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Journal articles on the topic 'Conceivability'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 14 February 2022

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1

Demin, T. S. "Deficit of conceivability: response to Bogdan Faul’s article «Minimal dualism and epistemic approach»." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 6, no. 1 (2021): 91–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-91-94.

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The argument in defense of minimal dualism presented in Bogdan Faul’s article presents the idea that we can conceive consciousness existing only in the introspection without a physical body. From that kind of conceivability follows the possibility of consciousness. And this leads to the falsity of physicalism. I argue that Faul’s argument is not fundamentally different from the ghost argument. Then I consider a step from conceivability to possibility and conclude that no argument of conceivability guarantees the possibility that consciousness is non-physical since we lack the epistemic capacity for such a conclusion. In the last part of this article, I discuss three kinds of conceivability. The classification of these kinds of conceivability demonstrates what kind of conceivability we lack for an argument to be sound, and we cannot have such conceivability

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2

Corkum, Philip. "Meta-conceivability." Essays in Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2012): 196–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213112.

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In addition to conceiving of such imaginary scenarios as those involving philosophical zombies, we may conceive of such things being conceived. Call these higher order conceptions ‘meta-conceptions’. Sorensen (2006) holds that one can entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-order conception. So it seems that I can meta-conceive possibilities which I cannot conceive. If this is correct, then meta-conceptions provide a counter-example to the claim that possibility entails conceivability. Moreover, some of Sorensen’s discussion suggests the following argument: if the conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility, then the meta-conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility; but we can meta-conceive impossibilities; so conceivability doesn’t entail possibility. In this paper, I’ll argue that one cannot entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-order conception. And so we can neither meta-conceive impossibilities nor meta-conceive possibilities of which we cannot thereby conceive.

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3

Htut Maung, Hane. "Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux." Synthesis philosophica 34, no. 1 (2019): 157–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp34111.

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In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.

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4

Oderberg, David S. "Conceivability and Possibility." International Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2004): 587–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200444448.

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5

Prudovsky, Gad. "ARGUMENTS FROM CONCEIVABILITY." Ratio 8, no. 1 (1995): 63–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.1995.tb00069.x.

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6

Vahid, Hamid. "Conceivability and possibility." Philosophical Explorations 9, no. 3 (2006): 243–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/138697903600815756.

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7

Pyle, A. "Conceivability and Possibility." British Journal of Aesthetics 44, no. 2 (2004): 206–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/44.2.206.

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8

Hunter, David A. "Consciousness and conceivability." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2003): 285–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716544.

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9

Prelević, Duško. "Zombies Slap Back: why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work." Disputatio 7, no. 40 (2015): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0002.

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Abstract In his “anti-zombie argument”, Keith Frankish turns the tables on “zombists”, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator. This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the ‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of scenarios. In this paper I also argue that conceiving of the zombiesituation is a good starting point for rendering the zombie argument plausible.

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10

Hanrahan, Rebecca. "Epistemology and Possibility." Dialogue 44, no. 4 (2005): 627–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000020.

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ABSTRACTRecently the discussion surrounding the conceivability thesis has been less about the link between conceivability and possibility per se and more about the requirements of a successful physicalist program. But before entering this debate it is necessary to consider whether conceivability provides us with even prima facie justification for our modal beliefs. I argue that two methods of conceiving—imagining that p and telling a story about p—can provide us with such justification, but only if certain requirements are met. To make these arguments, I consider those of Paul Tidman, whose position I use as a foil.

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11

Demin, Timofey S. "David Chalmers’ conceivability argument." Philosophy Journal 13, no. 3 (2020): 162–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2020-13-3-162-174.

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12

Worley, Sara. "Conceivability, possibility and physicalism." Analysis 63, no. 277 (2003): 15–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0003-2638.2003.00388.x.

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13

WOUDENBERG, RENE. "CONCEIVABILITY AND MODAL KNOWLEDGE." Metaphilosophy 37, no. 2 (2006): 210–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2006.00425.x.

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14

Divers, J. "Review: Conceivability and Possibility." Mind 113, no. 450 (2004): 347–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/113.450.347.

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15

Worley, S. "Conceivability, possibility and physicalism." Analysis 63, no. 1 (2003): 15–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.1.15.

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16

Callard, B. "The Conceivability of Platonism." Philosophia Mathematica 15, no. 3 (2007): 347–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm029.

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17

Kallestrup, Jesper. "Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles." Synthese 171, no. 3 (2008): 377–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9319-5.

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18

Cowling, Sam. "Conceivability arguments for haecceitism." Synthese 194, no. 10 (2016): 4171–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1136-7.

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19

Fiocco, M. Oreste. "Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility." Erkenntnis 67, no. 3 (2007): 387–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9057-y.

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20

Chen, Bo, and Jingxian Liu. "Hume’s Conceivability Arguments Reconsidered." Axiomathes 29, no. 5 (2019): 541–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09422-5.

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21

Hoffmann, Glen. "Truth, Superassertability, and Conceivability." Journal of Value Inquiry 42, no. 3 (2008): 287–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-008-9125-9.

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22

De Menezes, Julia Telles. "Elucidating the Conceivability Argument." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, no. 1 (2021): e37961. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.37961.

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It shall be examined how anti-physicalist arguments give rise to the tension between those aspects of our everyday life (with focus on phenomenality) and the thesis of physicalism. The debate over the subjective character of consciousness, or as it is sometimes called: “the hard problem of consciousness” (CHALMERS, 1996), is considered to be the greatest challenge to physicalism. Many philosophers posit this as a matter that cannot be solved, regardless of scientific progress, for it is beyond the scope of what science can find out about the world. If they are correct, the consequence is that the idea of physicalism itself fails. The paper is divided in two parts. For the first part we will deal with Chalmers’ version of the conceivability argument as well as the semantic apparatus of the two-dimensional framework required to make the appropriate link between conceivability and possibility. At the end of this we shall take a look at Kripke’s version of the conceivability argument against physicalism.

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23

Dohrn, Daniel. "Hume on Knowledge of Metaphysical Modalities." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 13, no. 1 (2010): 38–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01301003.

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I outline Hume’s views about conceivability evidence. Then I critically scrutinise two threats to conceivability-based modal epistemology. Both arise from Hume’s criticism of claims to knowing necessary causal relationships: Firstly, a sceptical stance towards causal necessity may carry over to necessity claims in general. Secondly, since – according to a sceptical realist reading – Hume grants the eventuality of causal powers grounded in essential features of objects, conceivability-based claims to comprehensive metaphysical possibilities seem endangered. I argue that although normal conceivability-based claims are defeasible, they are prima facie vindicated. Humes Ansichten über Vorstellbarkeit als Indikator für Möglichkeit werden zusammengefasst. Dann werden zwei Schwierigkeiten für eine auf Vorstellbarkeit basierende modale Erkenntnistheorie aufgeworfen. Beide entstehen aus Humes Kritik an Ansprüchen aufWissen notwendiger kausaler Beziehungen. Erstens könnte sich eine skeptische Haltung gegenüber kausaler Notwendigkeit auf Ansprüche, notwendige Zusammenhänge zu kennen, im allgemeinen auswirken. Zweitens gesteht Hume gemäß einem skeptischen Realismus die Eventualität kausaler Kräfte zu, die in wesentlichen Eigenschaften der Dinge gründen. Dies scheint unvereinbar mit der auf Vorstellbarkeit gestützten Behauptung umfassender metaphysischer Möglichkeiten. Dagegen soll gezeigt werden, dass auf Vorstellbarkeit gestützte modale Wissensansprüche zwar widerlegbar, aber prima facie gerechtfertigt sind.

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24

Faul, B. V. "Minimal dualism and epistemic approach." Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity 6, no. 1 (2021): 86–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90.

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In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticizing the conceivability argument. Secondly, the epistemic approach restricts the conceivability of creatures, the possibility of which is incompatible with the minimal dualism

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25

Jacoby, Henry. "Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments." Philosophical Psychology 2, no. 3 (1989): 271–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515088908572979.

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26

Stoljar, Daniel. "II ? Two Conceivability Arguments Compared." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 107, no. 1pt1 (2007): 27–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00210.x.

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27

D. Tycerium Lightner. "Hume on Conceivability and Inconceivability." Hume Studies 23, no. 1 (1997): 113–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0127.

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28

Mizrahi, Moti, and David R. Morrow. "Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?" Ratio 28, no. 1 (2014): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12047.

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29

FIOCCO, M. ORESTE. "Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 2 (2007): 364–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00022.x.

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30

Campbell, Neil. "Zombies and the Conceivability Illusion." International Journal of the Humanities: Annual Review 6, no. 1 (2008): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.18848/1447-9508/cgp/v06i01/42322.

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31

Brueckner, A. "Chalmers's conceivability argument for dualism." Analysis 61, no. 3 (2001): 187–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.3.187.

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32

Kallestrup, Jesper. "Physicalism, Conceivability and Strong Necessities." Synthese 151, no. 2 (2006): 273–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-7325-9.

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33

VandenHombergh, Jonathon. "Consciousness, Conceivability, and Intrinsic Reduction." Erkenntnis 85, no. 5 (2018): 1129–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0069-6.

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34

Geirsson, H. "Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification." Philosophical Studies 122, no. 3 (2005): 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-6522-9.

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35

Prelevic, Dusko. "Chalmers’ defense of the conceivability argument." Theoria, Beograd 54, no. 2 (2011): 25–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1102025p.

