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Journal articles on the topic 'Condorcet paradox'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 6 February 2022

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1

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, and Harold Houba. "The Condorcet paradox revisited." Social Choice and Welfare 47, no. 1 (2016): 141–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0950-7.

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2

Laffond, Gilbert, and Jean Lainé. "Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox." Social Choice and Welfare 32, no. 2 (2008): 317–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0325-9.

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3

Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures." Group Decision and Negotiation 21, no. 3 (2010): 291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9.

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4

Jones, Bradford, Benjamin Radcliff, Charles Taber, and Richard Timpone. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders." American Political Science Review 89, no. 1 (1995): 137–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2083080.

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That individual preferences may he aggregated into a meaningful collective decision using the Condorcet criterion of majority choice is one of the central tenets of democracy. But that individual preferences may not yield majority winners is one of the classic findings of the social choice literature. Given this problem, social choice theorists have attempted to estimate the probability of Condorcet winners, given certain empirical or theoretical conditions. We shall estimate the probabilities of Condorcet winners and intransitive aggregate orders for various numbers of individuals with strong

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5

Kalai, Gil. "A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem." Advances in Applied Mathematics 29, no. 3 (2002): 412–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0196-8858(02)00023-4.

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6

Weber, James S. "An elementary proof of the conditions for a generalized Condorcet paradox." Public Choice 77, no. 2 (1993): 415–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01047879.

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7

Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods." Group Decision and Negotiation 24, no. 3 (2014): 497–513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-014-9416-4.

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8

Zhan, Ping. "A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 90, no. 3 (2019): 477–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7.

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Abstract Single-peakedness was introduced by Black (J Political Econ 56:23–34, 1948) as a sufficient condition to overcome Condorcet paradox. Since then it has been attracting interest from researchers in various fields. In this paper, we propose a simple recursive procedure of constructing complete single-peaked domains of tiling type explicitly for any finite alternative sets, by combining two results published in recent years, and some observations of known results and examples by the author. The underlying basic structure of tiling type and properties of single-peaked domains provided here

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9

Rouncefield, Mary, and David Green. "Condorcet's Paradox." Teaching Statistics 11, no. 2 (1989): 46–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9639.1989.tb00050.x.

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10

Couppey-Soubeyran, Jézabel. "Le paradoxe de Condorcet." Alternatives Économiques N° 323, no. 4 (2013): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ae.323.0072.

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11

Qudrat-I Elahi, Khandakar. "A difficulty in Arrow’s impossibility theorem." International Journal of Social Economics 44, no. 12 (2017): 1609–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijse-02-2016-0065.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it evaluates the impossibility proposition, called the “Arrow impossibility theorem” (AIT), which is widely attributed to Arrow’s social choice theory. This theorem denies the possibility of arriving at any collective majority resolution in any group voting system if the social choice function must satisfy “certain natural conditions”. Second, it intends to show the reasons behind the proliferation of this impossibility impression. Design/methodology/approach Theoretical and philosophical. Findings Arrow’s mathematical model does not seem to

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12

Trujillo, Timothy. "Condorcet’s Paradox and Ultrafilters." American Mathematical Monthly 127, no. 2 (2020): 169–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00029890.2020.1680200.

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13

Gillard, Lucien. "Condorcet, deux autres paradoxes ?" Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 51, no. 1 (1996): 201–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1996.410840.

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La combinaison de systèmes de préférences individuelles peut aboutir globalement à choisir une solution qui ne satisfasse personne. C'est à propos des fonctions de préférences collectives existant à un moment donné que Condorcet démontre son célèbre paradoxe. Il semble que son raisonnement puisse être transposé à la formation dans le temps des systèmes de préférences d'un individu. Confronté à des situations changeantes, un individu élabore au cours de son existence des systèmes multiples de préférences, qui rendent la notion même d'individu paradoxale.

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14

Lepelley, Dominique, and Mathieu Martin. "Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings." European Journal of Political Economy 17, no. 1 (2001): 163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(00)00034-3.

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15

Piedra Aguilera, Marco, José Vera Reino, Ana Albornoz, and Camila Palacios. "Condiciones políticas existentes para la fijación de tarifas de agua potable. Análisis desde la paradoja de CONDORCET." Bolentín de Coyuntura 1, no. 22 (2019): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.31164/bcoyu.22.2019.719.

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El artículo estudia la Paradoja de Condorcet aplicada al funcionamiento del Cabildo Cantonal de Cuenca – Ecuador. La votación realizada al interior de un espacio político obedece a la regla de mayorías aún cuando su decisión involucre el normal desenvolvimiento organizacional. Los hallazgos determinan que por varios años las tarifas de agua potable no fueron modificadas pese a que ETAPA- EP presentaba necesidades de dinero y veía comprometida su operación. Se reconoce la Paradoja de Condorcet cuando las preferencias de los votantes son cíclicas aún a pesar de que la preferencia individual sea

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16

Peters, Dominik. "Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox." Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 251 (July 25, 2017): 455–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.251.34.

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17

Gehrlein, William V., and Dominique Lepelley. "Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition." Economics Letters 55, no. 1 (1997): 85–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)00046-3.

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18

Van Deemen, Adrian. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox." Public Choice 158, no. 3-4 (2013): 311–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0133-3.

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19

Moulin, Hervé. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox." Journal of Economic Theory 45, no. 1 (1988): 53–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0.

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20

Truchon, Michel. "La démocratie : oui, mais laquelle?" L'Actualité économique 75, no. 1-2-3 (2009): 189–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602289ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Cet article illustre les difficultés inhérentes au processus démocratique à partir des résultats d’une consultation tenue à l’Université Laval, dans le cadre de la nomination d’un doyen. Lors de ce scrutin, les votants devaient en principe ordonner tous les candidats, au nombre de quatre. La compilation des résultats s’avérait donc un exercice d’agrégation des ordres (préférences) individuels en ordre (préférence) collectif. L’article emprunte abondamment à la littérature sur la théorie des choix sociaux et constitue en quelque sorte un survol partiel de cette dernière. Il montre d’abor

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21

Epstein, Isaac. "O paradoxo de Condorcet e a crise da democracia representativa." Estudos Avançados 11, no. 30 (1997): 273–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0103-40141997000200017.

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22

Tangian, A. S. "Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society." Social Choice and Welfare 17, no. 2 (2000): 337–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050024.

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23

Mauerberg Junior, Arnaldo, and Eduardo Strachman. "A regra da maioria como agregação de preferências: questões e respostas." Nova Economia 24, no. 2 (2014): 297–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0103-6351/1831.

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Ancorado na abordagem racionalista, mas na impossibilidade da regra consensual e buscando apresentar as características da regra da maioria e alguns de seus problemas, como o paradoxo de Condorcet, e soluções a esses problemas, como o logrolling, este artigo se propõe a revisar e sintetizar a teoria a respeito, baseado nas principais contribuições ao tema. O estudo se justifica porque, como processo de agregação de preferências, a regra da maioria se destaca para usos eleitorais e de processos políticos internos, em um elevado número de nações.

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24

Gehrlein, William V., Dominique Lepelley, and Issofa Moyouwou. "Voters’ preference diversity, concepts of agreement and Condorcet’s paradox." Quality & Quantity 49, no. 6 (2014): 2345–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-014-0117-5.

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25

Stodder, James. "Strategic Voting and Coalitions: Condorcet’s Paradox and Ben-Gurion’s Tri-lemma." International Review of Economics Education 4, no. 2 (2005): 58–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1477-3880(15)30131-6.

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26

Gano, Mamadou Kabirou. "L’impensé d’un humanisme, l’autre paradoxe de Condorcet. Considérations autour des Réflexions sur l’esclavage des Nègres." Topique 137, no. 4 (2016): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/top.137.0019.

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27

Boussard, Jean-Marc. "« Du paradoxe de Condorcet à la gestion descommons : Mode de décision et appropriation des rentes »." Revue de l’organisation responsable 7, no. 2 (2012): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/ror.072.0046.

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28

Simpson, William A. "Why search committees must be wary of ex-cavalry officers, Condorcet's paradox, and dictators." Research in Higher Education 29, no. 2 (1988): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00992283.

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29

Milojevic, Miljana. "Rationality and deliberative democracy." Theoria, Beograd 53, no. 3 (2010): 71–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1003071m.

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In this paper I will give a short description of deliberative democracy, its advantages over the aggregative model of democracy and its strategies for overcoming the obstacles which the social choice theory puts before the defenders of democracy. I will continue with the argument that the aim of deliberative democracy should not be reaching the consensus or unanimity, but obtaining preference single-peakedness. For, there is a practical impossibility of consensus reaching and the single-peakedness criterion is sufficient for prevention against the 'paradoxes of democracy'. Through the analysis

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30

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, and Harold E. D. Houba. "The Condorcet Paradox Revisited." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1561723.

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31

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, and Harold Houba. "The Condorcet Paradox Revisited." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265943.

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32

Guerra-Pujol, Enrique. "Condorcet's Paradox in Puerto Rico (La paradoja de Condorcet y el caso de Puerto Rico)." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817959.

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33

Sebagh, Thierry, and Laurence Lepoder. "Searching for Compatibility between the Jury Theorem and Condorcet's Paradox." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1331863.

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