Journal articles on the topic 'Connecticut. Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security'

AbstractThe terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 led to the largest US Government transformation since the formation of the Department of Defense following World War II. More than 22 different agencies, in whole or in part, and >170,000 employees were reorganized to form a new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with the primary mission to protect the American homeland. Legislation enacted in November 2002 transferred the entire Federal Emergency Management Agency and several Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) assets to DHS, including the Office of Emergency Response, and oversight for the National Disaster Medical System, Strategic National Stockpile, and Metropolitan Medical Response System. This created a potential separation of “health” and “medical” assets between the DHS and HHS. A subsequent presidential directive mandated the development of a National Incident Management System and an all-hazard National Response Plan.While no Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) assets were targeted for transfer, the VA remains the largest integrated healthcare system in the nation with important support roles in homeland security that complement its primary mission to provide care to veterans. The Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group (EMSHG) within the VA's medical component, the Veteran Health Administration (VHA), is the executive agent for the VA's Fourth Mission, emergency management. In addition to providing comprehensive emergency management services to the VA, the EMSHG coordinates medical back-up to the Department of Defense, and assists the public via the National Disaster Medical System and the National Response Plan.This article describes the VA's role in homeland security and disasters, and provides an overview of the ongoing organizational and operational changes introduced by the formation of the new DHS. Challenges and opportunities for public health are highlighted.

The discipline of emergency management (EM) is at a critical crossroads. Emergency managers around the world are faced with new threats, new responsibilities, and new opportunities. This paper examines the organizational changes made by the US federal government in shaping the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and presents three key lessons learned during the past decade that could guide emergency planners as they design and manage EM organizations of the future.

As the Department of Homeland Security begins its 2018 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, it will certainly address the question “what is homeland security?”. This article is meant to provide a concise overview. It begins with a definition and relates it back to the origins of homeland security. It then takes that same definition and projects it onto the DHS mission sets. It then takes a closer look at DHS missions in border and transportation security, counterterrorism, emergency management, countering weapons of mass destruction, critical infrastructure protection, and cybersecurity. It concludes with a unique argument that homeland security may be only a transient concern, and that technological change may offer a brighter future.

This article examines local emergency manager's beliefs regarding control over tasks during various stages of the hazard cycle since federal policies went into effect following the September 11 attacks. The study considers whether a disparity exists between the actions of local officials during each phase of the “hazard cycle” and the policy expectations of the federal government, which call for greater federal control over activities in emergency management and homeland security. To do so, hypothesis testing investigates the jurisdiction's use of comprehensive emergency management (CEM) practices, the perceived “clarity” of the federal policy demands, and if the local actors feel coerced to comply with federal policy demands so that grant funding is not compromised. Using a model developed from “third-generation” policy implementation research, the results show that the odds of local officials citing federal control over these actions have very limited statistical significance. This signals that the perceived lack of local input into the development of these federal policies and the policies’ limited use of traditional CEM measures may not be in concert with what local actors perform in the field. Simply put, the respondents claim to understand the federal policy demands, support the concept of federal control as the policies describe, yet follow their own plans or traditional CEM principles, even if such actions do not support the federal policy demands. These results align with pre-existing research in the emergency management field that show issues with efforts to centralize policies under the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency.

This research explored federal intervention with the particular emphasis on examining how a collaborative relationship between Department of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) led to greater effectiveness between these two federal departments and their subordinates (United States Northern Command and Federal Emergency Management Agency, respectively) during the preparation and response phases of the disaster cycle regarding US continental-based hurricanes. Through the application of a two-phased, sequential mixed methods approach, this study determined how their relationship has led to longitudinal improvements in the years following Hurricane Katrina, focusing on hurricanes as the primary unit of analysis.

The US Department of Homeland Security identified college sport venues as terrorist targets due to the potential for mass casualties and catastrophic social and economic impact. Therefore, it is critical for college sport safety and security personnel to implement effective risk management practices. However, deficiencies have been identified in the level of preparedness of college sport event security personnel related to risk management training and effective emergency response capabilities. To address the industry need, the National Center for Spectator Sports Safety and Security designed, developed, and evaluated a national sport event risk management training program for National Collegiate Athletic Association command groups. The purpose of this article was to provide an overview of the design, development, and evaluation process.

ABSTRACTThere is no widely accepted, validated framework of health care emergency management capabilities (HEMCs) that can be used by facilities to guide their disaster preparedness and response efforts. We reviewed the HEMCs and the evaluation methods used by the Veterans Health Administration, The Joint Commission, the Institute of Medicine Metropolitan Medical Response System committee, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services to determine whether a core set of HEMCs and evaluative methods could be identified.Despite differences in the conceptualization of health care emergency management, there is considerable overlap among the agencies regarding major capabilities and capability-specific elements. Of the 5 agencies, 4 identified occupant safety and continuity of operations as major capabilities. An additional 5 capabilities were identified as major by 3 agencies. Most often the differences were related to whether a capability should be a major one versus a capability-specific element (eg, decontamination, management of resources). All of the agencies rely on multiple indicators and data sources to evaluate HEMCs. Few performance-based tools have been developed and none have been fully tested for their reliability and validity. Consensus on a framework and tools to measure HEMCs is needed. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2009;3(Suppl 1):S45–S51)

