Academic literature on the topic 'Conflit culturel – Liban'

Although communicative language teaching (CLT) is well recognized as the leading theoretical and the most effective model in English language teaching (ELT), it is still uncertain how culturally suitable it is regarding Non-Western cultures of teaching and learning, including Libyan-Arabic culture. Any teaching methodology is only effective to the extent that teachers and students are willing and able to accept and apply it with trust and optimism, and whether it is accepted or not is largely determined by a set of circumstances and beliefs that these teachers and students have been surrounded by and socialised into. Many Libyan teachers and students of English do not seem to have gone through any fundamental changes in their perception of efficient language instruction and in their daily teaching and learning practices. Based on my experience as a language educator in several Libyan universities, and on my professional thinking, I argue that CLT has not received widespread enthusiasm, has failed to make the expected impact on ELT and the traditional approach is still prevalent in many Libyan foreign language classrooms. There is a host of constraints on the adoption of CLT in the Libyan context which includes, among others, beliefs about the roles of teachers and students, teachers’ lack of language proficiency and sociolinguistic competence, examination pressure, and cultural teaching and learning styles. This article examines how these beliefs, pedagogy, and structures which have developed in the Libyan English language classroom culture limit pedagogical change advocated by foreign and Libyan education policy makers. The issues raised serve to acquaint the reader with some of the complexities of pedagogical change in Libya. The issues could also be of significance and relevance to other countries with a similar educational system and linguistic situation. The paper concludes with highlighting the need for taking attentively eclectic approach and making well-informed pedagogical options that stem from a deep understanding of the cultural and educational values that influence language learning and teaching styles.

ABSTRACT: This briefing evaluates the role of international intervention in prolonging the Libyan conflict, from financial, logistical, and military support. The briefing concludes that foreign interference interest was not necessarily the direct reason for protracting the Libyan conflict but played an essential role in strengthening the presence of the parties in the field. The regional countries showed different interests related to the Libyan conflict, including the interests of Egypt and the UAE, which harmonized with the eastern side led by Haftar’s forces ideologically in their hostility to political Islam. Conversely, the interests of Qatar and Turkey with the western side and political Islam contributed to supporting this party. Accordingly, the international intervention did not take a unified position, whether supporting conflict or peace. This led to the dispersion of international support between the conflicting parties, creating an imbalance of power to settle the conflict militarily. Moreover, some foreign parties tried to spoil the peace by biasing mediations such as the Skhirat Agreement and broadcasting their goals through internal spoilers, such as Haftar when he started the Tripoli war .

Abstract This paper explores the relationships between the Libyan state and society, and the ways in which these dynamics affected the subsequent civil wars in 2011 and onwards. Beyond the commonly-studied impact of oil and state rentierism, this paper demonstrates that the enduring centralization of the state, Gaddafi’s dystopian governance system, the socio-economic and political cultures pre-2011, and the interplay between local systems of legitimacy and central authority have played an underappreciated role in the contemporary Libyan landscape. The continuities and discontinuities of order that defined and characterized the Libyan state before and after 2011 are thus dissected. An exploration of the appositeness of Eurocentric theories of statehood to the Libyan landscape unveils the pillars of legitimacy that defined Libyan statehood pre-Gaddafi. This sheds light both on how the Gaddafi regime sought to control society by often manipulating these pillars and on the ways in which Libyan society either directly and indirectly resisted his rule or rested in complacency. This covert resistance, which turned overt, widespread, and violent in 2011, paved the way for a discursive mutation of “tribalism.” This notion morphed from one of a group behavioral binding mechanism tied to blood lineage into one underpinned by notions of solidarity that override kinship. This analysis in turn elucidates the precarity of the Libyan state and explains the subsequent turmoil in the country post-2011, characterized notably by the emergence of armed non-state actors. A key discontinuity identified is in the realm of foreign influencers that have exploited long-standing domestic grievances and weaponized Libya’s traditional pillars of legitimacy, thus tearing at its society’s social fabric.

The study dealt with extremist religious currents to attract young people into Libyan society through the framework of functional analysis, which resulted in the presence of dysfunction in society. This study sheds light on the relationship between Libyan youth and religious extremism in the context of the Arab Spring, meaning the political transition after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. Some trends are undergoing changes, resulting in the emergence of extremist religious currents. It can be concluded from this study that the problem of extremism is due to the existence of a cultural conflict and a cultural gap between two generations. This gap is the reason for creating the psychological, intellectual, political and ideological divergence of the young generation from the adult generation.

