence of a treaty. In those cases where noncompliance does occur and where the effects of selection are attenuated, both self-interest and enforcement play significant roles.

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Forlines, Grayson L., S. Andrew Martin, Valerie Keathley, Jerry Kissick, and Jennifer Walton. "Estimating Benefits of Automated Commercial Vehicle Enforcement." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2673, no. 10 (May 12, 2019): 25–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0361198119849574.

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Automated enforcement of commercial vehicle regulations is one potential method through which states can generate revenue and improve safety compliance by more efficiently directing the attention of law enforcement and state Department of Transportation (DOT) officials to non-compliant carriers and identifying carriers who may be evading taxes. This paper estimates the potential benefits of remote enforcement of weight–distance tax regulations in Kentucky, United States (U.S.) using data from camera-equipped Kentucky Automated Truck Screening (KATS) systems and PrePass weigh stations in Kentucky, and links these data sources with administrative tax returns and Kentucky State Police citation data. This research estimates that remote enforcement and identification of tax evaders could generate up to $10.4 million annually in revenue. Implementation of KATS weigh stations increases monthly impounds by approximately $5,000 per station, or about 160%. Overall, the results indicate that remote enforcement can assist state DOTs and law enforcement agencies targeting non-compliant carriers and may be an effective tax enforcement tool for states.

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The Giang, Vien. "Law compliance and enforcement in doing business to follow the rule of law in the market economy of Viet Nam." Science & Technology Development Journal - Economics - Law and Management 3, no. 4 (February 10, 2020): 478–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdjelm.v3i4.589.

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Based on the theory of agency problem and the relation between the government and market, this paper analyzes and evaluates the practice of law compliance and enforcement in doing business of enterprises. It is necessary to strengthen the law compliance and enforcement to enterprises, thereby ensuring the rule of law in business organization and operations. The results show that the regime of legal representative significantly affects the law compliance and enforcement of enterprises. In addition, the role of the government in enacting, modifying, and enforcing law of investment or doing business can negatively affect the the law compliance and enforcement of enterprises. Therefore, it is of importance to design a legal framework to monitor the behavior of legal representatives of enterprises and control the unreasonable intervention of the government in relationships in a market economy.

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Christian, Cary. "Enhanced enforcement outcomes through a responsive regulation approach to sales tax enforcement." Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management 29, no. 4 (March 1, 2017): 464–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jpbafm-29-04-2017-b002.

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AbstractIn this study, targeted interventions were applied in a natural quasi-experimental setting to taxpayers engaged in sales tax theft and evasion to gauge both the direct and indirect impacts of a responsive regulation approach to compliance enforcement. The approach adopted included substantial engagement with targeted businesses and deferral of more punishing forms of deterrence based on the target's level of cooperation and effort to return to and maintain compliance. Results were was found to be 2.17:1. Additionally, the impact of the targeted responsive regulation interventions greatly exceeded the results obtained in deterrence-only control groups in terms of tax assessments compared to multiple control groups to determine the indirect impact of the interventions and to compare the responsive regulation approach to traditional deterrence-only enforcement results. The indirect versus direct impact of the targeted responsive regulation enforcement regimen overall and assessment per dollar of cost ($322.19 vs. $5.21).

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Scribner, Richard, and Deborah Cohen. "The Effect of Enforcement on Merchant Compliance with the Minimum Legal Drinking Age Law." Journal of Drug Issues 31, no. 4 (October 2001): 857–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002204260103100403.

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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention to deter underage alcohol sales by targeting alcohol retailers instead of underage youth. A quasi-experiment using a repeated-intervention design was conducted for a random sample (n=143) of off-sale alcohol outlets from across New Orleans. Compliance checks of off-sale outlets were conducted at baseline, two months after the intervention, and eight months after the intervention. At baseline, only 11.2% (16/143) of outlets were compliant. Following the intervention, compliance increased to 39.9% (p<.001). The increase in compliance was greatest among outlets receiving citations for non compliance (23/45, 51.1%; p<.001); however, a significant increase in compliance (34/98, 34.7%; p<.001) was also observed among outlets that did not receive a citation but were only exposed to the media coverage of the issuing of citations. A small residual effect of the intervention persisted at eight months post intervention among the outlets receiving citations for non-compliance. The study demonstrates that a deterrence strategy composed of compliance checks and the threat of compliance checks was effective in increasing alcohol retailer compliance with the minimum legal drinking age law. Given the limited effectiveness of general deterrence strategies in targeting other illegal alcohol use behaviors, these findings suggest general deterrence strategies are less effective when the behavior targeted is influenced by physiologic and social externalities, as is the case for underage alcohol consumers, rather than by costs and benefits, as is the case for alcohol retailers.

