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Journal articles on the topic 'Condorcet procedure'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Young, H. P. "Condorcet's Theory of Voting." American Political Science Review 82, no. 4 (1988): 1231–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961757.

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Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely
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2

Compare, Michele, Michele Bellora, and Enrico Zio. "Aggregation of importance measures for decision making in reliability engineering." Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability 231, no. 3 (2017): 242–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1748006x17694495.

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This article investigates the aggregation of rankings based on component importance measures to provide the decision maker with a guidance for design or maintenance decisions. In particular, ranking aggregation algorithms of the literature are considered, a procedure for ensuring that the aggregated ranking is compliant with the Condorcet criterion of majority principle is presented and two original ranking aggregation approaches are proposed. Comparisons are made on a case study of an auxiliary feed-water system of a nuclear pressurized water reactor.
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3

Ortona, Guido. "A commonsense assessment of Arrow’s theorem." Journal of Heterodox Economics 3, no. 1 (2016): 54–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jheec-2016-0003.

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Abstract The usual, pessimistic interpretation of Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem (often “Impossibility” in textbooks) is excessive. The impossibility defined by Arrow occurs only in presence of a tie or of a cycle. These cases are rare or very rare, and their presence may be assessed ex post. If they occur it is necessary to resort to a second-best rule, but this two-stage procedure does not induce strategic behavior, nor impeaches the use of the Condorcet rule (in observance of the axioms) in all the others. The paper conclusions sustain that implementation of modern management systems t
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4

Berg, Sven, and Hannu Nurmi. "Making Choices in the Old-Fashioned Way*." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 6, no. 2 (1988): 95–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15760639917559.

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Abstract Sebbene la teoria delle scelte sociali sia stata studiata a partire dal Settecento (con le opere di Borda e di Condorcet), il ricorso alle decisioni collettive mediante votazioni ha, ovviamente, una tradizione molto più antica, lungo la quale diversi metodi di votazione sono stati adottati, sulla base di valutazioni puramente intuitive.Questo scritto si sofferma su due procedure tipicamente nordiche di scelta collettiva, che non erano ancora state sottoposte ad attento esame. Esse consistono in decisioni prese da organi con più membri, e hanno come oggetto raccomandazioni ad un organo
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5

Zhan, Ping. "A simple construction of complete single-peaked domains by recursive tiling." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 90, no. 3 (2019): 477–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-019-00685-7.

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Abstract Single-peakedness was introduced by Black (J Political Econ 56:23–34, 1948) as a sufficient condition to overcome Condorcet paradox. Since then it has been attracting interest from researchers in various fields. In this paper, we propose a simple recursive procedure of constructing complete single-peaked domains of tiling type explicitly for any finite alternative sets, by combining two results published in recent years, and some observations of known results and examples by the author. The underlying basic structure of tiling type and properties of single-peaked domains provided here
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6

Flanagan, Thomas. "The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo: Collective Choice in Canada's Parliament after Morgentaler." Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, no. 1 (1997): 31–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000842390001492x.

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AbstractRational choice theory has drawn attention to the phenomenon of structure-induced equilibrium in situations of potential cycling. When there is no majority, first preference or Condorcet winner, the outcome is determined by agenda control and institutional rules of decision making. Within that context, the status quo has a special advantage because of the parliamentary amendment procedure, in which the status quo, as the default option to the bill in formal form, is not voted upon until the last stage. The unsuccessful attempts of the Canadian government of Prime Minister Brian Mulrone
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7

Pérez, Joaquín, José L. Jimeno, and Estefanía García. "No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures." Group Decision and Negotiation 21, no. 3 (2010): 291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-010-9191-9.

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8

MERRILL, SAMUEL, and NICOLAUS TIDEMAN. "The Relative Efficiency of Approval and Condorcet Voting Procedures." Rationality and Society 3, no. 1 (1991): 65–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463191003001005.

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9

Courtin, Sébastien, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou. "Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?" Social Choice and Welfare 42, no. 4 (2013): 927–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0758-7.

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10

Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. "Minority Voting Rights Can Maximize Majority Welfare." American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (1999): 85–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585762.

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I use Condorcet's information aggregation model to show that sometimes the best possible decision procedure for the majority allows the minority to “enforce” its favored outcome even when overruled by a majority. “Special” voting power gives the minority an incentive to participate meaningfully, and more participation means more information is aggregated, which makes the majority better off. This result can be understood as a mathematical corroboration of Lani Guinier's arguments that voting procedures can be designed to encourage minority participation, benefitting everyone.
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11

Felsenthal, Dan S., Zeev Maoz, and Amnon Rapoport. "The condorcet-efficiency of sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures." Behavioral Science 35, no. 1 (1990): 24–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830350104.

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12

Felsenthal, Dan S., and Moshé Machover. "After two centuries, should condorcet's voting procedure be implemented?" Behavioral Science 37, no. 4 (1992): 250–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830370403.

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13

Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. "Anonymous Procedures for Condorcet's Model: Robustness, Nonmonotonicity, and Optimality." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2010): 45–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00008077.

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14

Regenwetter, Michel, Aeri Kim, Arthur Kantor, and Moon-Ho R. Ho. "The Unexpected Empirical Consensus Among Consensus Methods." Psychological Science 18, no. 7 (2007): 629–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01950.x.

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In economics and political science, the theoretical literature on social choice routinely highlights worst-case scenarios and emphasizes the nonexistence of a universally best voting method. Behavioral social choice is grounded in psychology and tackles consensus methods descriptively and empirically. We analyzed four elections of the American Psychological Association using a state-of-the-art multimodel, multimethod approach. These elections provide rare access to (likely sincere) preferences of large numbers of decision makers over five choice alternatives. We determined the outcomes accordi
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15

Potthoff, Richard F., and Michael C. Munger. "Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?" American Politics Research, May 2, 2021, 1532673X2110094. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x211009499.

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Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal normative standard for evaluating voting systems is advanced, privileging those systems that select Condorcet winners if one exists, and critiquing syst
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16

Labiod, Lazhar, Nistor Nistor Grozavu, and Younès Bennani. "SIMULTANEOUS TOPOLOGICAL CATEGORICAL DATA CLUSTERING AND CLUSTER CHARACTERIZATION." International Journal of Computing, December 20, 2011, 9–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.47839/ijc.10.1.732.

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In this paper we propose a new automatic learning model which allows the simultaneously topological clustering and feature selection for quantitative datasets. We explore a new topological organization algorithm for categorical data clustering and visualization named RTC (Relational Topological Clustering). Generally, it is more difficult to perform clustering on categorical data than on numerical data due to the absence of the ordered property in the data. The proposed approach is based on the self-organization principle of the Kohonen’s model and uses the Relational Analysis formalism by opt
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17

Jiménez-Rolland, Marc, Julio César Macías-Ponce, and Luis Fernando Martínez-Álvarez. "Using simulation in the assessment of voting procedures: An epistemic instrumental approach." SIMULATION, June 3, 2020, 003754972092303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0037549720923031.

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In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting methods on different collective decision problems. This could improve institutional design, even when there is no general theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method. To support our claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical attention in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision problem. Under certain criteria of assessment akin to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run
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18

Prasad, Mahendra. "Working Draft of May Condorcet Arrow - Elaboration of Why SWFs with Polychotomous Balloting Procedures Fail to Overcome Condorcetian Objections." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2877417.

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19

Basteck, Christian. "Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies." Economic Theory, April 9, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01353-w.

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AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized
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