This paper is an exploration of the 2004 Arabic adaptation of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, which premiered in Casino du Liban in Beirut. The Last Day was created by Oussama al-Rahbani, who also composed the musical scores. The play shows how local Shakespeares resonate with the wider global field of study, which in turn echo East–West cultural interactions. The Last Day challenges our perception of the Other in Arabic drama as it questions intraculturalism within the conflict-ravaged Middle East. It prompts us to ask how we should address local Shakespeares in a global context, and how local knowledge illuminates our understanding of Shakespeare's reception. This paper emphasizes the fluidity of the field of Shakespearean studies and the instability of East–West cultural divides.

When Libyan youth took to the streets in a populist uprising in 2011, which became known as the 17 February 2011 revolution, many Libyans thought they were on the verge of removing one of the most vicious dictators of the twentieth century, Muammar Gaddafi, and building a new democratic state. Gaddafi responded forcefully, hoping to eliminate the movement in its infancy. But clashes between Gaddafi’s forces and those who took to streets soon turned into a civil war, during which Libyan society was split into two major groups: one supporting the uprising, the other the regime. In addition to armed conflict, these warring groups regarded each other with contempt, generated slander, and accused each other of betrayal, using words and phrases in a discourse of hate speech. This vocabulary of hate manifested in demonstrations and social media. Eight months later Gaddafi was dead, and the political system he built over four decades collapsed. But the war did not stop: yesterday’s allies became enemies, competing for political and economic gains. The number of contesting groups expanded as different clans, tribes, and cities joined the fray for personal gains. Strategies and techniques first used during the Libyan uprising were applied in the civil war, and are still manifest today. Every militia has a Facebook page, owns a television station, or has access to one. These media have been widely used to spread hate speech and to widen the rift between neighbors, creating refugees and internally displaced people. At least five cities became ghost towns during the uprising. When the concept of subculture first appeared in the sociological literature, it referred to members of a group that behaved according to a set of values and norms that deviated from those of mainstream society. Reviewing the language of militia members and their supporters that is articulated in social media or on television, it becomes obvious that such language has devolved into hate speech, creating social fragmentation among Libyans. This language has created a new set of values and norms in Libya that are different from preexisting mainstream Libyan culture. The new language has created a subculture of hate, which serves to sustain and accelerate continuing divisions within Libya, while further fragmenting the social fabric of the country.

In the concept of the internal conflict, Michael Brown explained there are political factors, economic, social, cultural and structural contribute to conflict within a country. The fourth order assist researchers in analyzing the causes of the coup against Moammar Gaddafi in Libya. During the 42-year reign of Moammar Gaddaf, the Libyan people have political issues such as curbs on political activity, political institutional discrimination, exclusive state ideology, significant internal political groups and the role of the political elite that interfere with the freedom of the people. Then economic issues such as economic discrimination, unemployment, and corruption in the Gaddafi’s family that give rise to high social inequalities. Coupled with the structural and socio-cultural factors such as discrimination against minorities, gender, and state institutions are not effective as inhibitors of the country's development. Gaddafi uses his own thoughts in undergoing government, by creating the Green Book rules as guidelines for political, economic, and social. Began when the Arab Spring swept Tunisian and Egyptian people who successfully staged a coup against their leader, there arises a sense of longing for the same freedom. Then triggered by the arrest of human rights campaigner who conducted the country's security forces in February 2011 and the blocking of internet sites in the emergence of large demonstrations - demanding the release of their scale and the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi in the Libyan leadership.

This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of interactions between Libya’s Tripoli- and Tobruk-led actors in the period between Gaddafi’s 2011 ousting and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. In so doing, it reveals the extent to which Libyan decisions aligned with the game’s principal outcome-maximizing strategy to ascertain authority and a non-outcome-maximizing strategy’s conflict resolution-through-cooperation goal. In contrast to the game’s assumptions, however, the findings convey how negotiations between the two players were driven by contextual factors, predominantly: Libya’s historical makeup, internal–external links, and hydrocarbon control. This informs my contention that the complexities of the Libya case study demonstrate the limits of the prisoner’s dilemma in illuminating the dynamics of a given political phenomenon. As a result, this account presents a novel Libya-specific blueprint of the prisoner’s dilemma that highlights the limitations of this framework and concludes with a reflection on what this means for understanding this type of game.

