Journal articles on the topic 'Conflit culturel – Liban'

Although communicative language teaching (CLT) is well recognized as the leading theoretical and the most effective model in English language teaching (ELT), it is still uncertain how culturally suitable it is regarding Non-Western cultures of teaching and learning, including Libyan-Arabic culture. Any teaching methodology is only effective to the extent that teachers and students are willing and able to accept and apply it with trust and optimism, and whether it is accepted or not is largely determined by a set of circumstances and beliefs that these teachers and students have been surrounded by and socialised into. Many Libyan teachers and students of English do not seem to have gone through any fundamental changes in their perception of efficient language instruction and in their daily teaching and learning practices. Based on my experience as a language educator in several Libyan universities, and on my professional thinking, I argue that CLT has not received widespread enthusiasm, has failed to make the expected impact on ELT and the traditional approach is still prevalent in many Libyan foreign language classrooms. There is a host of constraints on the adoption of CLT in the Libyan context which includes, among others, beliefs about the roles of teachers and students, teachers’ lack of language proficiency and sociolinguistic competence, examination pressure, and cultural teaching and learning styles. This article examines how these beliefs, pedagogy, and structures which have developed in the Libyan English language classroom culture limit pedagogical change advocated by foreign and Libyan education policy makers. The issues raised serve to acquaint the reader with some of the complexities of pedagogical change in Libya. The issues could also be of significance and relevance to other countries with a similar educational system and linguistic situation. The paper concludes with highlighting the need for taking attentively eclectic approach and making well-informed pedagogical options that stem from a deep understanding of the cultural and educational values that influence language learning and teaching styles.

ABSTRACT: This briefing evaluates the role of international intervention in prolonging the Libyan conflict, from financial, logistical, and military support. The briefing concludes that foreign interference interest was not necessarily the direct reason for protracting the Libyan conflict but played an essential role in strengthening the presence of the parties in the field. The regional countries showed different interests related to the Libyan conflict, including the interests of Egypt and the UAE, which harmonized with the eastern side led by Haftar’s forces ideologically in their hostility to political Islam. Conversely, the interests of Qatar and Turkey with the western side and political Islam contributed to supporting this party. Accordingly, the international intervention did not take a unified position, whether supporting conflict or peace. This led to the dispersion of international support between the conflicting parties, creating an imbalance of power to settle the conflict militarily. Moreover, some foreign parties tried to spoil the peace by biasing mediations such as the Skhirat Agreement and broadcasting their goals through internal spoilers, such as Haftar when he started the Tripoli war .

Abstract This paper explores the relationships between the Libyan state and society, and the ways in which these dynamics affected the subsequent civil wars in 2011 and onwards. Beyond the commonly-studied impact of oil and state rentierism, this paper demonstrates that the enduring centralization of the state, Gaddafi’s dystopian governance system, the socio-economic and political cultures pre-2011, and the interplay between local systems of legitimacy and central authority have played an underappreciated role in the contemporary Libyan landscape. The continuities and discontinuities of order that defined and characterized the Libyan state before and after 2011 are thus dissected. An exploration of the appositeness of Eurocentric theories of statehood to the Libyan landscape unveils the pillars of legitimacy that defined Libyan statehood pre-Gaddafi. This sheds light both on how the Gaddafi regime sought to control society by often manipulating these pillars and on the ways in which Libyan society either directly and indirectly resisted his rule or rested in complacency. This covert resistance, which turned overt, widespread, and violent in 2011, paved the way for a discursive mutation of “tribalism.” This notion morphed from one of a group behavioral binding mechanism tied to blood lineage into one underpinned by notions of solidarity that override kinship. This analysis in turn elucidates the precarity of the Libyan state and explains the subsequent turmoil in the country post-2011, characterized notably by the emergence of armed non-state actors. A key discontinuity identified is in the realm of foreign influencers that have exploited long-standing domestic grievances and weaponized Libya’s traditional pillars of legitimacy, thus tearing at its society’s social fabric.

The study dealt with extremist religious currents to attract young people into Libyan society through the framework of functional analysis, which resulted in the presence of dysfunction in society. This study sheds light on the relationship between Libyan youth and religious extremism in the context of the Arab Spring, meaning the political transition after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011. Some trends are undergoing changes, resulting in the emergence of extremist religious currents. It can be concluded from this study that the problem of extremism is due to the existence of a cultural conflict and a cultural gap between two generations. This gap is the reason for creating the psychological, intellectual, political and ideological divergence of the young generation from the adult generation.

This paper is an exploration of the 2004 Arabic adaptation of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, which premiered in Casino du Liban in Beirut. The Last Day was created by Oussama al-Rahbani, who also composed the musical scores. The play shows how local Shakespeares resonate with the wider global field of study, which in turn echo East–West cultural interactions. The Last Day challenges our perception of the Other in Arabic drama as it questions intraculturalism within the conflict-ravaged Middle East. It prompts us to ask how we should address local Shakespeares in a global context, and how local knowledge illuminates our understanding of Shakespeare's reception. This paper emphasizes the fluidity of the field of Shakespearean studies and the instability of East–West cultural divides.

When Libyan youth took to the streets in a populist uprising in 2011, which became known as the 17 February 2011 revolution, many Libyans thought they were on the verge of removing one of the most vicious dictators of the twentieth century, Muammar Gaddafi, and building a new democratic state. Gaddafi responded forcefully, hoping to eliminate the movement in its infancy. But clashes between Gaddafi’s forces and those who took to streets soon turned into a civil war, during which Libyan society was split into two major groups: one supporting the uprising, the other the regime. In addition to armed conflict, these warring groups regarded each other with contempt, generated slander, and accused each other of betrayal, using words and phrases in a discourse of hate speech. This vocabulary of hate manifested in demonstrations and social media. Eight months later Gaddafi was dead, and the political system he built over four decades collapsed. But the war did not stop: yesterday’s allies became enemies, competing for political and economic gains. The number of contesting groups expanded as different clans, tribes, and cities joined the fray for personal gains. Strategies and techniques first used during the Libyan uprising were applied in the civil war, and are still manifest today. Every militia has a Facebook page, owns a television station, or has access to one. These media have been widely used to spread hate speech and to widen the rift between neighbors, creating refugees and internally displaced people. At least five cities became ghost towns during the uprising. When the concept of subculture first appeared in the sociological literature, it referred to members of a group that behaved according to a set of values and norms that deviated from those of mainstream society. Reviewing the language of militia members and their supporters that is articulated in social media or on television, it becomes obvious that such language has devolved into hate speech, creating social fragmentation among Libyans. This language has created a new set of values and norms in Libya that are different from preexisting mainstream Libyan culture. The new language has created a subculture of hate, which serves to sustain and accelerate continuing divisions within Libya, while further fragmenting the social fabric of the country.