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Tallberg, Jonas. "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union." International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002): 609–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081802760199908.

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The contemporary debate on compliance has been framed in terms of two contending perspectives on how best to make states comply with international rules: enforcement or management. Whereas enforcement theorists stress a coercive strategy of monitoring and sanctions, management theorists embrace a problem-solving approach based on capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency. In this article, I challenge the conception that enforcement and management are competing strategies for achieving compliance. Based on the case of the European Union (EU) and a comparison with other international regimes, I suggest that enforcement and management mechanisms are most effective when combined. The twinning of cooperative and coercive instruments in a “management-enforcement ladder” makes the EU highly successful in combating violations, thus reducing non-compliance to a temporal phenomenon. An examination of regimes in the areas of trade, environment, and human rights lends additional support to this proposition; compliance systems that offer both forms of mechanism are particularly effective in securing rule conformance, whereas systems that only rely on one of the strategies suffer in identifiable ways.

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Reinganum, Jennifer F., and Louis L. Wilde. "A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance." Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, no. 4 (November 1988): 793. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1886076.

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Friesen, Lana. "Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46, no. 1 (July 2003): 72–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00033-5.

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Pyć, Dorota. "ECA compliance and enforcement – legal regime for ships." SHS Web of Conferences 58 (2018): 01026. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20185801026.

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This paper addresses the importance of the prevention air pollution from ships in terms of international legal compliance and enforcement. In addition to effectively enforcing international norms, standards and procedures, flag States have an obligation to prevent polluting ships from sailing. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) has been described by the International Maritime Organization as “the most ambitious international treaty covering maritime pollution ever adopted”. Annex VI of the MARPOL allows for the establishment of Emission Control Areas (ECAs). ECAs have been implemented to reduce the amount of air pollution from ships. The new ECA regulations entered into force on the 1st of January 2015. First and foremost, this paper examines some aspects of the implementation of the new ECA regulations on shipping industry and control air emissions in the Baltic Sea ECA. Moreover, it outlines that Port State Control and Flag State Control are commitment to monitor and enforce compliance through inspections and penalties.

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Ronconi, Lucas. "Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina." ILR Review 63, no. 4 (July 2010): 719–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300409.

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Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. "Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties." Negotiation Journal 7, no. 3 (July 1991): 311–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1991.tb00625.x.

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Haloush, Haitham. "Enforcement, Recognition, and Compliance with OADR Outcome(s)." International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 21, no. 2 (July 2007): 81–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600860701492088.

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Boyer, Marcel, Tracy R. Lewis, and Wei Lin Liu. "Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique 33, no. 2 (May 2000): 319–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0008-4085.00018.

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Koenig, Judith Anderson. "Introduction and Overview: Considering Compliance, Enforcement, and Revisions." Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice 25, no. 3 (November 15, 2006): 18–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-3992.2006.00063.x.

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Misra, Fauzan. "TAX COMPLIANCE: THEORIES, RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND TAX ENFORCEMENT MODELS." ACCRUALS (Accounting Research Journal of Sutaatmadja) 3, no. 2 (September 30, 2019): 189–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.35310/accruals.v3i2.72.

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Tax compliance is still a serious problem in various countries. This is indicated by the low level of tax compliance and tax ratio. This paper aims to discuss tax compliance from three main perspectives, namely theories about tax compliance, research variables derived from the theory put forward, and models of tax compliance enforcement. Broadly speaking, this theory is divided into two, namely the economic-deterrence model and the fiscal and social psychology model. For a discussion of the research variables that have been tested before, this article follows the classification proposed by Devos (2014). Devos divides these variables into three classifications, namely tax / moral ethics variables, equity and fairness variables and deterrence measures variables. This writing also discusses tax compliance as a behavioral phenomenon. Next, the models of tax law enforcement are explained as proposed by Alm and Torgler (2011) and several other proposed models. Alm and Torgler classified the models into three paradigms, that is, traditional deterrence paradigm, services paradigm, and trust paradigm. These models are proposed to build a mutually beneficial enforcement model for tax authorities and taxpayers.

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HOVI, JON, CAMILLA BRETTEVILLE FROYN, and GURI BANG. "Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?" Review of International Studies 33, no. 3 (July 2007): 435–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210507007590.

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ABSTRACTTo enhance effective cooperation, the Marrakesh Accords provide a compliance system for the international climate regime. An innovative part of this system is an Enforcement Branch authorised to apply punitive consequences against countries that fail to comply with their Kyoto obligations. While previous research has primarily focused on the ability of this compliance system to deter non-compliance, this article discusses whether the actual use of punitive consequences will induce a non-compliant country to return to compliance. The Marrakesh Accords explicitly emphasise that the punitive consequences shall be aimed at the restoration of compliance. However, we show that the application of punitive consequences will accomplish this in only exceptional circumstances.

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Peruga, Armando, Luminita S. Hayes, Ximena Aguilera, Vinayak Prasad, and Douglas W. Bettcher. "Correlates of compliance with national comprehensive smoke-free laws." Tobacco Control 27, no. 6 (December 5, 2017): 608–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2017-053920.

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ObjectiveTo explore correlates of high compliance with smoking bans in a cross-sectional data set from the 41 countries with national comprehensive smoke-free laws in 2014 and complete data on compliance and enforcement.MethodsOutcome variable: compliance with a national comprehensive smoke-free law in each country was obtained for 2014 from the WHO global report on the global tobacco epidemic. Explanatory variables: legal enforcement requirements, penalties, infrastructure and strategy were obtained through a separate survey of governments. Also, country socioeconomic and demographic characteristics including the level of corruption control were included. Analysis: an initial bivariate analysis determined the significance of each potentially relevant explanatory variable of high compliance. Differences in compliance were tested using the exact logistic regression.ResultsHigh compliance with the national comprehensive smoke-free law was associated with the involvement of the local jurisdictions in providing training and/or guidance for inspections (OR=10.3, 95% CI 1.7 to 117.7) and a perception of high corruption control efforts in the country (OR=7.2, 95% CI 1.1 to 85.8).DiscussionThe results show the importance of the depth of the enforcement infrastructure and effort represented by the degree to which the local government is involved in enforcement. They also show the significance of fighting corruption in the enforcement process, including the attempts of the tobacco industry to undermine the process, to achieve high levels of compliance with the law. The results point out to the need to invest minimal but essential enforcement resources given that national comprehensive smoke-free laws are self-enforcing in many but not all countries and sectors.

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Heru Tjaraka, Edrick P. Putra,. "Tax Law Enforcement in Strengthening Tax Compliance Behavior of Individual Taxpayers." Jurnal Akuntansi 24, no. 1 (June 24, 2020): 154. http://dx.doi.org/10.24912/ja.v24i1.664.

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The main problem of taxation in Indonesia still revolves around the tax compliance level, which is low, the problem of tax compliance is a classic problem faced by almost all countries. Departing from the general taxation problem, this study specifically examines taxpayers in Central Kalimantan, specifically in Palangkaraya. The research questions raised are whether the interaction between tax awareness and tax law enforcement impact on strengthening taxpayer compliance behavior. Second, whether the interaction between trust in tax authority and tax law enforcement has an impact on strengthening taxpayer compliance behavior. The test results show that both tax awareness and trust in tax authority have a positive influence on the taxpayer obedient behavior. The tax law enforcement moderation variable is tested to be a moderation variable that reinforces the taxpayer's compliance behavior. In the final section we offer conclusions, contributions, and implications, including suggestions for further research.

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KANG, SANG MOK, and MYUNGHUN LEE. "An empirical study on effective pollution enforcement in Korea." Environment and Development Economics 9, no. 3 (May 19, 2004): 353–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x03001281.

