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Zwez, Kimberly. "Hegel's Critique of Contingency in Kant's Principle of Teleology." FIU Digital Commons, 2014. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1194.
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This research is a historical-exegetical analysis of Hegel’s reformulation of Kant’s regulative principle of teleology into a constitutive principle. Kant ascribes teleology to the faculty of reflective judgment where it is employed as a guide to regulate inquiry, but does not constitute actual knowledge. Hegel argues that if Kant made teleology into a constitutive principle then it would be a much more comprehensive theory capable of overcoming contingency in natural science, and hence, bridging the gap between natural science and theology. In this paper I argue that Hegel’s defense of the transition from natural science to theology is ultimately unsuccessful because it is built upon on an instinct of reason, which is the instinctive feature of human rationality to transition beyond the contingency remaining in our empirical understanding of nature, to a theological understanding of nature, in which all aspects of nature are necessarily related.
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Pereira, Reinaldo Sampaio. "Necessidade e contigencia a partir da potencia racional em Aristoteles." [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280130.
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Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez BenoitTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T11:44:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pereira_ReinaldoSampaio_D.pdf: 6973767 bytes, checksum: 4adf120b73d1bb84c7c412ebf15ce026 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006
Resumo: Advertimos que não temos como propósito a releitura de algum ponto específico de alguma parte da obra de Aristóteles ou uma nova interpretação acerca de alguma passagem, conceito ou 'doutrina¿ do corpus. Pretendemos tão somente estabelecer certo percurso de análise de um dos importantes conceitos da sua filosofia, a saber, o lógos, a partir da investigação de outro conceito de fundamental importância nos seus textos, a potência, percurso esse que conduz a um aparente paradoxo (o qual constituir-se-á no objeto norteador da nossa pesquisa), qual seja, por um lado, de uma perspectiva física, o lógos confere potencialidade para o homem não ficar totalmente sujeito à necessidade do mundo sublunar, permitindo-lhe agir na contingência que este comporta; por outro, de um ponto de vista prático, esse mesmo lógos tende a encerrar o homem em certa necessidade.
Abstract: Not informed.
Doutorado
Historia da Filosofia Antiga
Doutor em Filosofia
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Phillips, Kristopher Gordon. "Cartesian modality: God's nature and the creation of eternal and contingent truth." Diss., University of Iowa, 2014. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1380.
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Much ado has been made regarding Descartes's understanding of the creation of what he called the "eternal truths" because he described them, paradoxically, as both the free creations of God, and necessary. While there are many varying interpretations of Cartesian modality, the issue has heretofore been treated in a vacuum, as a niche issue having little import beyond being an interesting puzzle for Descartes Scholars. I argue that this treatment is misguided, and that in order to properly understand Cartesian philosophy at all, one must properly understand Descartes's theory of modality. This, however, is no small feat; in order to understand Descartes's seemingly peculiar view on modality, one must first make sense of what Descartes understood the nature of God to be. One reason for this, I argue, is the systematic nature of Cartesian philosophy; indeed when dealing with a dense inter-connection of philosophical issues, one must move from what is more known in itself to what is more known to us, and not the other way around.
I argue that in the literature on Cartesian modality, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of the French School of Spirituality (in particular the work of Cardinal Bérulle) on the Cartesian notion of the divine. I argue that this influence pushed Descartes to criticize traditional attempts (Aquinas's in particular) to split the horns of Plato's Euthyphro dilemma as violating a proper understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Descartes's commitment to a radical form of the doctrine of divine simplicity leads him to a version of divine voluntarism wherein all `things' depend on God for their existence, and God cannot have had antecedent reason to prefer the creation of anything over anything else. There is little doubt that Descartes embraced the voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, but just what that means for Cartesian modality and philosophy generally remains a contentious issue. I argue that Descartes is best read as what I call an `agnostic quietist' regarding God (and modality generally) given textual, historical, and systematic considerations. One virtue of an agnostic quietist reading is that I am able to square the passages where Descartes discusses the inconceivability of God's power with the conclusions reached regarding God's non-deceiving nature in the Meditations and elsewhere. Further virtues that I explore are the effects that a quietist reading has on the Cartesian scientific programme, the infamous mind-body problem, Descartes's seemingly inconsistent view regarding human free-will and Descartes's refusal to engage in "theology."
Traditionally, Cartesian epistemology has been understood to be a purely a priori undertaking, which succumbs to deep and insurmountable problems. One of the greatest problems facing the Cartesian was the move from the mind to the world. Simon Blackburn, for example, says of the Cartesian epistemological project in the Meditations that Descartes "has put himself on a desert island from which there is no escape." This view is echoed by, and even motivates some of the contemporary views concerning Cartesian modality. I argue, however, that a proper understanding of the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct ideas circumvents this famous problem. By highlighting the proper understanding and application of the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, I show that such ideas not only guarantee the existence of an external truth-maker, but also that such ideas do not do much more than show that there is a truth-maker. I argue that in instances of clear and distinct perception, the truth of the idea is normatively certain, but what makes it true is yet to be established. In this way, clear and distinct ideas are both powerful, in terms of guaranteeing truth, and relatively unhelpful, in that further work is required in order to determine to what the ideas conform. I argue that this is the case not only for actual truths, but for some clearly intuited truths about possibility.
As an illustration of my overall thesis, I address the Cartesian argument for the separability of mind and body, and entertain the various interpretations of Descartes's view of human freedom. I argue that in order to understand Cartesian views on either of these issues, one must first make sense of his modal commitments. In both of these cases Descartes claims that finite minds can know that something is possible, even though what makes it possible is well beyond what they can understand.
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Lundgren, Björn. "Tillfällig nödvändighet : En möjlig(a) värld(arna)s paradox och den aletiska modalitetens gåta." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för kultur och kommunikation, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-69552.