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Modal rationalism is a view according to which conceivability a priori entails metaphysical possibility. One of the most influential objections against this view is the claim that there are necessary a posteriori statements. For it seems that their falsity is conceivable but nevertheless metaphysically impossible. However, David Chalmers argues that modal rationalism could be compatible with the existence of necessary a posteriori statements because epistemic two-dimensional semantics framework could explain their nature and there are relevant senses of conceivability and possibility which could plausibly be connected. This paper assesses Chalmers? argument and shows that shifting the burden of proof to the skeptics is one of its best features. The zombie argument is a useful example which shows that even without epistemic two-dimensional semantics modal rationalism could be effective in metaphysics (i.e. it could defeat minimal physicalism). It is also argued in this paper that making parody of the zombie argument, in order to turn the table on modal rationalists, could be a better tool for distinguishing two senses of ideal positive primary conceivability. The zombie argument could be expressed in ?non-idealized? sense of ideal positive primary conceivability, while parody is bound to its ?idealized? reading only. This makes parody liable to objections which do not affect the zombie argument. The zombie argument and modal rationalism still stand.

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36

Woodling, Casey. "Imagining Zombies." Disputatio 6, no. 38 (2014): 107–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0006.

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Abstract Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.

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37

O'Sullivan, Brendan, and Peter Hanks. "Conceiving of Pain." Dialogue 47, no. 2 (2008): 351–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002651.

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ABSTRACTIn this article we aim to see how far one can get in defending the identity thesis without challenging the inference from conceivability to possibility. Our defence consists of a dilemma for the modal argument. Either “pain” is rigid or it is not. If it is not rigid, then a key premise of the modal argument can be rejected. If it is rigid, the most plausible semantic account treats “pain” as a natural-kind term that refers to its causal or historical origin, namely, C-fibre stimulation. It follows that any phenomenon that is not C-fibre stimulation is not pain, even if it is qualitatively similar to pain. This means there could be phenomena that feel like pain but are not pain since they are not C-fibre stimulation. These possible phenomena can be used to explain away the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fibre stimulation. On either horn of the dilemma, the identity theorist has ample resources to respond to Kripke's argument, even without wandering into the contentious territory of conceivability and possibility.

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38

Yablo, Stephen. "Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, no. 1 (1993): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108052.

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39

OMS, SERGI. "Conceivability, Minimalism and the Generalization Problem." Dialogue 58, no. 2 (2018): 287–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217318000288.

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One of the main problems that Paul Horwich’s Minimalist theory of truth must face is the generalization problem, which shows that Minimalism is too weak to have the fundamental explanatory role Horwich claims it has. In this paper, I defend Horwich’s response to the generalization problem from an objection raised by Bradley Armour-Garb. I also argue that, given my response to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s proposal to cope with the generalization problem can be simplified.

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40

Feng, Shuyi. "The Problem With Modal Conceivability Arguments." Philosophical Forum 50, no. 1 (2019): 135–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phil.12210.

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41

Roca-Royes, Sonia. "Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge." Noûs 45, no. 1 (2011): 22–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00757.x.

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42

Boulter, Stephen. "The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments." Metaphilosophy 42, no. 5 (2011): 617–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01719.x.

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43

Levin, Janet. "Functionalism and the Argument from Conceivability." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 11 (1985): 85–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1985.10715891.

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In recent years, functionalism has emerged as the most appealing candidate for a materialistic theory of mind. Its central thesis - that types of mental states can be defined in terms of their causal and counterfactual relations to the sensory stimulations, other internal states, and behavior of the entities that have them - offers hope for a reasonable materialism: it promises type-identity conditions for beliefs, sensations, and emotions that are not irreducibly mental, yet would permit entities that are physically quite different to be in mental states of the same type.

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44

Giberman, D. "Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability?" Mind 124, no. 493 (2014): 121–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzu142.

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45

Murphy, Peter. "Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability." dialectica 60, no. 2 (2006): 195–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01045.x.

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46

Levine, Joseph. "Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind." Noûs 32, no. 4 (1998): 449–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00134.

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47

Saint-Germier, Pierre. "Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology." Synthese 195, no. 11 (2016): 4785–816. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1194-x.

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48

Kauss, Dominik. "Realism and the logic of conceivability." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 12 (2020): 3885–902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01413-2.

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49

Jacobson-Horowitz, Hilla, and Amir Horowitz. "Conceivability, Higher Order Patterns, and Physicalism." Acta Analytica 23, no. 4 (2008): 349–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0039-8.

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50

Sepetyi, Dmytro. "Why Phenomenal Zombies Are Conceivable Whereas Anti-Zombies Are not." Актуальні проблеми духовності, no. 20 (November 30, 2019): 18–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31812/apd.v0i20.2598.

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In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entailment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument superfluous.

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