Relevant bibliographies by topics / Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Books
  3. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 August 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland).'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)"

1

Of the Journal, Editorial board. "The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe." Ukrainian Religious Studies, no. 2 (September 27, 1996): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.32420/1996.2.46.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Bone, Richard. "To Helsinki: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–1975." International Affairs 62, no. 2 (1986): 287–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2618377.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Dimitrijevic, Dusko. "Review of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 40 years after Helsinki." Medjunarodni problemi 67, no. 4 (2015): 365–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/medjp1504365d.

Full text
Abstract:
The paper deals with the genesis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the important pan-European forum for addressing security issues during the Cold War era, and, secondly, analyses the dynamics of institutional changes that led to establishment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As an active factor in the process of d?tente and the easing of tensions between the then USSR and the United States, the CSCE was the place in which were flowing all initiatives related to overcoming the security problems in bipolar Europe. The paper provides a brief of negotiation process that produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, an international political document that laid down the basic principles of interstate relations and political commitments in a number of areas, from military-political security, to economic and environmental co-operation and human rights. The author concludes that the role of the OSCE is likely to stagnate in the 21st century, for it will not be sufficiently capable to influence Euro-Atlantic and Euroasian affairs, and to maintain its function as an important consultative and negotiating mechanism, as well as a platform for regional security and cooperation.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Rojansky, Matthew. "The Geopolitics of European Security and Cooperation." Security and Human Rights 25, no. 2 (June 22, 2014): 169–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02502006.

Full text
Abstract:
At the present moment of obvious tension between Moscow and Washington, it may be tempting to dismiss the likelihood of progress on any diplomatic front, let alone in the complex multilateral format of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Yet the 1972–75 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) itself took place against a backdrop of intense rivalry between the u.s. and Soviet-led blocs, suggesting that reasoned dialogue and consensus on core issues of shared security in the osce space is possible, despite—or perhaps even because of—the looming threat of conflict between geopolitical rivals. Despite some superficial similarities, relations between Russia and the United States today are sufficiently different from the past that they cannot accurately be described as a conflict in the same category as the Cold War. The u.s.-Russia relations have been severely strained over the crisis in Ukraine, but management of the crisis alone will not be enough to restore productive relations between Washington and Moscow or to repair the damage to European security. The best hope is likely a return to the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and through a similarly inclusive region-wide dialogue. Today, the United States, Europe, and Russia all share an interest in renewal of just such a dialogue, although what will not—indeed what must not—return is the Cold War “balance of terror” that exerted pressure on all sides to participate seriously in the original Helsinki process.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Selvage, Douglas. "From Helsinki to “Mars”." Journal of Cold War Studies 23, no. 4 (2021): 34–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01039.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract After the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, the Soviet Union sought to compel the West to accept its vision for détente. This meant, on the one hand, the acceptance of the political and social status quo within the Soviet bloc and, on the other hand, the “completion” of the existing political détente with “military détente”—namely, East-West arms control agreements that preserved or augmented existing Warsaw Pact advantages. To this end, the KGB and its Soviet-bloc partners undertook two parallel campaigns of active measures, “Synonym” and “Mars.” Despite tactical successes, both campaigns failed to achieve their goals. The United States, supported by other Western governments, continued to pressure the Eastern-bloc governments on human rights violations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continued to modernize its forces in Europe, most importantly with the stationing of U.S. Euromissiles in 1983 in accordance with NATO's dual-track decision of December 1979.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Pașca, Vlad. "A Détente Equation: The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and Socialist Experts before Helsinki (1947–1975)." East Central Europe 45, no. 2-3 (November 29, 2018): 160–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763308-04502002.

Full text
Abstract:
The article explores the main features of cooperation between economic experts during the pre-csce (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) period (1947–1975) under the aegis of the most comprehensive all-European organization of the period, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (unece). At scientific and policy levels, contacts and exchanges between socialist and capitalist economic experts were circumscribed by common priorities and challenges faced by the unece staff and governments from both sides of the Iron Curtain. The article presents four types of activities pertaining to East-West cooperation: international conferences, training programs, institutionalized consultations (under the Committee for Trade Development and the group of Senior Economic Advisers to the unece Governments), and direct collaboration with the unece Secretariat and its subsidiary bodies. The contribution focuses on the institutional aspects of the socialist economic experts’ participation in the unece’s cooperative framework and the pan-European epistemic community. The study argues that the unece’s efforts towards détente also took into account community-building in the fields of economics, development of trade, and harmonization of policy-making from a transnational, all-European perspective.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Borko, Yuri. "The Birth of the Soviet School of European Integration Studies. Part 2." Contemporary Europe, no. 98 (October 1, 2020): 46–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope520204653.

Full text
Abstract:
The first part of the article shows that in the mid-1960s some Soviet researchers of the European integration problems concluded that integration did not correspond to the Leninist-Stalinist theory of the general crisis of capitalism. On the contrary, it corresponded to some Western concepts of the custom union, the common market, and economic integration. A new approach to the European integration studies was offered by the Institute of World Economy and International Relation (IMEMO), established in 1956. For many decades IMEMO was serving as the focal point for the European integration studies, and was providing the Soviet leadership with analytical information. The number of inquiries from authorities increased significantly. Firstly, it can be explained by the achievements of integration. Secondly, it was due to the growth of economic cooperation between the USSR and the EEC. Thirdly, Moscow defined new foreign policy priorities towards Western countries including Europe. There were two turning-points of bilateral relations: with France – in 1966, and with Germany – in 1969. The Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established during final session of the top-level Conference of European States in Helsinki in August 1975. Fourthly, experience of the EEC was relevant for the COMECON
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Huseynov, Ilyas. "The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the interparliamentary relations between Azerbaijan and Greece." Scientific Bulletin 2 (2019): 90–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.54414/oxjf9848.

Full text
Abstract:
This article deals with the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is one of the main topics of discussion during the meetings on the development of inter-parliamentary relations between Azerbaijan and Greece. An Azerbaijani-Greek working group on inter-parliamentary relations operates in the Milli Majlis of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and a Greek-Azerbaijani friendship group on inter-parliamentary relations functions in the Greek legislative body. In the framework of regular meetings of interparliamentary groups, among other issues, one of the main areas of discussion is the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The main goal of the study is to summarize the opinions voiced in the inter-parliamentary diplomatic meetings regarding the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, put them in a chronological framework and identify some factors that undermine Azerbaijani-Greek inter-parliamentary relations. The unanimous opinion of Greek parliamentarians is that the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved in accordance with international law. Greece is committed to the principles outlined in the Final Act of August 1, 1975 of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In addition, the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, which are the basic principles of international law, are the priority in Greek foreign policy. However, Armenia and Greece have very close relations, and Greece is a state that officially recognizes the "Armenian genocide". Therefore, studying the GreekAzerbaijani relations at the academic level is very important for Azerbaijani political science.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Kooijmans, P. H. "The Mountain Produced a Mouse: The CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valletta 1991." Leiden Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 (February 1992): 91–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156500002004.

Full text
Abstract:
From the very beginning peaceful settlement of disputes has been on the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Principle V of the first chapter of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 (the so-called first basket) reaffirmed the obligation of the participating states to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Final Act, however, does not provide a mechanism through which such disputes can be resolved. The Swiss delegation had submitted in 1973 a draft-convention (called the Bindschedler-proposal after its auctor intellectualis Rudolf Bindschedler, the Legal Advisor of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), containing a detailed system of compulsory dispute settlement. A distinction was made between judiciable and non-judiciable disputes. Judiciable disputes would be submitted to a permanent Arbitral Tribunal, non-judiciable disputes to a permanent Commission of Inquiry, Mediation and Conciliation. This proposal was, however, unacceptable to the East European states (with the exception of Romania) which had always rejected the idea of compulsory third-party dispute settlement, whereas the greaterpart of the Western states, although in principle favourable to a system of compulsory dispute settlement, had serious objections against the substance of the Swiss proposal, inter alia with regard to the rather artificial distinction between judiciable and non-judiciable disputes. The Swiss delegation did not insist on its proposal and went along with a clause in the Final Act which provided for a follow-up meeting of experts with the task “to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods”. It was decided that this meeting of experts was to be convened by Switzerland afterthe first follow-up meeting which was planned for 1977 in Belgrade.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Homonai, V. V. "The Budapest memorandum: lessons and unfulfilled expectations on Ukraine’s path to joining NATO." Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law 3, no. 81 (April 19, 2024): 346–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2024.81.3.52.

Full text
Abstract:
The Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine (the official name is the Memorandum on Security Guarantees in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) was the result of negotiations on the disposal of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its nuclear weapons were deployed or stored in four of the fifteen successor states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. This raised important questions of security and protection, as well as command and control; and Moscow and Washington agreed that Russia should be the sole nuclear successor to the Soviet Union. The United States recognized that it would have to offer security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to persuade them to hand over their Soviet-made nuclear weapons to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. In coordination with London and Moscow, Washington drew up a package of security guarantees. These assurances were set out in the Budapest memorandums regarding Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. France and China – the other nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT—have offered their own guarantees unilaterally. The Budapest Memorandum on Ukraine confirmed the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine (according to the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975); to refrain from the threat of force or its use against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, as well as from any use of weapons against Ukraine, except in cases of self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and refrain from economic coercion against Ukraine in accordance with the Final Act of the CSCE. The memorandum also reiterated the positive and negative security guarantees provided to all non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. This scientific article is devoted to the study of the significance of the Budapest Memorandum for Ukraine and its influence on the possibility of the country joining NATO. The historical context of the conclusion of the memorandum is studied, the key obligations are determined and the consequences of their violation are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the current security situation in Ukraine, in particular due to the annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine. The article examines the prospects of Ukraine’s membership in NATO and suggests ways to resolve unfulfilled expectations and restore the international community’s trust in the commitments made within the framework of the memorandum.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Books on the topic "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)"

1

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe., ed. To Helsinki--the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975. Durham: Duke University Press, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe., ed. To Helsinki--the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975. [Durham, N.C.]: Duke University Press, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Mastny, Vojtech. Helsinki, human rights, and European security: Analysis and documentation. Durham: Duke University Press, 1986.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

John, Fry. The Helsinki process: Negotiating security and cooperation in Europe. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Talalaev, A. N. Khelʹsinki: Print͡s︡ipi i realʹnostʹ. Moskva: "I͡U︡rid. lit-ra", 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Talalaev, A. N. Khelʹsinki: Print︠s︡ipy i realʹnostʹ. Moskva: I︠U︡ridicheskai︠a︡ literatura, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

A, Bloed, Dijk P. van, and T.M.C. Asser Instituut., eds. Essays on human rights in the Helsinki process. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Werner, Hänisch, and Schirmeister Helga 1935-, eds. Die Helsinki-Schlussakte, Grundlage für Sicherheit und Entspannung in Europa. Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Mathias, Jopp, ed. Zehn Jahre KSZE-Prozess: Bilanz und Perspektiven gesamteuropäischer Entspannung und Zusammenarbeit. Frankfurt a.M: Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Loth, Wilfried. Helsinki, 1. August 1975: Entspannung und Abrüstung. München: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1998.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)"

1

Morgan, Michael Cotey. "Trust and Transparency at the CSCE, 1969–1975." In Trust, but Verify. Stanford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.11126/stanford/9780804798099.003.0006.

Full text
Abstract:
This chapter examines the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) from 1969 to 1975. It contends that trust was both a tool and objective of the conference, detailing how, even in the absence of trust, a major international agreement was concluded with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the outcome of the CSCE talks. In a clear attempt to advance their respective interests, Warsaw Pact member states focused on state sovereignty and the immutability of post-World War II European borders as a cornerstone of their definition of international security, whereas North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states emphasized transparency, freer movement, and human rights, as well as confidence-building measures. As this chapter argues, the “tangled lines of trust and distrust” at the CSCE among the United States, the Western European countries, the neutral states, and the Soviet Union were incredibly complex, but they eventually secured the conference's success.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Thornberry, Patrick. "The Helsinki Final Act and Minorities: A Note." In International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 248–54. Oxford University PressOxford, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198256205.003.0028.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975, is one other major document of modern international relations which makes references to ‘minorities’ in its text. The Final Act was signed by representatives of thirty-four States, including the United States and the USSR, and by the Holy See.The Final Act is not a treaty; the signatories did not wish to bind themselves by an international treaty. A paragraph in the concluding part of the document is clear on this: ‘The Government of the Republic of Finland is requested to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the text of the Final Act, which is not eligible for registrationunder Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations ... .’ Article 102 of the Charter provides that every treaty entered into by any member of the United Nations must be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki, Finland)' for particular source types:
Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography