Relevant bibliographies by topics / Condorcet procedure

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Condorcet procedure'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Condorcet procedure.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Condorcet procedure"

1

Young, H. P. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting." American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1231–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961757.

Full text
Abstract:
Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Compare, Michele, Michele Bellora, and Enrico Zio. "Aggregation of importance measures for decision making in reliability engineering." Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability 231, no. 3 (2017): 242–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748006x17694495.

Full text
Abstract:
This article investigates the aggregation of rankings based on component importance measures to provide the decision maker with a guidance for design or maintenance decisions. In particular, ranking aggregation algorithms of the literature are considered, a procedure for ensuring that the aggregated ranking is compliant with the Condorcet criterion of majority principle is presented and two original ranking aggregation approaches are proposed. Comparisons are made on a case study of an auxiliary feed-water system of a nuclear pressurized water reactor.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ortona, Guido. "A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem." Journal of Heterodox Economics 3, no. 1 (2016): 54–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jheec-2016-0003.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract The usual, pessimistic interpretation of Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem (often “Impossibility” in textbooks) is excessive. The impossibility defined by Arrow occurs only in presence of a tie or of a cycle. These cases are rare or very rare, and their presence may be assessed ex post. If they occur it is necessary to resort to a second-best rule, but this two-stage procedure does not induce strategic behavior, nor impeaches the use of the Condorcet rule (in observance of the axioms) in all the others. The paper conclusions sustain that implementation of modern management systems t
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Berg, Sven, and Hannu Nurmi. "Making Choices in the Old-Fashioned Way*." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 6, no. 2 (1988): 95–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15760639917559.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Sebbene la teoria delle scelte sociali sia stata studiata a partire dal Settecento (con le opere di Borda e di Condorcet), il ricorso alle decisioni collettive mediante votazioni ha, ovviamente, una tradizione molto più antica, lungo la quale diversi metodi di votazione sono stati adottati, sulla base di valutazioni puramente intuitive.Questo scritto si sofferma su due procedure tipicamente nordiche di scelta collettiva, che non erano ancora state sottoposte ad attento esame. Esse consistono in decisioni prese da organi con più membri, e hanno come oggetto raccomandazioni ad un organo
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Zhan, Ping. "A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 90, no. 3 (2019): 477–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Single-peakedness was introduced by Black (J Political Econ 56:23–34, 1948) as a sufficient condition to overcome Condorcet paradox. Since then it has been attracting interest from researchers in various fields. In this paper, we propose a simple recursive procedure of constructing complete single-peaked domains of tiling type explicitly for any finite alternative sets, by combining two results published in recent years, and some observations of known results and examples by the author. The underlying basic structure of tiling type and properties of single-peaked domains provided here
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Flanagan, Thomas. "The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo: Collective Choice in Canada's Parliament after Morgentaler." Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (1997): 31–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000842390001492x.

Full text
Abstract:
AbstractRational choice theory has drawn attention to the phenomenon of structure-induced equilibrium in situations of potential cycling. When there is no majority, first preference or Condorcet winner, the outcome is determined by agenda control and institutional rules of decision making. Within that context, the status quo has a special advantage because of the parliamentary amendment procedure, in which the status quo, as the default option to the bill in formal form, is not voted upon until the last stage. The unsuccessful attempts of the Canadian government of Prime Minister Brian Mulrone
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures." Group Decision and Negotiation 21, no. 3 (2010): 291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

MERRILL, SAMUEL, and NICOLAUS TIDEMAN. "The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures." Rationality and Society 3, no. 1 (1991): 65–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003001005.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Courtin, Sébastien, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou. "Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?" Social Choice and Welfare 42, no. 4 (2013): 927–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. "Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare." American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (1999): 85–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585762.

Full text
Abstract:
I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to “enforce” its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. “Special” voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of Lani Guinier's arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation, benefitting everyone.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Condorcet procedure"

1

Richards, Whitman, and H. Sebastian Seung. "Neural Voting Machines." 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/30513.

Full text
Abstract:
“Winner-take-all” networks typically pick as winners that alternative with the largest excitatory input. This choice is far from optimal when there is uncertainty in the strength of the inputs, and when information is available about how alternatives may be related. In the Social Choice community, many other procedures will yield more robust winners. The Borda Count and the pair-wise Condorcet tally are among the most favored. Their implementations are simple modifications of classical recurrent networks.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Condorcet procedure"

1

Goodin, Robert E., and Kai Spiekermann. Extensions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823452.003.0003.

Full text
Abstract:
The classic Condorcet Jury Theorem comes with demanding assumptions. This chapter shows that similar results can be derived if the assumptions are weakened. First, if the Competence Assumption is weakened by allowing for heterogeneous voter competence, the Asymptotic Result of the jury theorem still obtains (though the Non-asymptotic Result does only under very specific assumptions). Second, the number of alternatives can be more than two for a structurally similar jury theorem, using plurality voting. Third, different decision procedures, such as the Borda count or the Condorcet pairwise crit
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Book chapters on the topic "Condorcet procedure"

1

Nurmi, Hannu. "Condorcet’s Rule and Preference Proximity." In Voting Procedures under Uncertainty. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24830-9_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Felsenthal, Dan S., and Hannu Nurmi. "The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes." In SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Felsenthal, Dan S., and Hannu Nurmi. "The (In)Vulnerability of Ranked Voting Procedures that Are Not Condorcet–Consistent to Various Paradoxes." In SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Condorcet procedure"

1

Vangulick, David, Bertrand Cornelusse, and Damien Ernst. "Blockchain: A Novel Approach for the Consensus Algorithm Using Condorcet Voting Procedure." In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPCON). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/dappcon.2019.00011.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Condorcet procedure' for particular source types:
Journal articles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography