Academic literature on the topic 'Conception constructive'

Tradition is a complex phenomenon of which we can find a multiplicity of conceptualizations in the philosophical, sociological, anthropological, and economic literature. In this paper, I offer both a critical and a constructive contribution to answering the question of how tradition should be conceptualized. In the critical part, I argue against attempts to construct a unified conception of tradition. In the constructive part, I discuss three taxonomies proposed in the literature and then develop an analytical grid for conceptions of tradition as an alternative. This analytical grid is based on a sample of 28 accounts of tradition sourced from the contemporary scholarly literature, and makes use of seven dimensions to distinguish among these conceptions.

Current research in music education tends to put the emphasis on learning processes outside formal academic contexts, both to rethink and to renew academic educational formats. Our aim is to observe and describe three music learning cultures simultaneously, including formal, non-formal and informal settings: Classical, Jazz and Flamenco, respectively. We observed the conceptions of learning, teaching and evaluation within the framework of implicit theories. We used multiple-choice questionnaires to infer the profiles of these conceptions in 30 guitarists who are starting out on their professional careers in the three cultures and analysed whether there are related profiles. The results show that: (a) the Flamenco culture differs significantly from the others in the conception of teaching; (b) the three cultures are most alike in the conception of evaluation, for which conceptions are more sophisticated; (c) the classical culture is closer to constructive conceptions and farther from direct positions, while the opposite is true of Flamenco.

Dworkin advances the view that judges decide legal cases according to constructive interpretation. The aim of constructive interpretation is to justify the coercion of the State. A trivial implication of this view is that officials and citizens will comply with the law because of the justification that has been advanced by judges in their exercise of constructive interpretation. Consequently, neither officials nor citizens comply with the law because they have been coerced or because they have been simply told to do so. But then, it seems that constructive interpretation cannot really provide any guidance since officials and citizens have been asked to accept the interpretation of the law that has been put forward by the judges since arguably, it is the best possible interpretation of what the law is in this particular case. However, why they ought to do so?I will argue that the mistake of the theory of constructive interpretation lies in a misleading and implausible conception of action that believes that action is raw behavioural data and that therefore we need to ‘impose meaning’, ‘value’ or ‘purpose’ on them. I will defend a more plausible conception of action along the classical tradition that understands practice as originating in agency and deliberation. The outcome is that constructive interpretation and its conception of ‘imposing meaning’ on practice is a theoretical perspective that neglects and misunderstands action and practical reason.