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Journal articles on the topic 'Conditionals'

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1

Nagar, Daya K., Edwin Zarrazola, and Alejandro Roldán-Correa. "Conditionally Specified Bivariate Kummer-Gamma Distribution." WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON MATHEMATICS 20 (April 29, 2021): 196–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.37394/23206.2021.20.21.

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The Kummer-gamma distribution is an extension of gamma distribution and for certain values of parameters slides to a bimodal distribution. In this article, we introduce a bivariate distribution with Kummer-gamma conditionals and call it the conditionally specified bivariate Kummer-gamma distribution/bivariate Kummer-gamma conditionals distribution. Various representations are derived for its product moments, marginal densities, marginal moments, conditional densities, and conditional moments. We also discuss several important properties including, entropies, distributions of sum, and quotient. Most of these representations involve special functions such as the Gauss and the confluent hypergeometric functions. The bivariate Kummer-gamma conditionals distribution studied in this article may serve as an alternative to many existing bivariate models with support on (0, ∞) × (0, ∞).
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2

Evans, Jonathan St B. T., Simon J. Handley, and David E. Over. "Conditionals and conditional probability." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 29, no. 2 (2003): 321–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.2.321.

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3

Manfrinati, Andrea, Pierdaniele Giaretta, and Paolo Cherubini. "Conditionals and conditional thinking." Mind & Society 7, no. 1 (March 13, 2007): 21–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11299-007-0032-8.

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4

Wang, Moyun, and Xinyun Yao. "The contrast effect in reading general conditionals." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 12 (January 1, 2018): 2497–505. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1747021817746154.

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To adjudicate between deterministic and probabilistic accounts of the meaning of conditionals, we examined the influence of context on the reading of general conditionals. Context was varied with the contrast context, where participants judged uncertain conditionals after certain conditionals, and the control context, where participants judged only uncertain conditionals. Experiment 1 had participants to judge whether a set of truth table cases was possible for the conditional. Experiment 2 had participants to judge whether the conditional was true for a set of truth table cases. The findings are as follows. Possibility and truth judgments showed a similar response pattern. The reading of general conditionals varied with conditional contexts. The predominant reading was deterministic in the contrast context but was probabilistic in the control context. Conditional contexts yielded a significant contrast effect. Meanwhile, conditional probability P( q| p) made a smaller difference to the acceptance rate in the contrast context than in the control context. The overall pattern is beyond both the deterministic and probabilistic accounts. Alternatively, we propose a dynamic-threshold account for the relative reading of general conditionals.
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Liu, Mingming. "Mandarin wh-conditionals as interrogative conditionals." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26 (November 7, 2016): 814. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3955.

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This paper examines wh-conditionals in Mandarin Chinese. It argues that wh-conditionals involve embedding two questions within a conditional, one in the antecedent and one in the consequent. Transition from a Hamblin/Karttunen question meaning to a conditional semantics is achieved by answerhood operators. The meaning obtained in this way is simple and intuitive: answers to the antecedent question already contains information to answer the consequent question.
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Espino, Orlando, and Carlos Santamaría. "Initial Models in Conditionals: Evidence from Priming." Spanish Journal of Psychology 11, no. 1 (May 2008): 36–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1138741600004091.

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We examined the comprehension of different types of conditionals. We measured the reading time of sentences primed by different types of conditionals (Experiments 1 and 2). We found that the participants readnot-p and not-qfaster when it was primed by the conditional formp if qand they were slower to readp and qwhen it was primed by the conditional formp only if q. This effect disappeared in the second experiment, where the order of the elements was reversed (q and pandnot-q and not-p). These results suggest that the conditional formp if qelicits an initial representation “from p to q” with two possibilities, while the conditional formp only if qelicits a reverse representation with only one possibility. The third experiment showed that there were effects of the order only for the conditionalif p then q, which confirms the reverse representation hypothesis. We discuss the implications of these results for different theories of conditional comprehension.
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7

Wang, Moyun, and Xinyun Yao. "The dual reading of general conditionals: The influence of abstract versus concrete contexts." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71, no. 4 (January 1, 2018): 859–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2017.1281321.