Inherent limitations of controlling risks in complex socio-technical systems were revealed in several major catastrophic disasters such as nuclear meltdown in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011, well blowout in Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in 2010, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. While desired risk management leans toward the prevention of such unwanted events, the mitigation of their impact becomes more important and emergency response operations provide the last line of protection against disasters (Kanno, Makita, & Furuta, 2008). In response to September 11 terrorist attack at World Trade Center in New York, U.S. Government launched the National Incident Management System (NIMS), an integrated national and multi-jurisdictional emergency preparedness and response program (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The NIMS framework is characterized by a common operating picture, interoperability, reliability, scalability and portability, and resilience and redundancy (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Among these characteristics, effective emergency response operations require resilience because planned-for actions may not be implementable and therefore the emergency response organizations must adapt to and cope with uncertain and changing environment (Mendonca, Beroggi, & Wallace, 2003). There have been many attempts to define resilience in various disciplines (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2007). Nevertheless, such attempts for emergency management systems (EMS) is still scarce in the existing body of resilience literature. By considering traits of EMS, this study proposes the definition of resilience as ‘ a system’s capability to respond to different kinds of disrupting events and to bring the system back to a desired state in a timely manner with efficient use of resources, and with minimum loss of performance capacity.’ In order to model resilience in EMS, the U.S. NIMS is chosen because it allows for investigation of resilient behavior among different components that inevitably involve both human agents and technological artifacts as joint cognitive systems (JCSs) (Hollnagel & Woods, 2005). In the NIMS, the largest JCS comprises five critical functions: Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics and Finance & Administration (F&A) (Department of Homeland Security, 2008). External stimuli or inputs to this JCS are events that occur outside of its boundary such as uncontrolled events. When these events do occur, they are typically perceived by the ‘boots-on-the-ground’ in the Operations function. The perceived data are reported and transported to the Planning function in which such data are transformed into useful and meaningful information. This information provides knowledge base for generating a set of decisions. Subsequently, Command function selects some of those decisions and authorizes them with adequate resources so that Operations actually take actions for such decisions to the uncontrolled events. This compensation process continues until the JCS achieves its systematic goal which is to put the event under control. On the other hand, Logistics feeds required and requested resources such as workforce, equipment and material for the system operations and F&A does the accounting of resources as those resources are actually used to execute its given missions. Such JCS utilizes two types of memory: a collective working memory (CWM) can be manifested in the form of shared displays, document or whiteboards used by teams; similarly, collective long-term memory (CLTM) can take forms of past accident reports, procedures and guidelines. Based on this conceptual framework for resilience of emergency operations, five Resilient Performance Factors (RPFs) are suggested to make resilience operational in EMS. Such RPFs are adaptive response, rapidity of recovery, resource utilization, performance stability and team situation awareness. Adaptation is one of the most obvious patterns of resilient performance (Leveson et al., 2006; Rankin, Lundberg, Woltjer, Rollenhagen, & Hollnagel, 2014). Another factor that typifies resilience of any socio- technical system is how quickly or slowly it bounces back from perturbations (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016). In most systems, resources are constrained. Hence, resilience requires the effective and efficient use of resources to varying demands. As such demands persist over time, the system’s performance level tends to diminish. For the EMS to remain resilient, its performance should be maintained in a stable fashion. Finally, EMS is is expected to possess the ability to perceive what is currently taking place, to comprehend what such occurrence actually means, and to anticipate what may happen and decide what to do about it. When this occurs within a team, it is often referred to as team situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; McManus, Seville, Brunsden, & Vargo, 2007). This resilience model for EMS needs validation and many assumptions and simplifications made in this work require further justification. This model will be discussed and validated by using subsequent data collection from Emergency Operations Training Center operated by Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) and will be reported in future publications.

Following its 1992 reorganization, the once scandal-ridden and sclerotic Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) experienced a dramatic turnaround. The agency morphed from a caricature of the ills of bureaucracy into a model of effective federal administration. Politicians who previously blamed the agency for its slow and inefficient response to disasters came to depend on the agency to lend credibility to their own efforts. After the agency’s reorganization, politicians at all levels of government purposefully appeared beside FEMA workers. As recently as 2002, FEMA’s reputation was so strong that the designers of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) included FEMA in it to lend prestige to the nascent department. Unlike other agencies so included, FEMA was allowed to keep its name, confirming the cachet of its brand.

AbstractAs the state of the nation's ability to respond to a radiological event is examined, it has become apparent that both capacity and capability are lacking. Department of Homeland Security National Planning Scenario #11 is designed to address the planning activities for the response to an attack using radiological dispersal devices. The scenario details show that the cleanup activity will take several years, and that there will be between 360000 and 1000000 environmental samples in the first year. Based on existing capacity and capabilities it would take four to six years to analyze the samples generated at the lower end of the sample range.The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been given responsibility for the remediation activities following a radiological event, and has awarded cooperative agreements to several laboratories to start the process of developing capacity and capabilities. The Connecticut Department of Public Health Laboratory (DPHL) was awarded one of the cooperative agreements. The DPHL has started activities to further those goals by investigating and implementing procedures to ensure that samples with activity higher than normal background can be processed safely, as well as implementing more rapid methods for radiochemical analysis. The DPHL already served as the primacy radiochemistry laboratory for several New England states and thus had a solid foundation to build upon. The DPHL has taken a process flow approach in preparing for radiological emergency response and recommends that radioanalytical laboratories that are reviewing their roles in such a response: • Ensure that their Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses allow for appropriate radioisotope types and activities;• Develop procedures and processes to ensure that samples with higher activities can be processed safely, with due regard for sample screening and aliquanting samples;• Provide for enhanced radioanalytical contamination control, with careful consideration of sample flow and breaking the laboratory into zones with controlled access;• Address personnel safety by enhancing training, adding real time dosimetry to exposure monitoring protocols, and reviewing personal protective equipment and hygiene protocols with staff;• Develop plans for spills and decontamination, as well as for increased monitoring of laboratory areas;• Plan for secure sample storage;• Exercise the plan.

Evolving threats, such as Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attacks (CCTAs) and other High-Threat Active Violence Incidents, require a comprehensive “Whole of Community” approach to enhance readiness within the emergency management mission. Engaging all community stakeholders, inclusive of the private sector, public safety organizations, and the health and healthcare communities, is essential for risk reduction by preventing and limiting consequences from such critical incidents. The Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS) is a unique interdisciplinary table-top exercise sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Counterterrorism Center, and is designed to test plans and capabilities surrounding a CCTA. JCTAWS focuses on response integration between and across disciplines and jurisdictions. The workshop stimulates participant identification of best practices and gaps so that plans can be refined and resources realigned to improve response coordination for CCTAs.

Recent and past problems with the NASA shuttle program are illustrative of decisionmaking problems centered at the executive level of knowledge on the organizational pyramid. The poor responses to hurricanes Katrina and Rita by executives at all levels of government, but particularly with regard to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), also bear scrutiny. These catastrophic incidents, beyond the obvious partisan/political differences and the physical and psychological devastation, are demonstrative of management failures in their respective organizations. The author argues that the key to unlocking the conundrum of management failure rests with the fact that multiple knowledges exist in modern organizations like NASA, DHS, and FEMA and the use and development of the knowledge analytic offers new theoretical insights for understanding managerialcrises.

Colleges and universities must be prepared to respond to events that could compromise the safety of any person in a classroom, residence hall, office, or any other campus facility as well as for any event that could jeopardize the continuation of use of any campus facility. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states, “Higher education institutions ... are realizing that improving their campus’ resistance to disaster will not only protect their own lives and those of their students, it will also safeguard their campus’ instruction, research, and public service.” The US Department of Homeland Security, FEMA developed the overarching strategy, the National Response Framework (NRF), for emergency preparedness for “government executives, private-sector and nongovernmental organization leaders.” FEMA and the Department of Education (DOE) developed specific guidelines for emergency preparedness for colleges and universities. This study linked these guidelines to the five principles of the NRF. Most institutions have an emergency preparedness plan, but just how effective are these plans? Do community colleges, state, independent, and proprietary institutions differ in terms of their level of emergency preparedness? The target population for this study is colleges and universities in the United States. This quantitative study measured how aligned the emergency preparedness plans of these colleges and universities are to the recommendations of FEMA and the US DOE, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools. The data suggest that much more needs to be done to bring college and university emergency plans into alignment with the government recommendations. Alignment with the government documents for this sample of US colleges and universities is extremely low for each principle of the NRF.

ABSTRACTHaving sufficient medical countermeasures (MCMs) available for the treatment of acetylcholinesterase-inhibiting nerve agent poisoned patients following a mass chemical exposure is a challenge for communities. After stockpiles containing auto-injectors are exhausted, communities need to be aware of alternative pharmaceutical options. The Department of Homeland Security Chemical Defense Program convened a federal interagency working group consisting of first responders, clinicians, and experts from the fields of medical toxicology, pharmacology, and emergency management. A literature review of pharmaceutical alternatives for treating nerve agent toxicity was performed. Pharmaceuticals that met the federal Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Product Specific Requirements were prioritized. Food and Drug Administration approval for one indication, market availability, and alignment to government procurement strategy were considered. This article summarizes the literature on comparative pharmacokinetics and efficacy against nerve agents (where available) of Food and Drug Administration approved drugs with muscarinic acetylcholine receptor antagonist and gamma-aminobutyric acid receptor agonist effects. This work is intended to serve as a resource of pharmaceutical options that may be available to communities (ie, emergency managers, planners, clinicians, and poison centers) when faced with a mass human exposure to a nerve agent and inadequate supplies of MCMs. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:605-612)

When developing response plans in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident, jurisdictions often fail to conduct the necessary interdisciplinary planning needed to fully address the needs across jurisdictional borders. The Purdue Homeland Security Institute (PHSI) was selected by the City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) in 2010 to lead an effort to address planning across jurisdictional borders during mass evacuations following a catastrophic incident. Specifically, PHSI was chosen to lead the effort in developing a planning and implementation guide for standing up a conceptual Regional Hub Reception Center (RHRC). A major component within the mass evacuation and sheltering continuum, the RHRC is designed to provide evacuees with quick-response mass care and emergency assistance while their other needs are assessed and appropriate shelter locations are identified. The RHRC also provides a central location to leverage governmental, nongovernmental, and private sector resources and is the first point in the evacuation, mass care, and sheltering concept of operations where more comprehensive support (food, shelter, medical, psychological, household pet sheltering, reunification, etc) can be expected. PHSI undertook this lead role working within the Illinois-Indiana-Wisconsin (IL-IN-WI) Combined Statistical Area (CSA) as part of the US Department of Homeland Security Regional Catastrophic Planning Grant Program. Coordinating closely with the City of Chicago OEMC and IL-IN-WI CSA Regional Catastrophic Planning Team, PHSI lead the research effort using resource and capability data compiled from all 17 jurisdictions within the IL-IN-WI CSA and validated the RHRC concept using three tabletop exercises. Upon completion, the PHSI team published the RHRC planning guide complete with procedures and processes that define the roles and responsibilities of government, nongovernment organizations, and private sector for providing RHRC mass care functions and RHRC capability and capacity assessments. This article further examines the potential for using simulation modeling as a cost-effective means to rapidly evaluate any facility for potential use as a RHRC and to measure and maximize RHRC operational efficiency. Using AnyLogic simulation software, PHSI developed a first-ever model of a theoretical RHRC capable of simulating, measuring, and manipulating RHRC operations under specified conditions/ scenarios determined by the emergency management planner. Future simulation modeling research promises to promote the Whole Community Approach to response and recovery by reinforcing interdisciplinary planning, enhancing regional situational awareness, and improving overall jurisdictional coordination and synchronization.

The year 2010 brought an unprecedented public health response to the novel H1N1 influenza pandemic. Included in that response were colleges and universities across the globe. At universities not associated with medical centers, medical directors of student health looked to nursing faculty or nurse practitioner directors of student health for leadership. From the day novel H1N1 was formally declared a public health emergency, Arkansas State University utilized a nurse faculty member with expertise in homeland security as its Incident Commander. A portion of the nurse's time was dedicated to managing the incident. The nurse was positioned to provide guidance and lead the response with an understanding of university structures as well as business and academic continuity. From the beginning, the nurse utilized the Incident Command System to manage the response. Portions of the University's Incident Command structure were activated and Incident Command meetings were held no less than every two weeks. A tabletop exercise was developed specifically for a university setting and to give University officials practice at pandemic management. The nurse's clinical focus and pre-established relationships with disaster response and public health officials allowed critical access to important resources that the University would have otherwise gone without. She guided the University through redefining their pandemic plan, including assisting residence life in establishing alternative housing for sick students. An on-line reporting system was developed that was utilized by faculty, students, staff, and other concerned constituents. A public awareness campaign on the campus was instituted and 1,000 posters were posted around campus encouraging sick students to stay home and/or seek medical care. The World Health Organization, (US) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Department of Education guidelines were monitored and implemented. Two mass-immunization clinics were held on the campus with > 7,000 immunizations provided.

This article discusses the implementation and use of Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) at The University of Texas at Dallas in the Office of Strategic Planning and Analysis (OSPA). Many institutional research offices primarily focus on traditional statistical and analytical tools to provide data for assessing, developing, or modifying institutional policies. However, by adding an additional facet such as location, more in depth analysis can be provided on a wide array of research topics. The article focuses on how the Office of Strategic Planning and Analysis utilizes Geospatial Information Systems (GIS) for a wide array of tasks. GIS is used currently by the department for facility information, tracking logistics through the university, benchmarking and for operational information for the university. In addition GIS can be used for admissions and recruiting, alumni giving, emergency management as well as homeland security purposes. In this article the requirements for using GIS in an institutional research or strategic planning office is addressed as well as some pitfalls and advantages to using such applications to perform institutional research in addition to providing data that can be used for institutional operations.

The way this nation prepares for and responds to domestic incidents is about to change. It won't be an abrupt change; best practices that have been developed over the years are part of this new comprehensive national approach to incident management known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS). But it will change—and for the better. Developed by the Department of Homeland Security and issued in March 2004, the NIMS will enable responders at all jurisdictional levels and across all disciplines to work together more effectively and efficiently. Beginning in FY 2006, federal funding for state, local and tribal preparedness grants will be tied to compliance with the NIMS. One of the most important ‘best practices’ that has been incorporated into the NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS), a standard, on-scene, all-hazards incident management system already in use by firefighters, hazardous materials teams, rescuers and emergency medical teams. The ICS has been established by the NIMS as the standardized incident organizational structure for the management of all incidents. Although many agencies now use various forms of ICS, there is considerable uncertainty about NIMS ICS and the impact it will have on systems and processes currently in place. These are important questions because one of the FY 2005 requirements for implementing NIMS is “institutionalizing the use of ICS, across the entire response system.” This paper is intended to provide an historical perspective on the development of ICS, explain how NIMS ICS works, describe how it is different from previous systems, and discuss the future of NIMS ICS training.

In the wake of recent disasters including September 11, 2001, and the 2005 hurricane season, regional planning has become a high priority. Despite the 2007 release of the National Preparedness Guidelines, improving regional collaboration has continued to be a significant challenge and remains immeasurable. Regional operational plans are ineffective during disasters because of the differing goals of the jurisdictions within that region. It is evident that regions should be formed naturally based on how jurisdictions usually interact with each other. Regional planning is ineffective today because the federal funding process does not promote regional planning as a main goal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identified Expanding Regional Collaboration as a National Priority; however, DHS does not effectively target this priority with grant money. To accomplish true regional collaboration, it is important to remember that all disasters are local. The federal government has become highly reactionary to major incidents and has forgotten this basic truth. Federal policies are built from the top down and do not effectively facilitate the traditional decentralized system of emergency management. The overhaul of existing systems to conform with national policies has resulted in less effective planning and disaster response. Regional planning needs to incorporate local jurisdictions and define their roles and processes. Local operational plans must be developed in concert with each other. Plans created for the region should be regional coordination plans. Additionally, the grant money must be tied closer to the National Priority of Expanding Regional Cooperation.

ABSTRACT 2017-205 Catastrophic events like Deepwater Horizon, Exxon Valdez, major hurricanes, and other such anomalies have a tendency to overwhelm the initial crisis management leadership due to the chaotic nature of the event. The inability to quickly and accurately make critical assessments about the magnitude and complexity of the emerging catastrophe can spell disaster for crisis managers long before the response ever truly takes shape. This paper argues for the application of metacognitive models for sense and decision-making. Rather than providing tools and checklists as a recipe for success, this paper endeavors to provide awareness of the cognitive processes and heuristics that tend to emerge in crises including major oil spills, making emergency managers aware of their existence and potential impacts. Awareness, we argue, leads to recognition and self-awareness of key behavioral patterns and biases. The skill of metacognition—thinking about thinking—is what we endeavor to build through this work. Using a literature review and cogent application to oil spill response, this paper reviews contemporary theories on metacognition and sense-making, as well as concepts of behavioral bias and risk perception in catastrophic environments. When catastrophe occurs—and history has proven they will—the incident itself and the external pressures of its perceived management arguably emerge simultaneously, but not necessarily in tandem with one another. Previous spills have demonstrated how a mismanaged incident can result in an unwieldy and caustic confluence of external forces. This paper provides an awareness of biases that lead to mismanagement and apply for the first time a summary of concepts of sense-making and metacognition to major oil spill response. The views and ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Coast Guard or Department of Homeland Security.

The Marine Pollution Program of NOAA/NESDIS's Satellite Analysis Branch (SAB) consists of manual detection and mapping of oil slicks through the use of available moderate to high resolution visible imagery such as MODIS (NASA), Landsat-7 (USGS) and SPOT-5 (CNES). Prior to 2012, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery from ENVISAT (ESA) was acquired in addition to visible imagery for satellite-based oil spill detection. Frequently oil spills are small in size and short in duration, but there have been times when events have continued to persist for weeks, months and even years. Located approximately 10 miles southeast of the Mississippi River Delta in the Gulf of Mexico resides the former location of the now destroyed Taylor Energy oil rig. This platform was damaged in 2004 during the passage of Hurricane Ivan and since then small surface oil slicks and sheens have been observed in satellite imagery originated from the site. Surface slicks or sheens associated with this source are frequently detected in satellite imagery analysis (>110 images since August 2010). Slicks are typically aligned along the isobaths (southwest to northeast) with typical dimensions of 0.5–2 km by 10–30 km varying with wind conditions (i.e. longer slicks tend to be more visible in satellite under winds generally <10 kts). The distribution of slick detection has two peaks, one in May with secondary maxima in September. This is primarily due to the advantage of having sun-glint, which enhances the ability for surface slick detection during the months from April to October in the Gulf of Mexico. On several occasions overflight reports have confirmed the presence of oil sheens at this location, matching very well with satellite analyzed maps. Geographic Information System (GIS) shapefiles and Keyhole Markup Language (KML) files depicting the location of the observed oil from satellites are disseminated to NOAA's National Ocean Service (NOS) Emergency Response Division (ERD), U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and several local and state agencies. NOS/ERD uses these analyses in their surface oil trajectory models in an effort to improve the model's performance.

Abstract This article presents and discusses, in the new context of COVID-19, findings from a tabletop exercise on response and resilience in the ongoing opioid crisis in Pennsylvania. The exercise was organized by [identifying information removed] and held at the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), in further collaboration with the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, and with the participation of several additional agencies and institutions. It addressed first-responder and whole-community response and resilience to the ongoing opioid crisis. More than 50 experts participated in the one-day program that involved state and local agencies, first-responder organizations, as well as academia in a discussion about effectuating comprehensive response to overdose incidents. Participant experts represented a wide array of backgrounds, including state and local law enforcement agencies; emergency medical technicians; public health and health care professionals; and scholars from the fields of law, security studies, public policy, and public health, among other relevant areas. Participants addressed specific challenges, including resource sharing among responders; capacity-building for long-term recovery; effective integration of non-traditional partners, such as spontaneous volunteers and donors; and public education and outreach to improve prevention. The exercise aimed to strengthen the whole-community approach to emergency response.

Natural disasters such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes create special challenges for people with disabilities, their caregivers, and their families. People with disabilities need to have the same basic disaster supply kit as everyone else. Basic supply lists are available from a number of sources, but the list available at the American Red Cross web site serves as the model (http://www.redcross.org/disaster/safety/fds-all.pdf). People with disabilities may have special needs that go beyond the basic supplies list. The tips in this document were recommended by the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency for people with disabilities. This document is FCS9215, one of a series of the Family Youth and Community Sciences Department, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida. Original publication date: August 2005. FCS9215/FY750: Preparing for a Disaster: Strategies for Older Adults (ufl.edu)

Abstract Introduction In May 2016, the Texas Department of State Health Services Public Health Region 7, in partnership with the local health departments in their region, designed and conducted a full-scale exercise (FSE) with a real-time epidemiologic phase leading to full-scale medical countermeasures distribution. Methods The exercise was designed to be a plausible scenario with a biologic agent that occurs naturally in Texas, Bacillus anthracis, and align with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) recommendations. After Action Reports (AAR) were reviewed and key informant interviews were conducted and content analyzed for themes through inductive coding. Results Themes identified include: benefits to exercising epidemiology’s role in public health preparedness; identification of gaps in real-time communication between public health and epidemiology; need to incorporate epidemiology into future exercises; importance of exercising realistic epidemiology scenarios in real-time; and identification of strengths and weakness in exercise coordination and logistics. Conclusion There is value in exercising epidemiology capabilities in real-time and in an operational full-scale context. Fully incorporating epidemiology into public health emergency preparedness exercises is one way to strengthen the relationship between these two disciplines and ensure well-coordinated rapid responses to public health threats.

ObjectiveThe purpose of this project is to demonstrate the progress in development of a standardized public health (PH) emergency preparedness and response data ontology (terminology) through collaboration between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Division of Emergency Operations (DEO), and the Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC) system.IntroductionThe U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Incident Management System (NIMS) establishes a common framework and common terminology that allows diverse incident management and support organizations to work together across a wide variety of functions and hazard scenarios1. Using common terminology helps avoid confusion and enhances interoperability, particularly in fast-moving public health (PH) emergency responses. In addition, common terminology allows diverse incident management and support organizations to work together across a wide variety of functions and scenarios1. LOINC is one of a suite of designated standards for the electronic exchange of public health and clinical information. Implementation of LOINC facilitates improvement of semantic interoperability, including unified terminology2. More than 68,100 registered users from 172 countries use LOINC to move interoperable data seamlessly between systems3. The CDC Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) leads development of standardized PH emergency preparedness and response terminology to improve effective and interoperable communications between national and international partners. Realizing the scale of LOINC support and implementation across the global public health arena, CDC DEO collaborates with LOINC to further enhance and harmonize the current PH emergency response terminology and to attain critical PH emergency management and preparedness and response requirements.MethodsDEO analyzed 87,863 LOINC terms that were included in LOINC version 2.64, released on 06/15/20183. Access to this LOINC version was obtained through the Regenstrief LOINC Mapping Assistant (RELMA). RELMA is a Windows-based LOINC utility developed by the Regenstrief Institute (Indiapolis, USA) for searching the LOINC database and mapping local codes to LOINC codes4. The relevance of LOINC terminology to PH emergency preparedness and response was assessed through evaluating existing LOINC terminology against terminology specified by the World Health Organization PH Emergency Operation Centers (EOC). The following functions were evaluated: 1) Managing and Commanding; 2) Operating; 3) Planning/Intelligence; 4) Logistics and 5) Finance/Administration5. LOINC terminology was also evaluated against the CDC PH EOC Minimum Data Set (MDS)6 that contains 315 standardized terms. Analysis of fully specified LOINC terms was conducted through assessment of such LOINC term parts (attributes) as the code, name (component), system, method and class. Recommendations of gaps and enhancements were coordinated with LOINC management for inclusion of the new terminology in the release of version 2.65 .ResultsA new LOINC method, “CDC.EOC”, is under development. Currently, the “emergency management incident” terminology presented by LOINC is limited by such characteristics as event type, event location and event name and requires amplification regarding to PH operations (i.e., communication, logistics etc.).As a result of this investigation, emergency management terms are now being classified according to the type of incident or event (i.e., hurricane, outbreak, etc.) under LOINC code 80394-0. Similarly laboratory and clinical terms are being classified under a provisional LOINC code (89724-9). Two panels were created: 1) The emergency medical systems from the National Emergency Medical Services Information System (NEMSIS) was added under the NEMSIS.Panel (n= 177 terms) and 2) the Data Elements for Emergency Departments Systems (DEEDS) panel (n = 152 terms) was added with two subpanels: Attach.ED and Panel.ED.Assessing existing LOINC taxonomy and codification, DEO is working with the LOINC management team on evaluating additional options for reconciliation the PH emergency preparedness and response common information exchange reference model and LOINC standard. This process aims to further improve semantic interoperability of PH emergency preparedness and response information.ConclusionsThe LOINC terminology standardization is essential for improving PH preparedness and response data exchange and semantic interoperability. Collaboration with the Regenstrief Institute (LOINC) allows CDC to meet the terminology needs of PH emergency management and defines new opportunities for reconciliation data exchange between NIMS partners. This collaborative effort incorporates critically needed PH emergency and preparedness terminology and hierarchical structure in the LOINC standard.References1.FEMA National Incident Management System. Third Edition, October 2017. At: https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_NIMS_2017.pdf2. US National Library of Medicine. Logical Observation Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC). At: https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/loinc_main.html3. LOINC. The international standard for identifying health measurements, observations, and documents. At: https://loinc.org/4. RELMA-the Reginstrief Institute LOINC Mapping Assistant. At: https://loinc.org/relma/5.WHO. Framework for a Public Health Emergency Operations Centre. Interim document. November, 2015. At: http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241565134_eng/en/6. CDC. Public Health Information Network Vocabulary Access and Distribution System (PHIN VADS). Minimum Data Set for PH Emergency Operations Center. At: https://phinvads.cdc.gov/vads/SearchVocab.action

ObjectiveAn important part of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center’s (NBIC) mission is collaboration with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments for the purpose of enhancing early warning, shared situational awareness, and related decision support for infectious disease events. Several such collaborations occurred at multiple jurisdictional levels during the recent Zika epidemic in the Americas and the associated microcephaly and other neurological disorders Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC). The collaborations and their known outcomes from this major infectious disease event are described below, and NBIC stands ready to support similar efforts for future events.IntroductionNBIC is charged with enhancing the capability of the Federal Government to enable early warning and shared situational awareness of acute biological events to support better decisions through rapid identification, characterization, localization, and tracking. A key aspect of this mission is the requirement to integrate and collaborate with federal and, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government agencies.NBIC develops and disseminates a variety of products to its stakeholders, including daily reports, ad-hoc reports, analytic collaborations, and leadership briefings upon request. Stakeholders interact with and utilize NBIC’s products in different ways, depending on the mission and jurisdiction involved.Specific collaborations with individual stakeholders are most frequent and evident during major infectious disease events, such as the recent Zika epidemic in the Americas and the associated microcephaly and other neurological disorders PHEIC. Collaborative efforts and known outcomes among varying levels of government are described in detail below in order to highlight NBIC’s integration focus and capabilities in this role.MethodsNBIC conducted a thorough review of data gathered, reports written, briefings delivered, and both direct and indirect collaborations completed during the Zika epidemic period from late April 2015 – March 2017. This review was completed with the intent to document collaborative efforts, feedback, and outcomes with multiple jurisdictions.ResultsBetween April 2015 and March 2017, NBIC worked both directly and indirectly with several of its stakeholders to describe and clarify the Zika event as it unfolded in the Americas. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NBIC provided briefings for department leadership, including the DHS Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the Office of Health Affairs), and communicated with other DHS components, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Coast Guard, to ensure the DHS workforce received effective messaging about Zika infection risks and protections.For its federal partners, NBIC coordinated and responded to requests for information about Zika across several departments, including the Departments of Defense, State, and Health and Human Services (HHS). In addition, NBIC analysts collected, structured, and provided information about imported and locally-acquired cases described in open source reporting to the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) for inclusion as a layer on the GeoHealth Platform interactive map before Zika reporting was added to the National Notifiable Disease System. Inclusion of this map layer on ASPR’s website was NBIC’s first public facing collaboration effort. Finally, NBIC coordinated the incorporation of maps and diagrams from ASPR and DOD’s Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch in NBIC products to broaden the distribution of key information.Outside of the federal government, NBIC received feedback from the Texas Department of State Health Services that a September 2016 NBIC Daily Monitoring List with a map depicting Zika cases near the border of Mexico and Texas, as well as the locations of border crossings, filled a gap in its understanding of the number and distribution of cases in Mexico. State health officials used this information to help target public and clinician outreach activities in Texas. In addition to the regular reports disseminated to the SLTT community, NBIC supported monthly calls for the community to provide infectious disease event updates, including Zika updates, and responded to questions from the community regarding the event and federal government response efforts.ConclusionsMajor global or regional infectious disease events that have a direct or potential impact on the health of U.S. citizens require substantial collaboration efforts across multiple jurisdictions. These events foster communication and coordination between organizations toward the common goal of serving the American people and keeping them safe and healthy. The Zika epidemic in the Americas and the associated microcephaly/neurological disorders PHEIC is an example of such an event, and NBIC supported its partners and the multiple jurisdictions they serve, as evidenced by the results presented. NBIC continues to expand its network and support capabilities, and is available to serve as integrators for both major and lesser infectious disease events of concern to their stakeholders.

Introduction Most developed countries, including Australia, have a strong focus on national, state and local strategies for emergency management and response in the face of disasters and crises. This framework can include coping with catastrophic dislocation, service disruption, injury or loss of life in the face of natural disasters such as major fires, floods, earthquakes or other large-impact natural events, as well as dealing with similar catastrophes resulting from human actions such as bombs, biological agents, cyber-attacks targeting essential services such as communications networks, or other crises affecting large populations. Emergency management frameworks for crisis and disaster response are distinguished by their focus on the domestic context for such events; that is, how to manage and assist the ways in which civilian populations, who are for the most part inexperienced and untrained in dealing with crises and disasters, are able to respond and behave in such situations so as to minimise the impacts of a catastrophic event. Even in countries like Australia that demonstrate a strong public commitment to cultural pluralism and social cohesion, ethno-cultural diversity can be seen as a risk or threat to national security and values at times of political, natural, economic and/or social tensions and crises. Australian government policymakers have recently focused, with increasing intensity, on “community resilience” as a key element in countering extremism and enhancing emergency preparedness and response. In some sense, this is the result of a tacit acknowledgement by government agencies that there are limits to what they can do for domestic communities should such a catastrophic event occur, and accordingly, the focus in recent times has shifted to how governments can best help people to help themselves in such situations, a key element of the contemporary “resilience” approach. Yet despite the robustly multicultural nature of Australian society, explicit engagement with Australia’s cultural diversity flickers only fleetingly on this agenda, which continues to pursue approaches to community resilience in the absence of understandings about how these terms and formations may themselves need to be diversified to maximise engagement by all citizens in a multicultural polity. There have been some recent efforts in Australia to move in this direction, for example the Australian Emergency Management Institute (AEMI)’s recent suite of projects with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities (2006-2010) and the current Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee-supported project on “Harnessing Resilience Capital in Culturally Diverse Communities to Counter Violent Extremism” (Grossman and Tahiri), which I discuss in a longer forthcoming version of this essay (Grossman). Yet the understanding of ethno-cultural identity and difference that underlies much policy thinking on resilience remains problematic for the way in which it invests in a view of the cultural dimensions of community resilience as relic rather than resource – valorising the preservation of and respect for cultural norms and traditions, but silent on what different ethno-cultural communities might contribute toward expanded definitions of both “community” and “resilience” by virtue of the transformative potential and existing cultural capital they bring with them into new national and also translocal settings. For example, a primary conclusion of the joint program between AEMI and the Australian Multicultural Commission is that CALD communities are largely “vulnerable” in the context of disasters and emergency management and need to be better integrated into majority-culture models of theorising and embedding community resilience. This focus on stronger national integration and the “vulnerability” of culturally diverse ethno-cultural communities in the Australian context echoes the work of scholars beyond Australia such as McGhee, Mouritsen (Reflections, Citizenship) and Joppke. They argue that the “civic turn” in debates around resurgent contemporary nationalism and multicultural immigration policies privileges civic integration over genuine two-way multiculturalism. This approach sidesteps the transculturational (Ortiz; Welsch; Mignolo; Bennesaieh; Robins; Stein) aspects of contemporary social identities and exchange by paying lip-service to cultural diversity while affirming a neo-liberal construct of civic values and principles as a universalising goal of Western democratic states within a global market economy. It also suggests a superficial tribute to cultural diversity that does not embed diversity comprehensively at the levels of either conceptualising or resourcing different elements of Australian transcultural communities within the generalised framework of “community resilience.” And by emphasising cultural difference as vulnerability rather than as resource or asset, it fails to acknowledge the varieties of resilience capital that many culturally diverse individuals and communities may bring with them when they resettle in new environments, by ignoring the question of what “resilience” actually means to those from culturally diverse communities. In so doing, it also avoids the critical task of incorporating intercultural definitional diversity around the concepts of both “community” and “resilience” used to promote social cohesion and the capacity to recover from disasters and crises. How we might do differently in thinking about the broader challenges for multiculturalism itself as a resilient transnational concept and practice? The Concept of Resilience The meanings of resilience vary by disciplinary perspective. While there is no universally accepted definition of the concept, it is widely acknowledged that resilience refers to the capacity of an individual to do well in spite of exposure to acute trauma or sustained adversity (Liebenberg 219). Originating in the Latin word resilio, meaning ‘to jump back’, there is general consensus that resilience pertains to an individual’s, community’s or system’s ability to adapt to and ‘bounce back’ from a disruptive event (Mohaupt 63, Longstaff et al. 3). Over the past decade there has been a dramatic rise in interest in the clinical, community and family sciences concerning resilience to a broad range of adversities (Weine 62). While debate continues over which discipline can be credited with first employing resilience as a concept, Mohaupt argues that most of the literature on resilience cites social psychology and psychiatry as the origin for the concept beginning in the mid-20th century. The pioneer researchers of what became known as resilience research studied the impact on children living in dysfunctional families. For example, the findings of work by Garmezy, Werner and Smith and Rutter showed that about one third of children in these studies were coping very well despite considerable adversities and traumas. In asking what it was that prevented the children in their research from being negatively influenced by their home environments, such research provided the basis for future research on resilience. Such work was also ground-breaking for identifying the so-called ‘protective factors’ or resources that individuals can operationalise when dealing with adversity. In essence, protective factors are those conditions in the individual that protect them from the risk of dysfunction and enable recovery from trauma. They mitigate the effects of stressors or risk factors, that is, those conditions that predispose one to harm (Hajek 15). Protective factors include the inborn traits or qualities within an individual, those defining an individual’s environment, and also the interaction between the two. Together, these factors give people the strength, skills and motivation to cope in difficult situations and re-establish (a version of) ‘normal’ life (Gunnestad). Identifying protective factors is important in terms of understanding the particular resources a given sociocultural group has at its disposal, but it is also vital to consider the interconnections between various protective mechanisms, how they might influence each other, and to what degree. An individual, for instance, might display resilience or adaptive functioning in a particular domain (e.g. emotional functioning) but experience significant deficits in another (e.g. academic achievement) (Hunter 2). It is also essential to scrutinise how the interaction between protective factors and risk factors creates patterns of resilience. Finally, a comprehensive understanding of the interrelated nature of protective mechanisms and risk factors is imperative for designing effective interventions and tailored preventive strategies (Weine 65). In short, contemporary thinking about resilience suggests it is neither entirely personal nor strictly social, but an interactive and iterative combination of the two. It is a quality of the environment as much as the individual. For Ungar, resilience is the complex entanglements between “individuals and their social ecologies [that] will determine the degree of positive outcomes experienced” (3). Thinking about resilience as context-dependent is important because research that is too trait-based or actor-centred risks ignoring any structural or institutional forces. A more ecological interpretation of resilience, one that takes into a person’s context and environment into account, is vital in order to avoid blaming the victim for any hardships they face, or relieving state and institutional structures from their responsibilities in addressing social adversity, which can “emphasise self-help in line with a neo-conservative agenda instead of stimulating state responsibility” (Mohaupt 67). Nevertheless, Ungar posits that a coherent definition of resilience has yet to be developed that adequately ‘captures the dual focus of the individual and the individual’s social ecology and how the two must both be accounted for when determining the criteria for judging outcomes and discerning processes associated with resilience’ (7). Recent resilience research has consequently prompted a shift away from vulnerability towards protective processes — a shift that highlights the sustained capabilities of individuals and communities under threat or at risk. Locating ‘Culture’ in the Literature on Resilience However, an understanding of the role of culture has remained elusive or marginalised within this trend; there has been comparatively little sustained investigation into the applicability of resilience constructs to non-western cultures, or how the resources available for survival might differ from those accessible to western populations (Ungar 4). As such, a growing body of researchers is calling for more rigorous inquiry into culturally determined outcomes that might be associated with resilience in non-western or multicultural cultures and contexts, for example where Indigenous and minority immigrant communities live side by side with their ‘mainstream’ neighbours in western settings (Ungar 2). ‘Cultural resilience’ considers the role that cultural background plays in determining the ability of individuals and communities to be resilient in the face of adversity. For Clauss-Ehlers, the term describes the degree to which the strengths of one’s culture promote the development of coping (198). Culturally-focused resilience suggests that people can manage and overcome stress and trauma based not on individual characteristics alone, but also from the support of broader sociocultural factors (culture, cultural values, language, customs, norms) (Clauss-Ehlers 324). The innate cultural strengths of a culture may or may not differ from the strengths of other cultures; the emphasis here is not so much comparatively inter-cultural as intensively intra-cultural (VanBreda 215). A culturally focused resilience model thus involves “a dynamic, interactive process in which the individual negotiates stress through a combination of character traits, cultural background, cultural values, and facilitating factors in the sociocultural environment” (Clauss-Ehlers 199). In understanding ways of ‘coping and hoping, surviving and thriving’, it is thus crucial to consider how culturally and linguistically diverse minorities navigate the cultural understandings and assumptions of both their countries of origin and those of their current domicile (Ungar 12). Gunnestad claims that people who master the rules and norms of their new culture without abandoning their own language, values and social support are more resilient than those who tenaciously maintain their own culture at the expense of adjusting to their new environment. They are also more resilient than those who forego their own culture and assimilate with the host society (14). Accordingly, if the combination of both valuing one’s culture as well as learning about the culture of the new system produces greater resilience and adaptive capacities, serious problems can arise when a majority tries to acculturate a minority to the mainstream by taking away or not recognising important parts of the minority culture. In terms of resilience, if cultural factors are denied or diminished in accounting for and strengthening resilience – in other words, if people are stripped of what they possess by way of resilience built through cultural knowledge, disposition and networks – they do in fact become vulnerable, because ‘they do not automatically gain those cultural strengths that the majority has acquired over generations’ (Gunnestad 14). Mobilising ‘Culture’ in Australian Approaches to Community Resilience The realpolitik of how concepts of resilience and culture are mobilised is highly relevant here. As noted above, when ethnocultural difference is positioned as a risk or a threat to national identity, security and values, this is precisely the moment when vigorously, even aggressively, nationalised definitions of ‘community’ and ‘identity’ that minoritise or disavow cultural diversities come to the fore in public discourse. The Australian evocation of nationalism and national identity, particularly in the way it has framed policy discussion on managing national responses to disasters and threats, has arguably been more muted than some of the European hysteria witnessed recently around cultural diversity and national life. Yet we still struggle with the idea that newcomers to Australia might fall on the surplus rather than the deficit side of the ledger when it comes to identifying and harnessing resilience capital. A brief example of this trend is explored here. From 2006 to 2010, the Australian Emergency Management Institute embarked on an ambitious government-funded four-year program devoted to strengthening community resilience in relation to disasters with specific reference to engaging CALD communities across Australia. The program, Inclusive Emergency Management with CALD Communities, was part of a wider Australian National Action Plan to Build Social Cohesion, Harmony and Security in the wake of the London terrorist bombings in July 2005. Involving CALD community organisations as well as various emergency and disaster management agencies, the program ran various workshops and agency-community partnership pilots, developed national school education resources, and commissioned an evaluation of the program’s effectiveness (Farrow et al.). While my critique here is certainly not aimed at emergency management or disaster response agencies and personnel themselves – dedicated professionals who often achieve remarkable results in emergency and disaster response under extraordinarily difficult circumstances – it is nevertheless important to highlight how the assumptions underlying elements of AEMI’s experience and outcomes reflect the persistent ways in which ethnocultural diversity is rendered as a problem to be surmounted or a liability to be redressed, rather than as an asset to be built upon or a resource to be valued and mobilised. AEMI’s explicit effort to engage with CALD communities in building overall community resilience was important in its tacit acknowledgement that emergency and disaster services were (and often remain) under-resourced and under-prepared in dealing with the complexities of cultural diversity in emergency situations. Despite these good intentions, however, while the program produced some positive outcomes and contributed to crucial relationship building between CALD communities and emergency services within various jurisdictions, it also continued to frame the challenge of working with cultural diversity as a problem of increased vulnerability during disasters for recently arrived and refugee background CALD individuals and communities. This highlights a common feature in community resilience-building initiatives, which is to focus on those who are already ‘robust’ versus those who are ‘vulnerable’ in relation to resilience indicators, and whose needs may require different or additional resources in order to be met. At one level, this is a pragmatic resourcing issue: national agencies understandably want to put their people, energy and dollars where they are most needed in pursuit of a steady-state unified national response at times of crisis. Nor should it be argued that at least some CALD groups, particularly those from new arrival and refugee communities, are not vulnerable in at least some of the ways and for some of the reasons suggested in the program evaluation. However, the consistent focus on CALD communities as ‘vulnerable’ and ‘in need’ is problematic, as well as partial. It casts members of these communities as structurally and inherently less able and less resilient in the context of disasters and emergencies: in some sense, as those who, already ‘victims’ of chronic social deficits such as low English proficiency, social isolation and a mysterious unidentified set of ‘cultural factors’, can become doubly victimised in acute crisis and disaster scenarios. In what is by now a