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It has been recognized that extra incentives for firms' compliance with pollution regulations would be created under state-dependent enforcement as Harrington (1988) has shown theoretically. However, the extent of the overall improvement in compliance is expected to be different according to the pollution control costs and industrial structures of any given country. This paper empirically examines, for the first time, the effectiveness of an imposition of higher fines for repeated violations and state-dependent enforcement in terms of the reduction of violation days, by simulating emitting behavior for 65 sub-industries in the Korean manufacturing industry over the period 1987–1989. State-dependent enforcement was found to be more effective than an imposition of higher non-compliance fines for repeated violations in regard to the number of sub-industries exhibiting persistent non-compliance. However, the number of fully complying sub-industries was found to be slightly higher under an imposition of higher non-compliance fines for repeated violations. In Korea, it would therefore be desirable to discriminate against certain industries with enforcement systems of different intensity based on their abatement cost structures rather than uniformly introducing a state-dependent approach.

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Greene, Carlton, Thomas Hanusik, Cari Stinebower, and Sarah Bartle. "AML compliance in the age of individual accountability." Journal of Investment Compliance 18, no. 3 (September 4, 2017): 44–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/joic-06-2017-0045.

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Purpose To analyze FinCEN’s settlement with Thomas Haider and examine regulatory agencies’ emphasis on individual accountability and the implications of this emphasis for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance personnel, and to provide practical guidance for personnel who have involvement with or oversight of corporate AML programs. Design/methodology/approach This article analyzes the Thomas Haider settlement and its importance for individuals involved in AML compliance functions. This analysis includes an examination of several recent corporate and individual enforcement actions to contextualize the Thomas Haider settlement and its usefulness in the prediction of trends in the financial regulatory space. Findings This article concludes that FinCEN’s May 2017 settlement with Thomas Haider, which resolved the first occurrence of FinCEN’s filing suit to enforce a civil penalty against an individual, illustrates the importance of effective AML programs and highlights the potential consequences for individuals who fail to ensure effective programs. The article also makes specific practical suggestions for AML compliance personnel, and finds that such personnel should be particularly conscientious in light of regulatory agencies’ focus on individual accountability in resolving corporate enforcement actions. Originality/value This article contains valuable information about recent regulatory enforcement activity and practical guidance for AML compliance personnel from experienced lawyers with specialties in financial services and white collar regulatory enforcement.

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Paramaduhita, Aqmarina Vaharani, and Elia Mustikasari. "Non-employee individual taxpayer compliance." Asian Journal of Accounting Research 3, no. 1 (August 6, 2018): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ajar-06-2018-0007.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine what factors may affect taxpayer (TP) compliance. Design/methodology/approach This research uses five independent variables such as income, TP’s perception on tax penalties, law and enforcement, fair tax treatment and the use of tax money in a transparent and accountable way. The dependent variable is the compliance of individual TPs non-employees. The data used are primary data obtained from questionnaires on KPP Surabaya Rungkut and processed using a multiple linear regression method with SPSS 21.0 Software for Windows. Findings The results show that partially income does not affect the compliance of individual TP non-employees; however, four other independent variables on the TP’s perception of penalties, law enforcement, tax treatment and the use of tax money simultaneously had a positive effect. Originality/value All independent variables had a positive effect on compliance by individual TP non-employees on KPP Surabaya Rungkut.

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Davidson, Stephanie A., and David R. Denton. "Ethics Compliance: Enforcing ASHA’s Code of Ethics." Perspectives on Fluency and Fluency Disorders 20, no. 3 (November 2010): 71–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1044/ffd20.3.71.

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ASHA’s Code of Ethics sets forth principles and rules essential to preserving the highest standards of integrity among audiologists, speech-language pathologists and speech, language and hearing scientists. ASHA members and certificate holders must abide by these principles and rules. This article summarizes ASHA’s ethics enforcement program by describing the program’s key components, including the special responsibility of ASHA’s members and certificate holders in the enforcement of the Code. The purpose of this article is to promote a fuller understanding of this important aspect of ASHA’s overall ethics program, which may not be familiar to readers.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Compliance enforcement'

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