Journal articles: 'Contingency (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy)'

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Sattler, Barbara. "Contingency and Necessity." Monist 97, no. 1 (2014): 86–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist20149716.

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Schlesinger, George N. "Nomic Necessity and Contingency." Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 149 (October 1987): 379. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219566.

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Rosenkrantz, Gary. "Necessity, Contingency, and Mann." Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 4 (1985): 457–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil1985243.

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Gaskin, Richard, and Jules Vuillemin. "Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument." Philosophical Review 107, no. 4 (October 1998): 627. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998385.

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Cresswell, M. J. "Necessity and contingency." Studia Logica 47, no. 2 (June 1988): 145–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00370288.

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Tennant, Neil. "Conventional Necessity and the Contingency of Convention." dialectica 41, no. 1-2 (June 1987): 79–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1987.tb00881.x.

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LEFTOW, BRIAN. "Swinburne on divine necessity." Religious Studies 46, no. 2 (February 5, 2010): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990370.

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AbstractMost analytic philosophers hold that if God exists, He exists with broad logical necessity. Richard Swinburne denies the distinction between narrow and broad logical necessity, and argues that if God exists, His existence is narrow-logically contingent. A defender of divine broad logical necessity could grant the latter claim. I argue, however, that not only is God's existence broad-logically necessary, but on a certain understanding of God's relation to modality, it comes out narrow-logically necessary. This piece argues against Swinburne's overall account of modality and rebuts his argument for narrow-logical contingency.

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VERDÚ BERGANZA, Ignacio. "Dios, libertad y amor en Duns Escoto / God, Freedom and Love in Duns Scot." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 15 (October 1, 2008): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v15i.6198.

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This paper examines the value awarded by Duns Escoto to the defence of god -understood as Lave- who acts in a completely free mannner and is omnipotent. I also studies the implications of his philosophical position when confrontingthe relationships between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, intellect and will, necessity and contingency. His analysis of The Philosopher, Aristotle, is also discussed.

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Pizzi, Claudio. "Necessity and Relative Contingency." Studia Logica 85, no. 3 (June 5, 2007): 395–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9044-y.

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Huoranszki, Ferenc. "The Contingency of Physical Laws." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 3 (December 31, 2019): 487–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p487.

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The purpose of this paper is to explain the sense in which laws of physics are contingent. It argues, first, that contemporary Humean accounts cannot adequately explain the contingency of physical laws; and second, that Hume’s own arguments against the metaphysical necessity of causal connections are not applicable in this context. The paper concludes by arguing that contingency is an essentially emergent, macroscopic phenomenon: we can understand the contingency of fundamental physical laws only through their relation to the distribution of macroscopic modal properties in the manifest world.

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Padui, Raoni. "The Necessity of Contingency and the Powerlessness of Nature." Idealistic Studies 40, no. 3 (2010): 243–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies201040316.

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Lundy, Craig. "The Necessity and Contingency of Universal History." Journal of the Philosophy of History 10, no. 1 (March 11, 2016): 51–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341315.

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History occupies a somewhat awkward position in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Although they often criticise history as a practice and advance alternatives that are explicitly anti-historical, such as ‘nomadology’ and ‘geophilosophy’, their scholarship is nevertheless littered with historical encounters and deeply influenced by historians such as Fernand Braudel. One of Deleuze and Guattari’s more significant engagements with history occurs through their reading and theory of universal history. In this paper I will explicate and critically analyse the nature of this universal history vis-à-vis its most pertinent counterpoint: Hegel’s philosophy of world history. In contrast to Hegel’s form of historicism, which universalizes by virtue of a unitary and totalizing force, Deleuze and Guattari develop a universalizing mechanism that is strictly devoid of any privileged essence. Following, Deleuze and Guattari’s form of universal history is marked above all by contingency as opposed to necessity. In this paper I will show precisely how. I will also go on to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history offers the promise of an historical ontology commensurate with the processes of creativity and becoming, provided that appropriate steps are taken to reaffirm the radical contingency at its heart.

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Wuchterl, Kurt. "Religious-Philosophical Contingency and Empirical Theology." Journal of Empirical Theology 32, no. 2 (November 11, 2019): 169–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15709256-12341390.

