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Journal articles on the topic 'Contextualité'
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1
Diet, Emmanuel. "Croyance, appartenance et contextualité." Revue de psychothérapie psychanalytique de groupe 49, no. 2 (2007): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rppg.049.0039.
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Poinat, Sébastien. "Popper, Bohr et la contextualité de la mécanique quantique." Philosophia Scientae, no. 25-3 (October 25, 2021): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.3199.
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Diet, Emmanuel. "Complexité de la clinique : contextualité, demande éducative et position psychanalytique." Dialogue 177, no. 3 (2007): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/dia.177.0081.
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Rodrigues, Tiegüe V. "CONHECIMENTO, CONTEXTOS E PREDICADOS MORAIS." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 42, no. 132 (2015): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v42n132p81-96/2015.
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Resumo: Neste texto, eu discuto a plausibilidade de uma interpretação contextualista sobre atribuições e alegações de juízos morais. Após uma breve introdução sobre alguns aspectos gerais concernentes à Epistemologia Moral apresentarei uma abordagem contextualista sobre conhecimento, a saber, a tese contextualista proposta por Stewart Cohen. Em seguida, ofereço uma análise contextualista, análoga à tese epistêmica proposta por Cohen, que pretende lidar de maneira mais adequada com os dados lingüísticos envolvendo alegações e atribuições ordinárias de juízos de moralidade. Posteriormente, apresento algumas críticas que podem ser feitas a esta abordagem sobre o contextualismo moral mostrando que elas não são suficientes para refutá-lo. Finalmente, concluo que o contextualismo moral se configura como uma alternativa plausível para explicar nossa prática ordinária referente às nossas alegações e atribuições de juízos morais. Abstract: In this paper I discuss the plausibility of a contextualist account of moral aOributions. APer a brief introduction to some general aspects concerning moral epistemology I present a contextualist approach to knowledge, namely, the contextualist account proposed by Stewart Cohen. Then I oSer a contextualist analysis, analogous to Cohen`s epistemic account, which aims to deal more adequately with the linguistic data involving ordinary claims and aOributions of morality. Subsequently I present some criticisms to this approach on moral contextualism arguing that they are not suUcient to refute it. Finally, I conclude that moral contextualism is a plausible alternative to explain our ordinary practice about our claims and aOributions concerning moral judgments.
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Pavlicic, Jelena. "Williams’ inferential contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403043p.
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This paper is concerned with version of epistemic contextualism known as inferential contextualism which cheif proponent is Michael Williams. The general contextualist strategy attempts to interpret the cognitive claims as expressing statements which meaning is sensitive to the context in which they are uttered, which implies that the truth-value of these claims may differ from context to context. Versions of epistemic contextualism that explain context sensitivity of cognitive claims by referring to conversational factors of the participants in the given conversational context are usually called simple conversational contextualism. Williams accepts the basic contextualists assumptions, but, in contrast to simple conversational contextualists, insists that explanation of contextual sensitivity of cognitive statements is to be found in differences (which are mainly the differences in the methodological assumptions and inferential patterns) between the thematic areas which are the subject of knowledge in different contexts. We will try to show that Williams? contextualism, despite some difficulties, does have certain advantages over the simple conversational contextualism.
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Kelp, Christoph. "Do ‘Contextualist Cases’ Support Contextualism?" Erkenntnis 76, no. 1 (2011): 115–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9330-y.
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Voltolini, Alberto. "Is Wittgenstein a Contextualist?" Essays in Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2010): 150–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip20101123.
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There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism.
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Fraisopi, Fausto. "Expérience et horizon chez Husserl: contextualité et synthèse à partir du concept de «représentation vide»." Studia Phaenomenologica 9, no. -1 (2009): 455–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7761/sp.9.455.
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Thorström, Tony. "Toward an Ontology of Emergence: Agency Materialization and Redistribution Processes in Jean-Michel Truong’s Le Successeur de pierre." IRIS, no. 38 (June 30, 2017): 81–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.35562/iris.1083.
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À travers l’ouvrage Le Successeur de pierre (1999) par Jean-Michel Truong et à la lumière des théories de Félix Guattari, de Mark B. N. Hansen et de Brian Rotman relatives aux multiples virtualités de l’être humain, cet article étudiera la narration romanesque de l’imbrication des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication (NTIC) dans les processus de matérialisation et d’agentivité du posthumain. Dans son roman, Truong nous invite en effet à repenser la contextualité du corps et de l’identité humaine en substituant un point de vue anthropocentrique et dualiste à une ontologie de l’émergence.
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Thorström, Tony. "Toward an Ontology of Emergence: Agency Materialization and Redistribution Processes in Jean-Michel Truong’s Le Successeur de pierre." IRIS, no. 38 (June 30, 2017): 81–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.35562/iris.1083.
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À travers l’ouvrage Le Successeur de pierre (1999) par Jean-Michel Truong et à la lumière des théories de Félix Guattari, de Mark B. N. Hansen et de Brian Rotman relatives aux multiples virtualités de l’être humain, cet article étudiera la narration romanesque de l’imbrication des nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication (NTIC) dans les processus de matérialisation et d’agentivité du posthumain. Dans son roman, Truong nous invite en effet à repenser la contextualité du corps et de l’identité humaine en substituant un point de vue anthropocentrique et dualiste à une ontologie de l’émergence.
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Bruna, Maria Giuseppina, and Mathieu Chauvet. "La diversité, un levier de performance : plaidoyer pour un management innovateur et créatif." Management international 17 (May 23, 2013): 70–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1015813ar.
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L’historicité, la contextualité et la polysémie des notions de diversité et de performance expliquent l’hétérogénéité des conclusions auxquelles aboutissent les études empiriques qui en testent la relation. Les dimensions culturelles et temporelles, le type de management adopté, les modes d’intégration professionnelle, la conjoncture et le contexte intra-organisationnel influent sur la performance des équipes diversifiées. Afin de transmuer la diversité en levier de performance, les organisations sont invitées à concevoir des politiques diversité soucieuses d’inscrire le changement dans la durée (perspective sociétale), de promouvoir un management intégrateur attentif aux dimensions culturelles et identitaires (niveau organisationnel), de développer la pratique du mentoring et du leadership (échelon individuel).
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Brown, Jessica. "Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 71–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001005.
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Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data
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Murphy, Peter. "A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism." Dialogue 44, no. 4 (2005): 693–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000044.
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ABSTRACTThis article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of this argument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I conclude, should abandon sensitivity for some other piece of epistemic machinery.
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Vilaró, Ignacio. "An Austinian Account of Knowledge Ascriptions." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía, no. 65 (December 2, 2022): 49–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v650.2061.
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According to epistemic contextualism, the truth value of a knowledge ascription sentence varies in relation to the epistemic standard in play at its context of use. Contextualists promise a relatively conservative (dis)solution of the skeptical paradox that threatens to destroy our alleged everyday knowledge, based on our apparent inability to discard some exotic possibilities of error. The origins of the contextualist position have been traced back to some passages of Austin’s “Other Minds.” However, it is at best dubious whether the alternative there explored is indeed contextualist. Austin seems to be proposing a much more radical position, one still ignored in the literature. This paper aims to develop an Austinian approach to knowledge attributions. I show how we could use the Austinian account to solve this skeptical paradox. I also respond to some important objections to this view.
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Sgaravatti, Daniele. "In Conversation with the Skeptic: Contextualism and the Raising of Standards." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3, no. 2 (2013): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/221057012x630704.
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I begin by describing the solution to the problem of skepticism propounded by contextualists, which constitutes the background of the rest of the paper. I then address the question of what happens when a skeptic and a non-skeptic are confronted in dialogue to the standards in play for correct knowledge ascription, on the assumption that contextualism about knowledge is right. I argue against Keith DeRose that there are reasons, both intuitive and theoretical, to conclude that the standards will be raised in such a way as to make the skeptic’s denials of knowledge true. Next, I argue, again against DeRose, for the claim that that conclusion has significant theoretical consequences. In particular, I argue that, if the standards do tend to rise, then there is a serious problem for contextualist answers to skepticism. The problem, which is sometimes called the factivity problem, is that the contextualist position is not possible to state properly unless we know in the theoretical context that skeptical hypotheses do not hold.
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Rizkallah, Élias. "L’analyse textuelle des discours assistée par ordinateur et les logiciels textométriques : réflexions critiques et prospectives à partir d’une modélisation des procédés analytiques fondamentaux." Cahiers de recherche sociologique, no. 54 (July 24, 2014): 141–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1025996ar.
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Partant d’un constat d’une focalisation de l’analyse de discours française sur les logiciels textométriques, l’auteur tente de modéliser les procédés fondamentaux sous-jacents à l’interaction analyste-texte en distinguant les modes, les opérations, les dimensions, la granularité, la contextualité et la temporalité de la démarche, et ce, avec ou sans recours aux traitements informatiques. À la lumière de cette modélisation, les logiciels textométriques montrent que l’assistance du chercheur est souvent une question de donner à voir, via des procédés d’interrogation, d’assignation automatique et de représentation, des données textuelles et extratextuelles, mais très rarement une question d’accompagner le chercheur dans son travail du texte (p. ex. annotation sur mesure, multiplicité des couches de lecture, évolution du corpus) pour produire et construire du sens par ses traces d’analyses dans un environnement intégré. Les origines de cette tendance sont discutées ainsi que les orientations pour les développements à venir.
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Vostrikova, Ekaterina V., and Petr S. Kusliy. "Contextualism and the Problem of Knowledge Ascription." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 4 (2021): 110–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158464.
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The paper explores the contextualist approach towards the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. The authors discuss the relevance of these studies in semantics for the major issues in virtue epistemology. It is argued that despite the advantages that contextualism has over its alternatives (in particular, relativism and subject sensitive invariablisism), it still requires a more elaborated compositional semantics that it currently has. We review several concrete contextualsit proposals to the semantics of the verb know in light of their applicability to the well-known type of examples known as the fake barn example, point out some of their particular shortcomings, and propose a revision, which represents a variant of D. Lewis’s general approach to the semantics of know.
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Perl, Jeffrey M. "Introduction." Common Knowledge 26, no. 3 (2020): 441–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-8521633.
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In this introduction to Part 1 of “Contextualism—the Next Generation: Symposium on the Future of a Methodology,” the editor of Common Knowledge, a “journal of left-wing Kuhnian opinion,” reports that the new symposium responds to contextualist criticism of the previous CK symposium, which was on xenophilia. The content of the earlier symposium met with objections, from contextualists, on the grounds of methodology, and the new symposium questions the methodology of contextualism for the limits that it places on content as well as on normative aims and degree of focus. Tracing the origins of contextualism to Kuhn and his theory that paradigms of scientific knowledge are incommensurable, this essay then argues that Kuhnian method is formal, with scant concern for content, and that Kuhn’s work was vatic, more than philosophical or historical. Kuhn’s depiction of his sudden, blinding realization that Aristotelian physics is correct in its own context is assessed as an ironic application of biblical scenes of revelation to what is, essentially, a process of scrupulous, piecemeal scholarship. What Kuhn unknowingly wanted, the essay concludes, was a combination of contextualism and phenomenology, as a means of knowing what it was like to believe in Aristotelian, as opposed to modern, concepts of matter, quality, space, void, position, change, and motion. The essay then introduces the first contribution to the new symposium: a monograph retrieving geometrical and taxonomic—Euclidean and Theophrastan—idioms of discourse about fictional characters and inquiring into their changing affective content.
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Kallestrup, Jesper. "Contextualism Between Scepticism and Common-Sense." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 247–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001013.