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A current main issue on conditionals is whether the meaning of general conditionals (e.g., If a card is red, then it is round) is deterministic (exceptionless) or probabilistic (exception-tolerating). In order to resolve the issue, two experiments examined the influence of conditional contexts (with vs. without frequency information of truth table cases) on the reading of general conditionals. Experiment 1 examined the direct reading of general conditionals in the possibility judgment task. Experiment 2 examined the indirect reading of general conditionals in the truth judgment task. It was found that both the direct and indirect reading of general conditionals exhibited the duality: the predominant deterministic semantic reading of conditionals without frequency information, and the predominant probabilistic pragmatic reading of conditionals with frequency information. The context of general conditionals determined the predominant reading of general conditionals. There were obvious individual differences in reading general conditionals with frequency information. The meaning of general conditionals is relative, depending on conditional contexts. The reading of general conditionals is flexible and complex so that no simple deterministic and probabilistic accounts are able to explain it. The present findings are beyond the extant deterministic and probabilistic accounts of conditionals.
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8

DeRose, Keith, and Richard E. Grandy. "Conditional Assertions and "Biscuit" Conditionals." Nous 33, no. 3 (September 1999): 405–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00161.

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9

Charlow, Nate. "Conditional preferences and practical conditionals." Linguistics and Philosophy 36, no. 6 (November 2013): 463–511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-013-9143-3.

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10

van Rooij, Robert, and Katrin Schulz. "Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability." Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28, no. 1 (October 11, 2018): 55–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-018-9275-5.

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11

Gillies, Anthony S. "Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics." Nous 38, no. 4 (December 2004): 585–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00485.x.

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12

Cehan, Nadina. "The ‘Drama-Queen’ and Other Conditionals in Real Discourse." Linguaculture 9, no. 1 (June 15, 2018): 99–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.47743/lincu-2018-1-0116.

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The formal approach to conditionals, treating them in a decontextualized manner, has been the most developed. The present paper shows how problematic this approach can be when conditionals are studied in context. One large class of conditionals could be termed ‘interactional’, and includes formulaic if-clauses of politeness, conditionals which soften the message, speech-act conditionals emphasizing the relevance of some information given beforehand, and paratactic conditionals making promises or issuing threats. It is to this eclectic class that the ‘drama queen’ conditional is added. Recently discovered, this conditional does not deal with either truth or hypotheticality, but with the human emotions of the people who face their reality and compare it with their own past. Not unlike the conditionals that relay the message “It’s absurd!”, the ‘drama queen’ conditionals convey the message “It’s unimaginable!”.
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13

Barrouillet, Pierre, and Jean-François Lecas. "Content and context effects in children's and adults' conditional reasoning." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A 55, no. 3 (August 2002): 839–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724980143000587.

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We have recently shown that children interpret conditional sentences with binary terms (e.g., male/female) in both the antecedent and the consequent as biconditionals (Barrouillet & Lecas, 1998). We hypothesized that the same effect can be obtained with conditionals that do not contain binary terms provided that they are embedded in a context that restricts to only two the possible values on both the antecedent and the consequent. In the present experiment, we asked 12-year-old children, 15-year-old children, and adults to draw conclusions from conditional syllogisms that involved three types of conditional sentence: (1) conditionals with binary terms (BB), (2) conditionals with non-binary terms (NN), and (3) conditionals with non-binary terms embedded in a restrictive context (NNR). As we predicted, BB conditionals elicited more biconditional response patterns than did NN conditionals in all age groups. On the other hand, manipulating the context had the same effect in children but not in adults. Content and context constraints on conditional reasoning along with developmental issues are discussed within the framework of the mental models theory.
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14

Arnold, Barry C., Diego I. Gallardo, and Héctor W. Gómez. "A Note on the Birnbaum–Saunders Conditionals Model." Symmetry 13, no. 5 (April 28, 2021): 762. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym13050762.

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As an alternative to available bivariate Birnbaum–Saunders (BS) models, a conditionally specified distribution with BS conditionals is considered. The behavior of conditional or pseudo-likelihood parameter estimates of the model parameters is investigated via simulation. A comparison using a mineralogy data set suggests that the conditionally specified model outperforms competing models (with BS marginals). An analogous comparison using a well-known data set of Australian athletes also suggests the superiority of the conditionally specified model. Further investigation of its possible general superiority is suggested.
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15

SZTENCEL, MAGDALENA, and LEESA CLARKE. "Deontic commitments in conditional promises and threats: towards an exemplar semantics for conditionals." Language and Cognition 10, no. 3 (August 13, 2018): 435–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2018.10.