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The writer has attempted to discuss the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. It begins with a criticism against the possibility for a so-called ‘a possible worlds realism’ to give a “philosophical explanation” of this distinction. The writer argues that this is impossible, since it requires that a notion of this distinction be already accepted (more precisely that the necessity of such a theory is already accepted). After this specific criticism, the writer intends to show that this is a more general problem that follows any explanation of the contingent/necessary distinction. The writer then discusses the counter-argument that the requirements placed on these explanations are set to high, therefore the writer shows in theory the problem can be solved and sketches a more specific way how to explain and show the basis for this distinction.Författaren har avsett att diskutera distinktionen mellan det nödvändiga och det kontingent. Det börjar med en kritik mot möjligheten för en så kallad ’möjliga världars realism’ att ge en ”filosofisk förklaring” av denna distinktion. Författaren argumenterar för att detta är omöjligt, eftersom det kräver att en sådan distinktion redan är accepterad (mer specifikt att nödvändigheten av en sådan teori redan är accepterad). Efter denna specifika kriticism, så avser författaren visa att detta problem är generellt och att det följer alla försök att förklara den kontingenta/nödvändiga distinktionen. Författaren diskuterar sedan motargumentet att de krav som ställts på dessa förklaringar är för högt ställda, därför visar författaren hur problemet kan lösas i teorin och visar också en förenklad modell av en lösningsmetod.
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Lancaster, Philip Charles. "Reason, necessity and genocide." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9233.
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This work examines core assumptions of the rationalism that underlies liberal political theory by placing it against the background of a dramatic historical phenomenon---genocide. An attempt is made to draw on historical accounts of two genocides to develop a critique of liberal political theory as it has been articulated during the latter years of the 20th Century by John Rawls. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to sort out the conceptual problems arising at the junction point of normative and descriptive theories of politics and argues that the basic elements of both kinds theories would benefit greatly from closer attention to history. The first chapter is devoted to a discussion of the ways in which political reason can be adapted to the needs of state and suggests that there are problems associated with the attempt to universalize the notion of human rights across a community of nations lacking the basic contextual requirements for rights. Chapter two considers the uncomfortable fit between political structure and value in liberal political theory. It argues that the administrative structure of states now exists as an important part of contemporary formal reality and thus ought to be a critical element in any serious study of politics. An argument begins here that works towards the final conclusion that states constitute an arena within which individualist and collectivist values collide. The third chapter examines the relationship between liberal values and rationality. It includes a technical discussion of Max Weber's theory of rationality but limits the discussion to political applications. This chapter raises a series of questions about the concept of rationality used in the construction of political theory. Chapters four, five and six examine the complications that arise when a liberal perspective is taken to issues of ontological existence, community values and the powers inhering in states to shape identity frames in the interests of administrative efficiency. This leads into a more technical discussion of rationality as represented in the theories of John Rawls and Alan Gewirth that is contained in the seventh chapter. Chapters eight and nine are devoted to discussions of elements of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide respectively. Both examples are used as a means of illustrating the complex power relations arising out of the various forms of collective agency needed to sustain state sovereignty and which complicate political theory far beyond the explanatory power of liberal rationalism. The examples are used to argue that theories based on notions of disassociated rational persons just fail to support their normative conclusions. The final chapter argues for a re-examination of the way in which political theory is read and suggests that liberal theory, in particular, tends towards abstraction in ways that limit its usefulness as either explanatory or normative theory.
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Lightner, David Eric. "Hume on possibility and necessity /." The Ohio State University, 1996. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487936356159386.
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Taylor, Craig Duncan. "Sympathy, reason and necessity." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.338469.
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Pippa, Stefano. "Althusser and contingency." Thesis, Kingston University, 2015. http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/35854/.
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This thesis argues that the concept of contingency plays a central role in Althusser's recasting of Marxist philosophy and in his attempt to free the Marxist conception of history from concepts such as teleology, necessity and origin. It is critically placed both against those readings that see the emergence of the problematic of contingency only in the late Althusserm and to the most recent attempts to establish a straightforward continuity in Althusser's work. Drawing on published and unplublished material and covering the entirety of Althusser's philosophical itinerary, the thesis seeks both to unearth the latent presence of this problematic, and its various implications, at each stage in the development of his work. It seeks to clarify, in a systematic way, the conceptual consequences of Althusser's commitment to contingency to the received understanding of his conceptions of structural change, ideology and political action. In particular, it argues that the standpoint of contingency allows us to locate in Althusser's 'Structural Marxism' the emergence of a 'logic of irruption' and structurally under-determined development of becoming. By emphasising this logic of contingency, it then seeks to produce a more nuanced assessment of his theory of ideology through the introduction of the concept of 'overinterpellation'. It finally attempts to distinguish two moments in the emergence (from the early 1970s onward) of a materialism of contingency, first political and then philosophical; the problematic coexistence of these two aspects helps to account for the unstable charactoer of Althusser's late philosophical project.
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Sabbarton-Leary, Nigel. "Naming without necessity." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/1151/.
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In this thesis I argue that we should break with the dominant Kripkean tradition concerning natural kind terms and theoretical identity. I claim that there is just no interesting connection between the metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, and demonstrate this by constructing a version of descriptivism that is combined with the same metaphysics – that is, a nontrivial version of essentialism – found in Kripke, but which effectively avoids all of the standard criticisms. With my version of descriptivism in place, I present what I take to be the most reasonable version of metaphysical essentialism, positing only what I call 'thin' essences. I claim that thin essences are perfectly adequate to underpin scientific realism, and moreover that they are sufficient to support the version of descriptivism developed here. In effect, what I offer here is an error theory of the Kripkean tradition: Kripke is right to think that there are interesting things to say about meaning and essence, but just wrong about what those things are. Thus whilst Kripke thinks that it is possible to make discoveries about the meanings of natural kind terms, I think, rather, that we make empirical discoveries that lead to revisions in meaning. Furthermore, whilst Kripke thinks there is a dichotomy between de re and de dicto necessity, and that theoretical identities are necessary de re, I think this distinction is both misleading and inaccurate, and that the necessity of theoretical identities is neither entirely de re nor entirely de dicto. By separating and insulating questions concerning meaning from questions concerning essence I show that whilst scientific discoveries are contingent and a posteriori, the definition of scientific terms are both necessary and a priori.
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Chetelat, Pierre J. "Hegel's logic: Its function, method and necessity." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9955.
