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Journal articles on the topic 'Contextualisme'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 2 March 2023

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1

Levinson, Jerrold. "Contextualisme esthétique." Articles 32, no. 1 (July 7, 2005): 125–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/011066ar.

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Résumé Je me fixe deux objectifs dans ce texte. Le premier est de situer l’esthétique ou la philosophie de l’art par rapport à la philosophie en général et d’expliquer pourquoi elle a été la préoccupation centrale de tant de philosophes dans la tradition. Mon second objectif est de définir un courant dominant de l’esthétique des trente dernières années, que je nomme « contextualisme », et d’expliquer son importance en ce qui concerne les réflexions des artistes, critiques, théoriciens et publics à propos de l’art. Le contextualisme, en un mot, est la thèse selon laquelle les oeuvres d’art sont, du point de vue ontologique, épistémologique et de la critique, liées à leur contexte de création et de projection ; en dehors de ce contexte, les oeuvres d’art cessent d’être ce qu’elles sont et n’ont plus les qualités et significations qu’elles possèdent en réalité.

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2

Rodrigues, Tiegüe V. "CONHECIMENTO, CONTEXTOS E PREDICADOS MORAIS." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 42, no. 132 (June 12, 2015): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v42n132p81-96/2015.

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Resumo: Neste texto, eu discuto a plausibilidade de uma interpretação contextualista sobre atribuições e alegações de juízos morais. Após uma breve introdução sobre alguns aspectos gerais concernentes à Epistemologia Moral apresentarei uma abordagem contextualista sobre conhecimento, a saber, a tese contextualista proposta por Stewart Cohen. Em seguida, ofereço uma análise contextualista, análoga à tese epistêmica proposta por Cohen, que pretende lidar de maneira mais adequada com os dados lingüísticos envolvendo alegações e atribuições ordinárias de juízos de moralidade. Posteriormente, apresento algumas críticas que podem ser feitas a esta abordagem sobre o contextualismo moral mostrando que elas não são suficientes para refutá-lo. Finalmente, concluo que o contextualismo moral se configura como uma alternativa plausível para explicar nossa prática ordinária referente às nossas alegações e atribuições de juízos morais. Abstract: In this paper I discuss the plausibility of a contextualist account of moral aOributions. APer a brief introduction to some general aspects concerning moral epistemology I present a contextualist approach to knowledge, namely, the contextualist account proposed by Stewart Cohen. Then I oSer a contextualist analysis, analogous to Cohen`s epistemic account, which aims to deal more adequately with the linguistic data involving ordinary claims and aOributions of morality. Subsequently I present some criticisms to this approach on moral contextualism arguing that they are not suUcient to refute it. Finally, I conclude that moral contextualism is a plausible alternative to explain our ordinary practice about our claims and aOributions concerning moral judgments.

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Seymour, Michel. "Le contextualisme sémantique en perspective." Philosophiques 33, no. 1 (2006): 249. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/012957ar.

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4

Lessay, Franck. "Skinner lecteur de Hobbes : le contextualisme confondu." Commentaire Numéro73, no. 1 (1996): 213. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.073.0213.

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5

Allard, F. "Contextualisme et langage d’acceptation en thérapie comportementale intégrative de couple." Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive 17, no. 3 (October 2007): 135–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1155-1704(07)73244-5.

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6

Pavlicic, Jelena. "Williams’ inferential contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403043p.

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This paper is concerned with version of epistemic contextualism known as inferential contextualism which cheif proponent is Michael Williams. The general contextualist strategy attempts to interpret the cognitive claims as expressing statements which meaning is sensitive to the context in which they are uttered, which implies that the truth-value of these claims may differ from context to context. Versions of epistemic contextualism that explain context sensitivity of cognitive claims by referring to conversational factors of the participants in the given conversational context are usually called simple conversational contextualism. Williams accepts the basic contextualists assumptions, but, in contrast to simple conversational contextualists, insists that explanation of contextual sensitivity of cognitive statements is to be found in differences (which are mainly the differences in the methodological assumptions and inferential patterns) between the thematic areas which are the subject of knowledge in different contexts. We will try to show that Williams? contextualism, despite some difficulties, does have certain advantages over the simple conversational contextualism.

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Ferry, Jean-Marc. "Trop brève note à propos du «?contextualisme critique?» de Mark Hunyadi." Revue d'éthique et de théologie morale N°304, no. 4 (2019): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/retm.306.0029.

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8

Kelp, Christoph. "Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?" Erkenntnis 76, no. 1 (October 20, 2011): 115–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9330-y.

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9

Voltolini, Alberto. "Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist?" Essays in Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2010): 150–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20101123.

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There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism.

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10

Brown, Jessica. "Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001005.

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Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data

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11

Franceschi, Paul. "L’argument de la Simulation et le problème de la classe de référence : le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique." Varia 43, no. 2 (December 5, 2016): 371–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1038211ar.

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Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique, fondée sur le problème de la classe de référence. Je décris tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation de manière détaillée. J’identifie ensuite la classe de référence et j’applique successivement l’argument à trois classes de référence distinctes : les simulations conscientes de leur propre nature de simulation, les simulations imparfaites et les simulations à immersion. Finalement, je montre qu’il existe trois niveaux de conclusion dans l’argument de la Simulation, selon la classe de référence choisie, qui engendrent des conclusions finales d’une nature très différente.

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12

Murphy, Peter. "A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism." Dialogue 44, no. 4 (2005): 693–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000044.

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ABSTRACTThis article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of this argument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I conclude, should abandon sensitivity for some other piece of epistemic machinery.

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Vilaró, Ignacio. "An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, no. 65 (December 2, 2022): 49–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v650.2061.

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According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistemic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radical position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skeptical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view.

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CHAVES, Jose E. "El contextualismo y P. Grice (The Contextualism and P. Grice)." THEORIA 19, no. 3 (September 6, 2004): 339–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.586.

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Según Recanati, hay un argumento anticontextualista que tiene su origen en Grice. En este artículo demuestro que ese argumento no puede estar en Grice si tenemos en cuenta la explicación que ofrece de ciertos ejemplos y su teoría de las implicaturas. Grice se muestra como un contextualista.

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15

Labrecque, Simon, and René Lemieux. "La fronde et la crosse. Aspects cynégétiques du débat entre « textualisme » et « contextualisme » en histoire des idées." Cygne noir, no. 3 (July 11, 2022): 26–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1090450ar.

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Cet article se propose de revoir le débat classique en histoire des idées politiques entre Leo Strauss (et les « straussiens ») et l’école de Cambridge, en particulier Quentin Skinner, sous l’angle du mystère, du secret et de la chasse aux signes. La notion de « chasse », comprise à la fois comme cynégétique du pouvoir et pratique textuelle de la pensée politique, permet de comparer une méthode interprétative, celle de Strauss, qui prétend retrouver les questions essentielles de la philosophie dans une démarche mystérieuse de lecture « entre les lignes » avec celle du « contextualisme » de l’école de Cambridge qui propose plutôt la mise au jour du vouloir-dire de l’auteur au moyen d’une étude du contexte dans lequel il a écrit. À partir de cette comparaison, nous proposons de mettre à l’épreuve les affirmations des deux écoles par l’« onomasiologie » de leurs pratiques intellectuelles (traduction et commentaire de textes). En conclusion, nous proposons de voir ce débat comme le lieu d’une décision quant au mystère : en dévoiler la vérité ultime ou l’entretenir pour les générations à venir.

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Sgaravatti, Daniele. "In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 2 (2013): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x630704.

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I begin by describing the solution to the problem of skepticism propounded by contextualists, which constitutes the background of the rest of the paper. I then address the question of what happens when a skeptic and a non-skeptic are confronted in dialogue to the standards in play for correct knowledge ascription, on the assumption that contextualism about knowledge is right. I argue against Keith DeRose that there are reasons, both intuitive and theoretical, to conclude that the standards will be raised in such a way as to make the skeptic’s denials of knowledge true. Next, I argue, again against DeRose, for the claim that that conclusion has significant theoretical consequences. In particular, I argue that, if the standards do tend to rise, then there is a serious problem for contextualist answers to skepticism. The problem, which is sometimes called the factivity problem, is that the contextualist position is not possible to state properly unless we know in the theoretical context that skeptical hypotheses do not hold.

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17

Perl, Jeffrey M. "Introduction." Common Knowledge 26, no. 3 (August 1, 2020): 441–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-8521633.

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In this introduction to Part 1 of “Contextualism—the Next Generation: Symposium on the Future of a Methodology,” the editor of Common Knowledge, a “journal of left-wing Kuhnian opinion,” reports that the new symposium responds to contextualist criticism of the previous CK symposium, which was on xenophilia. The content of the earlier symposium met with objections, from contextualists, on the grounds of methodology, and the new symposium questions the methodology of contextualism for the limits that it places on content as well as on normative aims and degree of focus. Tracing the origins of contextualism to Kuhn and his theory that paradigms of scientific knowledge are incommensurable, this essay then argues that Kuhnian method is formal, with scant concern for content, and that Kuhn’s work was vatic, more than philosophical or historical. Kuhn’s depiction of his sudden, blinding realization that Aristotelian physics is correct in its own context is assessed as an ironic application of biblical scenes of revelation to what is, essentially, a process of scrupulous, piecemeal scholarship. What Kuhn unknowingly wanted, the essay concludes, was a combination of contextualism and phenomenology, as a means of knowing what it was like to believe in Aristotelian, as opposed to modern, concepts of matter, quality, space, void, position, change, and motion. The essay then introduces the first contribution to the new symposium: a monograph retrieving geometrical and taxonomic—Euclidean and Theophrastan—idioms of discourse about fictional characters and inquiring into their changing affective content.

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18

Kallestrup, Jesper. "Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 247–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001013.

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This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.

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Montminy, Martin. "L’interprétationnisme radical." Articles 32, no. 1 (July 7, 2005): 191–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/011070ar.

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RésuméJ’examine la thèse défendue par Donald Davidson selon laquelle un être ne peut avoir des pensées que s’il a été en communication linguistique avec quelqu’un d’autre par le passé. Cette thèse, que j’appelle « l’interprétationnisme radical », dérive de la thèseAselon laquelle il est nécessaire d’avoir les concepts de croyance et de vérité objective pour avoir des croyances, et de la thèseBvoulant que la communication linguistique soit requise pour l’acquisition du concept de vérité objective. En réponse àA, je préconise un point de vuecontextualiste, selon lequel les normes d’attribution de croyances dépendent du contexte conversationnel. Le contextualisme entraîne non pas queAest fausse, mais qu’elle doit être relative à un contexte. Je montre par ailleurs que contrairement à ce qu’affirmeB, l’interaction (linguistique) avec autrui n’est pas nécessaire pour acquérir le concept de vérité objective. Je conclus que les arguments de Davidson soutiennent au mieux l’interprétationnismemodéré, c’est-à-dire l’idée selon laquelle un être a des pensées si et seulement si ces pensées sont interprétables par un interprète pleinement informé.

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Cukljevic, Filip. "Contextualism and externalism in Michael Williams’ epistemological theory." Theoria, Beograd 61, no. 1 (2018): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1801025c.

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In this paper I shall deal with the relation between the contextualist and externalist elements in the epistemological theory of Michael Williams. I shall claim that Williams did not clearly explicate the true nature of that relation. Firstly, I shall briefly present Williams? contextualist theory. Then I shall expose Brian Ribeiro?s objection to Williams according to which externalism, and not contextualism, plays a key role in his theory. I shall argue against this objection. On the other hand, contrary to Williams, I shall claim that externalism is not a necessary consequence of contextualism. Williams? theory is just an externalist version of the basic contextualist standpoint. Another, Wittgensteinian version is also possible. Finally, I shall show that Williams? theory is not obviously better then Wittgensteinian one.

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21

Brendel, Elke. "Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism." Acta Analytica 20, no. 2 (June 2005): 38–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1021-3.

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Freitag, Wolfgang. "ON THE KNOWABILITY OF EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM: A REPLY TO M. MONTMINY AND W. SKOLITS." Episteme 12, no. 3 (April 14, 2015): 335–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.2.

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AbstractIt has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.

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Aldridge, Jerry. "Constructivism, Contextualism, and Applied Developmental Psychology." Perceptual and Motor Skills 76, no. 3_suppl (June 1993): 1242. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1993.76.3c.1242.

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Constructivism and contextualism name two models for research in applied developmental psychology. Recommendations are made for including both the constructivist and contextualist perspectives in research.

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Koikkalainen, Petri. "The Politics of Contextualism." Journal of the Philosophy of History 9, no. 3 (November 2, 2015): 347–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341307.

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A central purpose of historicist contextualism, or the “new history of political thought”, the central methodological ideas of which were laid out between the 1950s and the 70s, was to liberate the history of ideas from distorting influence of political ideology, nationalism, and other presentist narratives that ascribed past events under false teleologies. From the 1980s onwards, it has been possible to find explicitly normative statements in the works of the leading contextualist historians and scholars influenced by their work, for example, Skinner’s defences of neo-Roman republicanism. This article examines the normative content of contextualism. Instead of arguing that the normative aspect was a novelty introduced after the 1980s, the claim here is that contextualist theorising was socially and politically implicated and arguably normative from its very beginning. To substantiate this, the article offers an interpretation of the normativity of early contextualism based on its relationship towards broader socio-political themes such as ideology, agency, emancipation, progress, and societies’ relationship with their pasts. Early contextualist normativity assumed that the professional research of history would be a suitable and sufficient way of generating also socially desirable outcomes. Later, as the political and academic background conditions changed, this normativity was given more explicit (e.g. republican) formulations in order to keep up its political relevance.

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Montminy, Martin, and Wes Skolits. "DEFENDING THE COHERENCE OF CONTEXTUALISM." Episteme 11, no. 3 (May 15, 2014): 319–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.13.

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AbstractAccording to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory.

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Pritchard, Duncan. "Neo-Mooreanism Contextualism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001002.

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Attributer contextualism has undoubtedly been the dominant anti-sceptical theory in the recent literature. Nevertheless, this view does face some fairly serious problems, and it is argued that when the contextualist position is compared to a refined version of the much derided 'Moorean' response to scepticism, then it becomes clear that there are distinct advantages to being a neo-Moorean rather than a contextualist.

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Baumann, Peter. "Varieties of Contextualism: Standards and Descriptions." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 229–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001012.

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Most contextualists agree that contexts differ with respect to relevant epistemic standards. In this paper, I discuss the idea that the difference between more modest and stricter standards should be explained in terms of the closeness or remoteness of relevant possible worlds. I argue that there are serious problems with this version of contextualism. In the second part of the paper, I argue for another form of contextualism that has little to do with standards and a lot with the well-known problem of the reference class. This paper also illustrates the fact that contextualism comes in many varieties.

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Bogdanovski, Masan. "Inferential contextualism as an epistemic anti-skeptical strategy." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 79–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403079b.

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This paper analyzes the advantages inferential contextualism has over the other contextualist theories in epistemology. Inferential contextualism is labelled as an epistemic anti-skeptical strategy, contrary to the semantic strategies that are also inspired by the Wittgenstein?s book On Certainty. It is claimed that there are certain internal incoherencies within the epistemic strategies, which gives an advantage to the semantic ones, both in the argumentation against skepticism and as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.

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Henderson, David K. "Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism." Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 12 (1994): 627–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940759.

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Rodrigues, Tiegue Vieira. "FALIBILISMO E ATRIBUIÇÕES DE CONHECIMENTO CONCESSIVO." Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia 3, no. 05 (July 30, 2011): 341–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2011.v3n05.4413.

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Neste artigo Jason Stanley desafia a alegação feita por Lewis de que a semântica contextualista para “saber” oferece a melhor explicação para a estranheza causada pela alegação falibilista. Stanley pretende, então, explicar a estranheza do falibilismo sem necessariamente abraçar o contextualismo. Para isso, ele recorre à Tese de Conhecimento de Asserção e conclui que a motivação contextualista de Lewis não é convincente, uma vez que não é preciso recorrer à semântica para explicar a estranheza do falibilismo.

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McKenna, Robin. "The Disappearance of Ignorance." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (March 3, 2020): 4–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191371.

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Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it.

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Black, Tim, and Peter Murphy. "Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 165–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001009.

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Epistemological contextualists maintain that the truth-conditions of sentences of the form 'S knows that P' vary according to the context in which they're uttered, where this variation is due to the semantics of 'knows'. Among the linguistic data that have been offered in support of contextualism are several everyday cases. We argue that these cases fail to support contextualism and that they instead support epistemological invariantism—the thesis that the truth-conditions of 'S knows that P' do vary according to the context of their utterance.

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Brajkovic, Ema. "Elusive luck: Contextualist approach to the Gettier problem." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 4 (2021): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2104083b.

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Lewis' philosophical ambition to eradicate the skeptical threat towards infallibilism was the driving force behind his contextualist approach to knowledge. One of the discerning characteristics of his conversational contextualism is the claim that it can solve the Gettier problem. The first part of this paper will be directed towards explicating the arguments Lewis employed in reaching said solution. The second part will be concerned with Cohen?s critique of the proposed explanation. Cohen?s considerations result in an insight that contextualism does not have the adequate means to answer the Gettier challenge. Finally, I shall make an attempt at further motivating Cohen?s claim by investigating the essential component of Gettier cases - epistemic luck. This will be done by appealing to Pritchard?s concept of veritic epistemic luck. The author?s goal is to suggest that contextualist resources are neither suitable to solve nor exhaustively articulate the Gettier problem.

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McLaughlin, Michael C. "The linguistic subject and the conscious subject in mysticism studies." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25, no. 2 (June 1996): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842989602500204.

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The current discussion in philosophy of mysticism is heading down two divergent lines. Contextualist studies (notably Steven Katz) employ a linguistic model of the epistemic subject. Critics of contextualism (notably Robert Forman) have offered what this study calls a cognitionalist approach which draws attention to the performance of the conscious subject. The two approaches are combined by some members of the contextualist camp. This study argues that there is an as yet unrecognized complementarity between linguistic and cognitional approaches to mystical philosophy.

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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don't Know We Have Hands and it's Fine." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 13, no. 1 (April 14, 2020): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.13.1.106-117.

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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don’t Know We Have Hands and It’s Fine." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 13 (2020): 106–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2020139.

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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.

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Lamb, Robert. "Recent Developments in the Thought of Quentin Skinner and the Ambitions of Contextualism." Journal of the Philosophy of History 3, no. 3 (2009): 246–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226309x461524.

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AbstractIn this article, I chart some recent developments in the linguistic contextualist philosophy of history defended by Quentin Skinner. I attempt to identify several shifts in the way in which Skinner's position has been presented and justified, focusing particularly on his embrace of anti-foundationalism, his focus on rhetoric rather than speech-acts and his concern to recast contextualism as compatible with other interpretive approaches. In the final section, I reject the notion – suggested by Skinner and others – that a contextualist philosophy of history might constitute a distinct form of political theorizing in itself.

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Jaster, Romy. "Contextualizing Free Will." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 74, no. 2 (June 15, 2020): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433020829410460.

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Hawthorne (2001) toys with the view that ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive. But the way he formulates the view makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. I step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution is not ad hoc. The view explains data which cannot be accounted for by an ambiguity hypothesis. On the other hand, I suggest a more plausible freedom contextualist analysis, which emerges naturally once we pair the assumption that freedom requires that the agent could have acted otherwise with a plausible semantics of "can" statements. I'll dub the resulting view Alternate Possibilities Contextualism, or APC, for short. In contrast to Hawthorne's view, APC is well-motivated in its own right, does not beg the question against the incompatibilist and delivers a context parameter which allows for a wide range of context shifts. I conclude that, far from being a non-starter, freedom contextualism sets an agenda worth pursuing.

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Brendel, Elke. "Disagreeing with a Skeptic from a Contextualist Point of View." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (March 3, 2020): 28–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191360.

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The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions of contextualism are better suited to account for those phenomena than DeRose’s indexical form of contextualism. Furthermore, I will argue against DeRose’s “single scoreboard” semantics and against his solution of ruling that in a dispute over skepticism, both parties to the conversation are expressing something truth-valueless. At the end, I will briefly address the question of whether DeRose’s contextualism combined with his double-safety account and his rule of sensitivity provide an epistemically satisfying answer to the skeptical challenge. It will be argued that by merely explaining (away) the attractiveness of skeptical arguments, DeRose’s contextualism seems to lack the resources to explain some important epistemic issues, as, for example, the question of what knowledge is and when a true belief turns into knowledge.

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Lazovic, Zivan. "Epistemic contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403005l.

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The aim of this article is to provide an introduction to the main topic of this issue of Theoria. First, the author presents the key thesis of epistemic contextualism, outlines its development in contemporary epistemology and briefly characterizes its two versions, namely conversational and inferential contextualism. Second, the author focuses on some contextualist solutions to three major epistemological problems: the problem of scepticism, lottery, and Gettier's problem. The author agrees with Stewart Cohen that Gettier?s problem does not belong to this group and explains why both its formulation and a solution require a traditional, invariantist approach.

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LUDLOW, PETER. "Contextualism, Multi-Tasking, and Third-Person Knowledge Reports: A Note on Keith DeRose’s The Case for Contextualism1." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84, no. 3 (May 2012): 686–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00584.x.

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Zilio, Diego. "Algumas considerações sobre a terapia de aceitação e compromisso (ACT) e o problema dos valores." Perspectivas em Análise do Comportamento 2, no. 2 (August 24, 2017): 159–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.18761/perspectivas.v2i2.61.

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O objetivo do presente ensaio é discorrer sobre a concepção de valores proposta pela terapia de aceitação e compromisso (ACT), à luz de sua filosofia contextualista funcional. Argumenta-se que o critério pragmático de verdade do contextualismo funcional, quando utilizado na ACT para lidar com a questão valores, pode ocasionar problemas devido ao seu caráter relativista e fundacional.

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Mijic, Jelena. "The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy." Filozofija i drustvo 31, no. 4 (2020): 615–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid2004615m.

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This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses? contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called ?abominable conjunction?. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose?s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick?s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black?s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.

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Cukljevic, Filip. "Williams’ contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403061c.

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At the beginning of this paper a formulation of skeptical paradox is offered. Subsequently, possible types of anti-skeptical answers to this paradox are shown. Special attention is paid to the determination of the contextualistic versus other anti-skeptical answers. Two versions of contextualism are then presented, in order to more accurately determine Williams' contextualist view by their comparative analysis. Presentation of this view is supplemented by the display of Williams' understanding of knowledge in nonepistemological contexts. In the end, two objections to the Williams' contextualist view are exposed, and the answers to them are offered.

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Williams, Michael. "Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism." Episteme 4, no. 1 (February 2007): 93–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.93.

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ABSTRACTThis article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good reason to doubt the belief; so we need not rely on our epistemic system to determine whether a belief is justified. Accordingly contextualism is not committed to the view that a belief’s status depends on the believer’s epistemic system, nor to the view that no system is superior to another. The contextualist is not committed to epistemic relativism.

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Smith, Nicholas D. "Contextualism and closure." Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies 36, no. 2 (2020): 291–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2020.207.

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Skepticism confronts us with a paradox (sometimes known as “the skeptical trilemma”), a version of which follows: (1) I know that I am working on a computer right now; (2) I know that knowing that I am working on a computer right now logically implies that I am not being deceived or manipulated in the way that skeptical hypotheses imagine. (This implication is called “closure under known logical implication”); (3) I do not or cannot know that I am not being deceived or manipulated in the way skeptical hypotheses imagine. The paradox of skepticism is that these three statements are logically incompatible. A relatively new movement in epistemology called contextualism proposes that we can accept all three of the claims in the trilemma, by recognizing that they are not all true within the same epistemic context. Briefly, contextualists claim that we can know in ordinary contexts, but cannot know that we are not being deceived or manipulated in a skeptical scenario, but the latter fact is true in a different epistemic context than the ordinary knowledge that we might have. Closure under known logical implication will remain true, but only insofar as the implications involved are alternatives that belong to the same epistemic context as the original knowledge claim. In this paper, I claim that contextualism’s account of how epistemological contexts change, together with its acceptance of closure, is implausible.

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García Campos, Jonatan, and Ricardo Vázquez Gutiérrez. "Contextualismo, fiabilismo y el problema pirrónico." Diánoia. Revista de Filosofía 57, no. 68 (September 1, 2016): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.21898/dia.v57i68.150.

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<p class='p1'>En este trabajo se explora una conexión entre el contextualismo y el fiabilismo. El propósito es desarrollar las líneas centrales de un acercamiento contextualista para resolver la crítica internista de que las nociones fiabilistas de justificación y de conocimiento no son adecuadas porque no recogen las intuiciones correspondientes a que un sujeto que está justificado o que sabe es racional y epistemológicamente responsable. Se argumenta que esta crítica y el escepticismo pirrónico comparten un presupuesto común, a saber, la cláusula internista, por lo que, si es posible limitar el alcance de esta cláusula a través del contextualismo distinguiendo dos contextos diferentes, entonces también es posible hacer uso de esta distinción para dar respuesta a la crítica internista al fiabilismo.</p>

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Lawlor, Krista. "Living Without Closure." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 25–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001003.

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Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure.

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Bachmann, Marcus. "The Epistemology of Understanding. A contextualist approach." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340105.

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Abstract This paper aims to provide a unifying approach to the analysis of understanding coherencies (interrogative understanding, e.g. understanding why something is the case) and understanding subject matters (objectual understanding) by highlighting the contextualist nature of understanding. Inspired by the relevant alternatives contextualism about knowledge, I will argue that understanding (in the above mentioned sense) inherently has context-sensitive features and that a theory of understanding that highlights those features can incorporate our intuitions towards understanding as well as consolidate the different accounts of how to analyse understanding. In developing a contextualist account of understanding, I will argue that an account of the features commonly taken to be central to understanding greatly benefits from a contextualist framework. Central to my analysis will be the claim that a person has to fulfill the function of a competent problem solver in order to qualify for the ascription of understanding. In addition to the theoretical elucidation of my contextualist approach to understanding, a demanding hypothetical scenario will be developed to function as a test case.

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Mascetti, Yaakov A. "Tokens of Love." Common Knowledge 27, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-8723023.

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Contextualist scholars working on the rhetoric of corporeal presence in seventeenth-century English religious lyrics have naturally focused their attention on sacramental discourse of the Reformation era. As part of the Common Knowledge symposium on the future of contextualism, this full-length monograph, serialized in installments, argues that the contextualist focus on a single and time-limited “epistemic field” has resulted in a less than adequately ramified understanding of the poetry of John Donne, George Herbert, Aemilia Lanyer, and John Milton. What the contextualist approach misses is that even the religious discourses of the period were tied to a long and in no way local epistemological debate about signs and their meaning, whose roots are to be found in Greek and Latin rhetorical theory. This first installment of “Tokens of Love” commences a discussion of the role of classical pagan sign-theory in the development of Reformation sacramental discourse.

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