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abstractThis paper studies two types of cognitive factors which have been assumed to underpin people’s interpretation of conditional promises and threats: logic and socio-cognitive assumptions about what conditional promisors and threateners are obliged and permitted to do. We consider whether the logic of conditionals is compatible with the socio-cognitive assumptions underlying their interpretation or whether the two come apart. From the classical logical accounts of conditionals, almost all modern theories have inherited a constraint which specifies that a conditional cannot be true if its antecedent is true and consequent false. This logical constraint is widely assumed to constitute, at least partially, a conditional’s semantics, or ‘core meaning’. A replication of Beller et al.’s (2005) study, reported in this paper, calls for revisiting this long-standing, cross-theoretically assumed constraint. As predicted, we have found that, in English, conditional promises are generally consistent with this logical constraint, but threats are not. Our findings provide evidence for the existence of a new usage-based category of conditional threats, and support the claim that the observed logical asymmetry in the interpretation of conditional promises versus threats is just an epiphenomenon of a socio-cognitive symmetry which pertains to people’s assumptions about the deontic commitments of both conditional promisors and threateners. Based on (i) the observed lack of uniform application of the logical constraint and (ii) a consideration of individual variation in the interpretation of conditional promises and threats, we argue that an exemplar approach to conditionals is a plausible option.
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16

Hu, Quan, and Qiaoyun Liao. "A Comparative Study of Causals and Conditionals Based on Iconicity." Philosophy and Social Science 1, no. 1 (January 2024): 52–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.62381/p243110.

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Based on the iconicity of sequence and iconicity of markedness, this study makes a comparative study of causals (causal complex sentences) and conditionals (conditional complex sentences) through corpus analysis. The results show that the iconicity of sequence outweighs the iconicity of markedness in conditionals, whereas the iconicity of markedness is more prevalent in causals. Logical causals and evidential causals frequently employ sequential or marked iconic expressions, while logical conditionals and evidential conditionals often utilize the iconicity of sequence. These results suggest that both causals and conditionals can convey the iconicity of sequence and iconicity of markedness. Conditionals typically convey hypothetical, uncertain, possible, or counterfactual meanings that necessitate the consideration of the conditional clause as a cognitive framework. Furthermore, due to their contrastive nature, conditional clause tends to exhibit a preference for prepositions. Therefore, the conditional clause usually precedes the main clause, exhibiting iconicity of sequence. However, causals usually express the causal relationships between actual events and their causality without explicit contrasts or hypothetical conditions. As a result, the causal clause can be positioned either before or after the main clause, exhibiting iconicity of sequence and iconicity of markedness.
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17

Oberauer, Klaus, Sonja M. Geiger, Katrin Fischer, and Andrea Weidenfeld. "Two meanings of “if”? Individual differences in the interpretation of conditionals." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 60, no. 6 (June 2007): 790–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470210600822449.

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This work investigates the nature of two distinct response patterns in a probabilistic truth table evaluation task, in which people estimate the probability of a conditional on the basis of frequencies of the truth table cases. The conditional-probability pattern reflects an interpretation of conditionals as expressing a conditional probability. The conjunctive pattern suggests that some people treat conditionals as conjunctions, in line with a prediction of the mental-model theory. Experiments 1 and 2 rule out two alternative explanations of the conjunctive pattern. It does not arise from people believing that at least one case matching the conjunction of antecedent and consequent must exist for a conditional to be true, and it does not arise from people adding the converse to the given conditional. Experiment 3 establishes that people's response patterns in the probabilistic truth table task are very consistent across different conditionals, and that the two response patterns generalize to conditionals with negated antecedents and consequents. Individual differences in rating the probability of a conditional were loosely correlated with corresponding response patterns in a classical truth table evaluation task, but there was little association with people's evaluation of deductive inferences from conditionals as premises. A theoretical framework is proposed that integrates elements from the conditional-probability view with the theory of mental models.
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18

Hayder SIGAR, Ahmed. "THE TRANSLATION OF CONDITIONAL CLAUSES IN THE GLORIOUS QUR’AN INTO ENGLISH." International Journal Of Education And Language Studies 03, no. 04 (December 1, 2022): 10–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.47832/2791-9323.4-3.2.