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Abstract The existentially important problem of contingency has in recent times been the topic of discussion not only in the philosophy of religion, but also in psychology, in sociology and especially in empirical theology. In the theory of the experience of contingency developed here, “contingency” is first clarified by differentiating the meanings of “necessity”, which makes it possible to distinguish several fundamental personal patterns of behaviour in dealing with contingencies. Since both the purely scientific considerations as well as those relating to reason have reached their limits, the focus is on the meaning of contingency in religion. The central point at issue is what lies beyond the limits of reason. Naturalists and immanent agnostics judge responses to contingency differently from religious agnostics and adherents of institutionalised religions.—Finally, by applying the notion of a latent philosophy as a basis for these religious-philosophical reflections, it becomes a bridge to empirical theology, which attempts to mold the individual ways of dealing with contingency into being practically applicable.

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Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. "Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent?" Philosophical Studies 177, no. 12 (December 24, 2019): 3775–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01407-9.

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AbstractAre the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Gideon Rosen, in his article “The Limits of Contingency” (2006), has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many laws of ontology are metaphysically contingent (Rosen 2006: 20, 27). Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true.

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Øhrstrøm, Peter, and David Jakobsen. "William of Ockham on Future Contingency." KronoScope 18, no. 2 (September 18, 2018): 138–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685241-12341413.

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AbstractIn his philosophy, William of Ockham (1285-1347) offered an important and detailed response to the classical argument from the truth of a statement regarding the future to the necessity (unpreventability) of the statement. In this paper, Ockham’s solution and the possible formalisation of it are discussed in terms of modern tense and modal logic. In particular, the famous branching time formalisation suggested by A. N. Prior (1914-19) is discussed. Weaknesses and problems with this suggestion are pointed out, and an alternative formalisation of Ockham’s solution without the use of branching time is presented.

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Fillion, Réal. "The Continuing Relevance of Speculative Philosophy of History." Journal of the Philosophy of History 8, no. 2 (July 18, 2014): 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341270.

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Speculative philosophy of history is concerned with history as a whole, which includes explicitly relating the past to the present and the present to the future. It proposes a philosophical appreciation of the importance of history in our lives and in our self-knowledge, but where history is understood not only as revealing to us what is past, but also as a shaping of the present, which itself sets the conditions for future developments. The notion of history-as-a-whole I propose to call, for the purposes of discussion, the past-present-future complex and it is this complex that is the explicit concern of the speculative philosopher of history. The speculative philosopher of history is never far from the historian and her work, whose concern is to elucidate the past and reveal its intelligibility, and in that sense, the past remains the privileged “object” of history, precisely because the past, as past, needs to be re-presented in order to be known, and is known through its re-presentations. I will here briefly discuss Frank Ankersmit’s account of the work of representation in his recent Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Two things about this work of re-presentation will be noted: 1) because what is re-presented is a past reality, it provides a contrast to present reality, and 2) because the past re-presented is meant to be an account of the reality of the past, it gives us a sense of the necessity of what has been. For the speculative philosopher of history, taking these two features together raises the modal consideration of the relation between the necessity of what has come to pass (as re-presented) and the lived contingency of the present. Here I will briefly discuss the relevance of Michel Foucault’s work in relating past and present in terms of the contingent formations that shape our lives (including the histories we re-present). While Foucault’s focus on contingent formations privileges the notion of possibility within the historical field of the present, it does not systematically address how such possibility might relate to the future. For this last modal consideration, I will discuss briefly Ernst Bloch’s work, specifically the notions of Not-Yet- and What-Is- as discussed in the Principle of Hope (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986) as a way to address the future within the past-present-future complex that is the concern of speculative philosophy of history.

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Mikhailovski, Alexander V. "Four Key Questions in Philosophy of Technology." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 225–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956361.

