Journal articles on the topic 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975 : Helsinki)'

At the present moment of obvious tension between Moscow and Washington, it may be tempting to dismiss the likelihood of progress on any diplomatic front, let alone in the complex multilateral format of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Yet the 1972–75 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce) itself took place against a backdrop of intense rivalry between the u.s. and Soviet-led blocs, suggesting that reasoned dialogue and consensus on core issues of shared security in the osce space is possible, despite—or perhaps even because of—the looming threat of conflict between geopolitical rivals. Despite some superficial similarities, relations between Russia and the United States today are sufficiently different from the past that they cannot accurately be described as a conflict in the same category as the Cold War. The u.s.-Russia relations have been severely strained over the crisis in Ukraine, but management of the crisis alone will not be enough to restore productive relations between Washington and Moscow or to repair the damage to European security. The best hope is likely a return to the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and through a similarly inclusive region-wide dialogue. Today, the United States, Europe, and Russia all share an interest in renewal of just such a dialogue, although what will not—indeed what must not—return is the Cold War “balance of terror” that exerted pressure on all sides to participate seriously in the original Helsinki process.

The paper deals with the genesis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the important pan-European forum for addressing security issues during the Cold War era, and, secondly, analyses the dynamics of institutional changes that led to establishment of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As an active factor in the process of d?tente and the easing of tensions between the then USSR and the United States, the CSCE was the place in which were flowing all initiatives related to overcoming the security problems in bipolar Europe. The paper provides a brief of negotiation process that produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, an international political document that laid down the basic principles of interstate relations and political commitments in a number of areas, from military-political security, to economic and environmental co-operation and human rights. The author concludes that the role of the OSCE is likely to stagnate in the 21st century, for it will not be sufficiently capable to influence Euro-Atlantic and Euroasian affairs, and to maintain its function as an important consultative and negotiating mechanism, as well as a platform for regional security and cooperation.

The article explores the main features of cooperation between economic experts during the pre-csce (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) period (1947–1975) under the aegis of the most comprehensive all-European organization of the period, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (unece). At scientific and policy levels, contacts and exchanges between socialist and capitalist economic experts were circumscribed by common priorities and challenges faced by the unece staff and governments from both sides of the Iron Curtain. The article presents four types of activities pertaining to East-West cooperation: international conferences, training programs, institutionalized consultations (under the Committee for Trade Development and the group of Senior Economic Advisers to the unece Governments), and direct collaboration with the unece Secretariat and its subsidiary bodies. The contribution focuses on the institutional aspects of the socialist economic experts’ participation in the unece’s cooperative framework and the pan-European epistemic community. The study argues that the unece’s efforts towards détente also took into account community-building in the fields of economics, development of trade, and harmonization of policy-making from a transnational, all-European perspective.

The first part of the article shows that in the mid-1960s some Soviet researchers of the European integration problems concluded that integration did not correspond to the Leninist-Stalinist theory of the general crisis of capitalism. On the contrary, it corresponded to some Western concepts of the custom union, the common market, and economic integration. A new approach to the European integration studies was offered by the Institute of World Economy and International Relation (IMEMO), established in 1956. For many decades IMEMO was serving as the focal point for the European integration studies, and was providing the Soviet leadership with analytical information. The number of inquiries from authorities increased significantly. Firstly, it can be explained by the achievements of integration. Secondly, it was due to the growth of economic cooperation between the USSR and the EEC. Thirdly, Moscow defined new foreign policy priorities towards Western countries including Europe. There were two turning-points of bilateral relations: with France – in 1966, and with Germany – in 1969. The Organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was established during final session of the top-level Conference of European States in Helsinki in August 1975. Fourthly, experience of the EEC was relevant for the COMECON

From the very beginning peaceful settlement of disputes has been on the agenda of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Principle V of the first chapter of the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 (the so-called first basket) reaffirmed the obligation of the participating states to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The Final Act, however, does not provide a mechanism through which such disputes can be resolved. The Swiss delegation had submitted in 1973 a draft-convention (called the Bindschedler-proposal after its auctor intellectualis Rudolf Bindschedler, the Legal Advisor of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), containing a detailed system of compulsory dispute settlement. A distinction was made between judiciable and non-judiciable disputes. Judiciable disputes would be submitted to a permanent Arbitral Tribunal, non-judiciable disputes to a permanent Commission of Inquiry, Mediation and Conciliation. This proposal was, however, unacceptable to the East European states (with the exception of Romania) which had always rejected the idea of compulsory third-party dispute settlement, whereas the greaterpart of the Western states, although in principle favourable to a system of compulsory dispute settlement, had serious objections against the substance of the Swiss proposal, inter alia with regard to the rather artificial distinction between judiciable and non-judiciable disputes. The Swiss delegation did not insist on its proposal and went along with a clause in the Final Act which provided for a follow-up meeting of experts with the task “to pursue the examination and elaboration of a generally acceptable method for the peaceful settlement of disputes aimed at complementing existing methods”. It was decided that this meeting of experts was to be convened by Switzerland afterthe first follow-up meeting which was planned for 1977 in Belgrade.

The “sexiest acronym in international diplomacy.” Such was a Washington pandit's roguish, if appropriate, characterization of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) just a few of years ago in 1990 after it critically helped ignite the revolutions in Eastern Europe and torpedo the Berlin Wall. Other, more serious, foreign affairs analysts were equally enthusiastic about CSCE. A prominent commentator called it the “premier post-Cold War political forum.”

ABSTRACT:The final phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975 is widely regarded as the high point of détente. This article discusses the staging and legacy of the CSCE from the perspective of its host city, Helsinki. The article examines how the Finnish initiative to host the conference became enmeshed with Helsinki's municipal politics and how the CSCE's and Finland's neutrality were used by the Helsinki authorities to project an attractive image of their city. The article further highlights the Helsinki Summit as a public spectacle with which a large number of local residents engaged.

In the 1970s, during the Cold War era, European and North American states began a dialogue in Helsinki which became known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or the Helsinki process. For Western states the CSCE served as a platform to raise questions related to security in Europe and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Eastern European states considered the CSCE as a means to secure the postwar borders and an opportunity to discuss economic and scientific cooperation. Today, 51 European States, plus the United States of America and Canada, participate in this process. Notwithstanding the many and often intense political tensions between the West and the East during those twenty years, quite a number of conferences, seminars and other meetings were held and a great many agreements were adopted and documents issued, dealing with matters related to CSCE's three main areas of concern: security in Europe; cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and environment; the promotion of human rights. In response to the fundamental changes in Europe in the late 1980s, the CSCE was given a new impetus and its operational framework was broadened. CSCE offices were established in Prague (CSCE Secretariat), Vienna (Conflict Prevention Center) and Warsaw (Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) with the aim to strengthen and monitor compliance with CSCE commitments, especially in the area of human rights. A Parliamentary Assembly was established and met twice, first in Budapest and then in Helsinki. A General Secretary and a High Commissioner on Minorities were appointed, with offices in Vienna and The Hague, respectively.

Promotion and protection of European identity rights of persons belonging to nationalminorities are part of human rights protection system developed universally under the UnitedNations and, respectively, in the Regional Council of Europe, Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe and other European institutions. International instruments adopted bythe OSCE human dimension that is circumscribed, and are political in nature (so there are nottreated) contributed to a great extent, the development of catalog rights identity for peoplewho belong to national minorities, the evidence of evolution ordination mechanisms andregulations and safeguarding the rights of the category listed and, last but not least, to outlinea programmatic directions and certain standards in this field. Documents to be examined, aswell as other regulatory and industry (universal or regional) that aim at protecting minorities"does not authorize any activity that is contrary to fundamental principles of internationallaw, or other obligations under international law or provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, inparticular the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states".

AbstractThe article sheds light on the powerful political legacy of Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. One of his most remarkable achievements was the wording of the principle of self-determination of people at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Principle VIII of the Declarations of Principles of the Helsinki Final Act acknowledged for all peoples in Europe the right to choose their internal regime or policies. The innovative wording successfully pursued by the Dutch delegation under Van der Stoel's guidance undermined the very basis of the Soviet empire and emboldened dissidents in Eastern Europe to fight for democracy and change.

In Polish political thought and foreign policy during the four-plus decades of Communist rule in Poland, the German question played a central role. Many aspects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were connected with the German question, but it would be a simplification to construe the Polish regime's interest in the conference only in the context of the German problem. Polish leaders saw CSCE also as a chance for introducing changes in East-West relations and for extending Poland's leeway for maneuver in international relations. This article shows how Polish Communist leaders thought about these issues and traces the diplomatic activity aimed at promoting the Polish point of view and securing the country's (and regime’s) priorities.

To answer the question of what is public history, let's turn to its origins. The emergence of academic history in the nineteenth century, now called official, was associated with the separation of history from other fields of knowledge. At that time, it was believed that without a professional historical education, it was impossible to be an erudite and intelligent person, and to tell the past objectively and truthfully. Otherwise, these stories would resemble myths and fairy tales. Over time, history gradually became a scientific discipline, as well as an ideological science, as its primary task during the rapid kaleidoscope of changes in various political regimes was to educate ideologically savvy professionals for state-building. Thus, historical science was formed during the creation of nation-states and affirmed the national identity of different social and ethnic groups that formed one nation. What prompted recent history to approach man as the object of study? In our opinion, interest in man - a phenomenon of any civilization has existed since Hellenic times, and in the era of authoritarianism and totalitarianism has been replaced by interest in power and strength. Such a change, unfortunately, led to the tragic consequences of the First and Second World Wars. The disproportionately heavy burden of the tragedies of the Second World War and the emergence of new threats to world security in the bipolar period forced two opposing ideological camps to understand the need for dialogue, finding common ground and finding consensus in peace building. The Helsinki process began, and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union deepened in strategic areas: space and high technology. Security levers have been strengthened, and a regional security structure, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE / OSCE), has been established in the European dimension. Civilizational exchange contributed to the growth of education of the population, the deepening of the intellectual component of society. At the center of the state and history was an intelligent man – Homo Sapiens, who felt his significance for the world, history and the future. World wars have forced historians to rethink the meaning of life, its fragility and vulnerability. And the deep political, economic, and social world crisis of the 1970s drew the attention of historical science to the person. Oral history, new social history, public history, etc. appeared. The philosophical and social sciences began to study individual social groups – women's society, religious communities, working and student youth, etc. With the growth of interest in the person, the interest in history as it is, without ornaments and artificial exaggerations, the history of ordinary people and places, increased.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections. It employs around 3,460 people, mostly in its field operations but also in its secretariat in Vienna, Austria and its institutions. It has its origins in the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki, Finland.

In May this year, a process called the Conference on the Future of Europe was launched, which serves as a platform in which the citizens of the European Union can take part. In this context, we all have the possibility to make suggestions and give opinions. We can participate as individuals or in groups; with a professional, scientific or purely personal contribution we have the possibility to participate in discussions and events or organize an event in our community on one of the priority topics. All this takes place on special common websites of the EU and the Member States. At the same time the Strategic Compass is being developed at the institutional level of the European Union. It is a document that is designed to unite, harmonize and unify all proposals, discussions and starting points on the future of the Union so that they can be implemented to the greatest extent possible. The above-mentioned facts served as the starting point for this thematic issue of Contemporary Military Challenges, which, in the context of the debate on the future of the European Union, specifically focuses on its area of Common Security and Defence Policy. It was designed in cooperation with the Nova univerza-New University as part of the project entitled Integral Theory of the Future of the European Union (J5-1791), led by Matej Avbelj and financed by the Slovenian Research Agency. Much has been written on European security and defence policy. What can be summed up on this occasion is the fact that as early as 1998, the then French President and the British Prime Minister met in Saint-Malo and signed a statement on the creation of a European security and defence policy, including a European autonomous military force capable of operating in cases where NATO would not opt for military participation. A year later, as a direct result of the Saint-Mal summit in Helsinki, the "main goal" was set, setting the year of 2003 as the target date for the establishment of the European armed forces with up to 60,000 troops. However, the European Union has still not reached this main goal. It was again revived by the EU Global Strategy in 2016 with some new approaches to old challenges. Consequently, some of the better known activities that were formed as its result include the European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation, Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and others. The debate on the future of the Union's common security and defence policy is mostly determined by the changes in the international security environment that affect the European Union and the events in and around it. The analysis of security threats and the risks associated with them represent the first step in creating a future strategic framework, to be defined by the debaters at national levels and coordinated at the European level. The key achievements will include coordinated agreements in the field of achieving the "main goal" of 2003, namely the European Union as an independent actor in the field of security and defence. It is expected to have more geopolitical power, which, as Josep Borrel, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, put it in 2019, will "also know how to use the language of power". The path to this goal will by no means be easy. Coordination between the 27 members in the field of security and defence is a demanding process. In addition, it needs to be properly positioned in relation to NATO's strategic security partner. However, its placement in the defence planning process of the Member States will be the most demanding and important. The Republic of Slovenia is chairing the Council of the European Union at a time of important changes for the Union, which may be decisive in the future. With this thematic issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we want to add to Slovenia's contribution in this process. Igor Senčar writes about the importance of the European Union's resilience in a cognitive sense. In the article The cognitive aspects of Europe’s security and defence challenges he uses the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea to describe the development of a phenomenon that was collectively perceived, understood and learnt from. Modern European society, with its prosperity and high democratic standards, also has shortcomings that need to be acknowledged in order to increase societal resilience in the future. One of the ways in which we could achieve greater power of the Union is the greater role of its community or its institutions. This is proposed by Katarina Vatovec in the article The Communitarization of the European Union's defence policy. Changes have to be applied also in the way the decisions are made, including the voting method, which should be a majority one in order to increase the effectiveness of this policy. In the article European security and defence: a breakthrough or simply muddling through, Dick Zandee notes that changes should be made in the EU security and defence. The long-standing agreement and coordination in this area, which is reflected primarily in its documents and not in its actions, must end. To this end, the author proposes the concrete changes needed to achieve this goal. Twenty years of the European Union’s activities in the field of international operations and missions is a proof that the EU is an important international player. The details of its activities are presented by Aleksandra Koziol in her article Missions and operations as a tool for shaping EU’s global engagement. She notes that the Covid 19 epidemic has shifted the Union’s focus from the global to more internal affairs of the Union itself, which calls to a reflection on the future in this area as well. As part of Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Jelena Juvan discusses The future of the common security and defence policy and small member states. She writes about what a small country can achieve in this process given the fact that the Union as a whole has failed to implement its decisions from the past. However, it is crucial whether the area of the common security and defence policy is designed in such a way that it could represent a response to modern security threats.