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This paper examines two recent objections against contextualism. The first is that contextualists are unable to assert their own position, and the second is that contextualists are forced to side with common-sense against scepticism. It is argued that once we get clear on the commitments of contextualism, neither objection succeeds in what it aims to show.
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Cukljevic, Filip. "Contextualism and externalism in Michael Williams’ epistemological theory." Theoria, Beograd 61, no. 1 (2018): 25–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1801025c.
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In this paper I shall deal with the relation between the contextualist and externalist elements in the epistemological theory of Michael Williams. I shall claim that Williams did not clearly explicate the true nature of that relation. Firstly, I shall briefly present Williams? contextualist theory. Then I shall expose Brian Ribeiro?s objection to Williams according to which externalism, and not contextualism, plays a key role in his theory. I shall argue against this objection. On the other hand, contrary to Williams, I shall claim that externalism is not a necessary consequence of contextualism. Williams? theory is just an externalist version of the basic contextualist standpoint. Another, Wittgensteinian version is also possible. Finally, I shall show that Williams? theory is not obviously better then Wittgensteinian one.
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Brendel, Elke. "Why contextualists cannot know they are right: Self-refuting implications of contextualism." Acta Analytica 20, no. 2 (2005): 38–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-005-1021-3.
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Kuzmanovic, Stefan. "Epistemic contextualism: Problems of disagreement and retraction." Theoria, Beograd 66, no. 4 (2023): 15–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2304015k.
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Elke Brendel claims that, regarding several challenges, her nonindexical contextualism fares better than the so-called indexical versions of contextualism supported by prominent epistemic contextualists such as Keith DeRose, Stewart Cohen, etc. Of these challenges, we will consider the problems of disagreement and retraction. I will argue that the indexical nature of DeRose?s account doesn?t necessarily have to relate to personally indicated standards. Instead, I will offer an interpretation that generalizes the idea of conversational context and determines conversationally indicated epistemic standards as the main bearer of the content and the truth condition of knowledge attributions. In some cases, conversationally indicated epistemic standards are collapsing into personally indicated. In other cases, some form of the reconciliation of personally indicated standards produces the final conversationally indicated epistemic standards. This interpretation is motivated by Mion?s contextualist position, but in the first stage, it doesn?t require his notion of objective contexts. When dealing with typical face-to-face disputes, this interpretation of DeRose?s position will successfully account for the challenge of disagreement. Only when we are faced with so-called one-way disputes and the challenge of retraction, we will depart from DeRose, and instead, refer to Mion?s position. I will claim that by adopting his view, we are in a position to better respond to these two challenges, than Brendel with her nonindexical account.
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Freitag, Wolfgang. "ON THE KNOWABILITY OF EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM: A REPLY TO M. MONTMINY AND W. SKOLITS." Episteme 12, no. 3 (2015): 335–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.2.
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AbstractIt has been frequently suggested that epistemic contextualists violate the knowledge norm of assertion; by its own lights contextualism cannot be known and hence not be knowingly stated. I have defended contextualists against this objection by showing that it rests on a misunderstanding of their commitments (Freitag 2011, 2012, 2013b). In M. Montminy's and W. Skolits' recent contribution to this journal (2014), their criticism of my solution forms the background against which the authors develop their own. The present reply ventures to demonstrate that their objections are ineffective, since they rest on a confusion of two different ways in which contextualism is unknowable. The precise nature of the original problem will be clarified and my solution briefly restated.
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Koikkalainen, Petri. "The Politics of Contextualism." Journal of the Philosophy of History 9, no. 3 (2015): 347–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341307.