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This article discusses Hans Poser’s new book “Homo creator” (2016). It aims to open the philosophy of technology to ontological, epistemological and ethical problems. The keynote of the book serves the conviction that the technical creativity builds the core of the engineering. Modal concepts as possibility, necessity, contingency and reality are used in a systematic way to characterize technology. Technological artifacts essentially depend on a special type of interpretation (“technical hermeneutics”). The central ontological problem consists in the fact that technology is based on new ideas, which at the beginning are a mere possibility, because the intended artifacts and processes never existed up to that moment. The author shows that conditions of the real world, cognitive, social and cultural conditions constitute the realm of the technological possibility and influence our culture (“life world”) from the very beginning.

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Inkpen, Rob, and Derek Turner. "The Topography of Historical Contingency." Journal of the Philosophy of History 6, no. 1 (2012): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187226312x625573.

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Abstract Starting with Ben-Menahem’s definition of historical contingency as sensitivity to variations in initial conditions, we suggest that historical events and processes can be thought of as forming a complex landscape of contingency and necessity. We suggest three different ways of extending and elaborating Ben-Menahem’s concepts: (1) By supplementing them with a notion of historical disturbance; (2) by pointing out that contingency and necessity are subject to scaling effects; (3) by showing how degrees of contingency/necessity can change over time. We also argue that further development of Sterelny’s notion of conditional inevitability leads to our conclusion that the topography of historical contingency is something that can change over time.

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di Georgio, P. "Contingency and Necessity in the Genealogy of Morality." Telos 2013, no. 162 (March 1, 2013): 97–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.3817/0313162097.

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Westfall, Richard, and Margaret J. Osler. "Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World." Philosophical Review 105, no. 1 (January 1996): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185780.

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Vos, Antonie. "The Systematic Place of Reformed Scholasticism: Reflections Concerning the Reception of Calvin’s Thought." Church History and Religious Culture 91, no. 1-2 (2011): 29–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187124111x557746.

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Modern notions like “Catholicism,” “Lutheranism,” and “Calvinism” are not helpful in describing the history of the thought at the early modern universities. However, the early modern university forms the context of Reformed academic thought, which has to be interpreted and to be analyzed in continuity and discontinuity with the thought of the medieval centuries. The decisive question to be raised is how a certain movement is related to the classic Christian model of necessity-contingency thinking: God exists necessarily and he acts contingently. The Reformed tradition of theology and philosophy closely followed this model, whereas Calvin did not.

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Driver, Julia. "IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2007): 301–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080114.

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Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.

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Werther, David. "Leibniz on Cartesian Omnipotence and Contingency." Religious Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1995): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500023271.

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Leibniz contrasted his views of necessity, possibility, and impossibility with those of Descartes and Spinoza. On the one hand, he argued that Descartes erred by allowing that God has the ability to make contradictory claims true. On the other hand, Leibniz found Spinoza's commitment to fatalism to be counterintuitive. I show that, given his in-esse account of truth, Leibniz could not have avoided a commitment to fatalism, without affirming one of the most objectionable features of Descartes' divine voluntarism, the contingency of the law of noncontradiction.

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Lindley, T. Foster. "David Hume and Necessary Connections." Philosophy 62, no. 239 (January 1987): 49–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100038572.

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David Hume's claim that necessary connection is essential to causality was at the expense of a useful causal distinction we sometimes note with the words ‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’. And since, as J. L. Mackie has stated, Hume made ‘the most significant and influential single contribution to the theory of causation’, subsequent writers on causality, regardless of their support for, or opposition to, Hume, have joined him in trampling this distinction. The object of this paper is not so much to undermine one of Hume's conclusions as it is to describe a use of ‘necessary’ that, while surviving in popular usage, is ignored or obfuscated in the literature on causality.

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Dear, Peter, and Margaret J. Osler. "Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World." American Historical Review 101, no. 2 (April 1996): 468. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2170428.

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Artmann, Stefan. "Three types of semiotic indeterminacy in Monod’s philosophy of modern biology." Sign Systems Studies 30, no. 1 (December 31, 2002): 149–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/sss.2002.30.1.09.