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The present study investigates the conditional clauses in the Glorious Qur'an of the types introduced by the three conditional particles ؤذإ ,ؤن and لو and their translation into English. The aim is to see how different translators of the Glorious Qur'an have translated conditionals and to what extent those translators have succeeded to render the intended meaning of the conditionals in the Glorious Qur'an. To accomplish the aims of the study, the following hypotheses are suggested: 1. Interpretations of the conditionals in the Glorious Qur'an are semantically rather than syntactically based. 2. Most of the time, interpreters fail to provide a fully accurate rendering of the conditionals in the Glorious Qur'an. To examine these hypotheses, seven English versions of the translation of 14 verses in the Glorious Qur'an have been chosen. The selected verses represent different patterns of the conditionals introduced by the conditional particles ؤذإ , ؤن and لو . The analysis of the data has validated the first hypotheses stated above, while the second one has been refuted through the following general findings: 1. The absence of equivalence between Arabic grammatical words and those of English leads to inaccuracy in rendering the exact meaning intended by the use of the conditionals. 2. The translation of the conditionals in the Glorious Qur'an reflects the superficial meaning only. 3. Conditionals with ؤذإ have proved to be the easiest for translators, whereas those with لو are the most difficult ones. 4. Most of the translators have succeeded to give the suitable translation of the Qura'nic conditionals.
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19

DIETZ, RICHARD, and IGOR DOUVEN. "RAMSEY’S TEST, ADAMS’ THESIS, AND LEFT-NESTED CONDITIONALS." Review of Symbolic Logic 3, no. 3 (July 12, 2010): 467–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020310000055.

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Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramsey’s test, which characterizes graded acceptability for conditionals in terms of hypothetical updates on the antecedent. Some results in van Fraassen (1976) may raise hope that this explicatory approach to Ramsey’s test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen’s results is to be rejected. Specifically, we provide an argument from material inadequacy against a generalization of Adams’ thesis for left-nested conditionals.
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20

McGee, Vann. "Conditional Probabilities and Compounds of Conditionals." Philosophical Review 98, no. 4 (October 1989): 485. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185116.

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21

Pruss, Alexander R. "Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities without Triviality." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60, no. 3 (August 2019): 551–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2019-0019.

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22

Klinedinst, N. "Quantified Conditionals and Conditional Excluded Middle." Journal of Semantics 28, no. 1 (September 24, 2010): 149–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffq015.

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23

Van Canegem-Ardijns, Ingrid, and William Van Belle. "Conditionals and types of conditional perfection." Journal of Pragmatics 40, no. 2 (February 2008): 349–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2006.11.007.

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24

Leitgeb, Hannes. "Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs." Topoi 26, no. 1 (March 20, 2007): 115–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-006-9003-7.

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RAIDL, ERIC. "COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS." Review of Symbolic Logic 12, no. 4 (October 30, 2018): 861–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020318000199.

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AbstractStandard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID ($\varphi > \varphi$) or even CN ($\varphi > \top$) are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries.
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Trafford, James. "Conditionals in Interaction." Studia Humana 6, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 39–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0005.

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Abstract There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one understanding of proof, conditional assertions may reflect the dynamics of proving, which (sometimes) generate categorical assertions. In particular, when we think about the relationship between assertion and proof as rooted in a dialogical approach to both, the distinction between conditional and categorical assertions is quite natural.
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27

Schultheis, Ginger. "Counterfactual Probability." Journal of Philosophy 120, no. 11 (2023): 581–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20231201133.

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Stalnaker’s Thesis about indicative conditionals says, roughly, that the probability one ought to assign to an indicative conditional is equal to the probability that one ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. Skyrms’s Thesis about counterfactual conditionals says, roughly, that the probability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual conditional equals one’s rational expectation of the chance, at a relevant past time, of its consequent conditional on its antecedent. In this article, I develop a new uniform theory of conditionals that allows us to derive a tenable version of Skyrms’s Thesis from a tenable version of Stalnaker’s Thesis, together with a chance-deference relating rational credence to beliefs about objective chance.
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28

García-Madruga, Juan A., Francisco Gutiérrez, Nuria Carriedo, Sergio Moreno, and Philip N. Johnson-Laird. "Mental Models in Deductive Reasoning." Spanish Journal of Psychology 5, no. 2 (November 2002): 125–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1138741600005904.

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We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including conditionals based on if then, only if, and unless. The paper also presents research on figural effects in syllogistic reasoning, on the effects of structure and believability in reasoning from double conditionals, and on reasoning from factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these studies support the model theory, pose some difficulties for rule theories, and show the influence on reasoning of the linguistic structure and the semantic content of problems.
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29

López-Astorga, Miguel. "Pseudo-conditionals and causal assertibles in Stoic logic." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 20, no. 3 (April 9, 2017): 417. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/808-1711.2016v20n3p417.

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http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p417The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.
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Greco, Paolo. "On the Political Use of the Reportative Conditional in Italian Newspapers." Anuari de Filologia. Estudis de Lingüística 10 (December 18, 2020): 105–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1344/afel.2020.10.5.

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The labels condizionale riportivo (reportative conditional) or condizionale citativo (quotative conditional) are employed to describe certain uses of the conditional mood in Italian, particularly when the conditional marks the non-firsthand nature of a given piece of information. This use of the conditional is particularly frequent in the language of newspapers. However, reportative conditionals may also carry epistemic overtones, and they are used by speakers when they want to stress that they are not committed to the truthfulness of the information reported. Depending on the context, a reportative conditional can be either a purely evidential marker, or an evidential marker with epistemic overtones. Some Italian (trained) speakers exploit this ambiguity as a strategy to play on the two possible interpretations. This strategy is particularly significant in contexts in which the speaker is supposed to be neutral and, as such, must refrain from expressing her/his epistemic stance when recounting events. In this paper, after an analysis of the different sections of newspapers in which reportative conditionals occur, I will discuss one particular use of reportative conditionals in Italian newspapers, i.e. the “political” use of conditionals. To this end, I will carry out a qualitative analysis of some excerpts from newspapers published between the second half of the 19th century and today. In particular, it will be shown that journalists often take advantage of the ambiguities underlying reportative conditionals in Italian, in order to discredit the political position of a person (or group) without overtly questioning it.
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Olguín Martínez, Jesús, and Alonso Vásquez Aguilar. "Counterfactual conditional strategies in some Amazonian languages." LIAMES: Línguas Indígenas Americanas 24 (July 10, 2024): e024010. http://dx.doi.org/10.20396/liames.v24i00.8676041.

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Studies on individual Amazonian languages have shown that these languages can contribute to informing and refining our theories of counterfactual conditional constructions. Still missing, however, is an attempt at exploring this complex sentence construction across different genetic units of the Amazonia in a single study. The paper explores counterfactual conditionals in a sample of 24 Amazonian languages. Special attention is paid to the range of TAM markers and clause-linking devices used in counterfactual conditionals in the Amazonian languages in the sample. As for TAM markers, it is shown that protases tend to be unmarked (they do not occur with any TAM values), and apodoses tend to occur with irrealis or frustrative marking. As for clause-linking devices, it is shown that most Amazonian languages in the sample contain counterfactual conditionals occurring with non-specialized clause-linking devices. This means that the distinction between counterfactual conditionals and other types of conditionals (e.g., real/generic) is not grammaticalized in clause-linking devices. Instead, the counterfactual conditional meaning resides in the combination of specific TAM markers. The paper also pays close attention to the distribution of TAM markers and clause-linking devices in counterfactual conditional constructions in the Vaupés. In particular, special attention is paid to how Tariana counterfactual conditional construction have been shaped by Tucanoan languages through language contact.
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Ri, Yong-Sok. "MODUS PONENS AND MODUS TOLLENS: THEIR VALIDITY/INVALIDITY IN NATURAL LANGUAGE ARGUMENTS." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 50, no. 1 (June 27, 2017): 253–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2017-0028.

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Abstract The precedent studies on the validity of Modus ponens and Modus tollens have been carried out with most regard to a major type of conditionals in which the conditional clause is a sufficient condition for the main clause. But we sometimes, in natural language arguments, find other types of conditionals in which the conditional clause is a necessary or necessary and sufficient condition for the main clause. In this paper I reappraise, on the basis of new definitions of Modus ponens and Modus tollens, their validity/invalidity in natural language arguments in consideration of all types of conditionals.
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33

Duffley, Patrick, and Pierre Larrivée. "Unconditionally conditional." International Review of Pragmatics 16, no. 1 (February 5, 2024): 52–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18773109-01601003.

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Abstract The purpose of this study is to assess from a corpus-based discourse-pragmatic perspective certain claims made in the literature concerning English wh- concessive conditional constructions (e.g. Whoever/No matter who comes to the party, it will be fun), namely that these utterance-types correlate with interrogative semantics, scalarity and potential modality. By means of an extensive investigation of corpus data these claims are shown to be largely unsupported by attested usage. Based on Dancygier and Sweetser’s classification of conditional constructions, it is found that potential modality is paradigmatic only of content-level concessive conditionals, and not of the epistemic, speech-act or metalinguistic varieties. Contrary to claims in the literature, scalarity is demonstrated to not be typical of wh- concessive conditionals. The lack of scalarity in most wh- concessive conditionals is argued to cast into doubt the category label “concessive conditional” applied to these constructions in a substantial part of the literature and to favour an alternative designation such as “irrelevance conditional.” The empirical data further reveals that wh- concessive conditionals practically never involve pure ignorance, and this is argued to be problematic on the discourse-pragmatic level for the claim that they have interrogative semantics.
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34

Lewis, David. "Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities II." Philosophical Review 95, no. 4 (October 1986): 581. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185051.

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35

Gilio, Angelo, and Giuseppe Sanfilippo. "Conditional Random Quantities and Compounds of Conditionals." Studia Logica 102, no. 4 (October 15, 2013): 709–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-013-9511-6.

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36

Oberauer, Klaus. "Oaksford & Chater's theory of reasoning: High prior, lower posterior plausibility." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, no. 1 (February 2009): 95–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x09000417.

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AbstractOaksford & Chater (O&C) subscribe to the view that a conditional expresses a high conditional probability of the consequent, given the antecedent, but they model conditionals as expressing a dependency between antecedent and consequent. Therefore, their model is inconsistent with their theoretical commitment. The model is also inconsistent with some findings on how people interpret conditionals and how they reason from them.
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37

Liu, Mingya, Stephanie Rotter, and Anastasia Giannakidou. "Bias and Modality in Conditionals: Experimental Evidence and Theoretical Implications." Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 50, no. 6 (November 1, 2021): 1369–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10936-021-09813-z.

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AbstractThe concept of bias is familiar to linguists primarily from the literature on questions. Following the work of Giannakidou and Mari (Truth and Veridicality in Grammar and Thought: Modality, Mood, and Propositional Attitudes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2021), we assume “nonveridical equilibrium” (implying that p and ¬p as equal possibilities) to be the default for epistemic modals, questions and conditionals. The equilibrium of conditionals, as that of questions, can be manipulated to produce bias (i.e., reduced or higher speaker commitment). In this paper, we focus on three kinds of modal elements in German that create bias in conditionals and questions: the adverb wirklich ‘really’, the modal verb sollte ‘should’, and conditional connectives such as falls ‘if/in case’. We conducted two experiments collecting participants’ inference about speaker commitment in different manipulations, Experiment 1 on sollte/wirklich in ob-questions and wenn-conditionals, and Experiment 2 on sollte/wirklich in wenn/falls/V1-conditionals. Our findings are that both ob-questions and falls-conditionals express reduced speaker commitment about the modified (antecedent) proposition in comparison to wenn-conditionals, which did not differ from V1-conditionals. In addition, sollte/wirklich in the antecedent of conditionals both create negative bias about the antecedent proposition. Our studies are among the first that deal with bias in conditionals (in comparison to questions) and contribute to furthering our understanding of bias.
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SARITAŞ, BURCU BAŞOĞLU, and BAHA CANKUT SARITAŞ. "CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN ENGLISH AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO TURKISH." International Journal of Social Sciences and Management Review 05, no. 03 (2022): 174–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.37602/ijssmr.2022.5314.

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‘‘Conditional sentences usually consist of two clauses: a conditional clause (or if clause) and the main clause (or result clause). The result in the main clause is dependent on the condition in the conditional clause’’ (Foley & Hall, 2003, p.120). Conditionals is a highly controversial subject in current linguistic analysis. In this article, the basic types of conditional sentences are identified and the functioning of conditionality in the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains has been clarified, and a number of relations in these conditionals both in English and Turkish have been introduced.
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39

Jennings, R. E. "Intrinsicality and the Conditional." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 2 (June 1986): 221–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1986.10717116.

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In [3] I argued for a particular kind of semantics for subjunctive conditionals. The arguments were based upon some linguistic considerations of the general character of what we mean when we say such and such. I urged that a semantics for subjunctive conditionals ought to provide a distinct representation of the subjunctive mood of a sentence, and should take seriously the fact that subjunctive conditionals admit distinctions of tense. The envisaged semantics took the subjunctive conditional to be about occasions, and the central problem discussed was, accordingly, how to represent what must count as the same occasion in spite of whatever changes were required to make the antecedent of the conditional true.
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40

Sano, Katsuhiko, and Yurie Hara. "Conditional independence and biscuit conditional questions in Dynamic Semantics." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 24 (April 5, 2015): 84. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v24i0.2417.

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<p>Biscuit conditionals such as ‘If you are thirsty, there’s beer in the fridge.’ are felt different from canonical conditionals ‘If it’s raining, the fireworks will be cancelled.’ in that the consequent seems to be entailed regardless of the truth/falsity of the antecedent. Franke (2009) argues that the “feeling of the consequent entailment” in biscuit conditionals is due to the conditional independence between the antecedent and consequent; thus a uniform semantics for canonical and biscuit conditionals can be maintained. A question arises as to whether it is possible to derive the same consequent entailment in the framework of dynamic semantics.<br />Furthermore, there are some instances of biscuit conditional questions such as ‘If I get thirsty, is there anything in the fridge?’ This paper provides a dynamic and non-symmetric version of the independence condition, a d-independence condition which correctly derives the consequent entailment in both declaratives and interrogatives.</p>
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Yu, Xishuang. "Motivations for Using Non-Initial Conditionals and Their Pragmatical Functions." Journal of Linguistics and Communication Studies 3, no. 1 (March 2024): 83–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.56397/jlcs.2024.03.12.

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There has been a lack of attention to the order of conditional clauses and resultant clauses in the study of conditional sentences in the Chinese research field. One commonality of human languages is that the conditional clause precedes the resultant clause. Previous researchers have given comprehensive explanations for the predominant antecedent order of initial conditional clauses, but there is still a research gap concerning the motivations for using non-initial conditionals and their pragmatical functions. With the help of the corpus, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of non-initial conditionals and explores the motivation for using them and their pragmatic functions. The current study finds that there are 2 main motivations for the use of non-initial conditional clauses, namely, to maintain discourse coherence and to act as post hoc complements; there are four main pragmatic functions of non-initial conditionals: boundary function, assessment function, euphemism function, and supplementary function. Similar microscopic studies help us reconceptualize conditional sentences’ actual role in communication to further reveal the dynamic nature of natural language communication.
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42

Raidl, Eric. "Neutralization, Lewis‘ Doctored Conditional, or Another Note on "A Connexive Conditional"." Logos & Episteme 14, no. 1 (2023): 101–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20231415.

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Günther recently suggested a 'new‘ conditional. This conditional is not new, as already remarked by Wansing and Omori. It is just David Lewis‘ forgotten alternative 'doctored‘ conditional and part of a larger class termed neutral conditionals. In this paper, I answer some questions raised by Wansing and Omori, concerning the motivation, the logic, the connexive flavor and contra-classicality of such neutralized conditionals. The main message being: Neutralizing a vacuist conditional avoids (some) paradoxes of strict implication, changes the logic essentially only by Aristotle‘s Thesis, makes strong connexivity impossible, and remains in the realm of non-contra-classical logics.
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43

Mohammed, B. I., Nicholas Makumi, Ramy Aldallal, Taysir E. Dyhoum, and Hassan M. Aljohani. "A New Model of Discrete-Continuous Bivariate Distribution with Applications to Medical Data." Computational and Mathematical Methods in Medicine 2022 (May 21, 2022): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/1883491.

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The bivariate Poisson exponential-exponential distribution is an important lifetime distribution in medical data analysis. In this article, the conditionals, probability mass function (pmf), Poisson exponential and probability density function (pdf), and exponential distribution are used for creating bivariate distribution which is called bivariate Poisson exponential-exponential conditional (BPEEC) distribution. Some properties of the BPEEC model are obtained such as the normalized constant, conditional densities, regression functions, and product moment. Moreover, the maximum likelihood and pseudolikelihood methods are used to estimate the BPEEC parameters based on complete data. Finally, two data sets of real bivariate data are analyzed to compare the methods of estimation. In addition, a comparison between the BPEEC model with the bivariate exponential conditionals (BEC) and bivariate Poisson exponential conditionals (BPEC) is considered.
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44

Falk, Arthur E. "Ifs and Newcombs." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 3 (September 1985): 449–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1985.10716428.

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‘Ifs’ come washed or unwashed. The washed ifs are embedded in precise theories: the constantly strict implication of deductive inference, the variably strict implication of ‘nearness’ conditionals, and statements of conditional probability. By a nearness conditional I mean the common part of Stalnaker's and D. Lewis's theory of counterfactual conditionals, which depends on a notion that possible worlds are more or less near to each other, as a measure of their over-all similarity to each other.
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45

Heyninck, Jesse, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Thomas Meyer, Jonas Philipp Haldimann, and Christoph Beierle. "Conditional Syntax Splitting for Non-monotonic Inference Operators." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 37, no. 5 (June 26, 2023): 6416–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25789.