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A central purpose of historicist contextualism, or the “new history of political thought”, the central methodological ideas of which were laid out between the 1950s and the 70s, was to liberate the history of ideas from distorting influence of political ideology, nationalism, and other presentist narratives that ascribed past events under false teleologies. From the 1980s onwards, it has been possible to find explicitly normative statements in the works of the leading contextualist historians and scholars influenced by their work, for example, Skinner’s defences of neo-Roman republicanism. This article examines the normative content of contextualism. Instead of arguing that the normative aspect was a novelty introduced after the 1980s, the claim here is that contextualist theorising was socially and politically implicated and arguably normative from its very beginning. To substantiate this, the article offers an interpretation of the normativity of early contextualism based on its relationship towards broader socio-political themes such as ideology, agency, emancipation, progress, and societies’ relationship with their pasts. Early contextualist normativity assumed that the professional research of history would be a suitable and sufficient way of generating also socially desirable outcomes. Later, as the political and academic background conditions changed, this normativity was given more explicit (e.g. republican) formulations in order to keep up its political relevance.
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Aldridge, Jerry. "Constructivism, Contextualism, and Applied Developmental Psychology." Perceptual and Motor Skills 76, no. 3_suppl (1993): 1242. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pms.1993.76.3c.1242.
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Constructivism and contextualism name two models for research in applied developmental psychology. Recommendations are made for including both the constructivist and contextualist perspectives in research.
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Pritchard, Duncan. "Neo-Mooreanism Contextualism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001002.
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Attributer contextualism has undoubtedly been the dominant anti-sceptical theory in the recent literature. Nevertheless, this view does face some fairly serious problems, and it is argued that when the contextualist position is compared to a refined version of the much derided 'Moorean' response to scepticism, then it becomes clear that there are distinct advantages to being a neo-Moorean rather than a contextualist.
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Montminy, Martin, and Wes Skolits. "DEFENDING THE COHERENCE OF CONTEXTUALISM." Episteme 11, no. 3 (2014): 319–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.13.
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AbstractAccording to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory.
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Henderson, David K. "Epistemic Competence And Contextualist Epistemology: Why Contextualism Is Not Just The Poor Person's Coherentism." Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 12 (1994): 627–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2940759.
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Baumann, Peter. "Varieties of Contextualism: Standards and Descriptions." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 229–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001012.
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Most contextualists agree that contexts differ with respect to relevant epistemic standards. In this paper, I discuss the idea that the difference between more modest and stricter standards should be explained in terms of the closeness or remoteness of relevant possible worlds. I argue that there are serious problems with this version of contextualism. In the second part of the paper, I argue for another form of contextualism that has little to do with standards and a lot with the well-known problem of the reference class. This paper also illustrates the fact that contextualism comes in many varieties.
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Bogdanovski, Masan. "Inferential contextualism as an epistemic anti-skeptical strategy." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 79–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403079b.
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This paper analyzes the advantages inferential contextualism has over the other contextualist theories in epistemology. Inferential contextualism is labelled as an epistemic anti-skeptical strategy, contrary to the semantic strategies that are also inspired by the Wittgenstein?s book On Certainty. It is claimed that there are certain internal incoherencies within the epistemic strategies, which gives an advantage to the semantic ones, both in the argumentation against skepticism and as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.
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McKenna, Robin. "The Disappearance of Ignorance." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (2020): 4–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191371.
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Keith DeRose’s new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of (and solution to) some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRose’s view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we don’t know these things. In slogan form, DeRose’s argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength” of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it.
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McLaughlin, Michael C. "The linguistic subject and the conscious subject in mysticism studies." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 25, no. 2 (1996): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842989602500204.
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The current discussion in philosophy of mysticism is heading down two divergent lines. Contextualist studies (notably Steven Katz) employ a linguistic model of the epistemic subject. Critics of contextualism (notably Robert Forman) have offered what this study calls a cognitionalist approach which draws attention to the performance of the conscious subject. The two approaches are combined by some members of the contextualist camp. This study argues that there is an as yet unrecognized complementarity between linguistic and cognitional approaches to mystical philosophy.
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Brajkovic, Ema. "Elusive luck: Contextualist approach to the Gettier problem." Theoria, Beograd 64, no. 4 (2021): 83–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2104083b.
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Lewis' philosophical ambition to eradicate the skeptical threat towards infallibilism was the driving force behind his contextualist approach to knowledge. One of the discerning characteristics of his conversational contextualism is the claim that it can solve the Gettier problem. The first part of this paper will be directed towards explicating the arguments Lewis employed in reaching said solution. The second part will be concerned with Cohen?s critique of the proposed explanation. Cohen?s considerations result in an insight that contextualism does not have the adequate means to answer the Gettier challenge. Finally, I shall make an attempt at further motivating Cohen?s claim by investigating the essential component of Gettier cases - epistemic luck. This will be done by appealing to Pritchard?s concept of veritic epistemic luck. The author?s goal is to suggest that contextualist resources are neither suitable to solve nor exhaustively articulate the Gettier problem.
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Black, Tim, and Peter Murphy. "Avoiding the Dogmatic Commitments of Contextualism." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 165–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001009.
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Epistemological contextualists maintain that the truth-conditions of sentences of the form 'S knows that P' vary according to the context in which they're uttered, where this variation is due to the semantics of 'knows'. Among the linguistic data that have been offered in support of contextualism are several everyday cases. We argue that these cases fail to support contextualism and that they instead support epistemological invariantism—the thesis that the truth-conditions of 'S knows that P' do vary according to the context of their utterance.
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Lamb, Robert. "Recent Developments in the Thought of Quentin Skinner and the Ambitions of Contextualism." Journal of the Philosophy of History 3, no. 3 (2009): 246–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226309x461524.
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AbstractIn this article, I chart some recent developments in the linguistic contextualist philosophy of history defended by Quentin Skinner. I attempt to identify several shifts in the way in which Skinner's position has been presented and justified, focusing particularly on his embrace of anti-foundationalism, his focus on rhetoric rather than speech-acts and his concern to recast contextualism as compatible with other interpretive approaches. In the final section, I reject the notion – suggested by Skinner and others – that a contextualist philosophy of history might constitute a distinct form of political theorizing in itself.
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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don't Know We Have Hands and it's Fine." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 13, no. 1 (2020): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.13.1.106-117.
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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.
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Jaster, Romy. "Contextualizing Free Will." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 74, no. 2 (2020): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433020829410460.
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Hawthorne (2001) toys with the view that ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive. But the way he formulates the view makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. I step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution is not ad hoc. The view explains data which cannot be accounted for by an ambiguity hypothesis. On the other hand, I suggest a more plausible freedom contextualist analysis, which emerges naturally once we pair the assumption that freedom requires that the agent could have acted otherwise with a plausible semantics of "can" statements. I'll dub the resulting view Alternate Possibilities Contextualism, or APC, for short. In contrast to Hawthorne's view, APC is well-motivated in its own right, does not beg the question against the incompatibilist and delivers a context parameter which allows for a wide range of context shifts. I conclude that, far from being a non-starter, freedom contextualism sets an agenda worth pursuing.
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Janssens, Nicolien. "We Don’t Know We Have Hands and It’s Fine." Stance: An International Undergraduate Philosophy Journal 13 (2020): 106–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/stance2020139.
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Based on the brain in a vat thought experiment, skeptics argue that we cannot have certain knowledge. At the same time, we do have the intuition that we know some things with certainty. A way to justify this intuition is given by semantic contextualists who argue that the word “knows” is context sensitive. However, many have objected to the intelligibility of this claim. In response, another approach called “moderate pragmatic contextualism” was invoked, which claims that “knows” itself is not context sensitive, but knowledge assertions are. I show, however, that to refute skepticism, moderate pragmatic contextualism rests on unjustified and implausible assumptions as well. Since no form of contextualism works as a response to skepticism, I argue that we should simply accept skepticism. However, I argue that skepticism is not a problem because skeptic pragmatic contextualism can offer a plausible explanation of why we have the intuition that our ordinary knowledge claims are true, even though they are not. I conclude that skeptic pragmatic contextualism offers the most plausible response to the brain in a vat thought experiment.
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Mijic, Jelena. "The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy." Filozofija i drustvo 31, no. 4 (2020): 615–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid2004615m.
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This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring to De Roses? contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather closure denial and embracing the so-called ?abominable conjunction?. In the third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful, contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose?s anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick?s theory, he successfully surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the article introduces Black?s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor counterintuitive proposals.
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Lazovic, Zivan. "Epistemic contextualism." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 5–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403005l.
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The aim of this article is to provide an introduction to the main topic of this issue of Theoria. First, the author presents the key thesis of epistemic contextualism, outlines its development in contemporary epistemology and briefly characterizes its two versions, namely conversational and inferential contextualism. Second, the author focuses on some contextualist solutions to three major epistemological problems: the problem of scepticism, lottery, and Gettier's problem. The author agrees with Stewart Cohen that Gettier?s problem does not belong to this group and explains why both its formulation and a solution require a traditional, invariantist approach.
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Cukljevic, Filip. "Williams’ contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox." Theoria, Beograd 57, no. 3 (2014): 61–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1403061c.
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At the beginning of this paper a formulation of skeptical paradox is offered. Subsequently, possible types of anti-skeptical answers to this paradox are shown. Special attention is paid to the determination of the contextualistic versus other anti-skeptical answers. Two versions of contextualism are then presented, in order to more accurately determine Williams' contextualist view by their comparative analysis. Presentation of this view is supplemented by the display of Williams' understanding of knowledge in nonepistemological contexts. In the end, two objections to the Williams' contextualist view are exposed, and the answers to them are offered.
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Lawlor, Krista. "Living Without Closure." Grazer Philosophische Studien 69, no. 1 (2005): 25–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-069001003.
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Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure.
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Brendel, Elke. "Disagreeing with a Skeptic from a Contextualist Point of View." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10, no. 1 (2020): 28–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-20191360.
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The paper focuses on the problem of how to account for the phenomena of disagreement and retraction in disputes over skepticism in a contextualist framework. I will argue that nonindexical versions of contextualism are better suited to account for those phenomena than DeRose’s indexical form of contextualism. Furthermore, I will argue against DeRose’s “single scoreboard” semantics and against his solution of ruling that in a dispute over skepticism, both parties to the conversation are expressing something truth-valueless. At the end, I will briefly address the question of whether DeRose’s contextualism combined with his double-safety account and his rule of sensitivity provide an epistemically satisfying answer to the skeptical challenge. It will be argued that by merely explaining (away) the attractiveness of skeptical arguments, DeRose’s contextualism seems to lack the resources to explain some important epistemic issues, as, for example, the question of what knowledge is and when a true belief turns into knowledge.
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Kujala, Janne V., and Ehtibar N. Dzhafarov. "Measures of contextuality and non-contextuality." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 377, no. 2157 (2019): 20190149. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2019.0149.
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We discuss three measures of the degree of contextuality in contextual systems of dichotomous random variables. These measures are developed within the framework of the Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory, and apply to inconsistently connected systems (those with ‘disturbance’ allowed). For one of these measures of contextuality, presented here for the first time, we construct a corresponding measure of the degree of non-contextuality in non-contextual systems. The other two CbD-based measures do not suggest ways in which degree of non-contextuality of a non-contextual system can be quantified. We find the same to be true for the contextual fraction measure developed by Abramsky, Barbosa and Mansfield. This measure of contextuality is confined to consistently connected systems, but CbD allows one to generalize it to arbitrary systems. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
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Williams, Michael. "Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism." Episteme 4, no. 1 (2007): 93–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.93.
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ABSTRACTThis article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good reason to doubt the belief; so we need not rely on our epistemic system to determine whether a belief is justified. Accordingly contextualism is not committed to the view that a belief’s status depends on the believer’s epistemic system, nor to the view that no system is superior to another. The contextualist is not committed to epistemic relativism.
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Bachmann, Marcus. "The Epistemology of Understanding. A contextualist approach." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 1 (2020): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2020-340105.
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Abstract This paper aims to provide a unifying approach to the analysis of understanding coherencies (interrogative understanding, e.g. understanding why something is the case) and understanding subject matters (objectual understanding) by highlighting the contextualist nature of understanding. Inspired by the relevant alternatives contextualism about knowledge, I will argue that understanding (in the above mentioned sense) inherently has context-sensitive features and that a theory of understanding that highlights those features can incorporate our intuitions towards understanding as well as consolidate the different accounts of how to analyse understanding. In developing a contextualist account of understanding, I will argue that an account of the features commonly taken to be central to understanding greatly benefits from a contextualist framework. Central to my analysis will be the claim that a person has to fulfill the function of a competent problem solver in order to qualify for the ascription of understanding. In addition to the theoretical elucidation of my contextualist approach to understanding, a demanding hypothetical scenario will be developed to function as a test case.
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Butakov, Pavel. "A Yesterday Battle over the Tomorrow Sea Battle." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 2 (2019): 657–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-2-657-669.
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The appropriationist approach to history of philosophy is often accused of being antihistorical and thus unreliable. The appropriationists are only concerned with their own philosophical problems, and they make discriminating use of the historical data as far as it serves their needs. Its rival, the contextualist approach, claims to be an honest, dedicated and reliable treatment of history. The contextualists are willing to make use of the tedious methodology of Classical studies as long as it promises to uncover the true historical data. In this paper I present a case where the contextualists have failed to surpass their rival appropriationists in their quest for veracity. The case is the debate about Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 9, which took place in 1950-1980s. In this debate the contextualists were unable to offer any other results except for those which have already been suggested by the appropriationists. In addition I demonstrate how the contextualists selectively used the arsenal of Classical methodology not to uncover the truth, but to justify their own preconceived interpretations.
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Mascetti, Yaakov A. "Tokens of Love." Common Knowledge 27, no. 1 (2021): 1–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-8723023.
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Contextualist scholars working on the rhetoric of corporeal presence in seventeenth-century English religious lyrics have naturally focused their attention on sacramental discourse of the Reformation era. As part of the Common Knowledge symposium on the future of contextualism, this full-length monograph, serialized in installments, argues that the contextualist focus on a single and time-limited “epistemic field” has resulted in a less than adequately ramified understanding of the poetry of John Donne, George Herbert, Aemilia Lanyer, and John Milton. What the contextualist approach misses is that even the religious discourses of the period were tied to a long and in no way local epistemological debate about signs and their meaning, whose roots are to be found in Greek and Latin rhetorical theory. This first installment of “Tokens of Love” commences a discussion of the role of classical pagan sign-theory in the development of Reformation sacramental discourse.
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Graham, Daniel J. "Integrating holism and reductionism in the science of art perception." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36, no. 2 (2013): 145–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x12001653.
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AbstractThe contextualist claim that universalism is irrelevant to the proper study of art can be evaluated by examining an analogous question in neuroscience. Taking the reductionist-holist debate in visual neuroscience as a model, we see that the analog of orthodox contextualism is untenable, whereas integrated approaches have proven highly effective. Given the connection between art and vision, unified approaches are likewise more germane to the scientific study of art.
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Stephens, Andreas. "Contextual Shifts and Gradable Knowledge." Logos & Episteme 14, no. 3 (2023): 323–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202314324.
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Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influential contextualist accounts is preferable to the others. According to Schaffer, Lewis’ theory of relevant alternatives succeeds as a linguistic basis for contextualism and as an explanation of what the parameter that shifts with context is, while Cohen’s theory of thresholds and DeRose’s theory of standards fail. This paper argues that Schaffer’s analysis is unsatisfactory since it fails to show that thresholds and standards cannot cope with skepticism, as it is ultimately the conversation participants who control how the conversation plays out. Moreover, Schaffer fails to show that gradability is of no importance in inquiries.