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Synthesizing important research traditions in information theory, structuralist semiotics, and generative linguistics, at least three main types of semiotic indeterminacy must be distinguished: Kolmogorov’s notion of randomness defined as sequential incompressibility, de Saussure’s principle of contingency of sign which ensures the possibility of translation between different sign systems, and Chomsky’s idea of indefiniteness in generative mechanisms as a requirement for the explanation of semiotic creativity. These types of semiotic indeterminacy form an abstract system useful for the description of concrete sign processes in their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimension. In his philosophical reflections on modern biology, Jacques Monod used the conceptual opposition chance versus necessity to analyse several phenomena of indeterminacy (especially in molecular biology). The biosemiotic approach to life permits to apply the suggested system of semiotic indeterminacy on these phenomena.

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Navarro Fuentes, Carlos Alberto. "Quentin Meillassoux. Realismo especulativo y Narrativas desde la Contingencia." Sincronía XXV, no. 80 (July 3, 2021): 131–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.32870/sincronia.axxv.n80.5b21.

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The objective of this work is to introduce Quentin Meillassoux's 'speculative materialist realism', establishing a critical stance against the metaphysical tradition of the 'absolute' that has prevailed in post-Kantian Western philosophy, based on the need for contingency that he proposes. This implies making a critique of what has been understood as realism, necessity and existing. To do this, key concepts of Meillassoux's philosophy are broken down, exemplifying its influence -and possible presence back in time- on other thinkers and artists in their respective narratives such as Graham Harman, Timothy Morton, Nick Land, and Florian Hecker, who delve into issues that generate discomfort, amazement, nihilism and pessimism in contemporary societies, such as probability and prediction in financial markets, the Anthropocene and nature, the conflictive relationship between subject and object, truth and chaos, between other things, subtracting ourselves from the humanist discourse on which the scientific, financial and environmental paradigms of our time rest and which have ended up cracking the identity of man, with capitalist production being the most determining geological factor. Let us to reflect on the following questions. What narratives can give an account of the current condition of the world? What narratives emerge when we stop focusing our attention on man? What habits of thought force us to change the awareness that everything around us is contingent?

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Sabolius, Kristupas. "QUENTINAS MEILLASSOUX IR RADIKALI MENO (NE)GALIMYBĖ." Problemos 85 (January 1, 2013): 153–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.2014.0.2914.

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Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjamas spekuliatyviojo realizmo ir meno santykis. Teigiama, kad nors naujasis judėjimas išpopuliarėjo kuratorių ir menininkų kontekstuose, vieno jo pradininkų Quentino Meillassoux knygoje „Po baigtinybės“ siūloma pozicija nepalieka galimybių paties meno legitimavimui. Spekuliatyvieji realistai stengiasi įveikti koreliacionizmo prieigą, pagal kurią tarp mąstymo ir būties egzistuoja būtinas ryšys. Kartu tokia pozicija nenumato galimybės meninėms praktikoms pasiekti realybės sferą – sukurdamas ką nors nauja, menininkas nuolatos pažeidžia absoliutaus pasaulio autonomiją. Tačiau atmetus spekuliatyvųjį realizmą grindžiantį reduktyvų racionalizmą, Meillassoux postuluojamas „kontingencijos būtinybės“ principas gali tapti meninės prieigos orientyru. Kūrybinėse praktikose įgyvendinamas kontingencijų radikalizavimas gali pasiūlyti nespekuliatyvią akistatą su Hiper-Chaosu, virtualybės plotmėje aktualizuodamas „virsmo kitu“ perspektyvą.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: spekuliatyvusis realizmas, menas, kontingencija, virtualumas. Quentin Meillassoux and Radical (Im)possibility of ArtKristupas Sabolius AbstractThis paper addresses the problematic relationship between Speculative Realism and art. Although the newly-born movement became popular among curators and artists, one finds no space left for legitimization of creative practices in Quentin Meillassoux’s “After Finitude”. By criticizing the so-called correlationism which privileges the necessary binding between being and thinking, Speculative Realism would not grant art a possibility of the access to the reality of things-in-themselves. By creating something new, artistic practices constantly violate the absolute autonomy of the world. On the other hand, if rejected the reductive rationalism of speculation, the principle of “the necessity of contingency”, as postulated by Meillassoux, could provide some guidelines for artistic take on the issue of reality. Through the radicalization of contingency in creative practices and the restitution of the value of the virtual, one could perform the transformation into Otherness and not-speculative confrontation with the realm of Hyper-Chaos.Keywords: speculative realism, art, contingency, virtuality.

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Jansen, Julia. "Transcendental philosophy and the problem of necessity in a contingent world." Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy s1.1 (2015): 47–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.19079/metodo.s1.1.47.

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Maar, Alexander. "Applying D. K. Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory of Causation to the Philosophy of Historiography." Journal of the Philosophy of History 10, no. 3 (November 17, 2016): 349–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341349.

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A theory of causation suitable for historiography must accommodate the many types of causal claims historians make. In this paper, I examine the advantages of applying D. K. Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation to the philosophy of historiography. I contend that Lewis’s possible world semantics offers a superior framework for making sense of historical causation, and that it lays the foundation for historians to look at history as causal series of events, remaining agnostic as to whether there may be historical regularities or laws. Lewis’s theory can also accommodate important notions often used by historians, such as absences as causes, historical necessity and contingency, and the role they play in the formulation of historical counterfactuals.

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Williams, Malcolm. "Contingent Realism—Abandoning Necessity." Social Epistemology 25, no. 1 (January 2011): 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2010.534566.

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DeMartino, George. "The Necessity/Contingency Dualism in Marxian Crisis Theory: The Case of Long-Wave Theory." Review of Radical Political Economics 25, no. 3 (September 1993): 68–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/048661349302500309.

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WUNDER, TYLER. "The modality of theism and probabilistic natural theology: a tension in Alvin Plantinga's philosophy." Religious Studies 51, no. 3 (August 14, 2015): 391–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412515000293.

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AbstractIn Wunder (2013) I observed a probabilistic blunder in Plantinga (2011) and argued that correcting it, while noting Plantinga's acceptance of logically non-contingent theism, had negative consequences for many other of his probabilistic claims. Professor Plantinga kindly replied to my correspondence, but the fruits of that conversation could not be incorporated into Wunder (2013). This article will explain the blunder and summarize my earlier arguments before addressing Plantinga's main replies. I conclude that these replies fail to circumvent most of the problems observed earlier: perhaps most significantly, the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism and theism's logical non-contingency still appear jointly to imply theism's necessary falsehood.

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McLeod, Stephen K. "Knowledge of Necessity: Logical Positivism and Kripkean Essentialism." Philosophy 83, no. 2 (April 2008): 179–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000454.

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AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted than the second. Contrary to received opinion, the paper argues, the considerations Kripke adduces concerning truths purported to be necessary a posteriori do not disprove the logical positivist thesis that necessary truth and a priori truth are co-extensive.

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Vos, Antonie. "Paul Helm on Medieval Scholasticism." Journal of Reformed Theology 8, no. 3 (2014): 263–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15697312-00803003.

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Berkouwer and Pinnock embraced deterministic Calvinism when they were young theologians. However, later on they started to revolt against the ‘Calvinism’ of their youth and Dort. Paul Helm never joined or affirmed this uprising. It is not that I revolt against Dort, but I defend that Reformed scholasticism, including Dort, was never a kind of theological necessitarianism—this in contrast with John Calvin’s theology. Instead, classic Reformed scholasticism offers us a theology of contingency and individuality, of goodness and will, and of freedom and grace. Rediscovering this comforting historical reality is a gift and a joy. Helm argues that he cannot embrace this viewpoint. However, this present contribution demonstrates that he misinterprets the core structure and the medieval foundation of classic Reformed theology and philosophy. It is the latter that form the basis of Reformed systematic theology and the necessity-contingency, the synchrony-diachrony, as the necessity of the consequence-consequent and the secundum compositionem/divisionem distinctions show.

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Watson, Richard A. "Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World.Margaret J. Osler." Quarterly Review of Biology 71, no. 1 (March 1996): 109–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/419274.

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LAUGHLIN, PETER. "DIVINE NECESSITY AND CREATED CONTINGENCE IN AQUINAS." Heythrop Journal 50, no. 4 (July 2009): 648–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00476.x.

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Pothos, Emmanuel M., Ulrike Hahn, and Mercè Prat-Sala. "Contingent necessity versus logical necessity in categorisation." Thinking & Reasoning 16, no. 1 (February 2010): 45–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546780903442383.

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Skrzypek, Jeremy W. "Existential Import and the Contingent Necessity of Descartes’s Eternal Truths." International Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2019): 309–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq2019624134.

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Descartes famously states that God could have made any and all of the “eternal truths” that are now in place (such as 1 + 2 = 3) false. This has led scholars to attribute to Descartes’s God a radical sort of power: the power to do the logically impossible. While Descartes does claim that God could have made any of the eternal truths that are now in place false, I do not think that this commits him to the view that God could have made twice four equal to nine, or anything of that sort. In this paper I show how, by placing Descartes’s doctrine of the eternal truths in its proper historical context, a new and more charitable interpretation of that doctrine becomes available. On this interpretation, Descartes’s God could have made the eternal truths false by choosing not to create the eternal essences to which these truths refer.

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Koons, R. C. "Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency, by Timothy O'Connor." Mind 118, no. 471 (July 1, 2009): 862–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzp083.

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Forrest, P. "Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency * By TIMOTHY O'CONNOR." Analysis 69, no. 3 (June 29, 2009): 589–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp051.

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Maar, Alexander. "A Metafísica de Copleston e o Debate com Russell." Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 76, no. 4 (January 31, 2021): 1331–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2020_76_4_1331.

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Father Frederick Copleston is best known for his carefully crafted works History of Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas. Copleston’s most notable metaphysical thesis is his interpretation of the argument from contingency, which he sees as the superior choice for theists. He draws on Aquinas and distinguishes between causa fieri and causa esse to argue that God is a higher order (vertical) cause of contingent causal series (horizontal). Copleston presents God not as a temporal first cause, but an ontologically ultimate cause necessary to explain a contingent universe. His contribution changed the way we read Aquinas. Copleston’s willingness to debate his thesis with different philosophical perspectives is illustrated by his acceptance to discuss God’s existence with Bertrand Russell, in 1948. This BBC radio debate epitomises the dispute between theists and atheists from the 1940s onwards. I undertake to expound and comment Copleston’s contribution to metaphysics, present relevant parts of the debate and provide criticism.

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Davidson, Jack D. "Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World. Margaret J. Osler." Journal of Religion 76, no. 1 (January 1996): 117–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/489753.

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Lennon, Thomas M. "Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy: Gassendi and Descartes on Contingency and Necessity in the Created World. Margaret J. Osler." Isis 87, no. 1 (March 1996): 168–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/357437.

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Pérez Otero, Manuel. "Una evaluación de la explicación kripkeana de la ilusión de Contingencia." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 39, no. 117 (December 7, 2007): 19–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2007.570.

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Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and offered different accounts of why certain necessary truths seem to be contingent. One of these accounts was used by Kripke in an argument against the psychophysical identity thesis. I defend the claim that the explanatory force of Kripke’s standard account of the appearance of contingency (the account used to argue for psychophysical dualism) relies on the explanatory force of one of the more general accounts he also offers. But the more general account cannot be used to undermine the psychophysical identity thesis. Specifically, a crucial feature in Kripke’s standard account, which is needed to argue for dualism, is explanatorily superfluous. Alternative accounts that are similar to Kripke’s original one but lack that trait would also explain the phenomenon. Consequently, the Kripkean dualist argument is blocked.

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Broadie, Sarah Waterlow. "Necessity and Deliberation: An Argument from De Interpretatione 9." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 2 (June 1987): 289–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10716437.

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In De Interpretatione 9 Aristotle considers the proposition that everything that is or comes to be, is or comes to be of necessity. From the supposition that this is so, he draws the following consequence: ‘[In that case] there would be no need (ού δέοο) to deliberate or take trouble, [saying] that if we do this there will be so and so, and if we do not do this there will not be so and so’ (18b31-3). Finding this result absurd, he rejects the supposition and concludes that some events or states of affairs are contingent.

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Werther, David. "Leibniz and the Contingency of God Exists." Religious Studies 30, no. 1 (March 1994): 99–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500022757.

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Leibniz offered two main defences of contingency, the per-se view and the analytic account.1 I argue that an acceptance of either account requires a rejection of what is now known as ‘the characteristic claim of S5 modal logic’, If possibly P then necessarily possibly P, and that apart from an affirmation of that claim Leibniz could not have either offered an a priori argument for God's existence or considered God exists to be a necessary truth. Since Leibniz considered God to be, by definition, the most perfect being and took existence to be a perfection, it follows that Leibniz could not have consistently accepted either account of contingency without abandoning theism.

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Arruda, Caroline T. "What the Humean Theory of Motivation Gets Wrong." Journal of Philosophical Research 44 (2019): 157–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20191029148.

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I show that defenses of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) often rely on a mistaken assumption. They assume that desires are necessary conditions for being motivated to act because desires (and other non-cognitive states) themselves have a special, essential, necessary feature, such as their world-to-mind direction of fit, that enables them to motivate. Call this the Desire-Necessity Claim. Beliefs (and other cognitive states) cannot have this feature, so they cannot motivate. Or so the story goes. I show that: (a) when pressed, a proponent of HTM encounters a series of prima facie counterexamples to this Claim; and (b) the set of claims that seem to naturally complement the Desire-Necessity Claim as well as provide successful responses to these counterexamples turn out to deny the truth of this same claim. As a result, the Humean implicitly grants that it is at least equally plausible, if not more plausible, to claim that desires are not able to motivate in virtue of what they necessarily possess. Instead, desires contingently possess features that enable them to motivate.

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de Laurentiis, Allegra. "The Parmenides and De Anima in Hegel's Perspective." Hegel Bulletin 27, no. 1-2 (2006): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200007539.

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In the chapter on ‘Plato and Aristotle’ of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel praises Aristotle's work for displaying a principle of ‘pure subjectivity’ in a manner that he considers to be largely absent from the Platonic corpus:In general, Platonic thinking [das Platonische] represents objectivity, but it lacks a principle of life, a principle of subjectivity; and this principle […], not in the sense of a contingent, merely particular subjectivity, but in the sense of pure subjectivity, is proper to Aristotle. (W vol. 19, p. 153)Elsewhere, Hegel refers to Aristotelian conceptions of organic life and of thinking as to the earliest speculative insights of Western philosophy. In § 378 of the Encyclopaedia (1830) he calls the De Anima ‘the best or even only work of speculative interest ever written on the philosophy of spirit’. In yet other places, however, Hegel attributes at least ‘intuitive’ forms of speculation to Plato as well.In a preliminary way, a 'speculative relation’ in Hegel's acceptation is instantiated by a subject's theoretical and practical relation to itself — that is, theoretical self-knowing and practical self-will. ‘Speculative’ is any concept which grasps as a unity what other kinds of cognition keep asunder: for example, the subjective and objective dimensions of a phenomenon or state of affairs. But even independently of a detailed analysis of what ‘the speculative’ entails, one is struck by the apparent inconsistency of these claims regarding Plato or Aristotle with Hegel's overall view of the logical necessity of philosophy's historical development. This view is synthetically expressed in the 1820 Introduction to these same Lectures.

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Zoppis, Andrea. "L’essere grezzo della tecnica." Chiasmi International 22 (2020): 249–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chiasmi20202226.

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Through a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s late courses on Nature, this essay presents a new reflection on technique and makes explicit the ontological significance of a rethinking of technique in this period. After an analysis of the historical sense of the notion of Nature and of animal behavior, we turn to cybernetics. The need to rethink man on the basis of his contingency, that is, on the basis of his relationship with the world and with the technical objects through which this relationship is structured, arises in the essay. Merleau-Ponty’s course on Nature has thus allowed us to investigate the ontological significance of the notion of technique by considering technical objects that Merleau-Ponty himself references. Technique, by prolonging Nature, becomes the keystone to the contact between man and Being, thus illustrating the necessity, for philosophy and for culture, of a return to the contact with brute being that founds and inhabits it.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Contingency (Philosophy) Necessity (Philosophy)'

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