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This thesis is essentially an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel's logic as a whole. In my first chapter I consider what Hegel is trying to accomplish in the logic. Here we see that Hegel's logic is not only a science of thought but a metaphysics as well. In my second chapter I examine Hegel's famous dialectical method by criticizing two previous interpretations of this method and by arguing for a third interpretation. In my last chapter I develop an interpretation of logical necessity by considering Hegel's comments on this topic as well as his discussion of the concept of necessity at the end of the "Doctrine of Essence".
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Rampley, Matthew. "Dialectics of contingency : Nietzsche's philosophy of art." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14775.
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This thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche's philosophy. Its primary concern is with Nietzsche's turn to art as the means to counter what he terms metaphysics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objective truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of exhausting the totality of these antecedent truths. This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse Nietzsche's criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme scepticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their necessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics. Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn to art is a response to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere cynical Nihilism.
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Williams, S. G. "Meaning, validity and necessity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.354816.
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Öberg, Anders. "Hilary Putnam on Meaning and Necessity." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-160279.
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In this dissertation on Hilary Putnam's philosophy, I investigate his development regarding meaning and necessity, in particular mathematical necessity. Putnam has been a leading American philosopher since the end of the 1950s, becoming famous in the 1960s within the school of analytic philosophy, associated in particular with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. Under the influence of W.V. Quine, Putnam challenged the logical positivism/empiricism that had become strong in America after World War II, with influential exponents such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. Putnam agreed with Quine that there are no absolute a priori truths. In particular, he was critical of the notion of truth by convention. Instead he developed a notion of relative a priori truth, that is, a notion of necessary truth with respect to a body of knowledge, or a conceptual scheme. Putnam's position on necessity has developed over the years and has always been connected to his important contributions to the philosophy of meaning. I study Hilary Putnam's development through an early phase of scientific realism, a middle phase of internal realism, and his later position of a natural or commonsense realism. I challenge some of Putnam’s ideas on mathematical necessity, although I have largely defended his views against some other contemporary major philosophers; for instance, I defend his conceptual relativism, his conceptual pluralism, as well as his analysis of the realism/anti-realism debate.
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Djukic, George. "Essentialism : Paradise lost /." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1997. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phd626.pdf.
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Chan, Ka-wo, and 陳嘉和. "What if natural kind terms are rigid?" Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B41633878.
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Haufe, Carly E. "Contingency, Choice and Consensus in James Joyce's Ulysses." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1428665589.
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Wong, Ka Ling. "The later Wittgenstein on grammar, necessity and normativity." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2011. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1271.
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陳啓恩 and Kai-yan Chan. "A critique of Kripke's theories of proper names and names of natural kinds: an application of the laterWittgenstein's methodology." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1997. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31236546.
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Rodriguez, Angel Garcia. "The subjective/objective dichotomy in personal identity: the necessity of embodiment." Thesis, University of Hull, 1994. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:3498.
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Philie, Patrice. "A vindication of logical necessity against scepticism." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12919.
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Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
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Oki, Takashi. "Aristotle on teleology, chance, and necessity." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9f6e9f40-eb61-43a8-92d6-b3749820e738.
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In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.
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Chan, Mark Lap-Yan. "Hermeneutics, contingency and the quest for transcontextual criteria in Christology." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.243713.
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McCrea, A. Grant. "Causal priority and temporal priority." Thesis, McGill University, 1986. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=66065.
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Parr, Walter Lamoyne. "John Wesley's Thoughts upon necessity in his search for the middle verity." Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1994. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=123328.
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The hypothesis of this paper is twofold. Firstly, Wesley was preoccupied with the issues being discussed by the British moralists; especially, the issue of liberty and necessity as this had a direct bearing on his doctrine of salvation. Secondly, the Methodist leader was attempting constantly to fulfill the enlightenment project of providing a rational basis for and justification of morality. Wesley's preoccupation with these issues in the development of his doctrine of entire sanctification promoted the constant need to balance his theological expression. Wesley's Thoughts upon Necessity published in 1774 was no isolated step into "the arcanum of speculative theology." Throughout his life Wesley argued for free will in the hope of exonerating God from being identified as the author of evil. This argument culminates in his essay against the evidently compatibilist and deterministic arguments of Jonathan Edwards, David Hartley, and Lord Kames. Wesley's central doctrine was entire sanctification. Since this doctrine's support derived from the twin pillars of original and actual sin, a refutation of the notion that man is not a free agent had to be made to prevent the collapse of his theology. The tension could not be relieved by logical explication, and it persisted in the various theological corollaries to the necessity issue. The incompatibility of the tenets of human freedom and divine omnipotence/omniscience prompted Wesley into a constant balancing of his theological expression on the paradox obtaining between the tenants of orthodox Christain belief. He remained a "free-willer" while guarding reason against the excesses of religion and promoting the cause of true religion in the face of that same reason.
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Chan, Ka-wo. "What if natural kind terms are rigid?" Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B41633878.
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Spinelli, Nicola. "Husserlian essentialism revisited : a study of essence, necessity and predication." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/79543/.
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Husserlian Essentialism is the view, maintained byEdmundHusserl throughout his career, that necessary truths obtain because essentialist truths obtain. In this thesis I have two goals. First, to reconstruct and flesh out Husserlian Essentialism and its connections with surrounding areas of Husserl's philosophy in full detail – something which has not been done yet. Second, to assess the theoretical solidity of the view. As regards the second point, after having presented Husserlian Essentialism in the first two chapters, I raise a serious problem for it in Chapter 3. In the remainder of the thesis I endeavour to solve the problem. In order to do so, I propose to amend both Husserl's theory of essence and his theory of predication. The bulk of the emendation consists in working out an account of essence and an account of predication that do not presuppose, or in any way imply, the claims that: 1) for a universal to be in the essence of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal; 2) for a universal to be truly predicated of an object, either the object or one of its parts must instantiate the universal. These claims, notice, apart from being what gets Husserl in trouble, are well entrenched not only in Husserl's, but in most theories of essence and predication (at least in those that feature universals). It is thus interesting to see what an alternative option may be – even regardless of the Husserlian setting in which I work it out.
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Wetherbee, James M. "An analysis of Plantinga's ontological argument." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1987. http://www.tren.com.
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CARROLL, JOHN WILLIAM. "THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL LAWS (CAUSATION, NECESSITY, ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY)." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/183855.
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A program for advancing a new philosophical account of physical laws is presented. The program is non-reductive in that it maintains that any correct account of physical laws must recognize law sentences as irreducible--that is, as not admitting of an analysis which does not invoke any unanalyzed nomic facts (i.e. causal statements, law statements, subjunctive conditionals, etc.). The program has the unusual attraction of being consistent with Nominalism and epistemically in the spirit of Empiricism. Initially motivating my program is a two-stage attack in chapters two and three on all reductive accounts. The first stage of the attack is on traditional reductive accounts. Traditional reductive accounts are those accounts which do not invoke abstract entities in addressing nomic modality, i.e. in distinguishing universal laws from accidentally true generalizations or in explaining the relationship between statements of probability and statements of relative frequency. These accounts include those of Brian Skyrms, David Lewis, and Bas van Fraassen. The second stage of the attack is on all non-traditional reductive accounts. These accounts include David Armstrong's Nomic Realism. The two-stage attack exhausts the ontological ground for a reduction of laws. It is concluded that no reductive accounts of physical laws is possible. Chapter four spells out the details of my positive program. The program calls for (i) statement of the basic philosophical truths about nomic modality, (ii) the specification of axiomatic principles governing physical laws, and (iii) the analysis of nomic facts in terms of other nomic facts. The basic truths about nomic modality are stated in full. Foremost among these is the Irreducibility Thesis which states that law sentences are irreducible. Some examples of axiomatic principles governing physical laws are specified and one example of an analysis of nomic facts in terms of other nomic facts is given. The analysis is of general causal statements. Time is also spent in chapter four critically reviewing other accounts in the history of philosophy which have recognized law sentences as irreducible. The final chapter addresses the most common and the most significant objection to my positive program. That objection is the epistemological challenge of Empiricism. I argue that my program and, in particular, the Irreducibility Thesis are epistemologically innocuous.
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Greene, John A. "Nietzsche's Genealogy: An Historical Investigation of the Contingency of Moral Values." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2017. https://dc.etsu.edu/honors/417.
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This work examines how values seem to be contingent on various factors which affect their growth and development. This study is based around the ethical writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. Specifically, On the Genealogy of Morals serves as the foundation for my thesis. This book contains three essays which purport to show how moral values originated as a result of certain human phenomena rather than, as many people take for granted, from moral “truths.” This contribution to ethics is important because it leaves many questions regarding the value of morality untouched. In the Genealogy, there are numerous themes of Nietzsche’s philosophy which are important to note such as anti-realism and naturalism. However, one of the difficulties of reading Nietzsche is that his writing has been misinterpreted, and it can be difficult to reach a consensus on how to properly understand his meanings. In the paper, I argue that to properly interpret Nietzsche one must recognize that his Genealogy serves two purposes: 1) to shake our faith in morality as “given” or “factual;” and 2) to provide us reasons that moral values might have detrimental effects on human flourishing. To fully appreciate these aspects of the Genealogy, I argue that the historical form of the text is a crucial component which cannot be ignored. Ultimately, if Nietzsche is successful in demonstrating these factors, then it will be shown that morality is contingent upon a plethora of historical factors.
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Feldmann, Judith M. (Judith Mary). "The significance of intuitions of contingency for the mind-body problem." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10780.
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Mehta, Rick R. "Contrasting associative and statistical theories of contingency judgments." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36822.
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"Blocking" refers to judgments of a moderate contingency being lowered when contrasted with a strong contingency. The Rescorla-Wagner model and causal model theory account for blocking through different mechanisms. To examine the predictions from these two models, seven experiments tested the extent to which "causal scenario" and "causal order" would influence whether blocking was observed in human contingency learning tasks. "Causal scenario" was manipulated by contrasting responses to two causes of one effect or to one cause of two effects; "causal order" was defined as causes preceding effects or effects preceding causes. The four conjunctions of these two factors were investigated separately in Experiments 1 to 5. In Experiments 1 and 2, two causes preceded one effect and two effects preceded one cause, respectively. Blocking was observed regardless of whether the predictors were causes or effects. In Experiments 3, 4 and 5, participants were presented with one antecedent cue and made separate predictions about each of the trial's two outcomes. Blocking was not observed, irrespective of whether the antecedent cue was a cause or an effect. These initial results were consistent with the Rescorla-Wagner model. An alternative explanation was that blocking failed to occur in Experiments 3 to 5 because participants were asked questions between the predictor and two outcomes. Predicting the outcomes might have implicitly led participants to monitor them separately and to report on subsets of the data at the time of judgment. To address this issue, the volunteers in Experiment 6 observed the events on each trial but did not make any predictions about the outcomes. Blocking was observed, signifying that the intervening questions between the antecedent and consequent cues constitute an important variable influencing cue competition effects. In Experiment 7, all four conjunctions of causal scenario and causal order were tested simultaneously. Furthermore, participants w
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Haldane, Adrian. "On the possibility of Kant's answer to Hume : subjective necessity and objective validity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1999. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/55830/.
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This thesis argues that Kant is able to maintain the distinctiveness of his position in opposition to Hume's naturalism (contrary to the arguments of R. A. Mall and L. W. Beck) without invoking premises which are question begging with regard to Hume's scepticism. The argument of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, as presented in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is considered in relation to the two sets of criticism that have been levelled at it from its publication up to the present day, both of which aim to demonstrate that synthetic a priori judgements are subjectively necessary but without objective validity. The first set of criticisms involves problems raised with regard to the status of transcendental arguments. The difficulties identified here (by B. Stroud, M. S. Gram, and others) are that the Deduction can either, at best, show that it is necessary for experience to be regarded in a certain way without demonstrating anything as to the nature of experience as such, or the argument is circular in that it begins by making assumptions regarding the nature of our experience. Alternatively, if the Deduction is taken to establish the objective nature of concepts via an analysis of the conditions under which it is possible for us to have some knowledge of ourselves, then incoherence is said to arise because this requires either an implausible reflective theory of consciousness (according to D. Henrich) or that we have knowledge of the subject-in-itself (as held by J. G. Fichte and other contemporaries of Kant). Through a consideration of both the historical and contemporary manifestations of these criticisms, the thesis advances an interpretation of the Deduction, with special attention paid to the role and nature of the subject, which does not fall prey to the alleged incoherence. As such, the thesis defends both the distinctiveness and legitimacy of transcendental philosophy.
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Diakoulakis, Christoforos. "Jacques Derrida and the necessity of chance." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2012. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/43290/.
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Chance, in the sense of the incalculable, the indeterminable, names the limit of every estimation of the truth. Whereas traditional philosophical discourses aspire to transcend this limit, deconstruction affirms on the contrary its necessity; not as a higher principle that relativizes truth and renders all our calculations futile, as is commonly suggested by flippant appropriations of Derrida's work, but as a structural property within every event and every concept, every mark. Rather than a mere impediment to the pursuit of truth then, the incalculable forms a necessary correlative of the pursuit itself. Deconstruction effectively attests to and exemplifies the dependence of every philosophical discourse on its irreducible, inherent limitation. With reference to numerous commentaries on Derrida's work, Chapter 1 shows that the unconditional indeterminability of a deconstructive, methodological identity is indissociable from deconstruction's critical import. And as Chapter 2 verifies in turn, focusing now primarily on Derrida's lecture ‘My Chances/Mes Chances' and the performative aspects of his writing, deconstruction's appeal to the accidental and the idiomatic is not a call to irresponsibility and a turning away from theory; it is what ensures its remarkable theoretical consistency. Through close readings of Aristotle, Freud, Richard Rorty and William James, Chapter 3 demonstrates that any attempt to regulate chance cannot help but put chance to work instead. Not even fiction can arrest its contaminating force. Reading Derrida alongside Edgar Allan Poe, Chapter 4 posits that the commonsensical conception of chance as a deviation from the truth is bound up with an uncritical notion of literary writing as sheer untruthfulness, and hence as the site of pure chance. The constitutive pervasiveness of chance bears out, in the first place and above all, the instability of the limit that separates fiction from non-fiction, truth from non-truth.
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Scanlan, John. "Valuing disorder : perspectives on radical contingency in modern society." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2001. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1145/.
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This thesis explores the relationship between social and individual forms of ordering social life on one hand, and the emergence of a number of ‘spheres’ of disorder in the experience of life on the other. In modern society such evidence of disorder can only be characterised in terms that reinforce the negative or formless experience of the human confrontations with disorder. Manifestations of radical contingency (taken as the cognitive residue of such disorder) in experience are thus contrasted with the progress and limits of reason and desire (which create the ‘valuable’ part of life), and these are further examined within a language of being that establishes the discordant nature of the relationship. It is argued that reason and desire, in creating value, always construct an edifice of social and personal expectation that is justified on the basis of the reliability of causal relations between phenomena in lived experience, and in so doing ‘make’ an objective and orderly social world. Several notions central to an understanding of the accumulation of categories of being in modern society are examined as the positive expression of the conditions of autonomous action, and thus as crucial determinants of value and identity. The central relationship is further investigated through the elaboration of three negative categories of experience, which are seen to contain individual and social forms of action that forcefully remove, or contradict order and autonomous freedom as it is here defined. The thesis is therefore divided into three parts. Part 1 examines the loss of autonomy through gambling, and specifically through the singular experience of the wager, which is seen to be an intensification of the motion that constitutes life, but that boldly refuses to be contained, as rational autonomy would dictate. Part 2 deals with the atomisation of knowledge and experience in modern society, looking specifically at instances of ‘non-representational’ art of the twentieth century as the residue of developments that had as a positive aim the refinement of experience. Part 3 deals with the material exclusion of various kinds of garbage resulting from both social and technological progress, and from the emergence of a multiplicity of opportunities for the establishment of self-identity that are seen as both a product of dividing the world of experience into ever smaller categories (i.e., the refinement of the ‘objective’ world) and of the subjective relationship between the individual in modern society and the world of objects.
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Feeney, Amanda Lynn. "Re-Writing “Pleasure and Necessity”: The Female Reader of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/34573.
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This thesis demonstrates that “Pleasure and Necessity”, a section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, both should and can be re-written, bringing the female reader out of the margins and into the texts of Hegel’s Absolute system. First, I demonstrate that the Phenomenology is a Bildungsroman that is both important for the reader’s philosophical education and Hegelian science itself. I provide an interpretation of “Pleasure and Necessity”, demonstrate that this section alienates the female reader, and discuss why Antigone is not a solution to this problem. Rather, I conclude that this stage should be re-written. Furthermore, I argue that “Pleasure and Necessity” can be re- written because the Phenomenology already contains the outline of its own re-writing insofar as it corresponds to the Logic. Finally, I re-write “Pleasure and Necessity” as “Impulse and Ought”, using new figures to re-stage the logical operation that occurs in the original text.
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Rossi, Lorenzo. "Truth, paradoxes, and partiality : a study on semantic theories of naïve truth." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:026f12c0-8a1a-4094-8ee9-3b7405021870.
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This work is an investigation into the notion of truth. More specifically, this thesis deals with how to account for the main features of truth, with the interaction between truth and fundamental linguistic elements such as connectives and quantifiers, and with the analysis and the solution of truth-theoretic paradoxes. In the introductory Chapter 1, I describe and justify the approach to truth I adopt here, giving some general coordinates to contextualize my work. In Part I, I examine some theories of truth that fall under the chosen approach. In Chapter 2, I discuss a famous theory of truth developed by Saul Kripke. Some difficulties of Kripke's theory led several authors, notably Hartry Field, to emphasize the importance of a well-behaved conditional connective in conjunction with a Kripkean treatment of truth. I articulate this idea in a research agenda, which I call Field's program, giving some conditions for its realizability. In Chapter 3, I analyze the main theory of truth proposed by Field to equip Kripke's theory with a well-behaved conditional, and I give a novel analysis of its shortcomings. Field's theory is remarkably successful but is technically and intuitively very complex, and it is unclear whether Field's conditional is a plausible candidate for a philosophically useful conditional. Moreover, Field's treatment of "determinate truth" and his handling of many kinds of paradoxes is not fully satisfactory. In Part II, I develop some new theories that capture the main aspects of the notion of truth and, at the same time, give a philosophically interesting meaning to connectives and quantifiers - in particular, they yield a strong and conceptually significant conditional. The theory proposed in Chapter 4 extends the inductive methods employed in Kripke's theory, showing how to adapt them to non-monotonic connectives as well. There, I also develop and defend a new, theoretically fruitful notion of gappiness. The theory proposed in Chapter 5 (and discussed further in Chapter 6), instead, employs some graph-theoretic intuitions and tools to provide a new model-theoretic construction. The resulting theory, I argue, provides a nice framework to account for the interaction between truth, connectives, and quantifiers, and it is flexible enough to be applicable to several interpretations of the logical vocabulary. Some new technical results are established with this theory as well, concerning the interplay between every Lukasiewicz semantics and some interpretations of the truth predicate, and concerning the handling of determinate truth. Finally, the theory developed in Chapter 5 provides articulate and telling solutions to truth-theoretical paradoxes.
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Garcia, Juan. "Leibniz on Contingency and Freedom: A Molinism Friendly Account." The Ohio State University, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1531742443652554.
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Wise, Jonathan D. Sands Roberts Robert C. "Like the green bay tree the necessity of virtue for happiness /." Waco, Tex. : Baylor University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2104/5307.
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Fernandez, Anthony Vincent. "Phenomenology and the Crisis of Contemporary Psychiatry: Contingency, Naturalism, and Classification." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6235.
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This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook.
In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes.
In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy.
While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms.
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Chan, Kai-yan. "A critique of Kripke's theories of proper names and names of natural kinds : an application of the later Wittgenstein's methodology /." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1997. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B19019385.
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Loftus, Emma. "The Good, the Bad, and the Necessity of Empathy in Ethics." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1399.
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Although empathy has been implicated in both academia and pop culture as nearly analogous to morality, some philosophers and psychologists have taken issue with this assessment. It has been argued that from an ethical perspective, empathy is biasing, myopic, and perhaps more trouble than it is worth. In this paper, I first address whether empathy is a necessary baseline trait for having some degree of ethical motivation. Based on the differing moral experiences of sociopaths and autistic individuals, as well as empathy’s unique ability to motivationally bridge the gap between self and other, I conclude that empathy is a required trait for the moral agent. Assuming empathy is present in the moral experience, I then delineate the negative and positive effects empathy has on the ethical outcome of actions. Empathy does appear to cause prejudiced biasing and derogation of self-respect, but it also acts as a powerful motivator for other-oriented action and provides ethically valuable information about mind-states. Ultimately, I conclude that empathy cannot be a standalone ethical trait, but when filtered through reason, it can be invaluably useful.
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Doherty, Cathal. "Sacrament and Superstition: Maurice Blondel on the Necessity of a "Literal Practice" in the Christian Religion." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104160.
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Thesis advisor: Oliva BlanchetteThis dissertation is a synthetic exercise in philosophy and theology, proceeding from the perennial question: "What is the specific difference between sacrament and superstition?" It answers that the difference lies in the order of revelation. Sacraments are a form of revealed praxis, and only the divine guaranty of revelation distinguishes them from other forms of human action, including superstitious action. Revelation takes shape in historical sensible signs demanding human interpretation, such as inspired scripture. These revealed signs also include precise human actions, however, in the form of the prescriptions of sacramental praxis. As the words of Scripture do not signify merely human intentions, but express the divine will, so sacramental action signifies a divine intention, not a purely human intention, in the form of this precise praxis. Sacraments, therefore, far from attempting some kind of natural purchase on the supernatural, in fact demand the opposite: the surrender of the human to the divine will, the admission of human insufficiency. This answer is based on a theological appropriation of Maurice Blondel's philosophical investigation of human action in his early philosophical work Action (1893), in which he rehabilitates the question of the supernatural on a properly philosophical footing by establishing a hypothetical necessity for a supernatural complement to human action. Blondel and Aquinas, therefore, both find the point of heterogenous insertion for the supernatural in human subjectivity: in the virtues for Aquinas, in voluntary human action for Blondel. The dialectic of Action (1893) hinges on the phenomenon of superstitious action, which functions as a middle term in the dialectic. Superstition for Blondel corresponds to an attempt at human `self-sufficiency': actively placing in a finite object of the will the transcendent perfection that can only be received passively as gift from outside the natural order, by insertion of a heterogenous factor in the human action. Given that human action is irreducible in Blondel's philosophy and even thought itself is a form of action, so superstition works its way into all forms of human practice, including intellectual pursuits like philosophy and theology, giving rise to `closed' and self-sufficient philosophical and theological systems. Moreover, Blondel audaciously turns Kant's accusation of superstition against sacraments around, arguing that it is the extreme rationalists, not the unlearned devout, who are guilty of the most insidious form of superstition by effectively fetishizing their own thought, finding there the completion that Blondel's dialectic demonstrates to be impossible in the natural order. Sacramental action, by contrast, since it requires submission of human to divine will and the admission of human insufficiency, it is at the very antipodes of superstition. The theological appropriation of Blondel's philosophy provides a heuristic in sacramental theology, since it entails that the supernatural efficacy of the sacraments cannot be attributed, even partially, to the natural efficacy of human action. It is hard to see how post-conciliar theories of `symbolic efficacy' avoid superstition, therefore, since they attempt to find in natural human action the heterogenous supernatural that cannot be reduced to the merely naturally perceptible
Thesis (STD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry
Discipline: Sacred Theology
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Cameron, Ross P. "The source of modal truth." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10949.
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This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't. I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn of his dilemma can be resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of. I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been. I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology. I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use modal language.
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Johannesson, Eric. "Analyticity, Necessity and Belief : Aspects of two-dimensional semantics." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-141565.
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A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.
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Ferreira, Mateus Ricardo Fernandes. "Substancia e unidade em Aristoteles." [s.n.], 2008. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278799.
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Orientador: Lucas AngioniDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Essa dissertação analisa as discussões de Aristóteles sobre a unidade da substância em Metafísica Z e como essas discussões pressupõem comprometimentos do autor, já enunciados nos Segundos Analíticos, sobre essencialismo, necessidade e unidade dos tipos naturais. Aristóteles não concebe a unidade da substância como um fato elementar, mas julga assegurá-la pela existência de uma causa capaz de unificar os elementos que a constituem. No entanto, para satisfazer o critério (que a própria distinção entre substância e concomitante estabelece) de que entre os constituintes de uma substância não pode haver heterogeneidade, Aristóteles depende fundamentalmente da existência de tipos controversos de causa: as formais e as teleológicas
Abstract: This thesis analyses Aristotle¿s discussion about the unity of substance in Metaphysics Z and how it presupposes his commitments on essentialism, necessity and unity of natural kinds stated in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle does not consider the unity of substance as a basic fact, but he claims to explain it by means of a cause that unifies the constituent elements of a substance. However, in order to satisfy the criterion that those constituents should not be extrinsic to each other (a criterion which the distinction between substance and accidents establishes), Aristotle critically depends on controversial kinds of cause: the formal and teleological causes
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia
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Bengtson, Ingrid Kestrel. "What's in a Name?: A thesis concerning the philosophical problems posed by proper names." Thesis, Boston College, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/500.
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Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-StevensThis essay addresses the problems posed by proper names in regards to their relationship to that which they name (their "reference"). This relation of a name to its reference serves as a model for how language in general relates to the world as it actually is, making the question of what a name names of vital epistemological importance. The main problem posed by proper names is whether they simply denote, or whether they connote (i.e. have some informational content), and if they connote, what picture should we give of that content? This essay critiques a variety of theories about proper names, including those of Frege, Russell, Kripke, Searle, Evans, and Sainsbury. It concludes that names of unique entities do have informational content, in the form of a yet unspecified family of definite descriptions that rigidly designate an individual, which arises out of various causal chains of communication in a community
Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2007
Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy
Discipline: College Honors Program
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Silva, Enrico Paternostro Bueno da 1988. "A teoria social crítica de Nancy Fraser : necessidade, feminismo e justiça." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280924.
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Orientador: Josué Pereira da SilvaDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A filósofa política Nancy Fraser destaca-se enquanto importante expoente da Teoria Crítica contemporânea. Conhecida majoriamente por seu debate com Axel Honneth acerca da teoria do reconhecimento, suas formulações legaram importantes contribuições a, no mínimo, três campos do pensamento social: a teoria feminista, a sociologia política dos movimentos sociais e a filosofia da justiça. Visando uma reconstrução e sistematização crítica da evolução teórica da autora, este trabalho considera uma ampla gama de escritos datados de 1980 a 2012. No estudo de uma filósofa que sempre priorizou textos curtos e ensaios publicados em revistas políticas e acadêmicas a grandes sistematizações monográficas, identifica-se dois grandes modelos críticos em torno dos quais orbitam grande quantidade de diagnósticos de época, conceitos críticos e perspectivas emancipatórias. Para tratá-los, é utilizada uma classificação metodológica de sua produção em três blocos temáticos. O primeiro refere-se ao modelo para as "políticas de interpretação das necessidades", que mobiliza conceitos como discurso, democracia, hegemonia, esfera pública, cidadania e necessidade. O segundo trata das concepções teóricas e análises empíricas a respeito da subordinação feminina e das lutas feministas, que atravessam toda a produção da autora; destaca-se aqui o diálogo com as mais variadas correntes do pensamento: Escola de Frankfurt, pós-modernismo, pós-estruturalismo, pragmatismo, teoria do discurso. O terceiro bloco temático, enfim, contempla o modelo para uma teoria crítica da justiça, desenvolvido em estreita conexão com a práxis política dos movimentos sociais; aparecem aqui conceitos como participação paritária, reconhecimento, redistribuição, representação, transnacionalização e estrutura de governança. Não ignorando as oscilações temáticas e conceituais presentes ao longo do percurso filosófico de Fraser, a pesquisa busca compreender as contribuições originais e os inevitáveis limites verificados no pensamento social da autora, tencionando participar da teorização crítica das sociedades contemporâneas e contribuir para a compreensão e superação das injustiças nelas presentes
Abstract: The political philosopher Nancy Fraser is recognized as an important exponent of contemporary Critical Theory. Mainly known for the debate with Axel Honneth about the theory of recognition, her formulations give important contributions to at least three fields of social thought: the feminist theory, the political sociology of social movements and the philosophy of Justice. Aiming at a systematic reconstruction and critique of theoretical evolution of the author, it is considered here a wide range of writings dated from 1980 to 2012. In the study of a philosopher who always prioritized short texts and essays published in academic and political journals to large monographic systematizations, it is possible to identify two major critical models that lead to many diagnosis, critical concepts and emancipatory perspectives. To describe them, I use a methodological classification of her writings in three thematic blocks. The first one is about the "politics of needs interpretation" model, which mobilizes concepts such as discourse, democracy, hegemony, public sphere, citizenship and need. The second is about the theoretical concepts and empirical analyzes regarding the subordination of women and feminist struggles, which is visible through the entire production of the author; here, it is possible to highlight the dialogue among the various theoretic currents: Frankfurt School, post modernism, post structuralism, pragmatism, discourse theory. The third thematic block, finally, brings the model toward a Critical Theory of Justice, proposed in close connection with the political praxis of social movements; here are developed concepts as participatory parity, recognition, redistribution, representation, transnationalization and structure of governance. Considering the thematic and conceptual oscillations along Fraser's philosophical course, the research seeks to understand the original contributions and inevitable limits observed in her social thought, intending to participate in the critical theory of contemporary societies and to contribute to understanding and overcoming the injustices present in them
Mestrado
Sociologia
Mestre em Sociologia
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Huthnance, Neil Peter School of Sociology UNSW. "Creativity in the bioglobal age: sociological prospects from seriality to contingency." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Sociology, 2006. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/25954.