Notre thèse se présente sous le titre : « La citoyenneté libanaise aux prises avec les médias, nouveaux et traditionnels, face aux conflits religieux et communautaires ; une amplification ou une réduction des fractures ?». Notre thèse est avant tout une question posée sur le pluriculturalisme qui constitue la société libanaise, qui la spécifie, et qui représente une richesse socioculturelle et sociopolitique qui intéresse les Sciences de l’information et de la communication. Les médias audiovisuels, électroniques (sites web, journaux électroniques, blogs internet, etc.) seront la source susceptible d’alimenter toutes ces facettes culturelles, politiques, économiques, ethniques, religieuses, etc. Depuis longtemps la réalité confessionnelle politisée libanaise est imprégnée plus ou moins sensiblement par les médias traditionnels, et récemment les nouveaux médias ou sites web. La structure libanaise de la citoyenneté serait basée en priorité sur quatre conditions fondamentales : communauté, médias, citoyens, Etat. Le citoyen libanais appartient par nature à une communauté dans laquelle il est lié aux autres par les liens de la religion et de la confession, ce qui donne au Libanais un sentiment particulier d’appartenance identitaire. De ce fait, cette communauté religieuse, cherche toujours à s’auto – défendre et à s’exprimer afin de préserver son existence et sa continuité, et les médias peuvent jouer un rôle majeur en ce sens : chaque communauté possède son média qui constitue son porte – parole. C’est ainsi, que la communauté médiatisée avec tous ses rites et convictions politico – communautaires, occupe le premier rang des préoccupations des Libanais, alors que les principes citoyenneté – Etat pour un grand nombre de Libanais, occupent un rang secondaire.C’est dans ce domaine que nous allons analyser au cours de notre recherche, le versant contemporain de l’opinion publique grâce au regard des technologies numériques et digitales, de la communication médiatisée, ainsi que la vision politico-sociale présentée par les quotidiens
The title of our thesis is: “The Lebanese citizenship grappling with the new and traditional Medias, facing religious and community conflicts; amplifications or reductions of fractures?” Our thesis in the first place is a question asked about multiculturalism which constitutes the Lebanese society, specifies it, and represents sociocultural and sociopolitical wealth which interests the Information and Communication Sciences. The Audiovisual and Electronic Media (Web Sites, Electronic Newspapers, Internet Blogs, etc.) will be the source likely to feed all these cultural, political, economic, ethnic and religious faces.Since a long time, the Lebanese politically confessional reality is more or less impregnated by the traditional Media, and recently the new Media or Web Sites.The Lebanese structure of citizenship would be based in priority on four fundamental conditions: Community, Media, Citizen and State. The Lebanese Citizen belongs by nature to a community in which he is bound to others by bonds of religion which gives the Lebanese a particular feeling of identity. Thereby, the religious community, always seeks to defend itself and to express itself in order to preserve its existence and its continuity, and this is done by the Media: each community has its own media, which is its spokesperson. Thus, the community mediatized with all its rites and political-community convictions occupy the forefront of Lebanese concerns. While the principles of citizenships and state for a large number of Lebanese occupy the secondary rank.It is in this area that we will analyze during our research the contemporary face of public opinion possibly enlightened by the new technology of communication, the opinion mediatized as well as the politico-social vision presented by the daily newspapers

