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1
Burns, R. M. "The Origins of Human Evil." Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no. 3 (August 2000): 292–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930600051000.
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Enlightenment optimism concerning man's ‘natural goodness’ is out of fashion. The many instances of monstrous evil on a mass scale (Nazi extermination camps; Gulags; Cambodia; Kosovo, etc.), the widespread reporting of the activities of sadistic torturers and killers, the great increase in violent crime and drug addiction in the most affluent and welleducated societies, expose to ridicule Condorcet's prediction that 'the time will come when the sun will shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason … the human race, emancipated from its shackles [will] advance with a firm and sure step along the path of truth, virtue, and happiness. Yet there have been few recent philosophical or theological attempts to consider afresh the nature of human evil, and most of them still tend, if mutedly, to cling to the notion of mankind's essential moral goodness. Thus the hesitant conclusion of Ricoeur's reconsideration of human moral responsibility is that ‘however radical evil may be, it cannot be as primordial as goodness’, and that we should think of an ‘existential superimposition of radical evil on primordial good’.2 In 1963, Hannah Arendt declared that ‘evil is never “radical”, that it is only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension … Only the good has depth and can be radical.‘ Instead she wrote of the ‘banality of evil’, generalising from the case of Eichmann.
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Artemyeva, Olga V. "Virtue and Duty in Thomas Reid’s Moral Philosophy." Ethical Thought 21, no. 1 (2021): 106–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2021-21-1-106-121.
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Based on the material of T. Reid’s ethical conception, it is shown that in the moral-philosophical teaching, built around the concepts of duty, obligation, the concept of virtue also retains its significance. Although Reid consciously conceptualizes morality through norms and duties, the concept of virtue plays an important role in his teaching. Without virtue, it is impossible to achieve two ends specific to human nature – the individual’s own good on the whole and what appears to be our duty. Reid shows that the person’s virtue coincides with her good on the whole, or happiness. This goal, however, can only be achieved when a human being combines it with the fulfillment of duty for duty’s sake rather than for self-interest. In connection with the principle of respect for duty, Reid sees the role of virtue in that it is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of duty and of moral obligation. It is virtue as a quality of the moral agent, manifested in his power to distinguish between good and evil, to make judgments concerning one’s own duty and to act according to one’s understanding-conviction, that makes the act performed virtuous and proper through the motive. Through the concept of virtue Reed grasps the idea, important to Early Modern ethics, that every duty is internally binding through a moral motive.
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Ekstrom, Laura W. "God, Moral Requirements, and the Limits of Freedom." Religions 12, no. 5 (April 21, 2021): 285. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12050285.
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This article addresses James Sterba’s recent argument for the conclusion that God’s existence is incompatible with the degree and amount of evil in the world. I raise a number of questions concerning the moral principles that Sterba suggests God would be required to follow, as well as with respect to the analogy he draws between the obligations of a just state and the obligations of God. Against Sterba’s proposed justified divine policy of constraint on human freedom, I ask: What would motivate a perfect being to create human beings who imagine, intend, and freely begin to carry out horrific actions that bring harm to other human beings, to nonhuman animals, and to the environment? I argue that the rationale is lacking behind the thought that God would only interfere with the completion of the process of human beings’ bringing to fruition their horrifically harmful intended outcomes, rather than creating beings with different psychologies and abilities altogether. I end by giving some friendly proposals that help to support Sterba’s view that God, by nature, would be perfectly morally good.
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Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "The Ethical and Legal Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 62, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 47–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcssr-2014-0011.
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Abstract The reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines. These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport. It is impossible to overestimate the role and meaning of metaethical reflection in the context of substantiating moral demands in sports as well as in the context of practical results of expectations. This metaethical reflection not only extends self-knowledge, but also contributes to the metaphilosophy of sports. The degree of the development of self-knowledge - both the metaethics of sports and the metaphilosophy of sports - is also a very important declaration, and a sign of general maturity of the philosophy of sports (Kosiewicz 2008/2009, pp. 5-38)
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Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "The Ethical Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes: Critical Reflections." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 53, no. 1 (December 1, 2011): 76–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10141-011-0024-6.
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The Ethical Context of Justifying Anti-Doping Attitudes: Critical ReflectionsThe reflections presented in the paper are not normative (in general, it can be said, that they do not create moral values and demands). The presented reflections particularly stress the sense, essence, meaning, and identity of sport in the context of moral demands. A disquisition pointing out that sports and sport-related doping can be situated beyond the moral good and evil must be considered precisely as metaethical, and leads in a consciously controversial way to fully defining the identity of sport in general, as well as the identity of particular sports disciplines.These reflections also refer to the issue concerning the identity of sports philosophy, i.e. general deliberations and specific issues concerning, for example, the factual and cognitive status of normative ethics in sport.It is impossible to overestimate the role and meaning of metaethical reflection in the context of substantiating moral demands in sports as well as in the context of practical results of expectations. This metaethical reflection not only extends self-knowledge, but also contributes to the metaphilosophy of sports. The degree of the development of self-knowledge – both the metaethics of sports and the metaphilosophy of sports – is also a very important declaration, and a sign of general maturity of the philosophy of sports (Kosiewicz 2008/2009, pp. 5-38).
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Silverman, Eric Jason, Elizabeth Hall, Jamie Aten, Laura Shannonhouse, and Jason McMartin. "Christian Lay Theodicy and The Cancer Experience." Journal of Analytic Theology 8 (September 21, 2020): 344–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.12978/jat.2020-8.1808-65001913.