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Syntax splitting is a property of inductive inference operators that ensures we can restrict our attention to parts of the conditional belief base that share atoms with a given query. To apply syntax splitting, a conditional belief base needs to consist of syntactically disjoint conditionals. This requirement is often too strong in practice, as conditionals might share atoms. In this paper we introduce the concept of conditional syntax splitting, inspired by the notion of conditional independence as known from probability theory. We show that lexicographic inference and system W satisfy conditional syntax splitting, and connect conditional syntax splitting to several known properties from the literature on non-monotonic reasoning, including the drowning effect.
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46

Wang, Moyun, and Mingyi Zhu. "Evidence for the Jeffrey Table." Experimental Psychology 66, no. 3 (May 2019): 187–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000443.

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Abstract. Conditionals statements are a common and necessary component in natural languages. The research reported in this paper is on a fundamental question about singular conditionals. Is there an adequate account of people’s truth, falsity, and credibility (probability) judgments about these conditionals when their antecedents are false? Two experiments examined people’s quantitative credibility ratings and qualitative truth and falsity judgments for singular conditionals, if p then q, given false antecedent, not-p, cases. The results demonstrate that, when relevant knowledge about the conditional probability of q given p, P( q|p), is available to participants in not-p cases, they tend to make credibility ratings based on P( q|p), and to make “true” (or “false”) judgments at a high (or low) level of these credibility ratings. These findings favor the Jeffrey table account of these conditionals over the other existing accounts, including that of the de Finetti table.
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47

Quickert, K., and Steve Nicolle. "Jesus and Illocutionary Forces: Common Functions of Conditionals in the Gospels." Journal of Translation 18, no. 2 (2022): 31–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.54395/jot-6yd3x.

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In this paper we look at the various functions of conditionals in Jesus’ speech as recorded in the gospels. We will show how Jesus often uses conditionals to describe hypothetical situations, frequently as illustrations to support a teaching point. We will also look at the way in which Jesus uses conditionals to argue from a known fact to a novel proposition, often using a familiar concrete situation to illustrate a novel spiritual truth. Differences between the ways that the gospel writers use the Greek conditional constructions are also noted.
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48

Iacona, Andrea. "Counterfactuals as Strict Conditionals." Disputatio 7, no. 41 (November 1, 2015): 165–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2015-0009.

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Abstract This paper defends the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Its purpose is to show that there is a coherent view according to which counterfactuals are strict conditionals whose antecedent is stated elliptically. Section 1 introduces the view. Section 2 outlines a reply to the main argument against the thesis that counterfactuals are strict conditionals. Section 3 compares the view with a proposal due to Åqvist, which may be regarded as its direct predecessor. Section 4 explains how the view differs from contextualist strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals. Finally, section 5 addresses the thorny issue of disjunctive antecedents.
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49

Stevanovic, Melisa. "Constructing a proposal as a thought." Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 519–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/prag.23.3.07ste.

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Drawing on fifteen video-recorded planning meetings as data, and on conversation analysis as a method, I examine the interactional import of the common Finnish practice of constructing a proposal as a thought. As a point of departure, I consider two different types of conditional utterances in which a speaker presents a plan: (1) ‘asking conditionals’ (jos ‘what if’ prefaced declarative conditionals and interrogative conditionals) and (2) ‘stating conditionals’ (declarative conditionals). While asking conditionals mark the plan as contingent on the recipient’s approval and involve a straightforward request for the recipient to engage in joint decision-making about the proposed plan, stating conditionals are regularly treated as informings about plans in which the recipients have actually no word to say. However, when asking and stating conditionals are prefaced with references to the speakers’ thoughts (mä aattelin et ‘I was thinking that’), the projected responses and sequential trajectories are more open-ended: The participants have the opportunity to share the responsibility, not only for what is to be decided with respect to the proposed plan, but also for what is to be jointly decided upon in the first place. Constructing a proposal as a thought seems thus to be a practice with which participants may enable the symmetrical distribution of deontic rights at the very beginning of joint decision-making sequences.
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50

HERMENS, RONNIE. "PLACING PROBABILITIES OF CONDITIONALS IN CONTEXT." Review of Symbolic Logic 7, no. 3 (May 28, 2014): 415–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020314000173.

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AbstractIn this paper I defend the tenability of the Thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This is done by adopting the view that the interpretation of a conditional may differ from context to context. Several triviality results are (re-)evaluated in this view as providing natural constraints on probabilities for conditionals and admissible changes in the interpretation. The context-sensitive approach is also used to re-interpret some of the intuitive rules for conditionals and probabilities such as Bayes’ rule,Import-Export, and Modus Ponens. I will show that, contrary to consensus, the Thesis is in fact compatible with these re-interpreted rules.
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