Relevant bibliographies by topics / Condorcet paradox

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Condorcet paradox'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 6 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Condorcet paradox"

1

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, and Harold Houba. "The Condorcet paradox revisited." Social Choice and Welfare 47, no. 1 (2016): 141–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0950-7.

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Laffond, Gilbert, and Jean Lainé. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox." Social Choice and Welfare 32, no. 2 (2008): 317–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0325-9.

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Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures." Group Decision and Negotiation 21, no. 3 (2010): 291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9.

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Jones, Bradford, Benjamin Radcliff, Charles Taber, and Richard Timpone. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders." American Political Science Review 89, no. 1 (1995): 137–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2083080.

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That individual preferences may he aggregated into a meaningful collective decision using the Condorcet criterion of majority choice is one of the central tenets of democracy. But that individual preferences may not yield majority winners is one of the classic findings of the social choice literature. Given this problem, social choice theorists have attempted to estimate the probability of Condorcet winners, given certain empirical or theoretical conditions. We shall estimate the probabilities of Condorcet winners and intransitive aggregate orders for various numbers of individuals with strong
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Kalai, Gil. "A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem." Advances in Applied Mathematics 29, no. 3 (2002): 412–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0196-8858(02)00023-4.

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Weber, James S. "An elementary proof of the conditions for a generalized Condorcet paradox." Public Choice 77, no. 2 (1993): 415–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01047879.

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Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods." Group Decision and Negotiation 24, no. 3 (2014): 497–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-014-9416-4.

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Zhan, Ping. "A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 90, no. 3 (2019): 477–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7.

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Abstract Single-peakedness was introduced by Black (J Political Econ 56:23–34, 1948) as a sufficient condition to overcome Condorcet paradox. Since then it has been attracting interest from researchers in various fields. In this paper, we propose a simple recursive procedure of constructing complete single-peaked domains of tiling type explicitly for any finite alternative sets, by combining two results published in recent years, and some observations of known results and examples by the author. The underlying basic structure of tiling type and properties of single-peaked domains provided here
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9

Rouncefield, Mary, and David Green. "Condorcet's Paradox." Teaching Statistics 11, no. 2 (1989): 46–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9639.1989.tb00050.x.

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Couppey-Soubeyran, Jézabel. "Le paradoxe de Condorcet." Alternatives Économiques N° 323, no. 4 (2013): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ae.323.0072.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Condorcet paradox"

1

Chauveau, Louis. "Imperfections des processus de choix sociaux : études des conflits électoraux." Thesis, Cergy-Pontoise, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016CERG0857/document.

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Cette thèse a pour enjeu de traiter des paradoxes étudiés en théorie du choix social.Le paradoxe d'Ostrogorski sur deux axes programmatiques a été traité, notamment sa probabilité de réalisation par l'ajout d'un critère discriminant sur les axes au moment de réaliser le choix de l'électeur : une formule de calcul exacte a été mise au point pour des valeurs de population finies afin de mesurer son occurrence pour différents effectifs, et une borne maximale émerge autours de 0,085.Parmi, les différentes anomalies étudiées en théorie du choix social affectant le fonctionnement des démocraties, le
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2

El, Ouafdi Abdelhalim. "Analyse probabiliste des règles de vote : méthodes et résultats." Thesis, La Réunion, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LARE0037.

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La motivation principale de cette thèse est de contribuer à étendre l’analyse probabiliste des règles de vote d'une part aux cas où quatre candidats sont soumis à la décision collective et d'autre part à l'étude de l'efficacité majoritaire du vote par évaluation à 3 niveaux et de sa manipulabilité par une coalition de votants. Ces deux problématiques nous ont conduit à un même et unique problème technique : calculer la probabilité limite d’un événement de vote lorsqu’il y a 24 préférences individuelles possibles. Les réponses que nous avons essayé d’apporter à cette question méthodologique con
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Diss, Mostapha. "Paradoxes, stabilité et efficience des classements par points." Caen, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010CAEN0659.

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Cette thèse s'intéresse à l'analyse de plusieurs situations de vote impliquant la famille des règles avec classements par points. Toutes les études sont menées dans un cadre probabiliste en s'appuyant sur des hypothèses standards utilisées en théorie du choix social pour le vote entre trois options. Dans un premier temps, nous étudions une nouvelle notion, la stabilité d'un ensemble de règles de vote. En particulier, nous discutons la stabilité d'un ensemble composé de règles célèbres appartenant à la famille des règles avec classements par points. Nous présentons ensuite une contribution à l'
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Kamwa, Eric. "Essais sur les modes de scrutin et la sélection des comités." Caen, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014CAEN0503.

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Cette thèse s'intéresse à la sélection des comités en distinguant deux approches. Avec l'approche fondée sur le respect du critère majoritaire, nous suggérons une nouvelle règle de sélection qui, comme quatre autres déjà proposées dans la littérature, élit toujours le Comité de Condorcet à la Gehrlein (CCG) lorsqu'il existe. Ces règles de sélection sont dites stables. Nous étudions plusieurs de leurs propriétés normatives et analysons les relations qui peuvent exister entre leurs ensembles de choix. Pour des situations avec quatre candidats et des comités de deux membres, nous déterminons la p
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Books on the topic "Condorcet paradox"

1

Gehrlein, William V. Voting paradoxes and group coherence: The condorcet efficiency of voting rules. Springer, 2011.

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Gehrlein, William V. Voting paradoxes and group coherence: The condorcet efficiency of voting rules. Springer, 2011.

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3

Gehrlein, William V. V. Condorcet's Paradox. Springer, 2010.

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Condorcet’s Paradox. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-33799-7.

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Gehrlein, William V. Condorcet's Paradox (Theory and Decision Library C:). Springer, 2006.

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Book chapters on the topic "Condorcet paradox"

1

Brandt, Felix, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel. "Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions." In Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_11.

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Brandt, Felix, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel. "Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox." In Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_5.

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Güth, Werner, and Reinhard Selten. "Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection." In Game Equilibrium Models IV. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8_3.

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Gehrlein, William V., and Dominique Lepelley. "Condorcet’s Paradox and Group Coherence." In Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_2.

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Felsenthal, Dan S., and Hannu Nurmi. "The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes." In SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_6.

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Felsenthal, Dan S., and Hannu Nurmi. "The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes." In SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_5.

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Kahn, Pierre. "Existe-t-il une morale laïque ? Les paradoxes de Condorcet." In École, morale laïque et citoyenneté aujourd'hui. Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.septentrion.14715.

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Conference papers on the topic "Condorcet paradox"

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Haret, Adrian, Hossein Khani, Stefano Moretti, and Meltem Öztürk. "Ceteris paribus majority for social ranking." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/42.

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We study the problem of finding a social ranking over individuals given a ranking over coalitions formed by them. We investigate the use of a ceteris paribus majority principle as a social ranking solution inspired from the classical axioms of social choice theory. Faced with a Condorcet-like paradox, we analyze the consequences of restricting the domain according to an adapted version of single-peakedness. We conclude with a discussion on different interpretations of incompleteness of the ranking over coalitions and its exploitation for defining new social rankings, providing a new rule as an
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Giansanti, Andrea, Sumiyoshi Abe, Hans Herrmann, Piero Quarati, Andrea Rapisarda, and Constantino Tsallis. "Remarks on the Condorcet's paradox." In COMPLEXITY, METASTABILITY, AND NONEXTENSIVITY: An International Conference. AIP, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.2828749.

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Zhang, Yiru, Tassadit Bouadi, and Arnaud Martin. "Preference fusion and Condorcet's paradox under uncertainty." In 2017 20th International Conference on Information Fusion (Fusion). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/icif.2017.8009636.

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Wang, Tiance, John Sturm, Paul Cuff, and Sanjeev Kulkarni. "Condorcet voting methods avoid the paradoxes of voting theory." In 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2012.6483218.

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