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In philosophy of religion, there are few more frequently visited topics than the problem of evil, which has attracted considerable interest since the time of Epicurus (341-270 BCE). It is well known that the problem of evil involves responding to the apparent tension between 1) belief in the existence of a good, all powerful, all knowing God and 2) the existence of evil—such as personal suffering embodied in the experience of cancer. While a great deal has been written concerning abstract philosophical theories that academics use to explain the existence of evil, much less has been written about how religious lay people make sense of evil and suffering. What explanations, meanings, and perceptions do they hold concerning the religious significance of evil? What can theologians and philosophers learn from these lay experiences? Our interdisciplinary team designed an experiment to identify the religious significance that personal suffering held for a group of religious cancer sufferers. We interviewed twenty-nine self-identified evangelical Christians who had received a cancer diagnosis at some point in their lives for our experiment. Since all interviewees identified as Christians, it was expected that they would assent to belief in a theistic God. It was also expected that each interviewee would assent the existence of evil and see their cancer experience as a dramatic and personal instance of an evil event. The explicit existential threat of cancer guarantees that the individual has much at stake in the experience. Furthermore, the pain and suffering that typically accompanies either the cancer itself or cancer treatments make it a compelling example of evil experienced in a very personal way. Finally, even when successfully treated, the ongoing threat of potentially fatal recurrence looms over the sufferer for years to come. We asked 17 questions related to the religious significance of their cancer experience in each interview and coded these interviews looking for five distinct types of explanations for/meaning of evil: trusting God in mystery, free will, moral development, spiritual growth, and growth in human relationships/community. These categories were meant to correspond loosely to five philosophical responses to the existence of evil.Our interviews included several important results. First, 79% of interviewees had at least one answer that fit into the ‘trust God in mystery’ category of responses with 48% using this category of responses as their most frequently cited theme. This result could be interpreted as a kind of generic theodical response: God has a good, but unknown reason for allowing evil/suffering. Alternatively, another possible interpretation is that at least some of these interviewees intuited something similar to skeptical theism, since it claims that if one understands the type of God proposed by theism and possesses an accurate view of human cognitive capacities, it is apparent that there is no real tension to be resolved between theism and the existence of evil. Some of our interviewees seemed to believe not only that the answer to why evil exists is mysterious, but that they simply could not have the necessary perspective to judge what kinds of purposes God might have for allowing this painful episode in their lives.While it was unsurprising that religious sufferers would find it important to trust God in ambiguous difficult circumstances, more surprisingly, we found that 52% of our respondents did not judge that their cancer experience was at all in tension with their religious beliefs. Whereas a broad range of philosophers and theologians acknowledge that there is at least an apparent conflict between the existence of a good, all-powerful God and the existence of evil, most of our interviewees did not even perceive an apparent tension between theistic beliefs and their painful cancer experiences that would be in need of additional reconciliation.There are at least two ways this result might be interpreted. First, our interviewees might hold additional beliefs that make the existence of evil easier for them to accept. After all, these interviewees were not ‘bare theists’ who held only to the existence of God, but presumably held a broad range of religious beliefs which may already serve to reconcile the existence of evil: that growing closer to God is more important than earthly life itself, that in evil in this life allows us a greater appreciation of a blessed eternity, or simply that ‘God works for our good in mysterious ways.’ Thus, a fully developed Christian worldview may already accommodate the existence of evil in a way not fully appreciated by philosophers.Another possible interpretation is that at least some of our interviewees were not adequately reflective to perceive the tension between their religious beliefs and their experience of suffering. There is at least some reason to doubt this explanation as an overarching interpretation of this result since our interviewees were generally well educated with the median participant holding at least a Bachelor’s degree, and most were ongoing participants in a cancer support group ensuring long-term ongoing engagement with their cancer experience.A final significant finding is that a high portion of our interviewees, 83% reported specific examples of beneficial personal growth—moral, spiritual, or relational— that resulted from their cancer experience. When asked about their cancer experience’s broad effect upon their lives in these areas they volunteered at least one example of a benefit they received in these areas. Depending on one’s accompanying value theory and whether such benefits might have been otherwise achieved, they might provide a morally sufficient reason for the existence of suffering. Our interviewees frequently described experiencing the kind of benefits at the heart of John Hick’s soul making theodicy and Eleonore Stump’s ‘spiritual growth’ theodicy, providing at least some corroborating evidence for such views. Experiences common to our interviewees were similar to what such theodicies would predict.
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Louw, Daniël. "Towards the aesthetics of self-termination (suicide)." STJ | Stellenbosch Theological Journal 6, no. 2 (January 22, 2021): 313–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17570/stj.2020.v6n2.a14.
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To end one’s life (suicide) creates a lot of questions concerning the identity and eventual emotional and spiritual condition of the person. Within a more religious context, the intriguing question surfaces: When a committed believer commits suicide, will such a person still go to heaven? The ethical dilemma evolves around questions regarding right (good/liberation) and wrong (evil/damnation), heaven or hell. Instead of a moral approach, the article opts for an aesthetic approach within the framework of a tragic hermeneutics of self-termination. Instead of applying the notions of “suicide” or “self-killing,” the concept of self-termination is proposed. A theology of dereliction is designed to explain the basic assumption: In a Christian spiritual assessment of “suicide,” the question is not about the how of death and dying but on the being quality of the sufferer. In his forsakenness, the suffocating Christ reframed the ugliness of death into the beauty of dying and termination: Resurrection hope! Several portraits are described from the viewpoint of literature, philosophical and poetic reflections regarding the complexity of the phenomenon of self-termination and its connection to the existential disposition of dreadful anguish; i.e., the ontic and tragic disposition of apathetic unhope (inespoir).
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O'connor, David. "On Failing to Resolve Theism-Versus-Atheism Empirically." Religious Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1990): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020229.