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This thesis is the first dedicated sociological attempt to offer a critical response to cultural studies and allied discourses that concern themselves with the relationship between technology and violence. A critical reconstruction is necessary because these cultural theorists have failed to adequately contextualize their arguments in relation to both the globally ascendant neoliberal policy outlook and its associated social Darwinian technoculture: the combined pernicious effects of which could be described as the logic of ???social constructionism as social psychosis???. The most prominent manifestation of this theoretical psychosis has to do with an interest in biotechnology in particular. The problem I identify in the treatment of this theme is how easily it can be used to support a technologically determinist position. One undesirable side effect is that these determinists are able to project from present trends a dystopian exhaustion of all critique through their focus on violence. In the thesis of ???bioglobalism??? this state of affairs is also deployed to take sociologists to task for insufficient recognition of processual ???network??? forms of distributed agency in technological processes. At stake therefore is the recovery of sociological critique. It follows that the core of my thesis is the radical reworking of two related heuristic devices: seriality and contingency. Seriality is taken to refer to social practices as diverse as the possible relationships between the social problem of rationality, case studies of individuals who have run amok, and the functioning of network characteristics. I use contingency to eschew seriality???s deterministic accounting of the social. Here I propose a new conceptual relationship between creativity and action. Emphasis is accordingly placed upon two related normative projects: Raymond Williams???s cultural materialism, and three of the ???problematiques??? Peter Wagner has identified as inescapable for theorizing modernity: the continuity of the acting person, the certainty of knowledge, and the viability of the political order. I conclude with a renewed conception of the role of normative critique as a form of conceptual therapy for bioglobal projections of seriality.
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Ribeiro, Francine M. 1985. "O conhecimento científico nos Segundos Analíticos de Aristóteles = causa e necessidade na demonstração." [s.n.], 2011. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278797.
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Orientador: Lucas AngioniDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: De acordo com Aristóteles, conhecemos algo cientificamente quando apreendemos a causa pela qual essa coisa é e apreendemos, também, certa relação necessária entre aquilo que pretendemos conhecer e o que descobrimos ser a causa adequada que explica por que tal fato é o caso. Além disso, o filósofo identifica o conhecimento científico com a posse de um silogismo científico ou demonstração. Neste trabalho, analisamos a relação entre a teoria demonstrativa que Aristóteles desenvolve, principalmente, no livro I dos Segundos Analíticos e sua teoria silogística dos Primeiros Analíticos I e tentamos responder por que o conhecimento científico deve ser via silogismo. Também procuramos explicitar como as noções de causa e de necessidade, pelas quais Aristóteles define o conhecimento científico, são contempladas pela exigência de que as proposições de uma demonstração sejam per se. Finalmente, discutiremos como essas noções de per se, necessidade e causa se encaixam na estrutura silogística, uma vez que conhecer algo cientificamente é possuir um silogismo científico
Abstract: According to Aristotle, we know something scientifically when we grasp not only the cause by which this something is and but also a certain kind of necessary relation between what we intend to know and what we have discovered to be the adequate cause that explains why this is the case. In addition, the philosopher identifies the scientific knowledge with the possession of a scientific syllogism or demonstration. In this work, we examine the relationship between the demonstrative theory that Aristotle develops mainly on book I of Posterior Analytics, and his syllogistic theory, presented in Prior Analytics I. We try to answer why scientific knowledge must be presented via syllogism. We also intend to explicit how the notions of cause and necessity, through which Aristotle defines scientific knowledge, are contemplated by the requirement that the propositions of a demonstration must be per se (in itself). Finally, we discuss how these ideas of per se, necessity and cause fit in the syllogistic structure, since knowing something scientifically means to have a scientific syllogism
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Bodziak, Junior Paulo Eduardo 1986. "Categorias de Validade Exemplar : sobre a distinção entre político e social em Hannah Arendt." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279521.
Full textAbstract:
Orientador: Yara Adario FrateschiDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Hannah Arendt trouxe uma nova perspectiva de formulação e de compreensão dos problemas políticos contemporâneos. Se, por um lado, foi capaz de evidenciar a insuficiência teórica do século XX diante do ineditismo dos eventos políticos, tendo que elaborar novas estratégias teóricas capazes de responder ao desafio de pensar a política no seu tempo; por outro lado, tal tarefa não pôde ser realizada sem que tais novidades fossem duramente criticadas por seus contemporâneos antes ou após sua morte em 1975. Neste trabalho, veremos que estas críticas se desenvolvem a partir de dois aspectos: da má compreensão das novidades teóricas elaboradas por Arendt e do tratamento dado pela autora à articulação entre social e político. Como resposta ao primeiro aspecto buscaremos construir a noção de "Categorias de Validade Exemplar", termo que tenta reunir as influências importantes de Kant, Benjamin e Sócrates ao pensamento arendtiano. Segundo, notaremos como as categorias políticas de Hannah Arendt podem ser pensadas em um cenário de efetivação da organização moderna da esfera de aparências, isto é, a sociedade. Sustentaremos que a autora acerta ao apontar para a funcionalização da política pela economia, embora seja necessário reinterpretar aspectos teóricos que a conduzem à citada conclusão para nos permitir pensar a política a partir de conflitos sociais
Abstract: Hannah Arendt brought a new perspective to the formulation and understanding of contemporary political problems. If, on the one hand, she was able to show the theoretical inadequacy of the twentieth century in front of unprecedented political events, having to develop new theoretical strategies capable of meeting the challenge of thinking about politics in her time, on the other, such a task could not be performed without such novelties were harshly criticized by his contemporaries before or after his death in 1975. In this work, we will see that these criticisms are developed from two aspects: the poor understanding of theoretical novelties prepared by Arendt and the treatment given by the author to the relationship between social and political. In response to the first aspect we will seek to build the notion of "Categories of Validity Exemplary", a term that attempts to bring together the important influences of Kant, Benjamin and Socrates to Arendt thought. Second, we will note how the political categories of Hannah Arendt can be thought of in a scenario of realization of the modern organization of sphere of appearances, that is, the society. I shall argue that the author hits the point to the functionalization of the political by economy, although it is necessary to reinterpret theoretical aspects that leads it to the above conclusion to enable us to think politics from social conflicts
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia