To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Constitution de sole.
Journal articles on the topic 'Constitution de sole'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Constitution de sole.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Kowalik-Bańczyk, Krystyna. "Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law." German Law Journal 6, no. 10 (October 1, 2005): 1355–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s207183220001436x.
Full textAbstract:
Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.
2
Крусян, А. Р. "КОНСТИТУЦІЙНИЙ СУД УКРАЇНИ." Наукові праці Національного університету “Одеська юридична академія” 13 (May 14, 2019): 22–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.32837/npnuola.v13i0.249.
Full textAbstract:
Стаття присвячена розгляду питань щодо удосконалення конституційно-правового регулювання порядку організації та діяльності Конституційного Суду України. Доводиться необхідність внесення змін до Конституції України та Закону України «Про Конституційний Суд України» з метою підвищення ефективності функціонування єдиного органу конституційної юрисдикції в Україні, що сприятиме посиленню дієвості механізмів охорони Конституції України, забезпеченню конституційної законності, захисту прав і свобод людини.
The article is devoted to the issues of improvement of the constitutional and legal regulation as to the organization and activities of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The article provides the necessity of amending the Constitution of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine «On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine» in order to increase the efficiency of the sole body of constitutional jurisdiction in Ukraine, which will enhance the effectiveness of mechanisms of the Constitution protection, ensuring the constitutional legality, protection of human rights and freedoms.
3
Canavan, Francis. "The Relevance of the Burke-Paine Controversy to American Political Thought." Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987): 163–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500033775.
Full textAbstract:
Thomas Paine's social-contract theory, which asserts the protection of individual rights as the sole end of civil society and the consent of the majority of individuals as the sole source of government's authority, may seem to be better suited to the democratic Constitution of the United States than Edmund Burke's theory of prescription of government. Burke's theory is based on the rational moral goals of civil society, not on the supremacy of the people's or any other will. It asserts that the natural ends of society are prior to rights as Paine and other radical democrats conceived of them and that natural obligation is prior to and controls consent. Burke can therefore afford us a more realistic interpretation of popular consent and of the Constitution as the political form that makes us a people. He also offers a useful corrective to the currently popular view of the Supreme Court's function as being primarily to protect an ever-expanding array of constitutional rights. Burke was no democrat but he may help democrats to overcome the limitations of the liberal contractarian model of society.
4
Webber, Grégoire C. N. "The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue." Canadian Journal of Political Science 42, no. 2 (June 2009): 443–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423909090362.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract. Constitutional scholarship has been exploring the idea that the court and the legislature engage in a dialogue over the meaning of the constitution. Yet, despite many contributions to the idea of dialogue over the last decade, its potential remains unfulfilled. The epistemological potential of dialogue remains understudied, in part because the court continues to be viewed as the supreme, if not also the sole, expounder of the constitution. For dialogue's potential to be realized, the legislature should be acknowledged as a co-ordinate actor in expounding constitutional meaning and both court and legislature should assume a disposition for dialogue.Résumé. La littérature en matière constitutionnelle explore l'idée que la cour et le législateur s'engagent dans un dialogue sur le sens à donner à la constitution. Cependant, malgré les nombreuses contributions à l'idée du dialogue au cours de la dernière décennie, son potentiel ne s'est pas épanoui. Le potentiel épistémologique de l'idée du dialogue demeure sous-étudié, en partie parce que la cour continue d'être considérée comme étant l'entité suprême, sinon la seule entité, qui puisse développer le sens de la constitution. Pour que l'idée du dialogue puisse être actualisée, le législateur devrait être reconnu comme étant un acteur complémentaire à la cour pour développer le sens de la constitution et tant la cour que le législateur devraient être disposés au dialogue.
5
Borz, Gabriela. "Justifying the constitutional regulation of political parties: A framework for analysis." International Political Science Review 38, no. 1 (July 8, 2016): 99–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512116638543.
Full textAbstract:
What are the main reasons behind the regulation of political parties by contemporary constitutional practices? This article presents a framework for analysis which identifies types of justifications and actors involved in the process of regulation and their further influence on the outcomes of constitutionalisation. The empirical focus is on the revelatory case of Luxembourg, which amended the constitution for the sole reason of giving parties constitutional status. The analysis suggests that the constitutional regulation of political parties depends on their current interests and power status. Additionally, the paper draws attention to the involvement of external actors and to the changing nature of contemporary constitutionalism.
6
Nuridahwati, Zuhro. "Karakter Final Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Dalam Melaksanakan Kewenangan Sesuai Pasal 24C Ayat (1) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945." Jurnal Ilmiah Raad Kertha 3, no. 1 (July 9, 2020): 105–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.47532/jirk.v3i1.171.
Full textAbstract:
The Constitutional Court is within the scope of the Judicial Power and occupiesa strategic position in the Indonesian constitutional structure. MK as one of the stateinstitutions that was born from the reformation in 1998. MK as a judicial institution hasa very important and strategic task, said to be the sole interpreter of the Republic ofIndonesia's state constitution. Article 24C paragraph (1), of the 1945 Constitution of theRepublic of Indonesia, the Constitutional Court has the authority to adjudicate at the firstand last level the final decision to review the law against the Constitution, to decide ondisputes over the authority of state institutions whose authority is granted by theConstitution, to decide upon the dissolution of parties politics, and decide upon disputesabout the results of general elections. The results of the study and analysis, the provisionsof the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and Law Number 24 Year 2003,found legal issues that become legal problems faced by the Constitutional Court, arerelated to their position, competence, and form of decisions, which often makes legalcertainty uncertain or absurd, and conflicts norm, it is very interesting to be studied as acentral theme of the dissertation. Understanding the Position, indicating the position anddegree of the Constitutional Court between state institutions and between the SupremeCourt and the Constitutional Court, while competency shows the competency boundarybetween the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, which has attributie authority,first and foremost authority, born from the format of the government system and thedistribution of state power . Attributie authority as the first and main center forresponsibility and at the same time the basis of delegating authority in the form of delegatie.
7
Haček, Miro, and Simona Kukovič. "Deliberative Democracy: The Case of Slovenia." Political Preferences, no. 27 (November 26, 2020): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/polpre.2020.27.5-24.
Full textAbstract:
In Europe and across the world, many countries are turning to deliberative democracy to reform their constitutions, and in many others this question is high on the political agenda. Such transformation also shuffles quite radically the role of the citizenry regarding constitutional changes. Traditionally such changes are the sole responsibility of elected officials in collaboration with experts. With the deliberative turn, many more actors may be involved in the designing of constitutions, from citizens both individually and collectively in the forms of informal associations to various civil society organisations. The main aim of this paper is to analyse potential of deliberative democracy in Slovenian national setting, therefore authors are analysing a) framework of constitution making dynamics and b) most successful deliberative democratic tools and opportunities developed so far on both national and sub-national levels of the Slovenian government. As deliberative democracy is well known political phenomenon, we will start not by yet another theoretical pandemonium, but with less-known Slovenian contribution to the global development of deliberative model.
8
Drăghici, Aurelia Teodora, and Teodor Bodoașcă. "Opinions about the Power of the People and the Powers of the State in Regulating the Constitution of Romania." International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 172–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2018-0085.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract In a perspective of a long-awaited and postponed revision of the Romanian Constitution, we consider that it is necessary to reanalyze the name of the state power, given to public authorities (legislative, executive and judicial), opposite the quality of the Romanian people's sole proprietor of power in the state. Under this aspect, the current constitution materializes an obvious normative indecision and inconsistency of terminology of the constituent Legislator.Also, in the legal doctrine of the field, although there are numerous and remarkable scientific works of constitutional law, he subject, as a rule, is bypassed, and the power of the people and the powers of the state are analyzed As if the first consecration would not exclude the other, And the recognition of the latter would not question the existence of the former
9
Kartika, Aditya. "PEMAKNAAN NORMA KONSTITUSI DALAM PENGUATAN DEWAN PERWAKILAN DAERAH DALAM RULE MAKING FUNCTION." Arena Hukum 14, no. 2 (August 31, 2021): 368–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.arenahukum.2021.01402.9.
Full textAbstract:
The existence of the House of Representatives (DPD) in including regional inputs in the form of norms has experienced polemics. These polemics include the decisions of the State Administrative Court (PTUN), the Supreme Court (MA), and the Constitutional Court (MK) that are out of sync with one another. This decision has the impact of legal dualism which results in confusion for the General Election Commission (KPU) to carry out its functions and even disharmony between legal norms. This normative research aims to determine the existence of a basis to support the DPD in order to reduce conflicts of interest. As a result, the KPU, when viewed from the normative aspect, the Constitutional Court is the sole interpreter of the constitution because of the authority granted by the constitution in Article 24 C. If so, then the KPU does not have to worry about implementing the Constitutional Court's decision because it is constitutional. That is, the KPU carrying out the Constitutional Court's Decision means maintaining the dignity of the DPR so that the aspirations carried out truly represent the needs of the region without worrying about conflicts of interest because they have as administrators of political parties.
10
PETERS, ANNE. "Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures." Leiden Journal of International Law 19, no. 3 (October 2006): 579–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156506003487.
Full textAbstract:
The article conceives international (or global) constitutionalism as a legal argument which recommends and strengthens efforts (legal and political) to compensate for ongoing de-constitutionalization on the domestic level. Although the notions ‘international constitution’ and ‘international constitutionalism’ have in recent years served as buzzwords in various discourses, the many meanings of those concepts have not yet been fully explored and disentangled. This paper suggests a specific understanding of those concepts. It highlights various aspects and elements of micro- and macro-constitutionalization in international law, and identifies anti-constitutionalist trends. On this basis, the paper finds that, although no international constitution in a formal sense exists, fundamental norms in the international legal order do fulfil constitutional functions. Because those norms can reasonably be qualified as having a constitutional quality, they may not be summarily discarded in the event of a conflict with domestic constitutional law. Because the relevant norms form a transnational constitutional network, and cannot be aligned in an abstract hierarchy, conflict resolution requires a balancing of interests in concrete cases. Finally, because constitutionalism historically and prescriptively means asking for a legitimate constitution, a constitutionalist reading of the international legal order provokes the question of its legitimacy. This question is pressing, because state sovereignty and consent are – on good grounds – no longer accepted as the sole source of legitimacy of international law. International constitutionalism – as understood in this paper – does not ask for state-like forms of legitimacy of a world government, but stimulates the search for new mechanisms to strengthen the legitimacy of global governance.
11
Manurung, Saut Parulian. "Inconsistent Constitutional Court Decisions Resulting in Uncertainty Regarding the Legal Dispute on Regional Head Election Results in Indonesia." Lentera Hukum 6, no. 2 (July 31, 2019): 317. http://dx.doi.org/10.19184/ejlh.v6i2.11131.
Full textAbstract:
In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court is the sole interpreter and guardian of the constitution and the decision made by this Court is expected to meet a sense of justice, utility, and legal certainty. This paper argues that there is a contradiction between two decisions ruled by the Court resulted in inconsistent constitutional interpretations. Such inconsistency can be referred to the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 072-073/PUU-II/2004 declaring the Constitutional Court to have the power to adjudicate disputes over the results of regional head elections, while on the other hand, the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 97/PUU-XI/2013 ruled this institution no longer to adjudicate disputes over the results of regional head elections by revoking Article 236C of the revised Regional Government Act No. 12/2008. In doing so, this paper analyzes the impact of such contradictory decisions on uncertainty in the legal dispute regarding regional head election results. This paper concludes that such inconsistency was caused by the application of two different approaches: the first decision applied judicial activism and the latter considered judicial restraint.
Keywords: Constitutional Interpretation, Judicial Restraint, Judicial Activism.
12
Pennitz, Martin. "IX. Zu Ursprung und Zweck der sog. laesio enormis." Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung 138, no. 1 (June 1, 2021): 379–445. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zrgr-2021-0009.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Reflections on the origin and scope of so-called laesio enormis: This paper attempts to show that the doctrine of so-called laesio enormis has its roots neither in social or economic reasons nor in moral or religious reasons. In the famous constitution C. 4,44,2 (lex secunda) Gregorius, a secretary of petitions under emperor Diocletian, has to solve a delicate juridical problem concerning agency: A father had sold land belonging to his son (as a procurator) for less than half of its true value, obviously committing fraud. According to classical law (Iul. D. 41,4,7,6) the dominus negotii is allowed to sue a buyer of good faith if his procurator sells land below value for the sole purpose of causing loss. But as a son is not allowed to assert his father’s dolus (cf. for example C. 2,50,5,1), C.4,44,2 establishes objective criteria instead in order to decide in favour of the son. This allows us to explain the ultra dimidium rule, the criterion of pretium iustum, the right of the buyer to pay the difference, as well as the facts that the lex secunda is cited in C. 4,44,8 (by Hermogenian) as a precedent and that later constitutions (as CTh. 3,1,1; 4; 7) ignore a laesio ultra dimidium. Futhermore the paper discusses the procedural rules of the rescission of such a sale under Diocletian.
13
Sages, Roger, and Curt R. Johansson. "Meaning Constitution Analysis — MCA a Software for Studying What People Really Think and Feel." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 44, no. 34 (July 2000): 388. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/154193120004403401.
Full textAbstract:
The individual constitutes meaning in and through his daily life activities. A careful analysis of meaning, as it is constituted by the individual, can give us indications for possible generalizations and formulations of typologies and classifications above the individual level. The concept of the individual is in this way of the highest scientific value, being the sole valid basis for all efforts of scientific conceptualizations. To affirm that meaning is individually constituted as a product of subjectivity, is also to affirm the necessity of reaching it with and through the concerned individual's own terms and expressions. This is accomplished by the MCA software.
14
Allen, J. G. "THE OFFICE OF THE CROWN." Cambridge Law Journal 77, no. 2 (May 21, 2018): 298–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197318000338.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractA troubling veil of mystery still shrouds the central institution of the British Constitution – the Crown. In this paper, I examine the modern utility of five historical doctrines: the doctrine of the “King's two bodies”; the doctrine that the Crown is a “corporation sole”; the doctrine that the King can “do no wrong”; the doctrine that (high) public offices are “emanations” of the Crown; and the doctrine that the Crown is “one and indivisible”. Using some insights from social ontology, the history of office in the Western legal tradition, and the sociology of role and status, I argue that the first four of these doctrines can be refashioned into a conception of the Crown as an office. An office is an enduring institutional entity to which individuals bear a relationship from time to time, but which is separate from any individual incumbent and is to be considered in legal analysis as a separate acting subject. Using the logic of office, official personality and official action, I distinguish between the Queen, the Crown, Her Majesty's Government and the Commonwealth and argue that together they provide a serviceable model of the modern British Constitution. The final doctrine, however, must be abandoned – the Crown is plural and divisible and this must be taken into account when using the Crown to reason about the UK's relationship to other constitutional orders.
15
Jenkins, Jeffery A. "Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the Senate, 1789–2002." Studies in American Political Development 19, no. 1 (April 2005): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x05000039.
Full textAbstract:
While the Founding Fathers included a number of checks and balances in the U.S. Constitution as a way of dispersing power across the various branches of the federal government, they made no such allowance regarding the internal makeup of Congress. Specifically, Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution states that “Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members. . . .” This clause, in effect, provides each chamber of Congress with the exclusive authority to determine how its membership will be comprised. Thus, when an election is contested, that is, when a dispute arises regarding who is the rightful occupant of a seat after all votes have been counted and a winner announced, the given chamber operates as the sole arbiter, insulated completely from Executive and Judicial pressures or constraints.
16
Knysh, V. V. "Historical Aspects Of Constitutional Responsibility In Ukrainian Lands In 1917-1920." Actual problems of improving of current legislation of Ukraine, no. 51 (August 6, 2019): 213–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.15330/apiclu.51.213-221.
Full textAbstract:
The article explores the main aspects of legal consolidation of constitutional legal responsibility on Ukrainian lands in 1917-1920. In this case, the main attention is paid to the legislation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR) on this issue.
On the author’s conviction, the responsibility of state authorities and local selfgovernment of the UPR was characterized by the following features:
1) the consolidation at the level of the Constitution of the general and specific features of the constitutional and legal responsibility of the parliament of the UPR (NationalAssembly ofthe UPR). In particular, the common features ofthe constitutional legal responsibility of the Parliament of the UPR are their clear correspondence with the main functions: law-making (responsibility for the exercise of the functions of the legislative power) and personnel (constitutional and legal responsibility for the formation of executive and judicial authorities). Specific features of constitutional legal responsibility were expressed in the functions of exclusive constitutional rulemaking (amending the Constitution of the UPR by at least 3/5 of the votes of the present deputies; the authority to approve political and economic treaties concluded in the name of the UPR and to be responsible for their content and execution); economic and fiscal functions (the impossibility of collecting taxes without a decision of the National Assembly; the impossibility of establishing loans and pledging state property without a resolution of the National Assembly) emergency functions (responsibility for the National Assembly to form troops and law enforcement agencies of the state, for declaring war and peace)
1) legal consolidation in relation to the government (Council of People’s Ministers) of sole retrospective (negative) constitutional legal responsibility, which provides for constitutional legal sanctions against the ministers themselves, as well as collective retrospective (negative) constitutional legal responsibility, which provides for constitutional legal sanctions against the entire government;
2) Determination of constitutional legal responsibility (both positive and negative) for the administration of justice in the state by the General Court of the UPR;
3) approval of the constitutional and legal responsibility of local authorities for the control function of the ministers of the UPR in relation to the elected Councils and Administrations of communities, volosts and lands, as well as through the jurisdictional function of the justice authorities;
4) Conditionality of the constitutional and legal responsibility of the autonomous rights of national Unions with the exclusive competence of the National Unions and bodies representing them with functions of a fiscal and economic nature.
So, the basic principles of competence and constitutional legal responsibility of the organs of state power and local self-government of the UPR according to the Constitution of the UPR were closely related to the principle of separation of powers and other leading principles, corresponding models of a democratic, social and legal state.
It should also be noted that the normative consolidation of the foundations of constitutional legal responsibility (as well as other institutions of constitutional law of Ukraine) at the present stage of development of Ukrainian constitutionalism should be based not only on the current needs of state and law-making, but also certain positive historical and legal traditions, earlier existed on Ukrainian lands.
17
Wolf, Loammi. "The Remedial Action of the "State of Capture" Report in Perspective." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 20 (July 24, 2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20i0a1687.
Full textAbstract:
In the State of Capture report the public protector instructed the president to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the capture of state institutions by the Gupta family. The president and his family are personally implicated and due to a conflict of interests, the public protector limited both his choice of a commissioner to conduct the inquiry and the power to specify certain terms of reference. In the Economic Freedom Fighters, the Constitutional Court ruled that the public protector's remedial action is legally binding and must be executed by the state organs concerned. President Zuma challenges the remedial action on the basis that it is the sole prerogative of the head of state under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution to appoint commissions of inquiry and that it is an unfettered discretionary power, which may not be limited. It is not only doubtful whether the responsibility to appoint commissions of inquiry is invariably a discretionary power; it is also doubtful whether the president has an unfettered discretion. In the case of a conflict of interest the president would in any event be barred from taking a decision in terms of the nemo iudex maxim if the decision could be tainted by bias. The difficulty is that section 90 of the Constitution does not regulate the ad hoc exercise of section-84(2) powers by another state organ when the president should recuse himself from taking a decision. The limitations imposed by the public protector in regard to the commission of inquiry appear to be the best solution under the circumstances.
18
Mączyński, Andrzej. "KONSTYTUCYJNA OCHRONA WŁASNOŚCI W ŚWIETLE POGLĄDÓW STANISŁAWA MADEYSKIEGO." Zeszyty Prawnicze 3, no. 2 (May 10, 2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2003.3.2.02.
Full textAbstract:
Constitutional Protection of Property in the Light of Stanisław Madeyski’s ViewsSummary The article discusses the work of Stanisław Madeyski „A political right to freedom of property” published in «Czasopismo Prawnicze i Ekonomiczne» [Journal of Law and Economics] from 1903 and points out that the ideas presented therein did not lose their immediate interest. The main discussions are preceded by a presentation of the curriculum vitae and the academic output of Stanisław Madeyski (1841-1910) a profesor of Jagiellonian University, also a politician, Austrian Minister of Religious Denomination and Education, and the member of the State Tribunal (Reichsgericht).In his work Stanisław Madeyski addresses an interpretation of, still in force in Austria, article V of the Citizens’ Universal Rights Act dated December 21,1867, pursuant to which the property right is inviolable, and expropriation against the owner’s will may occur only in cases provided for in law. Adducing the historical and comparative argumentation Madeyski demonstrates that the said provision is concerned with a ban, aimed at the State authorities, on encroaching upon a domain of property relations of the citizens apart from cases provided for in the constitution. In the author’s opinion the constitution article under discussion guarantees the citizens not only the inviolability of the right to property but also the inviolability of the whole of their possessions that is of the totality of the material rights vested in them. Madeyski points out that the constitutional ban on infringement upon property imposes on the State authorities the legal duty to a citizen to cease all unlawful acts that would infringe upon a property of a citizen. This duty of the State authorities corresponds on the side of a citizen to the possibility of a free disposal of his property. This formulation of a relation between a citizen and the State authorities bears the same features as all liberties guaranteed by the constitution, as for example personal liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of nationality. Doubtless, all these rights originate from the sole right of political liberty (personality). In the same way property inviolability is a particular way to exercise the general right of political liberty as it is the case with any aforementioned liberties. It serves the citizens to develop, within legal limits, their personality according to free will. Madeyski closes his considerations with the conclusion that inviolability of property provided for in this constitutional provision is a political, constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of property that is protected by law before the State Tribunal.The article emphasizes that it was to Madeyski’s credit that he demonstrated the protection guaranteed by the constitution covers not only property but also other material rights. This view is accepted nowadays, both in Polish and foreign legal doctrine. The most important and enduring is the expressed in the work of Madeyski idea emphasizing the connection between a constitutionally guaranteed protection of proprietary rights and protection of man’s liberty.Bringing back ideas expressed one hundred years ago by one of Polish lawyer of distinction, although nowadays almost forgotten in Poland, served also to point out the role which Austro-Hungarian Monarchy structural solutions played in the formation of constitutional jurisdiction. In this context statements of two professors have been indicated; these of Oswald Balzer and Jozef Buzek from the Lvov University who already in 1919 postulated an establishment of a body having a constitutional jurisdiction status in the Reborn Poland.
19
COMPAINS SILVA, Eneko. "Botere konstituziogilearen teoriaren hastapenak: 1789ko Frantziar Iraultza eta Sieyès abadearen pentsamendua." RVAP 95, no. 95 (April 30, 2013): 197–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.47623/ivap-rvap.95.2013.08.
Full textAbstract:
LABURPENA: Lan honetan Sieyèsek botere konstituziogilearen inguruan idatzitako ideia nagusien kokapen eta analisia egiten da. 1789ko frantziar iraultzaren aurrekarietan, Erresumak bizi zuen krisi orokorrari irtenbidea emateko bide bakarra Konstituzioa zela oharturik, Sieyès abadeak Botere Konstituziogilearen teoria formulatu zuen. Nazioa izanik subiranotasunaren jabe, bere ordezkariei egokituko zitzaien Konstituzioa egin eta onartzeko zeregina, zeinean ez zuten inolako mugarik izango. RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo se analizan las principales ideas que Sieyès formuló sobre el poder constituyente. En los prolegómenos de la Revolución francesa de 1789, convencido de que la única salida a la crisis que vivía el Reino era darle una Constitución, Sieyès formuló la teoría del Poder Constituyente. Siendo la nación la única titular de la soberanía, serían sus representantes los responsables de hacer y aprobar la Constitución, no teniendo en ese quehacer limitación alguna. ABSTRACT: This present work is an analysis of Sieyès ideas about constituent power. In the months leading up to the French revolution of 1789, convinced that the only solution to the general crisis affecting the Kingdom was drafting a Constitution, Sieyès formulated the Constituent Power theory. Being nation the sole owner of the sovereignty, there would be its representatives who made and approved the Constitution, with no limitation in that task.
20
Gallese, Vittorio. "Bodily selves in relation: embodied simulation as second-person perspective on intersubjectivity." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369, no. 1644 (June 5, 2014): 20130177. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0177.
Full textAbstract:
This article addresses basic aspects of social cognition focusing on the pivotal role played by the lived body in the constitution of our experience of others. It is suggested that before studying intersubjectivity we should better qualify the notion of the self. A minimal notion of the self, the bodily self, defined in terms of its motor potentialities, is proposed. The discovery of mirror mechanisms for action, emotions and sensations led to the proposal of an embodied approach to intersubjectivity—embodied simulation (ES) theory. ES and the related notion of neural reuse provide a new empirically based perspective on intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeality. ES challenges the notion that folk psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. ES is discussed within a second-person perspective on mindreading.
21
Tamir, Michal. "The Freedom to Exclude: The Case of Israeli Society." Israel Law Review 49, no. 2 (May 26, 2016): 237–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002122371600008x.
Full textAbstract:
The phenomenon of social exclusion in Israel is a vivid demonstration of the Basic Laws' failure to fulfil their integrative role. Despite the ‘constitutional revolution’ and the Supreme Court's ongoing endeavour over the last two decades to instil a bill of rights through its jurisprudence, Israeli society has failed to fully internalise values of equality. In terms of legal jargon, individuals continue to claim and exercise ‘sole and despotic dominion’ over their private property in order to avoid contact with individuals belonging to certain minority groups. In many cases, such behaviour in the private sphere results in exclusion from the public sphere.This phenomenon is especially astonishing considering the fact that many laws in Israel apply the right of equality to the private sphere. Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court has developed comprehensive human rights jurisprudence applicable to the private sphere. The gap between the law in the books and the law in action illustrates that effective implementation of human rights in the private sphere cannot be achieved solely by specific legislation or by jurisprudence that is sensitive to human rights. This argument is backed by several recent bills which preserve and enforce the exclusion of minorities, particularly of Arabs, from the public sphere. These bills illustrate that exclusion is indeed a growing phenomenon in Israeli society that cannot be overlooked. Moreover, they underscore the urgent need to entrench a direct obligation to apply human rights to the private sphere at the constitutional level. This will be achieved only when Israel adopts a full constitution.
22
Domino, John C. "The Origins and Development of Judicial Recusal in Texas." British Journal of American Legal Studies 5, no. 1 (May 1, 2016): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjals-2016-0005.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract In 21st century Texas, a judge’s decision to recuse from a case is based on a complex set of norms, codes and procedures intended to promote impartiality. For most of the state’s history, however, the sole ground for the removal of a judge from a case was not recusal for bias but disqualification based on rigid conditions set out in the Texas Constitution. This article examines the foundations and emergence of the modern concept of judicial recusal in Texas with the intent to illustrate a shift from rigid constitutional grounds to a more fluid approach based on judicial interpretation of a code of conduct. The author concludes that while Texas disqualification and recusal jurisprudence is conservative and restrained, it remains to be seen whether this restraint can continue unchanged in a post-Caperton era. The Caperton probability of bias standard has become part of the dialogue on recusal and disqualification in Texas, but Caperton-based challenges are unlikely to prevail in the near future because many members of the bench and bar share the belief that the state’s judicial campaign contribution restrictions and recusal jurisprudence create a firewall against violations of the Due Process Clause. The risk, however, is that continued resistance to change may further erode public confidence in existing ethical safeguards and fall short of assuaging concerns that wealthy donors continue to exercise disproportionate influence on the judiciary.