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At least since Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, theism has been under indictment; indeed it has been on trial for its life. In part, this indictment is that the enormous quantity, variety, and distribution of evils evident in the natural world disconfirm the core beliefs of theism. Those core beliefs, I think, are the following pair: there exists a being at once omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, the worshipful creator of the universe (henceforth G); and G stands in a relation to the natural world which might be called one of moral responsibility (henceforth M). Obviously, theism says a lot more than the above, rather abrupt, conjunction; nevertheless, that conjunction constitutes its core.
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Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "Sport beyond Moral Good and Evil." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 62, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 22–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcssr-2014-0009.
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Abstract Sport is - and should be - an amoral phenomenon (what should not be confused with an immoral one); that is, a phenomenon which is completely independent from ethics, except of, possibly, deontological ethics which concerns professionals who have professional obligations towards their employers and other persons who are provided with and influenced by their services. Conduct according to rules of a given sport has no moral character. It has only pragmatic character, similarly as conduct in compliance with principles of the administrative code, the civil code or the penal code. Of course, when you act in accordance with rules of sports rivalry you can additionally realize also other aims - like, for example, aesthetic, spectacular or moral ones. However, in each case rules of the game and legal norms have priority, because they are the most important regulative determinant of conduct in various societies, including variously defined human teams. The abovementioned legal and sports regulations are not moral norms. They can, however, influence moral behaviours if they are in conflict with the law or rules of the game. From that viewpoint moral norms are exterritorial in their relation to assumptions and rules of a particular sport. Contestants and people responsible for them - like, for example, coaches or sports officials - as well as their employers are neither required to account for their moral beliefs, nor for their moral behaviours, if only they act in compliance with rules of sports rivalry.
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Kosiewicz, Jerzy. "Sport beyond Moral Good and Evil." Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research 49, no. 1 (October 1, 2010): 21–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10141-010-0012-2.
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Sport beyond Moral Good and EvilSport is - and should be - an amoral phenomenon (what should not be confused with an immoral one); that is, a phenomenon which is completely independent from ethics, except of, possibly, deontological ethics which concerns professionals who have professional obligations towards their employers and other persons who are provided with and influenced by their services.Conduct according to rules of a given sport has no moral character. It has only pragmatic character, similarly as conduct in compliance with principles of the administrative code, the civil code or the penal code. Of course, when you act in accordance with rules of sports rivalry you can additionally realize also other aims - like, for example, aesthetic, spectacular or moral ones. However, in each case rules of the game and legal norms have priority, because they are the most important regulative determinant of conduct in various societies, including variously defined human teams. The above mentioned legal and sports regulations are not moral norms. They can, however, influence moral behaviours if they are in conflict with the law or rules of the game.From that viewpoint moral norms are exterritorial in their relation to assumptions and rules of a particular sport. Contestants and people responsible for them - like, for example, coaches or sports officials - as well as their employers are neither required to account for their moral beliefs, nor for their moral behaviours, if only they act in compliance with rules of sports rivalry.
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Gowramma, Y. S. "Evil." Artha - Journal of Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (November 11, 2004): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.12724/ajss.4.5.
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Man's sense of Mystery -Emergence of the concept of evil in his life Definition of evil -Kinds of evil -Natural and Moral Evils -Origin of moral evil traced to psychological and metaphysical aspects -Atheist's argument for the dismissal of theist's views - Hume's skeptic views on Theist's conception -Theodicee's answer to the question - Freewill Theodicees -Greater good theodicees and best possible world theodicees -Evil as a discipline and necessary means to Good -Effect of the shock of Evil.
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Benson, Sean. "Augustinian Evil and Moral Good in Lolita." Renascence 64, no. 4 (2012): 353–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/renascence201264435.
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Sarot, Marcel. "Als De Koppen Van De Leviathan." European Journal for the Study of Thomas Aquinas 36, no. 1 (December 1, 2017): 180–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ejsta-2017-0006.
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Summary In this article I discuss the concept of evil. I begin by showing that the concept of evil is not religiously neutral. Here, I will discuss the Western view of evil, influenced by Judaism and Christianity. Subsequently, I discuss Leibniz’s classic distinction between three forms of evil - metaphysical, physical and moral - and introduce the categories of natural and non-moral evil. Next, I show that one and the same event may be good in one respect and evil in another. Thus, the passion of Christ is a physical evil when we look at the suffering undergone, a moral evil when we look at the act of those who inflict it on Him, and a moral good when we look at the act of Christ: He gives His life for His friends. This I call the ambiguity of evil. Finally, I discuss two views on the origin of evil: dualism and the view of evil as a privation of a good that should be there, and argue in favour of the second.
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Dutra, Delamar José Volpato. "Torture: banality of evil or radical evil?" Filosofia Unisinos 21, no. 3 (November 25, 2020): 240–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2020.213.01.
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The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone “to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity”. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content.Keywords:radical evil, torture, perpetrator.
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HIMMA, KENNETH EINAR. "Plantinga's version of the free-will argument: the good and evil that free beings do." Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (October 29, 2009): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990230.
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AbstractAccording to Plantinga's version of the free-will argument (FWA), the existence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil is the greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God without allowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil. In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from the standpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga's version of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given this understanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that free beings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possible worlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seems clearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga's version might succeed as a defence against the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evil nor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God's existence with the evil that occurs in this world.
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McNAUGHTON, DAVID. "Is God (almost) a consequentialist? Swinburne's moral theory." Religious Studies 38, no. 3 (September 2002): 265–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250200608x.