Notre thèse se présente sous le titre : « La citoyenneté libanaise aux prises avec les médias, nouveaux et traditionnels, face aux conflits religieux et communautaires ; une amplification ou une réduction des fractures ?». Notre thèse est avant tout une question posée sur le pluriculturalisme qui constitue la société libanaise, qui la spécifie, et qui représente une richesse socioculturelle et sociopolitique qui intéresse les Sciences de l’information et de la communication. Les médias audiovisuels, électroniques (sites web, journaux électroniques, blogs internet, etc.) seront la source susceptible d’alimenter toutes ces facettes culturelles, politiques, économiques, ethniques, religieuses, etc. Depuis longtemps la réalité confessionnelle politisée libanaise est imprégnée plus ou moins sensiblement par les médias traditionnels, et récemment les nouveaux médias ou sites web. La structure libanaise de la citoyenneté serait basée en priorité sur quatre conditions fondamentales : communauté, médias, citoyens, Etat. Le citoyen libanais appartient par nature à une communauté dans laquelle il est lié aux autres par les liens de la religion et de la confession, ce qui donne au Libanais un sentiment particulier d’appartenance identitaire. De ce fait, cette communauté religieuse, cherche toujours à s’auto – défendre et à s’exprimer afin de préserver son existence et sa continuité, et les médias peuvent jouer un rôle majeur en ce sens : chaque communauté possède son média qui constitue son porte – parole. C’est ainsi, que la communauté médiatisée avec tous ses rites et convictions politico – communautaires, occupe le premier rang des préoccupations des Libanais, alors que les principes citoyenneté – Etat pour un grand nombre de Libanais, occupent un rang secondaire.C’est dans ce domaine que nous allons analyser au cours de notre recherche, le versant contemporain de l’opinion publique grâce au regard des technologies numériques et digitales, de la communication médiatisée, ainsi que la vision politico-sociale présentée par les quotidiens
The title of our thesis is: “The Lebanese citizenship grappling with the new and traditional Medias, facing religious and community conflicts; amplifications or reductions of fractures?” Our thesis in the first place is a question asked about multiculturalism which constitutes the Lebanese society, specifies it, and represents sociocultural and sociopolitical wealth which interests the Information and Communication Sciences. The Audiovisual and Electronic Media (Web Sites, Electronic Newspapers, Internet Blogs, etc.) will be the source likely to feed all these cultural, political, economic, ethnic and religious faces.Since a long time, the Lebanese politically confessional reality is more or less impregnated by the traditional Media, and recently the new Media or Web Sites.The Lebanese structure of citizenship would be based in priority on four fundamental conditions: Community, Media, Citizen and State. The Lebanese Citizen belongs by nature to a community in which he is bound to others by bonds of religion which gives the Lebanese a particular feeling of identity. Thereby, the religious community, always seeks to defend itself and to express itself in order to preserve its existence and its continuity, and this is done by the Media: each community has its own media, which is its spokesperson. Thus, the community mediatized with all its rites and political-community convictions occupy the forefront of Lebanese concerns. While the principles of citizenships and state for a large number of Lebanese occupy the secondary rank.It is in this area that we will analyze during our research the contemporary face of public opinion possibly enlightened by the new technology of communication, the opinion mediatized as well as the politico-social vision presented by the daily newspapers