23
Timo, Nils. "Future directions for workplace bargaining and aged care under a post 2005 Howard government." Australian Health Review 29, no. 3 (2005): 274. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/ah050274.
Full textAbstract:
ON THE 1ST OF JULY 2005, the Howard Government took control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate and substantial reform of the nation?s industrial relations framework is likely to proceed. In order to understand the implications of the proposed industrial relations (IR) reform agenda on aged care, it is necessary to briefly revisit the past. Historically, the ability of the Commonwealth Parliament to regulate industrial relations was construed in the context of Section 51 (xxxv) of the Australian Constitution Act 1900 (Cwlth) that enabled the Commonwealth to make laws concerning ?conciliation and arbitration and the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one state?. Since 1904, the Commonwealth, with the states following shortly thereafter, established a regime of industrial tribunals responsible for third party independent conciliation and arbitration, overseeing a system of legally binding industrial awards covering wages and employment conditions. This system, in the words of one of its chief architects, Justice Higgins, ? . . . would substitute for the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lock-out?1 (page 2). By 1991, Australian wages policy gradually shifted from centralised arbitration, elevating workplace agreements to the status of government policy on both sides of politics.2 This process accelerated labour market deregulation, shifting industrial relations and human resource issues to the enterprise level.3 The shift towards workplace agreements post 1990?s was underpinned by a bold reinterpretation of Section 51 (xx) of the Constitution Act that enabled the Commonwealth to regulate the affairs of ?trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the Commonwealth?, thus, by definition, including regulating employee relations of corporations. The use by the Commonwealth of these powers has extended the jurisdiction of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) to include the making and approving of certified agreements made by constitutional corporations or in settlement of an industrial dispute. Other types of employers such as sole traders, churches and charities, partnerships and unincorporated associations remained covered by state industrial jurisdictions. (On these powers of the Commonwealth, see State of
24
Delwaide, Karl. "La législature québécoise peut-elle implanter un système complet d'initiative et de référendum ?" Les Cahiers de droit 22, no. 3-4 (April 12, 2005): 695–721. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/042464ar.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, the author asks himself whether it would be permissible for the Quebec Legislature to implement a full and complete initiative and referendum scheme, thereby giving to the people the means to enact their own laws. And the answer brought about is in the affirmative. The author reaches that conclusion, first, by looking at the concepts of sovereignty in the state, legislative supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty. The second step is related to the analysis of the power attributed to the Legislature to modify its own constitution. The author assumes that this large power of legislation coupled with the principle of legislative supremacy should be sufficient to make a court of justice sustain the constitutional validity of the legislative implementation of a complete initiative and referendum process. But some exceptions are made to that large and supreme legislative power. The « Office of Lieutenant Governor », the idea of making the Legislature the sole legislative organ in the state, the principles of representative democracy and responsible government, and the impossibility of binding the Legislature's future course of action are among the exceptions discussed in this article. Finally, the author urges the reader to take a new look at the case-law on the subject keeping in mind that traditonal values of government are not stuck in concrete: The B.N.A. Act, has it been recognized, has to keep up with today's reality. Direct democracy may be part of this reality.
25
Stępkowska, Agnieszka. "USTANOWIENIE A UKONSTYTUOWANIE SIĘ POSAGU W RZYMSKIM PRAWIE KLASYCZNYM." Zeszyty Prawnicze 6, no. 1 (June 22, 2017): 195. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/zp.2006.6.1.12.
Full textAbstract:
On the Distinction between Assignment of the Dowry and its Constitution in Classical Roman LawSummaryThe dowry in Roman law (dos) was considered to be the husband’s property. Nevertheless its legal status was quite peculiar, when compared with the rest of the husband’s patrimony. The constitution of a dowry had a number of important legal consequences. Therefore it was crucial to indicate the moment of its establishment. The sole assignment of a dowry (dotis institutio) did not always have this effect. The reason for this was, that in classical Roman law there was a clear distinction between real and personal aspects of the property law.There were three ways for dotis institutio: dotis datio, dotis dictio, dotis promissio. In classical period only dotis datio had real effect and was the means by which - if done after marriage - dowry was immediately established. The other two were dowry agreements conferring on husband [or future husband] mere personal right to claim transfer of the patrimony subject to dictio or promissio. Therefore the dos took effect only after the husband became owner of the patrimony. In postclassical period this sharp distinction between assignment of a dowry and its material constitution gradually disappeared, and dotis institutio was considered to be only a real transfer of a property intended as a dowry. It was only Justinian who tried to restore this classical distinction.Nevertheless, acquiring the property subject to dotis institutio, although necessary, was not sufficient for dowry to take effect. The Roman dos derived its peculiar character from marriage. In case the transfer of patrimony dotis causa had taken effect before marriage (ante nuptias in dotem data) it acquired dotal character only after the marriage. If there was no marriage, the person assigning dowry (either woman, her pater familias, or a third person) was able to claim restitution of the patrimony intended previously to be dos, by means of condictio, or even by rei vindication in case the would-be husband did not acquired ownership, but only possession of the patrimony.
26
Bianco, Giovanni. "LABOUR LAW AND BALANCED BUDGETS: TWO DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW BETWEEN ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION?" International Journal of Legal Studies ( IJOLS ) 4, no. 2 (December 30, 2018): 457–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.0028.
Full textAbstract:
The European legislation on labour policies is emblematically represented by the system managed by the European Central Bank (ECB) in which price stability first comes, then all the rest. Unlike other similar institutions, the ECB is the only central bank whose sole objective is to maintain price stability, or better win the fight against inflation. Unlike the ECB, the US Federal Reserve has the so-called dual mandates, which is a dual objective of intervention: price stability and employment. In this sense, the Fed is required to effectively promote the objectives of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates, protecting in an equal way both the needs of the market economy and the rights of workers.In the European Union, in general, the objective of price stability is in fact superordinate to all the others, even those that Art. 3 of the Treaty of the European Union seemed to be on the same level. The fight against unemployment therefore becomes secondary even if, for example, in the Italian constitution the right to work since 1948 is considered a fundamental right.The decisive point is that the prevailing value is attributed to monetary stability with the consequent weakening of policies - potentially inflationary - such as the active ones of labour and more generally of stimulus of the economy.The new EU policies on financial issues are therefore destined to have a strong impact on the regulation of workers' rights in individual states. And above all in Italy where the principle of a balanced budget in 2012 even became a constitutional provision.
27
Zaman, Nurus. "THE MEANING OF AUTHORITY RELATION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE LAND SECTOR ACCORDING TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA." Yustisia Jurnal Hukum 6, no. 3 (December 31, 2017): 531. http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/yustisia.v6i3.16788.
Full textAbstract:
<p><em>In this study, there are two (2) issues that were examined. First, how the Central Government and Local Government gained authority in the land sector. Second, how the meaning of the relationship of authority of the Central Government and Local Government in the area of land according to the 1945 Constitution, This study uses normative legal research. The results of research are: First, the authority of the Central Government in the land sector is the inherent nature of authority, because as the sole power in a unitary state. In the development of central government authority derived from attributive authority and Local Government authorities in the land sector sourced from attributive authority and discretionary. Second, the meaning of the relationship of authority between the central government and the regional government in the land sector as: (a) the relationship of subordination; (B) the relationship of supervision; and (c) the relationship of responsibility in achieving the objectives of the State.</em></p>
28
Azis, Muhammad Abdul. "SIKAP ORGANISASI KEMASYARAKATAN ISLAM TERHADAP UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 17 TAHUN 2013 TENTANG ORGANISASI KEMASYARAKATAN DAN PERPU NOMOR 2 TAHUN 2017 (Perspektif Studi Kebijakan Dakwah)." Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah 37, no. 1 (July 23, 2018): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.21580/jid.v37.1.2621.
Full textAbstract:
<p><em>Freedom of association, assembly and expression is a part of human rights guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia. This freedom also includes the propagation of religious teachings as an ideology for transformation to real life. For Muslims, especially da'i certainly have great ideals for the realization of a prosperous fair society that is directed by Allah SWT. It can be fought, one of which can be through social organization.During the 72 years of independent Indonesia, several regulations issued by the government to regulate the system and mechanisms of mass organizations have added controversy to Islamic mass organizations. In the new order, some organizations threatened to be dissolved and not recognized for rejecting the sole principle of Pancasila. The dynamic continues until the reform era. This can be an afterthought for the da'wah perpetrators, especially those who take the path of the organization to pay more attention to the basic aspects of administrative formation with respect to the state / government, because it will subsequently be very influential on the sustainability of da'wah in the future.</em></p>
29
Ramdan, Ajie. "Aspek-Aspek Konstitusional Penodaan Agama Serta Pertanggungjawaban Pidananya di Indonesia." Jurnal Konstitusi 15, no. 3 (November 19, 2018): 616. http://dx.doi.org/10.31078/jk1538.
Full textAbstract:
Penodaan agama dalam konteks penafsiran konstitusi telah dijabarkan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) dalam Putusan Nomor 140/PUU-VII/2009. UU Pencegahan Penodaan Agama tidak menentukan pembatasan kebebasan beragama, akan tetapi pembatasan untuk mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan yang bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama serta pembatasan untuk melakukan penafsiran atau kegiatan yang menyimpang dari pokok-pokok ajaran agama yang dianut di Indonesia. Pembatasan-pembatasan tersebut hanya dapat dilakukan dengan Undang-Undang dengan maksud semata-mata untuk menjamin pengakuan serta penghormatan atas kebebasan orang lain dan untuk memenuhi tuntutan yang adil sesuai dengan pertimbangan moral, nilai-nilai agama, keamanan, dan ketertiban umum dalam masyarakat yang demokratis [vide Pasal 28J ayat (2) UUD 1945]. Tulisan ini akan menganalisis aspek-aspek konstitusionalitas penodaan agama serta pertanggungjawaban pidana dalam kasus yang dialami oleh Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Karena pidatonya di kepulauan seribu memenuhi unsur-unsur tindak pidana dalam Pasal 156a KUHPidana berdasarkan Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Utara Nomor 1537/Pid.B/2016/PN.JktUtr. Konsep pertanggungjawaban pidana (criminal liability /toerekeningvatsbaarheid) atau sesungguhnya tidak hanya menyangkut soal hukum semata-mata, melainkan juga menyangkut soal nilai-nilai moral atau kesusilaan umum yang dianut oleh suatu masyarakat atau kelompok-kelompok dalam masyarakat. Analisis pertanggungjawaban pidana dalam delik penodaan agama Islam dalam tulisan ini menggunakan teori pertanggungjawaban pidana, putusan MK Nomor 140/PUU-VII/2009, Putusan Pengadilan tentang Penodaan Agama dan perbandingan pertanggungjawaban pidana di Belanda dan Inggris.Blasphemy in the context of interpretation of the constitution has been elaborated by the Constitutional Court (MK) in Decision Number 140/PUU-VII/2009 The Prevention of Blasphemy Law does not specify restrictions on religious freedom, but restrictions on issuing feelings or committing acts of hostility, abuse or desecration against a religion as well as restrictions on interpretation or activities that deviate from the principles of the teachings of the religion adopted in Indonesia. These restrictions can only be done by Law with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition and respect for the freedom of others and to fulfill just demands in accordance with moral considerations, religious values, security and public order in a democratic society. [vide Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution]. This paper will analyze aspects of constitutionality of blasphemy and criminal liability in the case experienced by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Because his speech in the thousand islands fulfilled the elements of criminal acts in Article 156a of the Criminal Code based on the North Jakarta District Court Decision Number 1537/Pid.B/2016/PN.JktUtr. The concept of criminal liability (criminal liability/toerekeningvatsbaarheid) or actually does not only involve legal matters, but also concerns the general moral values or morality adopted by a society or groups in society. Analysis of criminal responsibility in the Islamic blasphemy offense in this paper uses the theory of criminal responsibility, Constitutional Court decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009, Court Decision on Blasphemy and a comparison of criminal liability in the Netherlands and England.
30
Dębska, Monika Magdalena, and Maciej Dębski. "Sytuacja prawna pracowników powyżej pięćdziesiątego roku życia." Prawo Kanoniczne 54, no. 3-4 (July 9, 2011): 367–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/pk.2011.54.3-4.14.
Full textAbstract:
Non-discrimination of treatment – also on the grounds of age – is a fundamental rule of Polish labour legislation. That rule is expressed in art. 32(2) of the Polish Constitution, art. 1 of Directive 2000/78/EC and art. 113 of the Polish Labour Code. According to art. 6 of Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 183b § 2 of the Polish Labour Code and ECJ case law, exceptions from that rule are permissible if they are justified by a legitimate aim and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. These exceptions include the legitimacy of termination of employment relationships with workers for the sole reason of their reaching the age of retirement. Indeed, such termination can be justified by employment policy. On the other hand, by virtue of art. 39 of the Labour Code, during four years prior to reaching retirement age workers benefit from the so-called protection period, which – with some exceptions – prohibits termination of their employment contracts or work and pay agreements. On October 17th, 2008, the Polish government adopted a program named Solidarity of generations – action for Increasing Occupational activity of Persons aged 50+, within which professional development training and apprenticeship programs were opened to people aged 50 and over, and legislation was introduced to promote their employment.
31
Duțu, Mircea. "Fundamente istorice și permanențe definitorii ale culturii juridice românești. Tradiție neolatină, sinteză europeană și amprentă proprie în unificarea constituțional-legislativă." Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Iurisprudentia 65, no. 4 (March 16, 2021): 246–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbiur.65(2020).4.6.
Full textAbstract:
Achieving constitutional unity (expressed by the adoption of the Constitution on March 29, 1923) and legislative unity (in three steps, especially by extending the regulations of the “Old Kingdom: 1928, Bessarabia, 1938 – Bukovina, 1943 – Transylvania) stand as major national acts related to the process of completion the political union of 1918 and consolidating the Romanian national unitary state. They have caused ample debates, facing, in specific terms, beyond conjunctural interests and priorities, there major legal visions and conceptions regarding justice in the Europe of the times, present in the reunified Romania: the neo-Latin, majorly formalist; the Austrian, of “material justice”; and, respectively, the Russian, of a strongly social nature. If regarding the necessity and even the urgency of legislative unification there has been a unanimous standing, the disputes concerned the method of realization, and regional resistances have delayed its effective and full realization. The experiences generated by these contexts – from the four draft projects of a constitutional pact, to laws for partial unification, and successful – the Criminal Code and the Criminal Proceedings Code of 1937 – or failed – the Civil Code, the Civil Proceedings Code and the Commercial Code, adopted in 1939-1940 but their entry into force delayed sine die, the sole imposed solution being eventually the extension of the regulations of the “Old Kingdom” over the unified provinces – bear as well several important scientific and cultural meanings. The have confirm the creation of a Romanian model for juridical development, built upon the Romanic inheritance, the adhesion to the neo-Latin juridical modernity, under its own print, consolidated and diversified by the receptions and synthesis of the juridical inter-war unification. The same unifying context, of European synthesis and national affirmation, gave birth to a Romanian school of law and a national jurisprudence. The traditions the configurated and completed have generated the landmarks of a juridical identity that have endured over time, with the specific nuances, and serve today as indispensable orientation in accepting and expressing the European integration and the generalized globalization, perceived as hybridizing and dialogue, and not as a one-sided obtrusion and deletion of national legal specificities.
32
Anasrullah, Anasrullah, Achmad Djunaidi, and Candra Candra. "Analisis Putusan Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) No 100/PUU-XIII/2015 Terkait Pemilihan Calon Tunggal Pilkada Serentak di Indonesia." CIVICUS : Pendidikan-Penelitian-Pengabdian Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan 5, no. 1 (April 12, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.31764/civicus.v5i1.781.
Full textAbstract:
Tujuan penelitian ini untuk menjelaskan pertimbagan hukum putusan Hakim Mahkamah Konstitusi No. 100-PUU-8-2015 Tentang Pemilihan Calon Tunggal Pilkada Serentak di Indonesia dan implikasinya dalam pelaksanaan. Penelitian ini termasuk penelitian hukum normatif, pendekatan dalam penelitian adalah perundang-undangan dan pendekatan kepustakaan, jenis dan sumber datanya ialah data perimer dan data sekunder, tehnik pengumpulan data dengan menggunakan studi pustaka dan tehnik analisis data adalah dari hal yang bersifat induktif kededuktif yaitu data umum tentang konsepsi hukum baik berupa asas-asas hukum, postulat serta ajaran-ajaran (doktrin). Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi calon tunggal dalam pilkada adanya kekosongan hukum mana kala syarat paling kurang dua pasangan calon tersebut tidak terpenuhi. Mahkamah Konstitusi menilai adanya kekosongan hukum tersebut telah mengancam tidak terlaksananya hak-hak rakyat untuk dipilih dan memilih karena dua alasan. Pertama, penundaan kepemilihan serentak berikutnya sesungguhnya telah menghilangkan hak Rakya untuk dipilih dan memilih pada pemilihan serentak berikutnya. Kedua apabila penundaan demikian dapat dibenarkan, tetap tidak ada jaminan bahwa pada pemilihan serentak berikutnya itu, hak Rakyat untuk dipilih dan memilih akan dipenuhi. Dengan demikian menurut Mahkamah Konstitusi Pilkada yang ditunda sampai pemilihan berikutnya hanya kerena tidak terpenuhinya syarat paling sedikit dua pasangan calon bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. The purpose of this study is to explain the legal considerations of the decision of Constitutional Court Judge No. 100-PUU-8-2015 Regarding the Election of Single Candidates for Simultaneous Local Elections in Indonesia, the legal implications of the decision of the judges of the Constitutional Court No. 100 / PUU / 8/2015 on the election of a single candidate for simultaneous elections in Indonesia. This research includes normative legal research, the approach in research is legislation and library approach, the types and sources of data are perimer data and secondary data, data collection techniques using library studies and data analysis techniques are from things that are inductive, that is general data about the concept of law in the form of legal principles, postulates and teachings (doctrine). The decision of the Constitutional Court is the sole candidate in the election where there is a legal vacuum where when the requirements of at least two candidate pairs are not fulfilled. The Constitutional Court assesses that the legal vacuum has threatened the failure of the people's rights to be elected and elected for two reasons. First, the next simultaneous election delay has actually eliminated the Rakya's right to be elected and elected in the next simultaneous election. Second, if such delays are justified, there is still no guarantee that in the next simultaneous election, the people's right to be elected and elected will be fulfilled. Accordingly, according to the Constitutional Court Pilkada which was postponed until the next election only because it did not fulfill the requirements of at least two candidate pairs contrary to the 1945 Constitution.
33
Kim, Seung Ju. "Constitutional Court's Decision of Unconformable to Constitution for Criminal Abortion and Pro-life Movement of Korean Catholic Church." Research Institute for Life and Culture Sogang University 58 (November 30, 2020): 47–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.17924/solc.2020.58.47.
Full text
34
Martinez Fritscher, André C., and Aldo Musacchio. "Endowments, fiscal federalism and the cost of capital for states: evidence from Brazil, 1891–1930." Financial History Review 17, no. 1 (March 23, 2010): 13–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0968565010000041.
Full textAbstract:
There is a large literature that aims to explain what determines country risk (defined as the difference between the yield of a sovereign's bonds and the risk free rate). In this article, we contribute to the discussion by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created database with state-level fiscal and risk premium data (between 1891 and 1930) to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand (e.g. rubber and coffee) ended up having higher revenues per capita and lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita was both a product of the variation in natural endowments (i.e. the fact that states cannot produce any commodity they want) and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. These two effects generated variation in revenues per capita at the state level thanks to the extreme form of fiscal decentralisation that the Brazilian government adopted in the constitution of 1891, which gave states the sole right to tax exports. We also run instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state. These estimates confirm our findings that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia.
35
Galiana, Eric, Antoine Marais, Catherine Mura, Benoît Industri, Gilles Arbiol, and Michel Ponchet. "Ecosystem Screening Approach for Pathogen-Associated Microorganisms Affecting Host Disease." Applied and Environmental Microbiology 77, no. 17 (July 8, 2011): 6069–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1128/aem.05371-11.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTThe microbial community in which a pathogen evolves is fundamental to disease outcome. Species interacting with a pathogen on the host surface shape the distribution, density, and genetic diversity of the inoculum, but the role of these species is rarely determined. The screening method developed here can be used to characterize pathogen-associated species affecting disease. This strategy involves three steps: (i) constitution of the microbial community, using the pathogen as a trap; (ii) community selection, using extracts from the pathogen as the sole nutrient source; and (iii) molecular identification and the screening of isolates focusing on their effects on the growth of the pathogenin vitroand host disease. This approach was applied to a soilborne plant pathogen,Phytophthora parasitica, structured in a biofilm, for screening the microbial community from the rhizosphere ofNicotiana tabacum(the host). Two of the characterized eukaryotes interfered with the oomycete cycle and may affect the host disease. AVorticellaspecies acted through a mutualistic interaction withP. parasitica, disseminating pathogenic material by leaving the biofilm. APhomaspecies established an amensal interaction withP. parasitica, strongly suppressing disease by inhibitingP. parasiticagermination. This screening method is appropriate for all nonobligate pathogens. It allows the definition of microbial species as promoters or suppressors of a disease for a given biotope. It should also help to identify important microbial relationships for ecology and evolution of pathogens.
36
Gallese, V. "From mirror neurons to embodied simulation: A new neuroscientific perspective on intersubjectivity." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (March 2011): 2127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)73830-5.
Full textAbstract:
Our seemingly effortless capacity of conceiving of the acting bodies inhabiting our social world as goal-oriented individuals like us depends on the constitution of a shared “we-centric” space. I have proposed that this shared manifold space can be characterized at the functional level as embodied simulation, a basic functional mechanism by means of which our brain/body system models its interactions with the world.The mirroring mechanism for action and other mirroring mechanisms in our brain represent sub-personal instantiations of embodied simulation. Embodied simulation provides a new empirically based notion of intersubjectivity, viewed first and foremost as intercorporeity. Embodied simulation challenges the notion that Folk-psychology is the sole account of interpersonal understanding. Before and below mind reading is intercorporeity as the main source of knowledge we directly gather about others.By means of embodied simulation we can map others’ actions onto our own motor representations, as well as others’ emotions and sensations onto our own viscero-motor and somatosensory representations. “Representation”, as used here, refers to a particular type of content, generated by the relations that our situated and inter-acting brain-body system instantiates with the world. Such content is pre-linguistic and pre-theoretical, but nevertheless has attributes normally and uniquely attributed to conceptual content.Social cognition is not only explicitly reasoning about the contents of someone else's mind. Embodied simulation, gives us a direct insight of other minds thus enabling our capacity to empathize with others.This proposal opens new perspectives on our understanding of autism and other psychopathological states such as schizophrenia.
37
Gisser, Richard. "The Population Census in Austria." Revista Brasileira de Estudos de População 37 (April 22, 2020): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.20947/s0102-3098a0107.
Full textAbstract:
Based on the Constitution, the Population Census in Austria is a matter of the central state, serving many political-administrative, planning, research, and other purposes. After its start as a systematic operation in the middle of the 18th century, it developed further by a modern legal basis in 1857 and advances in statistical technology in 1890 (punch cards) and 1971 (machinereadable questionnaires). In the second half of the 20th century, the Population Census became a comprehensive operation, including dwellings, buildings, and workplaces. The communes organized the classical method of on the spot household data collection on behalf of the state. The register-based Census replaced the household collection in 2011. Following a government decision of 2000, which aimed at the sole use of available micro-data, the first steps for creatingthe necessary administrative and statistical registers took place in conjunction with the last traditional census of 2001. With new provisions for linking the records, the Register Census Act of 2006, and a full test census in the same year, the new methodology was established and evaluated in a short period. The first regular Register Census “took place” with reference date 31 October 2011. It is described in the central part of this communication, featuring the advantages, strengths, and weaknesses, the backbone registers, the “comparison registers,” and the redundancy principle, which help to ensure high data quality and the fit of the census into the international framework. Current developments include the annual update of results,changes and improvements in the data sources, and a short outlook on the next census of 2021.
38
Dr. Shefali Raizada, Prof. "Social policy and social legislation A jurisprudential interface." International Journal of Engineering & Technology 7, no. 2.4 (March 10, 2018): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.14419/ijet.v7i2.4.13027.
Full textAbstract:
Principle of democracy as governance is for the people by the people and of the people. People are not the recipient of state framed policies and programs. Citizens are not only consumers, choosers or users, but active participants for making and shaping the policies.According to Duguit, “Essence of law is to serve and secure social solidarity, where individual has to perform obligations as a member of the community”. Duguit says “everyone has to perform his duties to the society which would help to develop cooperation and social solidarity.” Law and society are interrelated and interdependent. Changes in every social component leads to change in various aspects, right from the social institutions, customs, ideologies, human behavior and human interactions.Law is meant for nonprofessionals. The welfare of the society &humanity is the sole purpose of Indian constitution. To take care of interests, social security, social solidarity are the main aim of law. Sociological school of thought says that ‘Law is social phenomenon’. According to this school, essential characteristic of law should be to represent common interaction of men in social group. Treatment towards law should be as instrument of social control and social progress. The role of law and its functioning towards society is the basic philosophy of sociological jurisprudence.Thus, social progress is very much regulated by the degree of law. Law is like the steering to lead society in particular direction. Law may be the fulcrum to control society. Balance between law and society will certainly responsible for social progress.
39
Ebibi, Candidate Dashnim. "Challenges of Guaranteeing Privacy in Pandemic Time." SEEU Review 15, no. 2 (December 1, 2020): 21–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/seeur-2020-0014.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The right of citizens to privacy in the Republic of Kosovo is guaranteed under the Law on Personal Data Protection. Moreover, this right is guaranteed by the Constitution (Official Gazette, 2008), which is the highest legal act. The purpose of this academic paper goes beyond a superficial assessment of the level of implementation of this fundamental right of the citizen. The core of this paper focuses on highlighting the existing challenges and those that may persist in guaranteeing the privacy of each of us under the reign of the 'Covid 19' Virus in the geographical and psychological space of all citizens of Kosovo. Despite the existence of an independent authority, mandated to oversee the implementation of this right in the public and private sector, its implementation is a permanent mission of this authority, which in our country is the Information and Privacy Agency, but also is subject to challenges, which are not always generated by human negligence. To give the deserved physiognomy to this article, official accessible sources of the sole authority that oversees the implementation of this right in our country have been used. Statistical data presented within the trunk of the paper reinforce the thesis introduced in the introduction of the article, which is confirmed during its full elaboration, reinforcing the view that part of the main challenges for Information and Privacy Agency persists being the limited number of human professional resources, as a guarantee for establishing an unwavering trust among the citizens that their privacy is guaranteed.
40
Arnoldus, Edo P. J., Laetitia B. T. Wolters, Joan H. C. Voormolen, Sjoerd G. van Duinen, Anton K. Raap, Mels van der Ploeg, and A. C. Boudewijn Peters. "Interphase cytogenetics: a new tool for the study of genetic changes in brain tumors." Journal of Neurosurgery 76, no. 6 (June 1992): 997–1003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3171/jns.1992.76.6.0997.
Full textAbstract:
✓ Interphase cytogenetics is the application of nonradioactive in situ hybridization with chromosome-specific DNA probes to interphase nuclei. In this study, interphase cytogenetics was used to investigate 66 primary brain tumors (33 gliomas, 30 meningiomas, and three medulloblastomas) for numerical chromosomal aberrations of chromosomes 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 17, 18, X, and Y. Of the 33 gliomas (17 astrocytomas grades II, III, and IV, five oligoastrocytomas, seven oligodendrogliomas, and four ependymal tumors), 22 were near diploid, while the remaining 11 showed a significant triploid or tetraploid component. The predominant specific aberrations in gliomas were an over-representation of chromosome 7 (13 cases) and an under-representation of chromosome 10 (16 cases), These changes were observed in grade III and grade IV astrocytomas, as well as in oligodendrogliomas. Other frequent numerical changes were a gain of chromosome 17 (six cases) and a loss of chromosome 18 (seven cases). This loss of chromosome 18 seemed relatively specific for gliomas with an oligodendroglial component (six cases). Only two of 33 gliomas displayed no genetic abnormality with the probes used. Seven patients with astrocytomas died of their brain tumor during the clinical follow-up period. Their astrocytomas did not show a different chromosomal constitution compared to the other gliomas. For the meningiomas, the probe panel was extended with a probe specific for chromosome 22. Loss of chromosome 22 was obvious in 21 of the 30 meningiomas, and was the sole abnormality in 11 meningiomas; in the other 10, this loss was associated with other chromosomal changes. Five of these tumors with additional aberrations were recurrent or atypical meningiomas. It is suggested that interphase cytogenetics can contribute to a better understanding of the biological behavior of these tumors and possibly result in better insights into prognosis and strategies for therapy.
41
Akthar, Zia. "Acts of State, State Immunity, and Judicial Review in the United States." British Journal of American Legal Studies 7, no. 1 (May 30, 2018): 205–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2018-0006.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The doctrine of the Act of State and State Immunity has its foundation in common law frameworks. It is settled law that there is no cause of action that will make a foreign state liable in the domestic court of another country. In the United States there has been acceptance that certain cases involve “political questions” that are non-justiciable, as they are not a “case or controversy” as required by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The courts have only intervened either where the federal statutes have applied extraterritorially, such as under the Civil Rights Act 1964 where a U.S. citizen is employed abroad by a company registered in the United States, or under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 1789, which protects foreign parties who are designated sufficiently “alien” for the sole purpose of invoking jurisdiction after a civil wrong has been committed against them. There needs to be an evaluation of the U.S. Supreme Court precedents that have asserted judicial oversight in respect of wrongs committed extra-territorially, and their present rationale for retaining the doctrine. This paper also discusses the scope of the Federal State Immunity Act (FSIA) and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) that narrow the concept of state immunity when dealing with terrorism by another state or its agents. A comparative analysis with the state immunity doctrine in Canada and the framework for litigation under the merits-based approach by the courts is provided. The common law courts have developed the doctrine of the Act of State and it has become a principle of customary international law. The argument of this paper is that there needs to be a greater focus on the civil injuries that are caused in other jurisdictions that should allow the claimants to litigate in the forum court and for judicial review to be available.
42
III, Frank O. Bowman,. "Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System." Federal Sentencing Reporter 24, no. 5 (June 1, 2012): 356–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/fsr.2012.24.5.356.
Full textAbstract:
This article contends that the advisory guidelines system created by the Supreme Court's 200 decision in United States v. Booker should be replaced. It advances three arguments: First, the post-Booker advisory system is conceptually indefensible. It retains virtually every feature excoriated by critics of the original sentencing guidelines. Its extreme 'advisoriness,' while partially ameliorating some problems with the original guidelines, reintroduces the very concerns about unreviewable judicial arbitrariness that spawned the structured sentencing movement in the first place. More importantly, the post-Booker system does not solve the biggest problem with the pre-Booker system — that its architecture and institutional arrangements predisposed the Commission's rule-making process to become a one-way upward ratchet which raised sentences often and lowered them virtually never. Its sole relative advantage — that of conferring additional (and effectively unreviewable) discretion on sentencing judges — is insufficient to justify its retention as a permanent system. Second, there exist a number of constitutionally permissible alternatives to the court-created Booker system, one of which — that originally proposed by the Constitution Project and more recently endorsed by Judge William Sessions, former Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission — is markedly superior to the present system. Third, the difficult problem is not designing a sentencing mechanism better than either the pre- or post-Booker guidelines, but ensuring that such a system, once in place, does not replicate pre-Booker experience and become a one-way upward ratchet prescribing ever higher sentences. The article offers suggestions about how this difficulty might be solved, while conceding both the difficulty of this problem and the justice of the concern that, however imperfect the advisory system, it may be the best that can be achieved given the present constellation of institutional and political forces.
43
Zhuravlev, A. V. "The Doctrine of Passive Obedience in Stuart England, 1603–1688." History 17, no. 8 (2018): 20–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1818-7919-2018-17-8-20-29.
Full textAbstract:
The article examines the history of the doctrine of passive obedience in England during the Stuart period. Traditionally weak financial and legal basis for royal absolutism in England forced monarchs to rely thoroughly on ideology. The concept of passive obedience promoted by the loyal Anglican clergy was one of the key elements of the absolutist ideology of the 17th century. This doctrine was employed as a counterbalance to revolutionary resistance and monarchomach theories embraced by protestant dissenters and papist recusants alike. During the course of the century the doctrine was embraced by numerous representatives of the Church of England’s establishment, including, but not limited to, John Donn, Roger Maynwaring, George Hickes, Edmund Bohun and many others and disseminated via an array of sermons and pamphlets. One component of the doctrine: non-resistance, was particularly stressed. Several political, social and economic factors conditioned the employment of this doctrine. The first instance of its pronouncement followed the failure of the Gunpowder plot and the necessity to refute catholic contractual theories. Charles I saw the doctrine of passive obedience as both the means to maintain social peace and promote fiscal interests. The new impetus the doctrine gained in the later years of the Restoration: an attempt to integrate it into the ‘ancient constitution’ failed, yet the doctrine of passive obedience was taken up as the chief ideological tool by the Anglican church and employed as a mighty instrument of suppressing resistance and dissent. The Glorious Revolution weakened the grasp of the doctrine in the minds of the English, though by no means killed it. Yet, the regime erected by the Convention of 1689 and strengthened by William of Orange claimed as much of its legitimacy in revolutionary resistance. Thus, henceforth the ideas of passive obedience and non-resistance could not be used as the sole basis of legitimate power in England.
44
Cañas de Pablos, Alberto. "Personificando la revolución. Espartero: carisma en la Revolución de 1840 y su llegada a la RegenciaEmbodying revolution. Espartero: charisma in the 1840 Revolution and his arrival to the regency." Vínculos de Historia. Revista del Departamento de Historia de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, no. 5 (May 23, 2016): 270. http://dx.doi.org/10.18239/vdh.v0i5.213.
Full textAbstract:
RESUMEN La revolución de septiembre de 1840 supuso la abdicación de la viuda de Fernando VII, María Cristina de Borbón, y la llegada del manchego Baldomero Espartero al poder. Pocos meses después se convirtió en regente único durante algo más de dos años, hasta su caída posterior y partida al exilio londinense. En todo el proceso de presión sobre la madre de Isabel II, además de la firma de la restrictiva ley de Ayuntamientos, jugó un papel fundamental la admiración que despertaba el héroe de Luchana entre gran parte de las capas populares. La meta de este texto se fundamenta en descubrir por qué, desde la guerra carlista, se consideraba que él sería capaz de garantizar las libertades establecidas en la Constitución de 1837 frente a los obstáculos y abusos perpetrados por María Cristina y sus acólitos. Con este fin, se combina el estudio de fuentes primarias (prensa, debates parlamentarios) con los trabajos más recientes sobre esta cuestión. PALABRAS CLAVE: Baldomero Espartero, carisma, Isabel II, regencia, 1840 ABSTRACT The 1840 September Revolution ended when Fernando VII’s widow, María Cristina de Borbón, abdicated and Baldomero Espartero from Manchego came to power. A few months later, he became the sole Regent for more than two years, until his final fall and exile in London. In this process of pressure over Isabel II’s mother, as well as the signing of the restrictive City Halls Law, admiration of the hero of Luchana among the lower classes played a crucial role. The aim of this text is to discover why from the Carlist War it was believed that Espartero would be able to guarantee the liberties established by the 1837 Constitution against obstacles and abuses set by María Cristina and her acolytes. Towards this goal, the study of primary sources (press, parliamentary debates) is combined with the most recent works on this topic. KEY WORDS: Baldomero Espartero, charisma, Isabel II, Regency, 1840
45
Chung, Heera. "From a Protectionist Party to a Church Party, 1846–48: Identity Crisis of the Conservative Party and the Jew Bill of 1847." Albion 36, no. 2 (2004): 256–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4054215.
Full textAbstract:
This article investigates the influence of the Maynooth and Repeal crises on Conservative politicians after 1846 and the putative maintenance of their identity as defenders of the Church after the Disruption of the party. Historians of the Conservative party have long realized that it suffered from a crisis of identity for a long time after 1846. Some of the leading Peelites were heading more and more towards the Liberal party, and most backbench Peelites gradually joined the Protectionist party; but the Protectionists did not have enough experienced leaders to qualify for the inheritance. Norman Gash has argued that “the Protectionists were not a political party in the sense of one able to provide and sustain a Government in the circumstances of the mid-nineteenth century…. The weakness of the Protectionists was not merely that after 1846 they represented the Conservative party with most of the brains knocked out, but that until they could shake off the monolithic character implied by their title, they could scarcely hope to become a national party or form a viable Government.” Likewise Robert Stewart and John Ramsden consider that the Protectionists were unable to take the place of the Conservative party, given their lack of effective and experienced leaders. It is undeniable that the Protectionist party was not as strong as the Conservative party had been in terms of executive capacity or party organization. But to say also that it was unable to inherit the mantle of Conservatism is to fall into the same trap as Gash and to exaggerate the importance of Peelite executive ability. More significant is the fact that the party of Stanley and Disraeli maintained fidelity to the core principles of the Conservative party—i. e. the constitution of Church and State, and the principle of protectionism. In this sense, the Protectionist party did become the sole inheritor of the Conservative party during the later 1840s.
46
CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ, Miguel Ángel. "En torno a la práctica desaparición de una competencia. El art. 149.1.6 CE y las especialidades procesales autonómicas." Revista Vasca de Administración Pública / Herri-Arduralaritzarako Euskal Aldizkaria, no. 93 (August 30, 2012): 103–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.47623/ivap-rvap.93.2012.04.
Full textAbstract:
LABURPENA: Konstituzioak, 149.1.6 artikuluan, ez zion atea itxi nahi izan autonomia- erkidegoen parte-hartzeari araudi prozesalaren erregulazioan, eta, berez, Estatuari legegintza prozesalaren gainean eman zion eskumen esklusiboa mugatua da; izan ere, beren zuzenbide substantiboaren berezitasunetatik eratorritako espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena aitortu baitzien, aldi berean, autonomia-erkidegoei. Eskumen hori batez ere zuzenbide zibil propioa duten erkidegoetan erabiltzekoa zen, baina ez haietan bakarrik, ez eta soilik gai honi dagokionean ere. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, baina, hain modu murriztailean jokatu du konstituzio-arau hori interpretatu eta aplikatu behar izan duenean (47/2004 epaia da salbuespen bakarra), non autonomia-erkidegoen espezialitate prozesalen gaineko eskumena ezerezean geratu baita. Artikulu honen asmoa honako hau da: alde batetik, egoera honetara nola heldu garen aztertzea; bestetik, 21/2012 epaia analizatzea, zeinak Konstituzio Auzitegiaren ildo murriztailea berresten duen; eta, azkenik, gaurko egoeran beste hautabide batzuk eskaintzea, autonomia-erkidegoek espezialitate prozesalen gainean daukaten eskumena (haietako batzuk erabiltzen ari direna) desagertzeko zorian dago-eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren jurisprudentzian. RESUMEN: La Constitución, en su art. 149.1.6, no quiso cerrar la puerta a la intervención de las CCAA en la regulación de la normativa procesal y otorgó al Estado una competencia exclusiva sobre legislación procesal cuya exclusividad es, en realidad, limitada, dada la simultánea atribución a las CCAA de la competencia para dictar las necesarias especialidades procesales derivadas de las particularidades de su derecho sustantivo. Ello debía ser especialmente útil en aquellas comunidades con Derecho civil propio, aunque no solo en estas ni únicamente respecto de este ámbito material. Ocurre sin embargo que el Tribunal Constitucional, en las ocasiones en que ha debido interpretar y aplicar el mencionado precepto constitucional, lo ha hecho de modo tan restrictivo que, con la única y aislada excepción de la STC 47/2004, la competencia autonómica relativa a las especialidades procesales ha quedado reducida a la nada. El propósito de este artículo es, por un lado, el de examinar cómo se ha llegado a este punto; por otro, estudiar el último de los casos relevantes, la STC 21/2012, que confirma la citada línea restrictiva seguida por el Tribunal; y finalmente apuntar algunas alternativas a la situación a la que se ha llegado, en que la competencia de las CCAA en materia de especialidades procesales (que por otra parte algunas están ejerciendo) se halla condenada a la práctica desaparición en la jurisprudencia constitucional. ABSTRACT: The Constitution in section 149.1.16 has not closed the door to the Autonomous Communities intervention in the regulation of the procedural provisions and conferred the State the exclusive power over the procedural legislation albeit its exclusivity is limited by the simultaneous allocation to the Au tonomous Communities of the power to enact the necessary procedural specifities that come from the special features of its substantive law. That should be extremely useful in those Communities with their own Civil law, even though not only in those and not solely regarding this material field. But what happens is that when the Constitutional Court had to interpret and apply the aforementioned constitutional provision, it has done it so narrowly that with the only and sole exception of the Constitutional judgment 47/2004 the power is almost reduced to nothing. The purpose of this article is on the one hand to examine how this is been reached; and on the other hand, to study the last relevant ruling, judgment 21/2012, which confirms the aforementioned narrow line of interpretation followed by the Court; and finally to point at some alternatives to the situation that has been created in which the power of the Autonomous Communities regarding the procedural specificities (and which they are exercising anyway) is doomed to the practical disappearance according to the constitutional caselaw.
47
Heyns, Anri, and Boitumelo Mmusinyane. "Should the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 be Amended to Address Homelessness? Sarrahwitz v Maritz 2015 8 BCLR 925 (CC)." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 20 (January 3, 2017): 1–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2017/v20i0a1540.
Full textAbstract:
The article critically evaluates the decision of the Constitutional Court to resort to the amendment of the Alienation of Land Act in order to protect a vulnerable purchaser of property against homelessness. It is argued that the origins and purpose of the said Act should have been considered by the Constitutional Court. Such consideration shows that the Act protects against a specific vulnerability which an instalment sale purchaser faces and deals with the right to take transfer. This vulnerability is not necessarily homelessness and is it, therefore, questioned whether the Act can be applied to give effect to the section 26 of the Constitution. The article further argues that an alternative solution could have been to develop, in line with constitutional values, the common law provision which provides the trustee of the insolvent estate with the discretion to cancel a sale agreement pertaining to property sold but not yet transferred, as it is this provision which created the risk of homelessness in this instance. It is, however, submitted, that the minority judgment’s reliance on the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, provided the best solution in this instance.
48
RICHARDS, JUDITH M. "MARY TUDOR AS ‘SOLE QUENE’?: GENDERING TUDOR MONARCHY." Historical Journal 40, no. 4 (December 1997): 895–924. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x97007516.
Full textAbstract:
Although Mary Tudor had reigned for five years before her, Elizabeth Tudor's reign has often been treated as if it raised issues of English female monarchy de novo. The argument of this paper is that the study of Mary's reign is important in its own right, as well as a necessary introduction for any wider study of English female monarchy. It was during Mary's reign that the accommodations consequent upon the occupation of the traditionally male monarchy by the first female occupant were devised. Those strategies subsequently defined central symbolic forms of Elizabeth's reign and shaped their readings. Moreover, the shifts in ritual and representations during the first queen's reign made to accommodate that other novelty, a king as consort, throw considerable light on the underlying political assumptions of the times, as well as the more gendered aspects of constitutional theory.
49
Mead, Adam J., Onima Chowdhury, Christian Pecquet, Alexandra Dusa, Petter Woll, Deborah Atkinson, Adam Burns, et al. "Impact of isolated germline JAK2V617I mutation on human hematopoiesis." Blood 121, no. 20 (May 16, 2013): 4156–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1182/blood-2012-05-430926.
Full textAbstract:
Key Points Germline JAK2V617I mutation as a sole genetic event does not suppress hematopoietic stem cells. JAK2V617I induces weaker constitutive activation than JAK2V617F but considerable cytokine hyperresponsiveness.
50
Våhlin, Vagn. "Grundtvigs økonomiske tænkning." Grundtvig-Studier 41, no. 1 (January 1, 1989): 246–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/grs.v41i1.16034.
Full textAbstract:
Grundtvig’s View of EconomyBy Vagn WåhlinBecause of his impressive impact on Danish culture and society, Grundtvig has been studied from nearly all angles except that of economic philosophy. Due to his consistent omission of references in his writings about society, it is quite difficult to pinpoint exactly from where and when he got the economic ideas he transformed over the years - especially 1830-1848/49 - into a more total economic understanding and which he in 1848 formulated to an economic program for Danish society at the time of the debate and decision on the Danish democratic Constitution of 1849. The author demonstrates that Grundtvig was well acquainted with the major trends in late mercantilistic, French physiocratic and German cameralistic economic thinking of the late Enlightenment as well as with the mainstream of British (Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Mill, etc.) and Continental (Saint Simon, Sismondi et al.) economic thinking of his day. He held some of the physiocratic (i.e., predominance to the agrarian sector) and some of the cameralistic (a strong state, the king, balancing social and economic contradicting forces) views. But at the same time, he was strongly in favour of British liberal economics in the world of trade and distribution and against any economic and professional monopolies. Grundtvig’s economic thinking was well in accordance with the social and economic realities and possibilities in the Danish society of around 1850. His economic platform was built on the existing natural (agrarian) resources and traditions (75% of all land under cultivation belonged to the family farms of 20-120 acres). He wanted to learn from the best of foreign experiences and avoid the misfortunes of industrial capitalism: the class wars and the dehumanization of the industrial working force. Believing that labour - manual and intellectual – was the sole source of social wealth, he would favour the solid and hardworking middle strata of farmers on their family farms and the independent craftsmen as the backbone of production and economy. For him, real democracy required not only the right institutions but even more: well educated and economically independent citizens who were aware not only of their political, but also of their moral (Christian) responsibilities to their fellow men in a society where (as he wrote in 1820 and repeated in 1848) Few have too much and Fewer have too little”.