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Swinburne offers a greater-goods defence to the problem of evil within a deontological framework. Yet deontologists characteristically hold that we have no right to inflict great evil on any individual to bring about the greater good. Swinburne accepts that humans generally do not have that right, but argues that God, as the supreme care-giver, does. I contend that Swinburne's argument that care-givers have such a right is flawed, and defend the classical deontological objection to imposing evils that good may come.
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Stefanazzi, Mary. "Victor White OP." International Journal of Jungian Studies 11, no. 2 (September 23, 2019): 114–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/19409060-01102001.
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Abstract Jungians and Christians use the word evil in different and contradictory senses. The moral aim of the Jungian is the ‘integration of evil’, whereas for the Christian it is ‘the overcoming of evil by good’. This paper guides the reader through Victor White’s thinking on evil—understood in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas as parasitic on good—malum est privatio boni, and concludes by considering the clinical significance of the relationship between moral evil—malum culpae—and guilt. Although Jung and White never resolved their differences on evil, they agreed that the subject demands concentration and careful reflection. The hypothesis here is that, although the literature on the Jung–White dialogue offers extensive analysis on evil, it does not go far enough. There is little evidence of dynamic engagement with the underlying ethical issues that White’s clarity of thought challenges one to consider.
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Ibrahim, Abdullahi Ali. "Saḥirand Muslim Moral Space." International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, no. 3 (August 1991): 387–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002074380005635x.
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Metaphors of the evil eye (sahir) are interpreted as posing a threat to the Muslim Arab Rubāṭāb1of the Sudan. A common situation in which these metaphors are used is when the speaker(saḥḥār)attempts to cast or “shoot” asahirmetaphor at persons or objects by comparing them to something else. A victim may then try to counteract the shot by uttering protective invocations. The victim's later account of the event in which the evil eye was cast upon him will include subsequent misfortunes and perhaps justifications for personal failure. For example, asahhārlikened someone eating a green onion to somebody speaking into a microphone. The man threw away the onion, cursed thesahhār, and complained thereafter that his hand had never been the same. The audience evaluates the metaphors. Good comparisons evoke much laughter. “He is really evil,” or “He killed him,” are often pronounced by the audience both in appreciation of the theoretical powers of the metaphor shooter and in anticipation of the harm that may come in the shot's wake. The audience later reports the interaction as a joke or legend.
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FORREST, PETER. "Replying to the anti-God challenge: a God without moral character acts well." Religious Studies 48, no. 1 (March 31, 2011): 35–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412511000023.
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AbstractSeveral authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the analogical predication of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ of God from the literal predication, (2) interpreting ‘acting in a morally good way’ to mean ‘acting like a good consequentialist’, and (3) relying on an axiarchist thesis about agency that is congenial to theists and perhaps even presupposed by theism.
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Seregin, Andrei V. "Against metaphysical retributivism." Philosophy Journal, no. 3 (2021): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-1-5-19.
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The paper offers an argument against metaphysical retributivism, i.e. the belief that the existence of physical evil (suffering) can be causally explained and normatively justified by being interpreted as a just punishment for the moral evil committed by those who suffer. First, the author introduces a disjunctive distinction between the humanistic and the non-humanistic normative theories of moral good and evil. Then, he justifies his anti-retributivist thesis with regard to both of these alternatives. The humanistic theories, according to which an activity can only be morally evil due to the fact that it inflicts physical evil on other agents, logically imply that physical evil is a precondition of moral evil and, therefore, cannot just be one of its consequences. This is demonstrated with respect both to the linear (e.g. “abrahamic”) metaphysical scenarios and the circular ones (e.g. ancient or esoteric). Besides, according to these theories, the infliction of very intensive physical evil presupposed by metaphysical retributivism cannot be morally justified even if it is formally just. On the other hand, the non-humanistic normative theories logically imply that the very content of the notion of moral evil is in no way related to the notion of physical evil. However, in that case moral and physical evil are essentially heterogeneous and incommensurable. Therefore, one cannot establish a proportional correlation between them which is a necessary prerequisite for a just and morally justified retribution.
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Muchnik, Pablo. "Radical Evil (radikal Böse)." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 6, no. 2 (January 29, 2019): 101–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2018.v6n2.20.p101.
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By “evil,” Kant does not designate any set of particularly pernicious acts, but the type of volition that underlies and makes possible immorality in all its forms. The evil person, Kant believes, “makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law –whereas it is the latter that, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole incentive” (R 6:36). This inversion of the ethical order of priority does not entail the repudiation of “the moral law (…) in rebellious attitude (by revoking obedience to it)” (R 6:36), but its conditional respect. This fraudulent relation to morality is based on complex strategies of deception, self-deception, and rationalization. The “radical “nature of these tendencies has nothing to do with the intensity or magnitude of observable wrongdoing. Evil’s radicalism is a spatial metaphor intended to designate the locus of immorality (its “root”) in an agent’s “disposition (Gesinnung). What is most baffling the Kantian view is that evil so construed is perfectly compatible with good conduct. Indeed, under the conditions of civilization, Kant believes, it is impossible to distinguish a man of good conduct from a morally good man (RGV 6:30), for the dictates of self-love generally overlap with the prescriptions of duty. The persistence of war, poverty, oppression, and the infinity of vices which cast a dark shadow over the contemporary world speak of the prescience of the Kantian approach.
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LANCASTER-THOMAS, ASHA. "Truth, consequences, and the Evil-god challenge: a response to Anastasia Scrutton." Religious Studies 56, no. 3 (October 16, 2018): 447–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000690.