In the concept of the internal conflict, Michael Brown explained there are political factors, economic, social, cultural and structural contribute to conflict within a country. The fourth order assist researchers in analyzing the causes of the coup against Moammar Gaddafi in Libya. During the 42-year reign of Moammar Gaddaf, the Libyan people have political issues such as curbs on political activity, political institutional discrimination, exclusive state ideology, significant internal political groups and the role of the political elite that interfere with the freedom of the people. Then economic issues such as economic discrimination, unemployment, and corruption in the Gaddafi’s family that give rise to high social inequalities. Coupled with the structural and socio-cultural factors such as discrimination against minorities, gender, and state institutions are not effective as inhibitors of the country's development. Gaddafi uses his own thoughts in undergoing government, by creating the Green Book rules as guidelines for political, economic, and social. Began when the Arab Spring swept Tunisian and Egyptian people who successfully staged a coup against their leader, there arises a sense of longing for the same freedom. Then triggered by the arrest of human rights campaigner who conducted the country's security forces in February 2011 and the blocking of internet sites in the emergence of large demonstrations - demanding the release of their scale and the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi in the Libyan leadership.

This paper explores the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of interactions between Libya’s Tripoli- and Tobruk-led actors in the period between Gaddafi’s 2011 ousting and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement. In so doing, it reveals the extent to which Libyan decisions aligned with the game’s principal outcome-maximizing strategy to ascertain authority and a non-outcome-maximizing strategy’s conflict resolution-through-cooperation goal. In contrast to the game’s assumptions, however, the findings convey how negotiations between the two players were driven by contextual factors, predominantly: Libya’s historical makeup, internal–external links, and hydrocarbon control. This informs my contention that the complexities of the Libya case study demonstrate the limits of the prisoner’s dilemma in illuminating the dynamics of a given political phenomenon. As a result, this account presents a novel Libya-specific blueprint of the prisoner’s dilemma that highlights the limitations of this framework and concludes with a reflection on what this means for understanding this type of game.

AbstractSince 1995 the Archaeological Mission to Libya of Roma Tre University has carried out several surveys in the territory and suburbs of Lepcis Magna. Besides the survey of the archaeological and historical sites, the Roma Tre team has also had the opportunity to observe and record the development of the landscape through periods of war and peace.In this article, the issues related to the cultural heritage in the area of the modern city of Khoms and in the Lepcis hinterland are analysed and particular consideration is given to the damage and destruction that has occurred since the Italian occupation (1911) until the present day. The Lepcitanian/Khoms territory is an interesting case study in which the cultural heritage has been, and still is, at risk due to ‘civilian’ and ‘conflict’ causes. Besides the damage that occurred during the Italo-Turkish War and – to a minor extent – during WWII, the main damage seems to have occurred in the last sixty years due to the expansion of Khoms and to the ongoing unstable political situation in which the lack of central government control is playing an important role. In particular, since 2011, Islamic fundamentalists have demolished in these areas several ancient marabouts, destroying one of the most characteristic aspects of the Tripolitanian/Libyan cultural landscape.

This article discusses how multilevel ‘policyscapes’ and complex temporalities of ‘memoryscapes’ are assembled to reshape the categories and dynamics of terrorism and victimhood in the context of the United Kingdom. It specifically examines a case where unionist politicians from Northern Ireland are seeking to realign memory – and policyscapes through integrating diverging transnational policy narratives on victims and terrorism in debates on the Libyan Asset Freeze Bill in the UK Houses of Parliament. It is argued that these particular parliamentary interventions work to transcend the parameters of a peace process which otherwise prevent unionists from asserting a particular interpretation of conflict in Northern Ireland. Repositioning Northern Ireland in relation to the contemporary ‘War on Terror’ allows them to reassemble a bounded British mnemonic community. Theoretically, the article sets out a framework for an empirical study of memory – and policyscapes that conceptualizes dimensions of transnationalism as both intra-state and interstate dynamics.

The formation of the Libyan state had an atypical chronology and history. It was not until the 1940s that the construction of the state and the formation of the Libyan nation took place, during the death throes of Italian colonial rule. The arrival of Idrīs on the throne was a compromise: although on the one hand it was the return to a pre-colonial and pre-modern political leadership, on the other this leadership lay within a modern institutional framework, derived from European constitutionalism. In the process of renewal of the tradition linked to the figure of Idrīs, the leader of the al-Sanūsiyyah, the Islam has been inestimably important. At the point of independence, the task was to transform Libya from an artifice of colonialism into a shared political and cultural reality; it was Islam, much more than Arabism, that was identified as the lowest common denominator. The twenty years of rule by Idrīs, from his appointment as Amīr of an autonomous Cyrenaica on 1 July 1949 to the revolution of 1 September 1969, can be summarized as a continual attempt at the opening-up and controlled reform of a strongly conservative political system, which, in view of a rapidly changing society, sought to move from a fragmented political perspective to a truly national one, without any conclusive success. Internal instability became increasingly related to external interference, not just by former colonial countries or the superpowers but also by other Arab countries such as Egypt, who were the purveyors of a project of militant nationalism: Libya became a zone of political and ideological conflict between the West and the Third World.

The study investigates NATO’s and Russian involvement in the Libyan crisis by evaluating their actions from realist and humanitarian perspectives. There have been numerous studies portraying Middle East conflicts as great power confrontations and the mere pursuit of geopolitical interests. The study counters these explanations by analyzing the actions of the US, European powers, and Russia, and demonstrates how there were specific cases during which they acted in a humanitarian manner, while at other times they acted as realist powers. The study proves that when all three powers pursued humanitarian objectives, it led to a prompt collective action. However, when one or more of them pursued realist objectives, it led to a prolongation of the conflict. Nevertheless, when NATO powers (the US and European states) acted on humanitarian motives and Russia refrained from actively pursuing realist interests, collective action was still possible. Furthermore, even when all powers pursued realist motives, collective action was possible as those motives did not collide. The study implies that the application of R2P as a newly emerging form of international law might be possible elsewhere given that certain conditions are met.

Since the fall of Gaddafi’s forty-two years of rule, Libya has been facing tremendous challenges of instability and insecurity reflecting and characterized by both a political impasse and a lack of legitimate state institutions. Ad-hoc and non-state formations grew outside the legitimate state boundary and became the real actors, polarizing politics and society while rendering any political dialogue ineffective, especially when confined to exclusionary power-sharing arrangements. Official bodies remain weak and divided, while peripheral actors reject/resist submitting to its authority. While acknowledging that the current Libyan crisis is the product of the interaction of several factors including the Islamists and non-Islamist contestation, regional and tribal dimensions, and foreign interventions, this paper concentrates on the effects of the state approach of the Gaddafi era as well as the failure to adopt and implement reconciliation post the 2011 conflict. Therefore, it is argued that the first step towards realizing peace, security, and development is a departure from the current approach and the necessity of bringing in the real players to agree on a roadmap to reclaim the state by launching state-building processes that have national reconciliation as an essential component at their core. State-building cannot be purely a technical exercise of defining, designing, building, or reforming public institutions, while ignoring reconciliation. No matter how successful such technical state-building processes may be, some parts of the population will remain excluded and major segments of the population are likely to remain highly mistrustful of the (new) state and its institutions. Therefore, addressing this gap is central to a transformative approach to state-building that includes reconciliation in which dealing with the Gaddafi legacy is central to preventing future conflict relapse.

AbstractThis article considers how trust is constructed in the refugee community of Malta, against the backdrop of ongoing and recurrent unrest in Libya. As social trust is re-evaluated, social spaces have become sites of tension where divisions re-emerge along political, ideological, and economic lines. By focusing on the Libyan diaspora, the article presents an insight into the ways that conflict trauma shapes trust-building, and considers the challenges faced by civil society organisations and government bodies in their efforts to facilitate support and community-building on the island. The article is based on 14 interviews conducted in 2015 with members of the Libyan diaspora, and Maltese civil society organisations and government bodies. The interviewees discussed the multifaceted aspects of trust-building, including the legacy of 42 years of political distrust during the regime of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, regional affiliations and divisions, and the continuum of trauma that unfolds in the Maltese Open Centres and in the host community. The findings of the study indicate that there are additional structural impediments that extend beyond the ongoing conflict, including the Maltese detention process, the redrawing of political boundaries around social spaces in the towns, and the role of identity, which present determining factors in the building of social trust. Collectively, these aspects hold implications for integration into the diaspora community on the island, while in the long term, individual recovery from conflict trauma is dependent on the trust-networks that are constructed, or joined, by the refugees.

Abstract Background Dental caries and Obesity in children are issues of public health concern. Even though researching the relationship between these two noncommunicable diseases has been conducted for many years, the results remain equivocal. This paper aimed to examine the association between dental caries and obesity among 12-year-old schoolchildren living in war-affected environment in Benghazi. Methods A secondary analysis of a cross-sectional study was conducted to determine the prevalence of caries among 12-year-old school children in Benghazi in 2017 during the armed conflict that affected the city. The data extracted for the analysis included sociodemographic of the participants (gender, maternal education and school type), caries experience (DMFT index), and anthropometric measures (height in cm, weight in kg, BMI and Z score for BMI). Comparisons of anthropometric measures were conducted according to caries experience. Linear regression models were developed to determine the association between Body Mass Index and Z score as outcome variables, caries as an explanatory variable, and covariates (gender, maternal education and school type). Beta coefficient (β) and 95% confidence intervals were calculated. All statistical tests were conducted at p ≤ 0.05. Results There were 782 children with a mean (SD) BMI of 20.7 SD5.09 and an average z (SD) score of 0.56 SD1.51. Also, 159 (20%) children had obesity. No significant association was observed between caries and anthropometric measures. However, higher BMI was observed in children from a private school (p ≤ 0.001***), females (p ≤ 0.001***) and self-reported regular sugary drinks consumers (p ≤ 0.001***). Conclusion The present study shows no significant association between dental caries and anthropometric measures. However, the study findings support the notion of tackling sugar intake as a common risk factor for caries and obesity, which should be encouraged in the Libyan culture.

Alors que l’américanisme, l’africanisme, l’européanisme, l’indianisme… sont reconnus, certifiés par des musées ou des sections de musée, des départements universitaires, des chapitres de manuels depuis les origines, l’anthropologie de la Méditerranée est une spécialité récente, prenant corps, sous l’égide des universités britanniques, dans les années 1950. Ce retard est dû, au moins en partie, à l’hétérogénéité du monde méditerranéen partagé entre les façades méridionale et orientale de la mer, qui relèvent, à première vue, de l’étude du monde arabo-musulman, et la façade septentrionale ressortissant de prime abord de l’ethnologie européenne. Le scepticisme, récusant la pertinence d’une anthropologie de la Méditerranée, peut encore trouver des arguments dans l’histoire des civilisations ou dans l’actualité. Contrairement à d’autres régions du monde, l’aire iranienne voisine par exemple, le monde méditerranéen ne forme une unité ni par ses langues ni par ses traditions religieuses. Faut-il rappeler que seul l’Empire romain l’a unifié pendant plusieurs siècles autour du « mare nostrum » en favorisant l’épanouissement d’une culture gréco-latine à vocation universelle et en développant tout autour de la mer des institutions politiques sur le modèle de Rome ? Puis l’histoire de la Méditerranée fut faite de partages, de schismes, de croisades, de guerres entre empires, de conquêtes coloniales qui aboutirent, au terme de péripéties violentes, à la situation contemporaine où coexistent trois ensembles eux-mêmes fractionnés : une Méditerranée latine, catholique, largement laïcisée , partie intégrante de l’Europe occidentale, une Méditerranée balkanique orthodoxe avec ses poches islamiques, une Méditerranée arabo-musulmane. En dépit de ces fractures, des hommes de lettres campèrent, dans les années 1930, une Méditerranée des échanges et de la convivenza, à laquelle donnent crédit des lieux et des épisodes remarquables de l’histoire (l’Andalousie au temps du califat omeyade, la Sicile de Frédéric II, des villes cosmopolites de la fin du XIXème siècle et du début du XXème siècle : Istanbul, Smyrne, Salonique, Beyrouth, Alexandrie, Alger, Tanger, Trieste, Marseille, etc.). Des revues (à Marseille, les Cahiers du sud de Jean Ballard, à Tunis Les Cahiers de la Barbarie d’Armand Guibert et Jean Amrouche , à Alger Rivages d’Edmond Charlot et Albert Camus, à Rabat Aguedal d’Henri Bosco) exaltèrent cette « fraternité méditerranéenne » tout autant imaginaire que réelle. Gabriel Audisio fut le chantre le plus exalté de cette commune « patrie méditerranéenne »: « Non, écrit-il, la Méditerranée n’a jamais séparé ses riverains. Même les grandes divisions de la Foi, et ce conflit spirituel de l’Orient et de l’Occident, la mer ne les a pas exaltés, au contraire adoucis en les réunissant au sommet sensible d’un flot de sagesse, au point suprême de l’équilibre ». Et à l’image d’une Méditerranée romaine (il veut « remettre Rome ‘à sa place’ ») il oppose celle d’une « synthèse méditerranéenne » : « À cette latinité racornie, j’oppose tout ce qui a fait la civilisation méditerranéenne : la Grèce, l’Égypte, Judas, Carthage, le Christ, l’Islam ». Cette Méditerranée qui « vous mélange tout ça sans aucune espèce de pudeur », dit-il encore, « se veut universelle ». Avant qu’un projet collectif d’anthropologie n’émerge, des ancêtres de la discipline, des géographes, des historiens, avaient apporté une contribution importante à la connaissance du monde méditerranéen. Maine, Robertson Smith, Frazer, etc. étaient classicistes ou historiens du droit et se référaient souvent aux sociétés antiques de la Méditerranée pour analyser coutumes et croyances ou encore les différentes formes d’organisation sociale (la tribu, la cité, etc.) et leur évolution. Plus tard, dans les premières décennies du XXème siècle, de remarquables études monographiques ou thématiques furent réalisées sur les différentes rives de la Méditerranée , telles celles de Maunier (1927) sur les échanges rituels en Afrique du nord, de Montagne (1930) sur les Berbères du sud Marocain, de Boucheman (1937) sur une petite cité caravanière de Syrie…Géographes et historiens, plus préoccupés par l’ancrage matériel des sociétés que par leur structure ou leurs valeurs, publièrent aussi des travaux importants, synthétiques ceux-ci, sur le monde méditerranéen ; ainsi Charles Parain, dans La Méditerranée, les hommes et les travaux (1936), campe une Méditerranée des infrastructures, celle qui prévaudra jusques et y compris dans les 320 premières pages de la thèse de Fernand Braudel (1949), celle des « ressources naturelles, des champs et des villages, de la variété des régimes de propriété, de la vie maritime, de la vie pastorale et de la vie agricole, des métiers et des techniques ». L’acte fondateur de l’anthropologie de la Méditerranée fut un colloque organisé en 1959 par Julian Pitt-Rivers, Jean Peristiany et Julio Caro Baroja, qui réunit, entre autres, Ernest Gellner, qui avait mené des travaux sur le Haut-Atlas, Pierre Bourdieu, alors spécialiste de la Kabylie, John K. Campbell, auteur de recherches sur les Saracatsans du nord de la Grèce. Cette rencontre, et celle qui suivit, en 1961, à Athènes donnèrent lieu à la publication de deux recueils fondamentaux (Pitt-Rivers, 1963, Peristiany, 1965), campant les principaux registres thématiques d’une anthropologie comparée des sociétés méditerranéennes (l’honneur, la honte, le clientélisme, le familialisme, la parenté spirituelle, etc.) et véritables coups d’envoi à des recherches monographiques s’inscrivant désormais dans des cadres conceptuels fortement charpentés. Les décennies 1960, 1970 et 1980 furent celles d’une croissance rapide et d’un épanouissement de l’anthropologie de la Méditerranée. Le monde méditerranéen est alors saisi à travers des valeurs communes : outre l’honneur et la honte, attachés au sang et au nom (Pitt-Rivers, 1977, Gilmore, 1987), la virilité qui combine puissance sexuelle, capacité à défendre les siens et une parole politique ferme qui ne transige pas et ne supporte pas les petits arrangements, l’hospitalité ostentatoire. C’est aussi un univers où domine une vision endogamique du monde, où l’on prise le mariage dans un degré rapproché, mieux la « république des cousins », où se marient préférentiellement le fils et la fille de deux frères, une formule surtout ancrée sur la rive sud et dans l’Antiquité pré-chrétienne, ; Jocaste ne dit-elle pas à Polynice : « Un conjoint pris au-dehors porte malheur » ? Ce à quoi Ibn Khaldoun fait écho : « La noblesse, l’honneur ne peuvent résulter que de l’absence de mélange », écrivait-il. Aux « républiques des beaux-frères », caractéristiques des sociétés primitives exogames étudiées par Claude Lévi-Strauss s’opposent ainsi les « républiques méditerranéennes des cousins », prohibant l'échange et ancrées dans l'endogamie patrilinéaire. Alors que dans les premières, « une solidarité usuelle unit le garçon avec les frères et les cousins de sa femme et avec les maris de ses sœurs », dans les secondes « les hommes (...) considèrent leurs devoirs de solidarité avec tous leurs parents en ligne paternelle comme plus importants que leurs autres obligations, - y compris, bien souvent, leurs obligations civiques et patriotiques ». Règne ainsi, dans le monde méditerranéen traditionnel, la prédilection pour le « vivre entre soi » auquel s’ajoute une ségrégation marquée entre les sexes, « un certain idéal de brutalité virile, dont le complément est une dramatisation de la vertu féminine », poursuit Germaine Tillion (1966). La Méditerranée, c’est aussi un monde de structures clientélaires, avec ses patrons et ses obligés, dans de vieilles sociétés étatiques où des relais s’imposent, à tous les sens du terme, entre le peuple et les pouvoirs; parallèlement, dans l’univers sacré, les intermédiaires, les saints, ne manquent pas entre les fidèles et la divinité ; ils sont nombreux, y compris en islam où leur culte est controversé. La violence avec ses pratiques vindicatoires (vendetta corse, disamistade sarde, gjak albanais, rekba kabyle…) fait aussi partie du hit-parade anthropologique des caractéristiques méditerranéennes et les auteurs analysent les moyens mis en œuvre pour sortir de ces conflits (Black-Michaud, 1975). Enfin, comment ne pas évoquer une communauté de comportements religieux, en particulier les lamentations funèbres, les dévotions dolorisantes autour des martyrs ? L’« inflation apologétique du martyre » est ainsi un trait commun au christianisme et à l’islam chiite pratiqué au Liban. La commémoration des martyrs fondateurs, dans le christianisme comme en islam chiite, donne lieu à des rituels d’affliction de part et d’autre de la Méditerranée. C’est en terre chrétienne la semaine sainte, avec ses spectaculaires processions de pénitents en Andalousie, ou, en Calabre, ces cérémonies où les hommes se flagellent les mollets et les cuisses jusqu’au sang. Au Liban les fidèles pratiquent, lors des processions et des prônes qui évoquent les tragiques événements fondateurs, des rituels dolorisants : ils se flagellent avec des chaînes, se frappent la poitrine avec les paumes des mains, voire se lacèrent le cuir chevelu avec un sabre. Dans le monde chrétien comme en islam chiite, des pièces de théâtre (mystères du Moyen Âge, ta’zie) ont été composées pour représenter le martyre du sauveur. Rituels chiites et chrétiens présentent donc un air de famille (Bromberger, 1979). Cette sensibilité au martyre dans les traditions religieuses méditerranéennes est à l’arrière-plan des manifestations laïques qui célèbrent les héros locaux ou nationaux tombés pour la juste cause. C’est le cas en Algérie. Toutes ces remarques peuvent paraître bien réductrices et caricaturales, éloignées des formes de la vie moderne et de la mondialisation qui l’enserre. Ne s’agit-il pas d’une Méditerranée perdue ? Les auteurs cependant nuancent leurs analyses et les insèrent dans le contexte spécifique où elles prennent sens. Dans leur généralité, elles offrent, malgré tout, une base de départ, un cadre comparatif et évolutif. Après une période faste, couronnée par un ouvrage de synthèse récapitulant les acquis (Davis, 1977), vint le temps des remises en cause. Plusieurs anthropologues (dont Michael Herzfeld, 1980, Josep Llobera,1986, Joao de Pina-Cabral,1989…) critiquèrent de façon radicale l'érection de la Méditerranée en « regional category » en fustigeant le caractère artificiel de l'objet, créé, selon eux, pour objectiver la distance nécessaire à l'exercice légitime de la discipline et qui s'abriterait derrière quelques thèmes fédérateurs fortement stéréotypés. À ces critiques virulentes venues des centres européens ou américains de l’anthropologie, se sont jointes celles d'ethnologues originaires des régions méditerranéennes, pour qui la référence à la Méditerranée est imaginaire et suspecte, et dont les travaux sont ignorés ou regardés de haut par les chercheurs formés à l’école britannique. Ce sentiment négatif a été d’autant plus accusé sur les rives méridionale et orientale de la Méditerranée que la mer qui, à différentes périodes, reliait est devenue un fossé aussi bien sur le plan économique que politique. Diverses initiatives et prises de position scientifiques ont donné un nouvel élan, dans les années 1990-2000, à l’anthropologie de la Méditerranée. Colloques et ouvrages (par exemple Albera, Blok, Bromberger, 2001) rendent compte de cette nouvelle conjoncture. On se garde désormais plus qu’avant de considérer le monde méditerranéen comme une aire culturelle qui présenterait, à travers le temps et l’espace, des caractéristiques communes stables. Au plus parlera-t-on d’un « air de famille » entre les sociétés riveraines de la mer en raison de contextes écologiques similaires, d’une histoire partagée, de la reconnaissance d’un seul et même Dieu. Cette perspective mesurée rejoint le point de vue de Horden et Purcell (2000), auteurs d’un ouvrage important tirant un bilan critique de l’histoire du monde méditerranéen. Pour eux, qui combinent points de vue interactionniste et écologique, la Méditerranée se définit par la mise en relation par la mer de territoires extrêmement fragmentés, par une « connectivity » facilitée par les Empires. Le titre énigmatique de leur livre, The Corruptive Sea, « La Mer corruptrice », prend dès lors tout son sens. Parce qu’elle met en relation, cette mer serait une menace pour le bon ordre social et pour la paix dans les familles. Cette proximité entre sociétés différentes qui se connaissent fait que le monde méditerranéen s’offre comme un terrain idéal au comparatisme « à bonne distance ». C’est sous le sceau de ce comparatisme raisonné que s’inscrivent désormais les travaux les plus convaincants, qu’ils se réclament explicitement ou non de l’anthropologie de la Méditerranée (voir sur la nourriture Fabre-Vassas, 1994, sur la parenté Bonte éd., 1994 , sur la sainteté Kerrou éd., 1998 et les traditions religieuses, sur les migrations et les réseaux Cesari, éd., 2002, sur le cosmopolitisme Driessen, 2005) Tantôt les recherches soulignent les proximités (Albera, 2005, 2009, Dakhlia, 2008, Dakhlia et Kaiser, 2011), tantôt elles les relativisent (Fernandez Morera, 2016, Bromberger, 2018), tantôt elles insistent sur les aspects conflictuels (Chaslin, 1997). Une autre voie est de considérer le monde méditerranéen, non pas comme un ensemble fait de similarités et de proximités mais comme un espace fait de différences qui forment système. Et ce sont ces différences complémentaires, s’inscrivant dans un champ réciproque, qui permettent de parler d’un système méditerranéen. Chacun se définit, ici peut-être plus qu’ailleurs, dans un jeu de miroirs (de coutumes, de comportements, d’affiliations) avec son voisin. Les comportements alimentaires, les normes régissant l’apparence vestimentaire et pileuse, le statut des images… opposent ainsi des populations revendiquant un même Dieu (Bromberger, 2018).

The Arab world witnessed an influx of satellite channels during the 1990s and in the early years of the first decade of the new century. Many analysts in the Arab world applauded this influx as a potential tool for political change in the Arab countries. Two stations were at the heart of the new optimism: Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya, the two most prominent 24-hour news channels in the region. Al-Jazeera proved to be more controversial because in its early years of broadcasting it managed to break taboos in the Arab media by tackling issues of human rights and hosting Arab dissidents. Also, its coverage of international conflicts (primarily Afghanistan and Iraq) has marked it as a counter-hegemonic news outlet. For the first time, the flow of news went from South to North. Some scholars who study Arab satellite media, and Al-Jazeera specifically, have gone so far as to suggest that it has created a new Arab public sphere (Lynch, Miladi). However, the political developments in the Arab world, mainly the recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and what is now happening in Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen, have raised questions as to how credible these suggestions are. And are we going to claim the same powers for social media in the Arab world? This article takes the form of a personal reflection on how successful (or not) Arab satellite channels are proving to be as a tool for political change and reform in the Arab world. Are these channels editorially free from Arab governments’ political and economic interests? And could new media (notably social networking sites) achieve what satellite channels have been unable to over the last two decades? 1996 saw the launch of Al-Jazeera, the first 24-hour news channel in the Arab world. However, it didn’t have much of an impact on the media scene in the region until 1998 and gained its controversial reputation through its coverage of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (see Zayani; Miles; Allan and Zelizer; El-Nawawy and Iskandar). In the Arab world, it gained popularity with its compelling talk shows and open discussions of human rights and democracy (Alterman). But its dominance didn’t last long. In 2003, Al Walid Al Ibrahim, son-in-law of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia (1921-2005) established Al Arabiya, the second 24-hour news channel in the Arab world, just before the start of the Iraq war. Many scholars and analysts saw in this a direct response to the popularity that Al-Jazeera was achieving with the Arab audiences. Al Arabiya, however, didn’t achieve the level of popularity that Al-Jazeera enjoyed throughout its years of broadcasting (Shapiro). Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera Arabic subsequently became rivals representing political and national interests and not just news competitors. Indeed, one of Wikileaks’ latest revelations states that Al-Jazeera changed its coverage to suit Qatari foreign policy. The US ambassador to Qatar, Joseph LeBaron, was reported as saying: The Qatari prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, had joked in an interview that Al-Jazeera had caused the Gulf State such headaches that it might be better to sell it. But the ambassador remarked: “Such statements must not be taken at face value.” He went on: “Al-Jazeera’s ability to influence public opinion throughout the region is a substantial source of leverage for Qatar, one which it is unlikely to relinquish. Moreover, the network can also be used as a chip to improve relations. For example, Al-Jazeera’s more favourable coverage of Saudi Arabia's royal family has facilitated Qatari–Saudi reconciliation over the past year.” (Booth). The unspoken political rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar on Lebanese domestic disputes, over Iran, and over the Palestinian internal conflict was played out in the two channels. This brings us to my central question: can Arab satellite channels, and specifically Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al Arabiya, be regarded as tools for democratic political change? In the recent revolution in Tunisia (spring 2011), satellite channels had to catch up with what social media were reporting: and Al-Jazeera more so than Al Arabiya because of previous encounters between Al-Jazeera and Zein Al Abidine bin Ali’s regime (Greenslade, The Guardian). Bin Ali controlled the country’s media and access to satellite media to suit his interests. Al-Jazeera was banned from Tunisia on several occasions and had their offices closed down. Bin Ali allowed private TV stations to operate but under indirect state control when it came to politics and what Ben Ali’s regime viewed as national and security interests. Should we therefore give social networking credit for facilitating the revolution in Tunisia? Yes, we should. We should give it credit for operating as a mobilising tool. The people were ready, the political moment came, and the people used it. Four out of ten Tunisians are connected to the Internet; almost 20 per cent of the Tunisian population are on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem). We are talking about a newly media-literate population who have access to the new technology and know how to use it. On this point, it is important to note that eight out of ten Facebook users in Tunisia are under the age of 30 (Mourtada and Salem). Public defiance and displays of popular anger were sustained by new media outlets (Miladi). Facebook pages have become sites of networking and spaces for exchanging and disseminating news about the protests (Miladi). Pages such as “The people of Tunisia are burning themselves, Mr President” had around 15,000 members. “Wall-posts” specifying the date and place of upcoming protest became very familiar on social media websites. They even managed to survive government attempts to disable and block these sites. Tunisian and non-Tunisians alike became involved in spreading the message through these sites and Arab transnationalism and support for the revolution came to a head. Many adjacent countries had Facebook pages showing support for the Tunisian revolution. And one of the most prominent of these pages was “Egyptians supporting the Tunisian revolution.” There can be little doubt, therefore, that the success of the Tunisian revolution encouraged the youth of Egypt (estimated at 80 per cent of its Facebook users) to rise up and persist in their call for change and political reform. Little did Wael Ghonim and his friends on the “Kolinah Khaled Said” (“We are all Khaled Said”) Facebook page know where their call for demonstrations on the 25 January 2011 would lead. In the wake of the Tunisian victory, the “We are all Khaled Said” page (Said was a young man who died under torture by Egyptian police) garnered 100,000 hits and most of these virtual supporters then took to the streets on 25 January which was where the Egyptian revolution started. Egyptians were the first Arab youth to have used the Internet as a political platform and tool to mobilise people for change. Egypt has the largest and most active blogosphere in the Arab world. The Egyptian bloggers were the first to reveal corruption and initiated calls for change as early as 2007 (Saleh). A few victories were achieved, such as the firing and sentencing of two police officers condemned for torturing Imad Al Kabeer in 2007 (BBC Arabic). However, these early Egyptian bloggers faced significant jail sentences and prosecution (BBC News). Several movements were orchestrated via Facebook, including the 6 April uprising of 2007, but at this time such resistance invariably ended in persecution and even more oppression. The 25 January revolution therefore took the regime by surprise. In response, former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his entourage (who controlled the state media and privately owned TV stations such as Dream TV) started making declarations that “Egypt is not Tunisia,” but the youth of Egypt were determined to prove them wrong. Significantly, Mubarak’s first reaction was to block Twitter, then Facebook, as well as disrupting mobile phone text-messaging and Blackberry-messaging services. Then, on Thursday 27 January, the regime attempted to shut down the Internet as a whole. Al-Jazeera Arabic quickly picked up on the events in Egypt and began live coverage from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, which resulted in Mubarak’s block of Al-Jazeera’s transmission in Egypt and the withdrawal of its operational licences. One joke exchanged with Tunisian activists on Facebook was that Egyptians, too, had “Ammar 404” (the nickname of the government censor in Tunisia). It was not long, however, before Arab activists from across the regions started exchanging codes and software that allowed Egyptians to access the Internet, despite the government blockades. Egyptian computer science students also worked on ways to access the Worldwide Web and overcome the government’s blockade (Shouier) and Google launched a special service to allow people in Egypt to send Twitter messages by dialling a phone number and leaving a voice message (Oreskovic, Reuters). Facebook group pages like Akher Khabar’s “Latest News” and Rased’s “RNN” were then used by the Egyptian diaspora to share all the information they could get from friends and family back home, bypassing more traditional modes of communication. This transnational support group was crucial in communicating their fellow citizens’ messages to the rest of the world; through them, news made its way onto Facebook and then through to the other Arab nations and beyond. My own personal observation of these pages during the period 25 January to 12 February revealed that the usage of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter changed markedly, shifting from being merely social in nature to becoming rapidly and primarily political, not only among Arab users in the Arab world, as Mourtada and Salem argue, but also throughout the Arabian diaspora. In the case of Libya’s revolution, also, social media may be seen to be a mobilising tool in the hands of both Libyans at home and across the Libyan diaspora. Libya has around 4 per cent of its population on Facebook (Mourtada and Salem), and with Gaddafi’s regime cracking down on the Internet, the Libyan diaspora has often been the source of information for what is happening inside the country. Factual information, images, and videos were circulated via the February 17th website (in Arabic and in English) to appeal to Arab and international audiences for help. Facebook and Twitter were where the hash tag “#Feb17th” was created. Omar Amer, head of the UK’s Libyan youth movement based in Manchester, told Channel 4: “I can call Benghazi or Tripoli and obtain accurate information from the people on the ground, then report it straight onto Twitter” (Channel 4 News). Websites inspired by #Feb17th were spread online and Facebook pages dedicated to news about the Libyan uprisings quickly had thousands of supporters (Channel 4 News). Social media networks have thus created an international show of solidarity for the pro-democracy protestors in Libya, and Amer was able to report that they have received overwhelming support from all around the globe. I think that it must therefore be concluded that the role Arab satellite channels were playing a few years ago has now been transferred to social media websites which, in turn, have changed from being merely social/cultural to political platforms. Moreover, the nature of the medium has meant that the diasporas of the nations concerned have been instrumental to the success of the uprisings back home. However, it would be wrong to suggest that broadcast media have been totally redundant in the revolutionary process. Throughout the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, Al-Jazeera became a disseminating tool for user-generated content. A call for Arab citizens to send their footage of unfolding events to the Al-Jazeera website for it to re-broadcast on its TV screens was a key factor in the dissemination of what was happening. The role Al-Jazeera played in supporting the Egyptian revolution especially (which caused some Arab analysts to give it the name “channel of revolutions”), was quickly followed by criticism for their lack of coverage of the pro-democracy protests in Bahrain. The killing of peaceful protestors in Bahrain did not get airtime the way that the killing of Egyptian pro-democracy protestors had. Tweets, Facebook posts and comments came pouring in, questioning the lack of coverage from Bahrain. Al Arabiya followed Al-Jazeera’s lead. Bahrain was put last on the running order of the coverage of the “Arab revolutions.” Newspaper articles across the Arab world were questioning the absence of “the opinion and other opinion” (Al-Jazeera’s Arabic motto) when it came to Bahrain (see Al Akhbar). Al Jazeera’s editor-in-chief, Hassan El Shoubaki, told Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar that they were not deliberately absent but had logistical problems with the coverage since Al-Jazeera is banned in Bahrain (Hadad). However, it can be argued that Al-Jazeera was also banned in Egypt and Tunisia and that didn’t stop the channel from reporting or remodelling its screen to host and “rebroadcast” an activist-generated content. This brings us back to the Wikileaks’ revelation mentioned earlier. Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Bahraini protests is influenced by Qatari foreign policy and, in the case of Bahrain, is arguably abiding by Qatar’s commitment to Gulf Cooperation Council security treaties. (This is one of the occasions where Al Arabiya and Al-Jazeera appear to have shared the same editorial guidelines, influenced by Qatari and Saudi Arabian shared policy.) Nevertheless, the Bahraini protests continue to dominate the social networks sites and information has kept flowing from Bahrain and it will continue to do so because of these platforms. The same scenario is also unfolding in Syria, but this time Al-Jazeera Arabic is taking a cautious stance while Al Arabiya has given the protests full coverage. Once again, the politics are obvious: Qatar is a supporter of the Syrian regime, while Saudi Arabia has long been battling politically with Syria on issues related to Lebanon, Palestine, and Iran (this position might change with Syria seeking support on tackling its own domestic unrest from the Saudi regime). All this confirms that there are limits to what satellite channels in the Arab world can do to be part of a process for democratic political reform. The Arab media world is not free of the political and economic influence of its governments, its owners or the various political parties struggling for control. However, this is clearly not a phenomenon unique to the Arab world. Where, or when, has media reporting ever been totally “free”? So is this, then, the age of new media? Could the Internet be a free space for Arab citizens to express their opinion and fulfil their democratic aspirations in bringing about freedom of speech and political freedom generally? Is it able to form the new Arab public sphere? Recent events show that the potential is there. What happened in Tunisia and Egypt was effectively the seizure of power by the people as part of a collective will to overthrow dictators and autocratic regimes and to effect democratic change from within (i.e. not having it imposed by foreign powers). The political moment in Tunisia was right and the people receptive; the army refused to respond violently to the protests and members of bin Ali’s government rose up against him. The political and social scene in Egypt became receptive after the people felt empowered by events in Tunis. Will this transnational empowerment now spread to other Arab countries open to change notwithstanding the tribal and sectarian alliances that characterise their populations? Further, since new media have proven to be “dangerous tools” in the hands of the citizens of Tunisia and Egypt, will other Arab regimes clamp down on them or hijack them for their own interests as they did the satellite channels previously? Maybe, but new media technology is arguably ahead of the game and I am sure that those regimes stand to be taken by surprise by another wave of revolutions facilitated by a new online tool. So far, Arab leaders have been of one voice in blaming the media for the protests (uprisings) their countries are witnessing—from Tunisia to Syria via Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Libya. As Khatib puts it: “It is as if the social, economic, and political problems the people are protesting against would disappear if only the media would stop talking about them.” Yet what is evident so far is that they won’t. The media, and social networks in particular, do not of themselves generate revolutions but they can facilitate them in ways that we are only just beginning to understand. References Allan, Stuart, and Barbie Zelizer. Reporting War: Journalism in War Time. London: Routledge, 2004. Alterman, John. New Media New Politics? From Satellite Television to the Internet in the Arab World. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998. BBC News. “Egypt Blogger Jailed for ‘Insult,’” 22 Feb. 2007. 1 Mar. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6385849.stm›. BBC Arabic. “Three Years Jail Sentence for Two Police Officers in Egypt in a Torture Case.” 5 Nov. 2007. 26 Mar. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/middle_east_news/newsid_7079000/7079123.stm›. Booth, Robert. “WikiLeaks Cables Claim Al-Jazeera Changed Coverage to Suit Qatari Foreign Policy.” The Guardian 6 Dec. 2010. 22 Feb. 2011 ‹http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/05/wikileaks-cables-al-jazeera-qatari-foreign-policy›. Channel 4 News. “Arab Revolt: Social Media and People’s Revolution.” 25 Feb. 2011. 3 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.channel4.com/news/arab-revolt-social-media-and-the-peoples-revolution›. El-Nawawy, Mohammed, and Adel Iskandar. Al Jazeera. USA: Westview, 2002. Greenslade, Roy. “Tunisia Breaks Ties with Qatar over Al-Jazeera.” The Guardian 26 Oct. 2006. 23 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2006/oct/26/tunisiabreakstieswithqatar›. Hadad, Layal. “Al thowra al Arabiya tawqafet Eindah masharef al khaleegj” (The Arab Revolution Stopped at the Doorsteps of the Gulf). Al Akhbar 19 Feb. 2011. 20 Feb. 2011 ‹http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/4614›. Khatib, Lina. “How to Lose Friends and Alienate Your People.” Jadaliyya 26 Mar. 2011. 27 Mar. 2011 ‹http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1014/how-to-lose-friends-and-alienate-your-people›. Lynch, Marc. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia UP, 2006. Miladi, Noureddine. “Tunisia A Media Led Revolution?” Al Jazeera 17 Jan. 2011. 2 Mar. 2011 ‹http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/01/2011116142317498666.html#›. Miles, Hugh. Al Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World. London: Abacus, 2005. Mourtada, Rasha, and Fadi Salem. “Arab Social Media Report, Facebook Usage: Factors and Analysis.” Dubai School of Government 1.1 (Jan. 2011). Oreskovic, Alexei. “Google Inc Launched a Special Service...” Reuters 1 Feb. 2011. 28 Jan. 2011 ‹http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/01/us-egypt-protest-google-idUSTRE71005F20110201›. Saleh, Heba. “Egypt Bloggers Fear State Curbs.” BBC News 22 Feb. 2007. 28 Jan. 2011 ‹http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/6386613.stm›. Shapiro, Samantha. “The War inside the Arab Newsroom.” The New York Times 2 Jan. 2005. Shouier, Mohammed. “Al Tahrir Qanat al Naser … Nawara Najemm” (Liberation, Victory Channel… and Nawara Najem). Al Akhbar 17 Feb. 2011. Zayani, Mohammed. The Al-Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on Arab Media. London: Pluto, 2005.

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic actors, such as major industries and interest groups, whose actions and understandings in turn impact on how the norm is understood and implemented. This in turn feeds back to the larger normative community and creates variations of those norms. There are three main factors that can contribute to the domestic salience of an international norm. First, as the norm-takers, domestic actors can decide whether and to what extent an international norm can enter the domestic agenda and how it will be implemented in policy-making. These actors tend to favour an international norm that can justify their political and social programs and promote their interests in domestic policy debates (Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 453). By advocating the existence and adoption of an international norm, domestic actors attempt to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their current policy or institution (Acharya, “How Ideas Spread” 248). Political elites can strengthen state legitimacy by complying with an international norm in their policy-making, and consequently obtain international approval with reputation, trust, and credibility as social benefits in the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 903). For example, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), only four states – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – voted against the Declaration. They argued that their constitutional and national policies were sufficiently responsive to the type of Indigenous self-determination envisioned by UNDRIP. Nevertheless, given the opprobrium directed against these states by the international community, and their well-organised Indigenous populations, the four state leaders recognised the value of supporting UNDRIP. Subsequently all four states adopted the Declaration, but in each instance state leaders observed UNDRIP’s ‘aspirational’ rather than legal status; UNDRIP was a statement of values that these states’ policies should seek to incorporate into their domestic Indigenous law. Second, the various cultural, political, and institutional strategies of domestic actors can influence the effectiveness of norm empowerment. Political rhetoric and political institutions are usually created and used to promote a norm domestically. Both state and societal leaders can make the performative speech act of an international norm work and raise its importance in a national context by repeated declarations on the legitimacy and obligations brought by the norm (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). Moreover, domestic actors can also develop or modify political institutions to incorporate an international norm into the domestic bureaucratic or legal system (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). These institutions provide rules for domestic actors and articulate their rights and obligations, which transforms the international norm’s legitimacy and authority into local practices. For example, the New Zealand Government adopted a non-nuclear policy in the 1980s. This policy arose from the non-nuclear movement that was leading the development of the Raratonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) and peace and Green party movements across Europe who sought to de-nuclearise the European continent. The Lange Labour Government’s 1984 adoption of an NZ anti-nuclear policy gained impetus because of these larger norm movements, and these movements in turn recognised the normative importance of a smaller power in international relations. Third, the characteristics of the international norm can also impact on the likelihood that the norm will be accepted by domestic actors. A ‘cultural match’ between international norm and local values can facilitate norm diffusion to domestic level. Sociologists suggest that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if the norm is congruent with the prior values and practices of the norm-taker (Acharya, “Asian Regional Institutions” 14). Norm diffusion tends to be more efficient when there is a high degree of cultural match such that the global norm resonates with the target country’s domestic values, beliefs or understandings, which in turn can be reflected in national discourse, as well as the legal and bureaucratic system (Checkel 87; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 73). With such cultural consistency, domestic actors are more likely to accept an international norm and treat it as a given or as ‘matter-of-fact’ (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 74). Cultural match in norm localisation explains why identical or similar international socialisation processes can lead to quite different local developments and variations of international norms. The debate between universal human rights and the ‘Asian values’ of human rights is an example where some Asian states, such as Singapore and China, prioritise citizen’s economic rights over social and political rights and embrace collective rights instead of individual rights. Cultural match can also explain why one country may easily accept a certain international norm, or some aspect of one particular norm, while rejecting others. For example, when Taiwanese and Japanese governments adapted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into their local political and legal practice, various cultural aspects of Indigenous rights have been more thoroughly implemented compared to indigenous economic and political rights (Gao et al. 60-65). In some extreme cases, the norm entrepreneurs even attempt to change the local culture of norm recipients to create a better cultural match for norm localisation. For example, when it tried to socialise India into its colonial system in the early nineteenth century, Britain successfully shaped the evolution of Indian political culture by adding British values and practices into India’s social, political, and judicial system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 307-309). The International Normative Community: Would States Continue Wearing ‘Uniforms’? International norms evolve. Not every international norm can survive and sustain. For example, while imperialism and colonial expansion, where various European states explored, conquered, settled, and exploited other parts of the world, was a widely accepted idea and practice in the nineteenth century, state sovereignty, equality, and individual rights have replaced imperialism and become the prevailing norms in international society today. The meanings of the same international norm can evolve as well. The Great Powers first established the post-war international norms of ‘state responsibility’ based on the idea of sovereign equality and non-intervention of domestic affairs. However, the 1980s saw the emergence of many international organisations, which built new standards and offered new meanings for a responsible state in international society: a responsible state must actively participate in international organisations and comply with international regimes. In the post-Cold War era, international society has paid more attention to states’ responsibility to offer global common goods and to promote the values of human rights and democracy. This shift of focus has changed the international expectation of state responsibility again to embrace collective goods and global values (Foot, “Chinese Power” 3-11). In addition to the nature and evolution of international norms, the unity and strength of the normative community can also affect states’ compliance with the norms. The growing size of the community group or the number of other cooperatives can amplify the effect of socialisation (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503-506). In other words, individual states are often more concerned about their national image, reputation and identity regarding norm compliance when a critical mass of states have already subscribed into the international norm. How much could this critical mass be? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that international norms reach the threshold global acceptance when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded at least one third of all states to adopt the new norm (901). The veto record of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) shows this impact. China, for example, has cast a UNSC veto vote 17 times as of 2022, but it has rarely excised its veto power alone (Security Council Report). For instance, though being sceptical of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which prioritises human right over state sovereignty, China did not veto Resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the Libyan civil war. The Resolution allowed the international society to take ‘all necessary measure to protect civilians’ from a failed state government, and it received wide support among UNSC members (no negative votes from the other 14 members). Moreover, states are not entirely equal in terms of their ‘normative weight’. When Great Powers act as norm entrepreneurs, they can usually utilise their wealth and influence to better socialise other norm novice states. In the history of promoting biological diversity norms which are embedded in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the OECD countries, especially France, UK, Germany, and Japan, have been regarded as normative leaders. French and Japanese political leaders employed normative language (such as ‘need’ and ‘must’) in various international forums to promote the norms and to highlight their normative commitment (see e.g. Chirac; Kan). Additionally, both governments provided financial assistance for developing countries to adopt the biodiversity norms. In the 2011 annual review of CBD, Japan reaffirmed its US$12 million contribution to assisting developing countries (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). France joined Japan’s commitment by announcing a financial contribution of €1 million along, with some additional funding from Norway and Switzerland (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). Today, biological diversity has been one of the most widely accepted international environmental norms, which 196 states/nations have ratified (United Nations). While Great Powers can make more substantial contributions to norm diffusion compared to many smaller powers with limited state capacity, Great Powers’ non-compliance with the normative ‘uniform’ can also significantly undermine the international norms’ validity and the normative community’s unity and reputation. The current normative community of climate change is hardly a unified one, as it is characterised by a low degree of consensus. Major industrial countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, have not yet reached an agreement concerning their individual responsibilities for reducing greenhouse emissions. This lack of agreement, which includes the amount of cuts, the feasibility and usefulness of such cuts, and the relative sharing of cuts across various states, is complicated by the fact that large developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, also hold different opinions towards climate change regimes (see Vidal et al.). Experts heavily criticised the major global powers, such as the European Union and the United States, for their lack of ambition in phasing out fossil fuels during the 2022 climate summit in Egypt (COP27; Ehsan et al.). In international trade, both China and the United States are among the leading powers because of their large trade volume, capacity, and transnational network; however, both countries have recently undermined the world trade system and norms. China took punitive measures against Australian export products after Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry request at the World Health Organisation. The United States, particularly under the Trump Administration, invoked the WTO national security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Lastly, norm diffusion and socialisation can be a ‘two-way path,’ especially when the norm novice state is a powerful and influential state in the international system. In this case, the novices are not merely assimilated into the group, but can also successfully exert some influence on other group members and affect intra-group relations (Moreland 1174). As such, the novices can be both targets of socialisation and active agents who can shape the content and outcome of socialisation processes (Pu 344). The influence from the novices can create normative contestation and thus influence the norm evolution (Thies 547). In other words, novice states can influence international society and shape the international norm during the socialisation process. For example, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a set of norms that regulate member states’ relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It establishes a diplomatic and security culture characterised by informality, consultation, and dialogue, and consensus-building in decision-making processes (Caballero-Anthony). From its interaction with ASEAN, China has been socialised into the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Ba 157-159). Nevertheless, China’s relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also suggest that there exists a ‘feedback’ process between China and ARF which resulted in institutional changes in ARF to accommodate China’s response (Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?” 291). For another example, while the Western powers generally promote the norm of ‘shared responsibility’ in global environment regimes, the emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), have responded to the normative engagement and proposed a ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ regime where the developing countries shoulder less international obligations. Similarly, the Western-led norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which justifies international humanitarian intervention, has received much resistance from the countries that only adhere to the conventional international rules regarding state sovereignty rights and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Conclusion International norms are shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate state behaviour. They are the ‘uniforms’ for individual states to wear when operating at the international level. States comply with international norms in order to affirm their preferred national identities as well as to gain social acceptance and reputation in the normative community. When the normative community is united and sizable, states tend to receive more social pressure to consistently wear these normative uniforms – be they the Geneva Conventions or nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic world where liberal values, such as individual rights and rule of law, face significant challenges and democracies are in decline, the future success of the global normative community may be at risk. Great Powers are especially responsible for the survival and sustainability of international norms. The United States under President Trump adopted a nationalist ‘America First’ security agenda: alienating traditional allies, befriending authoritarian regimes previously shunned, and rejecting multilateralism as the foundation of the post-war global order. While the West has been criticised of failing to live up to its declared values, and has suffered its own loss of confidence in the liberal model, the rising powers have offered their alternative version of the world system. Instead of merely adapting to the Western-led global norms, China has created new institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, to promote its own preferred values, and has reshaped the global order where it deems the norms undesirable (Foot, “Chinese Power in a Changing World Order” 7). Great Power participation has reshaped the landscape of global normative community, and sadly not always in positive ways. Umberto Eco lamented the disappearance of the beauty of the past in his novel The Name of the Rose: ‘stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus’ ('yesterday’s rose endures in its name, we hold empty names'; Eco 538). If the international community does not want to witness an era where global norms and universal values are reduced to nominalist symbols, it must renew and reinvigorate its commitment to global values, such as human rights and democracy. It must consider wearing these uniforms again, properly. 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