familiar trope, the description of CALD communities as ‘vulnerable’ precludes asking questions about what they do have, what they do know, and what they do or can contribute to how we respond to disaster and emergency events in our communities. A more profound problem in this sphere revolves around working out how best to engage CALD communities and individuals within existing approaches to disaster and emergency preparedness and response. This reflects a fundamental but unavoidable limitation of disaster preparedness models: they are innately spatially and geographically bounded, and consequently understand ‘communities’ in these terms, rather than expanding definitions of ‘community’ to include the dimensions of community-as-social-relations. While some good engagement outcomes were achieved locally around cross-cultural knowledge for emergency services workers, the AEMI program fell short of asking some of the harder questions about how emergency and disaster service scaffolding and resilience-building approaches might themselves need to change or transform, using a cross-cutting model of ‘communities’ as both geographic places and multicultural spaces (Bartowiak-Théron and Crehan) in order to be more effective in national scenarios in which cultural diversity should be taken for granted. Toward Acknowledgement of Resilience Capital Most significantly, the AEMI program did not produce any recognition of the ways in which CALD communities already possess resilience capital, or consider how this might be drawn on in formulating stronger community initiatives around disaster and threats preparedness for the future. Of course, not all individuals within such communities, nor all communities across varying circumstances, will demonstrate resilience, and we need to be careful of either overgeneralising or romanticising the kinds and degrees of ‘resilience capital’ that may exist within them. Nevertheless, at least some have developed ways of withstanding crises and adapting to new conditions of living. This is particularly so in connection with individual and group behaviours around resource sharing, care-giving and social responsibility under adverse circumstances (Grossman and Tahiri) – all of which are directly relevant to emergency and disaster response. While some of these resilient behaviours may have been nurtured or enhanced by particular experiences and environments, they can, as the discussion of recent literature above suggests, also be rooted more deeply in cultural norms, habits and beliefs. Whatever their origins, for culturally diverse societies to achieve genuine resilience in the face of both natural and human-made disasters, it is critical to call on the ‘social memory’ (Folke et al.) of communities faced with responding to emergencies and crises. Such wellsprings of social memory ‘come from the diversity of individuals and institutions that draw on reservoirs of practices, knowledge, values, and worldviews and is crucial for preparing the system for change, building resilience, and for coping with surprise’ (Adger et al.). Consequently, if we accept the challenge of mapping an approach to cultural diversity as resource rather than relic into our thinking around strengthening community resilience, there are significant gains to be made. For a whole range of reasons, no diversity-sensitive model or measure of resilience should invest in static understandings of ethnicities and cultures; all around the world, ethnocultural identities and communities are in a constant and sometimes accelerated state of dynamism, reconfiguration and flux. But to ignore the resilience capital and potential protective factors that ethnocultural diversity can offer to the strengthening of community resilience more broadly is to miss important opportunities that can help suture the existing disconnects between proactive approaches to intercultural connectedness and social inclusion on the one hand, and reactive approaches to threats, national security and disaster response on the other, undermining the effort to advance effectively on either front. This means that dominant social institutions and structures must be willing to contemplate their own transformation as the result of transcultural engagement, rather than merely insisting, as is often the case, that ‘other’ cultures and communities conform to existing hegemonic paradigms of being and of living. In many ways, this is the most critical step of all. A resilience model and strategy that questions its own culturally informed yet taken-for-granted assumptions and premises, goes out into communities to test and refine these, and returns to redesign its approach based on the new knowledge it acquires, would reflect genuine progress toward an effective transculturational approach to community resilience in culturally diverse contexts.References Adger, W. Neil, Terry P. Hughes, Carl Folke, Stephen R. Carpenter and Johan Rockström. “Social-Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters.” Science 309.5737 (2005): 1036-1039. ‹http://www.sciencemag.org/content/309/5737/1036.full> Bartowiak-Théron, Isabelle, and Anna Corbo Crehan. “The Changing Nature of Communities: Implications for Police and Community Policing.” Community Policing in Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) Reports, Research and Policy Series 111 (2010): 8-15. Benessaieh, Afef. “Multiculturalism, Interculturality, Transculturality.” Ed. A. Benessaieh. Transcultural Americas/Ameriques Transculturelles. Ottawa: U of Ottawa Press/Les Presses de l’Unversite d’Ottawa, 2010. 11-38. Clauss-Ehlers, Caroline S. “Sociocultural Factors, Resilience and Coping: Support for a Culturally Sensitive Measure of Resilience.” Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology 29 (2008): 197-212. Clauss-Ehlers, Caroline S. “Cultural Resilience.” Encyclopedia of Cross-Cultural School Psychology. Ed. C. S. Clauss-Ehlers. 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Diversifying Australian Approaches to Community Resilience and Cultural Difference”. Global Perspectives on Multiculturalism in the 21st Century. Eds. B. E. de B’beri and F. Mansouri. London: Routledge, 2014. Grossman, Michele, and Hussein Tahiri. Harnessing Resilience Capital in Culturally Diverse Communities to Counter Violent Extremism. Canberra: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, forthcoming 2014. Grossman, Michele. “Cultural Resilience and Strengthening Communities”. Safeguarding Australia Summit, Canberra. 23 Sep. 2010. ‹http://www.safeguardingaustraliasummit.org.au/uploader/resources/Michele_Grossman.pdf>. Gunnestad, Arve. “Resilience in a Cross-Cultural Perspective: How Resilience Is Generated in Different Cultures.” Journal of Intercultural Communication 11 (2006). ‹http://www.immi.se/intercultural/nr11/gunnestad.htm>. Hajek, Lisa J. “Belonging and Resilience: A Phenomenological Study.” Unpublished Master of Science thesis, U of Wisconsin-Stout. 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Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton U P, 2000. Mohaupt, Sarah. “Review Article: Resilience and Social Exclusion.” Social Policy and Society 8 (2009): 63-71.Mouritsen, Per. "The Culture of Citizenship: A Reflection on Civic Integration in Europe." Ed. R. Zapata-Barrero. Citizenship Policies in the Age of Diversity: Europe at the Crossroad." Barcelona: CIDOB Foundation, 2009: 23-35. Mouritsen, Per. “Political Responses to Cultural Conflict: Reflections on the Ambiguities of the Civic Turn.” Ed. P. Mouritsen and K.E. Jørgensen. Constituting Communities. Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict, London: Palgrave, 2008. 1-30. Ortiz, Fernando. Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar. Trans. Harriet de Onís. Intr. Fernando Coronil and Bronislaw Malinowski. Durham, NC: Duke U P, 1995 [1940]. Robins, Kevin. 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NotesThe concept of ‘resilience capital’ I offer here is in line with one strand of contemporary theorising around resilience – that of resilience as social or socio-ecological capital – but moves beyond the idea of enhancing general social connectedness and community cohesion by emphasising the ways in which culturally diverse communities may already be robustly networked and resourceful within micro-communal settings, with new resources and knowledge both to draw on and to offer other communities or the ‘national community’ at large. In effect, ‘resilience capital’ speaks to the importance of finding ‘the communities within the community’ (Bartowiak-Théron and Crehan 11) and recognising their capacity to contribute to broad-scale resilience and recovery.I am indebted for the discussion of the literature on resilience here to Dr Peta Stephenson, Centre for Cultural Diversity and Wellbeing, Victoria University, who is working on a related project (M. Grossman and H. Tahiri, Harnessing Resilience Capital in Culturally Diverse Communities to Counter Violent Extremism, forthcoming 2014).