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AbstractIn her 2016 article in Religious Studies, Anastasia Scrutton attempts to undermine Stephen Law's Evil-god challenge by arguing that belief in a good god is more justified than belief in an evil god, despite the alethic similarity of the two hypotheses. Drawing on the epistemological theory of pragmatic encroachment, Scrutton claims that is it more reasonable to believe in a benevolent deity than a malevolent one because belief in the latter (i) is detrimental to one's well-being and (ii) has worse moral consequences, whereas belief in the former (i) is good for one's well-being and (ii) has better moral consequences. In this article, I critically respond to Scrutton's argument by proposing that even if belief in a good god results in better consequences than belief in an evil god does, pragmatic encroachment does not undermine the Evil-god challenge. I further argue that pragmatic encroachment potentially undermines itself in this instance.
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Kerimov, A. D., and E. V. Halipova. "The evil and crime: moral and legal dimension." Russian Journal of Legal Studies 2, no. 2 (June 15, 2015): 234–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls18059.
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The article, in fact, a response to the ideas contained in the monograph A.I.Aleksandrova "evil philosophy and the philosophy of Crime (questions of philosophy of law, criminal policy and criminal procedure)." Readers are invited to meditation, inspired by philosophical and legal views A.I.Aleksandrova on such fundamental issues as the understanding and the ratio of good and evil crimes and atrocities, socially approved, lawful and unlawful conduct, political and moral responsibility of the government of the state of affairs in the field of the fight against crime, the intrinsic value of education, education and education not only youth, but also all citizens of the state of organized society, and others.
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김철호. "Xunzi's Theory of Good and Evil and Its Moral Educational Meaning." KOREAN ELEMENTARY MORAL EDUCATION SOCIETY ll, no. 58 (December 2017): 69–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.17282/ethics.2017..58.69.
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Kim, Kyung-Min. "The Theory of ‘Good and Evil’ of Buddhism and Moral Education." Korean Society for the Study of Moral Education 27, no. 2 (August 31, 2015): 129–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2015.08.27.2.129.
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Murphy, Frank J. "The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence." Religious Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1995): 243–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023532.
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This paper argues that God may create and exist in any possible world, no matter how much suffering of any sort that world includes. It combines the traditional free will defence with the notion of an ‘occasion’ for good or evil action and limits God's responsibility to the creation of these occasions. Since no possible world contains occasions for more evil than good action, God is morally permitted to create any possible world. With regard to suffering that is not due to free will, namely the suffering of beings who are not moral agents, the paper questions the idea that the relief of such suffering is a moral perfection.
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Breitenbach, Zachary. "A Case for How Eschatological and Soteriological Considerations Strengthen the Plausibility of a Good God." Philosophia Christi 22, no. 2 (2020): 257–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202022223.
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This article contends that considerations of continued human existence beyond this earthly life are advantageous both for defending against a key challenge to the existence of a good God (the evidential problem of evil) and for making a positive moral case for theism. On the defensive side, I address the charge that the amount and alleged gratuitousness of evil render God’s existence unlikely. On the offensive side, I leverage postmortem considerations to bolster a positive case for a good God by offering new arguments that God and an afterlife are key to making sense of moral rationality and morality’s overridingness.
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Biggar, Nigel. "Compromise: What Makes it Bad?" Studies in Christian Ethics 31, no. 1 (October 24, 2017): 34–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0953946817737926.
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This article considers what makes a compromise bad. First, it defines a compromise as a decision involving a loss of good (i.e., an evil), which should therefore be accompanied by ‘agent-regret’. Regret, however, is not moral guilt. Pace proponents of ‘dirty hands’, a morally right compromise cannot retain elements of moral wrongness (as distinct from non-moral evil). Second, the article proceeds to elaborate the features of bad compromise further in terms of common moral sense: the preference of less rather than more of a single good; the preference of an inferior to a superior good; and the violation of an absolute moral rule. Third, it extends its elaboration in terms of three historical cases: the abandonment of strategic promotion of a good; tactical suspension for insufficient reasons; complicity in indubitable and certain injustice to avoid tolerable costs; and the violation of a basic principle of justice as distinct from normal judicial process. Finally, it adds a methodological epilogue, in which it reflects on whether its treatment of the topic has been sufficiently theological.
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Stróżyński, Mateusz. "The Fall of the Soul in Book Two of Augustine’s Confessions." Vigiliae Christianae 70, no. 1 (January 7, 2016): 77–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700720-12341248.
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The purpose of the paper is to show a mutual interaction of Platonic and Christian ideas in the pear theft narrative from Book Two of the Confessions. Augustine is provocatively questioning the Platonic theory of good, evil, and love by suggesting that in the theft he loved evil itself. He is considering three possible explanations, but is not fully content with any of them. Not having any better theory than the Platonic one, Augustine is suggesting that moral evil is completely beyond understanding. What is new in Augustine’s provocative analysis is placing the irrationality and incomprehensibility of moral evil in the context of the “I-Thou” relationship of the soul with God.
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Turek, Waldemar. "Id non culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam (Confessiones VII 3, 5). Niektóre wątpliwości i refleksje św. Augustyna analizującego źródło zła." Vox Patrum 59 (January 25, 2013): 241–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/vp.4028.
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In light of the distinction Saint Augustine makes between a committed evil, understood as the result of a mistake in choosing (culpa), and a suffered evil, described as the effect of a just divine judgment (poena) – a distinction he makes in several texts dealing with the origin of evil – I analyze Augustine’s reflections in the Confessions on his relationship with the unnamed women. He calls the relationship a pactum libidinosi amoris, that is, one aimed at satisfying the passions. The negative moral judgment he passes on this stage of his life is expressed with particular poignancy by the word libido/libidinosus, indicating the passions to which man submits at times. Looking back at his affair with the unnamed woman, he considers the evil committed a culpa; hence one has the impression that he wanted to place the moral responsibility of the evil committed upon himself, thus giving greater witness to the goodness of the merciful God who revealed to him gradually the truth concerning the various phases of his spiritual journey and the pain experienced along the way.