Le travail présenté ici se veut être une analyse du comportement d'un consommateur bien précis : l'acheteur de produits de luxe, issu de la classe moyenne supérieure libanaise. En nous basant sur ses pratiques mais aussi ses contraintes face à l'acte d'achat, nous tenterons de dresser la liste des facteurs sociaux qui régissent ses actions face aux produits de luxe. Quels sont les interdits ? Qu'est ce qui, au contraire, le pousse à acheter ce type de marchandises ? Cette étude veut comprendre le comportement des acheteurs dans un espace précis - le Liban - qui se révèle instable tant sur le plan géopolitique, social qu'économique. Après de nombreuses guerres civiles et des tensions permanentes entre religions, le pays se trouve face à une problématique délicate. Ainsi, par exemple, un consommateur qui va dans une boutique appartenant à un groupe religieux différent du sien sera considéré comme un traître par son propre groupe. Les conflits religieux et la montée des extrémismes est au cœur de cette problématique. Les groupes extrémistes font appel à leurs fidèles pour boycotter les produits provenant de nombreux pays européens. Le consommateur, quant à lui, se trouve au cœur de tensions issues de plusieurs contraintes. Cela fait aujourd'hui plus d'un an que le Liban se trouve sans président. Les partis politiques, tout comme les milices, sont à la tête d'un système politique privilégiant le clientélisme. Ce système s'est installé suite à la disparition du pouvoir de l'État et met en avant l'échange de produits de luxe contre des services en tout genre et une amélioration du statut social. Notre travail veut montrer comment ces « cadeaux » en général et principalement les produits de luxe ont participé à la cohésion et à la mise en place d'une identité d'un groupe spécifique de Libanais. Chaque individu essaye de construire - ou reconstruire - son identité sociale, essaye également de sécuriser cette identité dans un environnement totalement instable comme c'est le cas dans ce pays sans gouvernement et parlement légaux, et qui ne peuvent plus garantir cette stabilité. L'acteur social tente de trouver de nouvelles stratégies afin de s'assurer une certaine paix au quotidien. Les individus du milieu social concerné se sentent menacés par leur propre environnement mais aussi par les autres environnements socio-religieuses : Maronites, les Chiites, les Sunnites, etc. Ils ont peur pour leurs enfants, leurs proches mais aussi leurs biens : commerces, logements ... Ils doivent donc trouver une manière de s'assurer une certaine sécurité face aux différentes menaces. C'est dans ce cadre que les cadeaux de luxe interviennent et réduisent l'incertitude à la fois face à l'insécurité et aux différentes menaces
This study explores and analyses the factors involved in the act of consumption of luxury goods of the upper middle-class consumers through a case study on Lebanon. Based on the consumer's behaviour as well as the economic and social constraints he faces, we will try to define the social determinants of luxury goods consumption. What are the banners? What are the factors pushing the upper-middle class to buy such goods? This study aims to understand the behavior of buyers in a specific area - Lebanon - which is geopolitically, economically and socially unstable. After many civil wars and constant tensions between different religious groups, the country is facing a delicate problem. For example, due to social pressure executed by the society of his religious group, the consumer finds himself obligated to buy from shops owned by people of his religious group. If not, he will be considered as a traitor. Religious conflicts and the rise of extremism are at the heart of this problem. Extremist groups call on their followers to boycott products from many European countries. Consumers, meanwhile, are at the heart of tensions from several constraints It has been for more than a year now that Lebanon is without a president. Political parties, like the militias, are at the head of the political system that favors cronyism. This system was installed due to the disappearance of the state power and highlights the role of luxury goods as "gifts" in exchange of all kinds of services and improved social status. The objective of this study is to show how these "gifts" in general, and mainly luxury goods, were involved in the cohesion and the establishment of an identity of a specific group of the Lebanese population. Each individual trying to build - or rebuild - their social identity, is also trying to secure this identity in a totally unstable environment, especially when the legal government and the parliament are unable to guarantee this stability. Therefore, the social actor is trying to find new strategies to ensure some peace everyday. Individuals of a certain social environment feel threatened by their environment but also by other socio-religious environments: Maronites, Shiites, Sunnis, etc. They are afraid for their children, their relatives but also their material properties: retail, housing ... They must find a way to provide certainty about the various threats. It is in this context that luxury gifts intervene and reduce uncertainty both to insecurity and the various threats

An unprecedented analysis of how the liberation from colonial rule has threatened the Maghreb region of Africa and created political and social challenges that puts global security at risk. Northwestern Africa, known as the Maghreb, consists of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. Recent changes in the political climate—including the collapse of the Libyan regime in October 2011 and structural factors, such as the decolonization of the countries within the Maghreb—have escalated violence in the area, exposing global powers, including the United States, to terrorist attacks. This is the first book of its kind to focus on the strategic planning of the United States, as well as other world powers, in the stabilization of the region. Global Security Watch—The Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia examines domestic, regional, and international policies as they relate to the area's culture, geography, and history. Each of the book's seven chapters looks at the political and social stability of the land, and features a discussion on such topics as interstate relations, regional integration, conflict resolution, and the legislation governing security.

Abstract The chapter provides an overview of the political and administrative history of the Twenty-sixth or Saite Dynasty of Egypt (656–526 bc). After a long period of political disintegration in Egypt, Psamtek I, a local dynast from the city of Sais in the western Nile delta, succeeded in reuniting Upper and Lower Egypt in the middle of the seventh century bc. In the course of his long reign, he consolidated his rule in Egypt against local rivals and Libyan incursions and was even able to briefly extend his territory into the southern Levant. After the fall of the Assyrian Empire, Egypt came into direct conflict with the succeeding Neo-Babylonian Empire regarding the control over the Levant, but its ambitions were soon confined to its traditional borders. Under the impression of this new eastern threat, the Saite kings focused on building up a fleet in the Mediterranean, as well as on recruiting Ionian and Carian mercenaries, whose presence in Egypt came to greatly influence also internal politics. The Saite period is regarded as a phase of prosperity, characterized by a conscious return to Egypt’s own cultural traditions, as testified prominently by the monuments commissioned by various high officials of the central administration and an extensive temple-building program. The chapter puts the domestic and foreign policies of the Saite rulers into context, outlining also the main initiatives regarding temples and cults, and discusses the significance of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty for the cultural history of ancient Egypt.