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Haji, Ishtiyaque. "Appraisals of Virtue and Value." Dialogue 41, no. 2 (2002): 349–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300013949.
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Thomas Hurka's brilliant study on the nature and value of virtue and vice opens with a puzzle. Hurka tells us that as consequentialism defines “all other moral properties in terms of goodness and evil” (p. 8), a fully consequentialist characterization of virtue and vice should define these things by appeal to goodness and evil as well. However, it has traditionally been thought that the most promising analysis of virtue, in terms of what is intrinsically good or evil, embarks from the fundamental claim that virtue is a disposition to promote good and prevent evil (p. 8). But then this been concluded, the bedrock truth that virtue is intrinsically good cannot be captured successfully by any consequentialist approach.
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Marggraff, M. "The moral theme in Zulu literature: a progression." Literator 19, no. 1 (April 26, 1998): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/lit.v19i1.515.
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A moral theme in literature is not only unique to Zulu literature. Despite the relative youth of the modern branch of Zulu literature, any observer can make the interesting and important discovery that the moral theme is predominantly conveyed by the following three literary types: the folktale, the moral story, the detective story. The folktale, belonging to traditional literature, is a very well-developed form, that formed the principal means of teaching both children and adults about good and evil. The birth of modern Zulu literature in 1930 brought with it the emergence of the moral story, a literary type in which good triumphs over evil and in which justice prevails. Further development and changes have led to the appearance of the detective story in which crimes are solved and bad people are punished. This progression has developed due to ever-changing circumstances and a need for relevance.
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Floridi, Luciano. "Faultless responsibility: on the nature and allocation of moral responsibility for distributed moral actions." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 374, no. 2083 (December 28, 2016): 20160112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0112.
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The concept of distributed moral responsibility (DMR) has a long history. When it is understood as being entirely reducible to the sum of (some) human, individual and already morally loaded actions, then the allocation of DMR, and hence of praise and reward or blame and punishment, may be pragmatically difficult, but not conceptually problematic. However, in distributed environments, it is increasingly possible that a network of agents, some human, some artificial (e.g. a program) and some hybrid (e.g. a group of people working as a team thanks to a software platform), may cause distributed moral actions (DMAs). These are morally good or evil (i.e. morally loaded) actions caused by local interactions that are in themselves neither good nor evil (morally neutral). In this article, I analyse DMRs that are due to DMAs, and argue in favour of the allocation, by default and overridably, of full moral responsibility (faultless responsibility) to all the nodes/agents in the network causally relevant for bringing about the DMA in question, independently of intentionality. The mechanism proposed is inspired by, and adapts, three concepts: back propagation from network theory, strict liability from jurisprudence and common knowledge from epistemic logic. This article is part of the themed issue ‘The ethical impact of data science’.
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Hemsley, Jeff, Jenna Jacobson, Anatoliy Gruzd, and Philip Mai. "Social Media for Social Good or Evil: An Introduction." Social Media + Society 4, no. 3 (July 2018): 205630511878671. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2056305118786719.
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In the heyday of social media, individuals around the world held high hopes for the democratizing force of social media; however, in light of the recent public outcry of privacy violations, fake news, and Russian troll farms, much of optimism toward social media has waned in favor of skepticism, fear, and outrage. This special issue critically explores the question, “Is social media for good or evil?” While good and evil are both moral terms, the research addresses whether the benefits of using social media in society outweigh the drawbacks. To help conceptualize this topic, we examine some of the benefits (good) and drawbacks (evil) of using social media as discussed in eight papers from the 2017 International Conference on Social Media and Society. This thematic collection reflects a broad range of topics, using diverse methods, from authors around the world and highlights different ways that social media is used for good, or evil, or both. We conclude that the determination of good and evil depends on where you stand, but as researchers, we need to go a step further to understand who it is good for and who it might hurt.
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King-Farlow, John, and Niall Shanks. "Theodicy: Two Moral Extremes." Scottish Journal of Theology 41, no. 2 (May 1988): 153–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003693060004076x.
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Shake the leaky buckets of human meditation on theodicy. Out fall problems of moral perception, of linguistic and logical subtlety, of imagination in metaphysical work and biblical interpretation, of so much more. … They are disparately connected things which can suggest a Tower of Babel at least as much as any Tree of Good and Evil. But then such a picture is what one might fairly expect from a central mystery of theology, from something one can make (in this life, at least) only limited progress towards understanding.
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Huffling, Joseph Brian. "Is God Morally Obligated to Prevent Evil? A Response to James Sterba." Religions 12, no. 5 (April 28, 2021): 312. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12050312.
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James Sterba’s book, Is a Good God Logically Possible?, argues that given the amount of significant and horrendous evil in the world, it is not possible for a (morally) good God to exist. This article draws on the work of Brian Davies’ interpretation of Thomistic metaphysics and theology proper and argues that God is not a moral being, and thus has no obligations to prevent such evil. If such is the case, then the problem of evil as presented by Sterba is not a problem for God’s existence.
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McLean, Murdith. "Residual Natural Evil and Anthropic Reasoning." Religious Studies 27, no. 2 (June 1991): 173–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500020825.
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Bad things happen; and not just to bad people, but with apparent indifference to the moral or other qualities of the victims. For the theist who believes that the world is created and governed by an all-powerful and perfectly good God, this is a notorious difficulty. In fact the problem of evil is surely the most persuasive consideration available in favour of atheism.
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Ahortor, Godson. "Salvation and Morality: the Interconnections in African Thought." European Scientific Journal, ESJ 12, no. 26 (September 30, 2016): 220. http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n26p220.
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A careful study and analysis of the religio-cultural practices of most tribal groups in Africa reveal that there is usually interconnectedness between the notions of salvation, morality and the conceptualisation of evil. It is thus believed that the ethical values and moral practices of such societies are sustained mainly by this interconnectedness of the concepts of the afterlife, morality and evil. As such, salvation among Africans in general can be said to have been greatly influenced by the ethical value systems of indigenous African societies from the perspective of their conceptualisation of evil. An investigation into the worldviews of the Tongu Mafi people reveals that this interconnectedness is firmly grounded in the beliefs and practices of the people. I contend in this paper therefore that the core indigenous beliefs, worldviews and practices of Africans are resilient and capable of sustaining their soteriological and moral practices. This paper is based on a phenomenological study of the Tongu Mafi people of Ghana mainly through interviews and observation of their religio-cultural practices. It concludes that the intersections of notions of salvation, morality and evil are couched in two moral principles: living a good life and avoiding evil. These two moral principles must be observed simultaneously in life for they constitute the foundations of the soteriological concerns and moral praxis of the Tongu Mafi people.
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Weisberger, A. M. "Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence." Religious Studies 31, no. 3 (September 1995): 375–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023726.
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One of the most vexing problems in the philosophy of religion is the existence of moral evil in light of an omnipotent and wholly good deity. A popular mode of diffusing the argument from evil lies in the appeal to free will. Traditionally it is argued that there is a strong connection, even a necessary one, between the ability to exercise free will and the occurrence of wrong-doing. Transworld depravity, as characterized by Alvin Plantinga, is a concept which has gone far to explain this relationship. Essentially, the notion of transworld depravity involves the claim that in any world where a person is significantly free that person would, on some occasion, act morally wrongly, or as Plantinga phrases it: ‘If S' were actual, P would go wrong with respect to A’ (where S' is a possible world, P is a person and A is an action). Not only, Plantinga claims, is it possible that there are persons who suffer from transworld depravity, but ‘it is possible that everybody suffers from it’. If transworld depravity obtains, Plantinga notes, God ‘might have been able to create worlds in which moral evil is very considerably outweighed by moral good; but it was not within His power to create worlds containing moral good but no moral evil – and this despite the fact that He is omnipotent’. On this view, God could not instantiate perfect-person essences who would not ever sin. Although Plantinga argues that these instantiated beings are significantly free in that they could have done otherwise (i.e. not sinned), it does seem that his claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about transworld depravity amounts to a claim about the existence of a necessary connection obtaining between freedom and evil. For even though it makes sense to claim that an individual may have unactualized dispositions, to claim that everyone, past, present and future, has unactualized dispositions seems to be a significantly different claim. It is therefore difficult to see how this latter claim differs in substance from the claim of a necessary connection obtaining between the capacity for free will and the commission of evil acts.
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Glanzer, Perry L. "Harry Potter's Provocative Moral World: Is There a Place for Good and Evil in Moral Education?" Phi Delta Kappan 89, no. 7 (March 2008): 525–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/003172170808900716.
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Jonason, Peter K., Virgil Zeigler-Hill, and Ceylan Okan. "Good v. evil: Predicting sinning with dark personality traits and moral foundations." Personality and Individual Differences 104 (January 2017): 180–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.08.002.
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Kollerová, Lenka, Pavlína Janošová, and Pavel Říčan. "Good and evil at school: Bullying and moral evaluation in early adolescence." Journal of Moral Education 43, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 18–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2013.866940.
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Jarudi, Izzat, Tamar Kreps, and Paul Bloom. "Is a Refrigerator Good or Evil? The Moral Evaluation of Everyday Objects." Social Justice Research 21, no. 4 (September 30, 2008): 457–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-008-0082-z.
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Hämäläinen, Nora. "Wolf Hall and moral personhood." Ethics & Bioethics 9, no. 3-4 (December 1, 2019): 197–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2019-0021.
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Abstract Can a good man do evil things? This paper offers a moral philosophical reading of Hilary Mantel’s novels Wolf Hall and Bring up the bodies, focusing on Mantel’s fictional portrayal of Thomas Cromwell as a good person, in spite of his growing involvement in the dirty work of Henry VIII. The narrative resists interpretations of Cromwell as someone corrupted by power. It also thwarts attempts to read his deeds as results of a deficient capacity for sympathetic imagination, which has been a focalized moral flaw in contemporary moral philosophical discussions of literature. By thus resisting moralized readings of his character, the novels invite intensified attention to the complex dynamics of character and circumstance.
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Reilly, Christopher M. "Rescuing the Good Samaritan in Embryo Adoption and Beyond." National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 20, no. 3 (2020): 487–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ncbq202020345.
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Embryo adoption, when oriented to the rescue of a dignified human person, is a merciful and morally licit response to an evil consequence of in vitro fertilization and the freezing of embryos. Those who object to embryo adoption not only misconstrue the relevant moral reasoning but exhibit confusion among the object, intention, and circumstances and between two very different potential objects. Because the mercy and charity effected through embryo adoption are at the very heart of moral action, juridical arguments that undermine people’s confidence in these priorities have far-reaching, harmful implications.
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Osborne, Patrick William. "Constructing the Antichrist as Superstar: Marilyn Manson and the Mechanics of Eschatological Narrative." Persona Studies 3, no. 1 (June 13, 2017): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.21153/ps2017vol3no1art651.
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This article examines the moral crusade against Marilyn Manson’s Antichrist Superstar, the various sign-vehicles that contributed to his persona, and the social construction of a folk devil. By fashioning his persona using previous claims concerning Satan’s influence in society - primarily, those employed during the 1980s Satanism scare - Manson ensured that Antichrist Superstar would incite panic as moral crusaders interpreted his pseudo-ostensive actions using collective memories and explanatory millenarianism. He achieved this aim by attacking middle-class Christian ideologies and connecting his persona to previous social problems and cultural scripts to delineate his deviant character. The pseudo-ostensive characteristics of Manson’s stage performances and blasphemous lyrics grant creditability to traditional folk beliefs concerning Satan’s influence in rock music therefore allowing conservative groups to interpret his persona using pre-existing rumours and narratives. By presenting himself as the Antichrist, Manson became a social problem for fundamentalist Christianity: a reiterated moral panic greatly blown out of proportion, and produced using traditional exaggerations and deviant stereotypes in a collective attempt to construct a folk devil. Because Manson’s image and lyrics are meticulously fashioned from various cultural symbols concerning evil and the Antichrist, he encourages his own demonization by enticing his audience to employ explanatory millenarianism and the knowledge of previous cultural scripts to interpret the traditional representations of evil he dangles before them.
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Peels, Rik. "The Effects of Sin upon Human Moral Cognition." Journal of Reformed Theology 4, no. 1 (2010): 42–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156973110x495621.
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AbstractThis article provides an elaborate defense of the thesis that we have no reason to think that sin has any direct effects upon our moral cognition. After a few methodological comments and conceptual distinctions, the author treats certain biblical passages on humans’ evil hearts, the function of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in Genesis 2 and 3, Paul’s comments on the moral situation of the Gentiles in Romans 2, and Paul’s ideas on the Gentiles’ futility of mind as found in Ephesians 4. The most that can be concluded from these passages is that sin has not damaged human moral cognitive faculties to such an extent that they function insufficiently to hold people morally responsible. The author also argues that it is a consequence of sin that humans have knowledge by acquaintance of sin, and that it is only by divine revelation that humans recognize certain morally reprehensible acts, beliefs, and emotions as sinful. Finally, it is briefly argued that we have good reason to think that sin has certain indirect effects upon our moral cognition.
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Aleksandrov, Aleksei Ivanovich, and Andrei Andreevich Kovalev. "Philosophical conceptualization of evil in the ethical space of Confucianism." Философия и культура, no. 1 (January 2021): 30–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0757.2021.1.34791.
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The subject of this research is the philosophical conceptualization of evil in the Confucianism. This goal is achieved by solving the following tasks: 1) assessment of Confucianism as a synthesis of the philosophical views of Confucius and Mencius; 2) determination of good and evil as the contrasting concepts in the ethical space, which is based on the ideal of a “person of high nature” Junzi and the real world of a “petty person"; 3) evaluation of evil as the antipode of good, which is based on the sense of duty and regard of moral rules. The novelty of this research consists in the first within the Russian historical-philosophical literature comparative analysis of the views of Confucius and Mencius upon the nature of evil, examination of the genesis of such representations, and their relevance for modern philosophy. Representations on the nature of good and evil of Confucius and Mencius are based on the contrast within the ethical space of the ideal of a “gentleman” (due) and the reality of a “petty person”. The virtue of a “gentleman” is a means of achieving good; and the virtuous life leads to prosperity of the country. Evil of a “petty person” captured by selfish motives, leads to social demise and political disintegration. Mecius applies same moral principles, which govern the individual’s everyday life, to the political sphere of social existence. The thinker underlines circumscription of the monarchs, indicating that even the monarch – if not a “gentleman”, but merely a “petty person” – can be corrupted by evil, in which case the country faced demise.
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Ostrovskaya, Helena Petrovna. "Interpretation of Dejectedness and Insanity in Buddhist Exegetical Treatises." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 4 (December 15, 2020): 590–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-4-590-600.
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The subject of the paper is the moral aspect of interpretations of dejectedness (daurmanasya) and insanity (cittavikṣepa-unmāda) in the treatises Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya by Vasubandhu (4-5th centuries) and Sphuṭārtha-abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā by Yaśomitra (8th century). Buddhist interpretation of these phenomena is based on the canonical postulate that only corporeal suffering is a karmic retribution (vipāka-phala). Dejectedness is treated by Buddhist exegetics as a peculiar trait of imagination (kalpanā) manifesting in the moment of mental construction of evil projective situations. Dejectedness can be good (kuśala) and evil (akuśala) dependent on personal moral position. Good dejectedness is repentance (kaukṛtya) for an undone good deed or sin done. Opposite to it is evil dejectedness. Insanity is treated as destruction of predicative (abhinirūpana) and mnestic (anusmaraṇa) functions of consciousness. This mental suffering is determined by karma in cases when attempts to destroy others consciousness had place in the past. Karmic retribution in these cases is corporeal suffering, or disbalance of gross elements, and insanity is the consequence of this disbalance.
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Lobel, Diana. "Being and the Good: Maimonides on Ontological Beauty." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 19, no. 1 (2011): 1–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/147728511x591207.
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AbstractMaimonides expresses the view that being is goodness; evil is a deprivation of being and goodness. This view is prominent in Neoplatonism but has strong roots in Aristotle as well. While Maimonides problematizes moral language of good and evil, he makes use of an ontological sense of Necessary Existence as the absolute good. Plotinus wrote that beings are the beautiful. Avicenna adds that the pure good is Necessary Existence, which is free of deficiency, as it has no possibility of lacking existence. This notion has a strong Aristotelian core. Despite his strictures on language about the divine, Maimonides allows himself to express this vision—an affective-aesthetic appreciation as well as a purely cognitive one. Being is the absolute good, the source of ontological beauty and value.