Relevant bibliographies by topics / Contract analysis

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Contract analysis'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Contract analysis.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Lange, Jeff, Eric A. Wiening, and Donald Malecki. "Insurance Contract Analysis." Journal of Risk and Insurance 61, no. 2 (June 1994): 353. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/253721.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Alisa Ahmad, Azlin, Mat Noor Mat Zain, and Nur Diyana Amanina Zakaria. "A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SMART CONTRACTS AND ISLAMIC CONTRACTS." International Journal of Advanced Research 8, no. 10 (October 31, 2020): 316–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/11859.

Full text
Abstract:
A smart contract is a computer protocol contract of which its innovation rooted from the traditional contract. However, Sharia-compliant transaction necessitates a contract to fulfils all pillars of Islamic contracts in order smart contract can be accepted as an innovation of Islamic contracts. Thus, this paper aims to make a comparison between Islamic contracts and smart contract on blockchain. This paper is a qualitative research by adopting content analysis method to analyze some related topics. The pillars of Islamic contract are compared with the smart contract to ensure whether the smart contract follows the guidelines of Islamic contract or vice versa. The analysis shows that smart contract does not entirely comply with the Islamic principles of a contract. Even though smart contract generally has three pillars of Islamic contract but in details, it does not comply with the Sharia principles. By comparing between the pillars of Islamic contract and smart contract on blockchain, it shows that smart contract on blockchain is not underline with the Islamic contracts pillars. Contracting parties participate in the smart contract does not recognize each other that can be lead to gharar. Meanwhile, every transaction in the smart contract allows prohibited subject matters such as illegal drugs, weapons where as it is not allowed in Islamic contracts transactions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Abdul Manap, Norhoneydayatie, Tze Chin Ong, and Farhah Abdullah. "REMEDY FOR MISREPRESENTATION IN CONTRACTS: A CASE ANALYSIS IN MALAYSIA." International Journal of Advanced Research 8, no. 11 (November 30, 2020): 380–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/12019.

Full text
Abstract:
Misrepresentation is a false statement made by one party which affects the other partys decision to agree to a contract. The act of misrepresentation nullifies the free consent of the contracting party to enter the contract, and that party is entitled to remedy. In Malaysia, the act of misrepresentation in contract is governed by section 18, Contracts Act 1950, whereas the remedy is provided for under sections 65 and 66, Contracts Act 1950. Based on this provision, the remedy given in cases of misrepresentation is contract rescission. However, based on previous court decisions, the remedy of contract rescission and rescission and damages have both been awarded by the courts. The objective of this article is to provide an analytical and critical case-by-case analysis of misrepresentation in contract, specifically regarding the remedies awarded by the court. The analysis of these cases found that there are court decisions where the court had awarded the remedy of contract rescission, and other cases where the court awarded contract rescission together with damages. The remedy expressly provided for in the Contracts Act 1950 is, however, contract rescission. This situation may cause confusion as the effects of each remedy are different. It is also submitted that the provisions in the Contracts Act 1950 should be reviewed to ensure their suitability with the application of misrepresentation laws in Malaysia.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

GOVERNATORI, GUIDO, and ZORAN MILOSEVIC. "A FORMAL ANALYSIS OF A BUSINESS CONTRACT LANGUAGE." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 15, no. 04 (December 2006): 659–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843006001529.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper presents a formal system for reasoning about violations of obligations in contracts. The system is based on the formalism for the representation of contrary-to-duty obligations. These are the obligations that take place when other obligations are violated as typically applied to penalties in contracts. The paper shows how this formalism can be mapped onto the key policy concepts of a contract specification language, called Business Contract Language (BCL), previously developed to express contract conditions for run time contract monitoring. The aim of this mapping is to establish a formal underpinning for this key subset of BCL.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Norman, Gethin, and Vitaly Shmatikov. "Analysis of probabilistic contract signing1." Journal of Computer Security 14, no. 6 (December 1, 2006): 561–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/jcs-2006-14604.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Wils, W. "Beginning to understand contract analysis." Journal of Dental Education 60, no. 4 (April 1996): 390–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.0022-0337.1996.60.4.tb03038.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Arumugam, N., M. A. Fatimah, E. F. C. Eddie FC Chiew, and M. Zainalabidin. "Supply chain analysis of fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV): Prospects of contract farming." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 56, No. 9 (September 21, 2010): 435–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/30/2009-agricecon.

Full text
Abstract:
The paper examines the factors that lead farmers to participate in c the contract farming in the Peninsular Malaysia. The primary data was collected through a survey using a questionnaire on the total of two hundred and eight farmers from various states in Malaysia. The study utilizes the stratified sampling method. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The survey identified forty-one contract farmers. Factor analysis was carried out to identify the factors that lead farmers to participate in the contract farming. Based on the analysis, five factors were identified as the reasons for contracting, namely, market stability, and access to marketing information and technology, transfer of technology to improve farming practices, access to inputs and indirect benefit. Contract farming or contract arrangements can be a valuable source of an additional income and knowledge that can be employed to enhance the productivity of the entire farming enterprise.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Beuve, Jean, Marian W. Moszoro, and Stéphane Saussier. "Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 28, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 316–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12268.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Rich, Robert, and Joseph Tracy. "Early Contract Renegotiation: An Analysis of US Labor Contracts, 1970–1995." Journal of Labor Economics 31, no. 4 (October 2013): 825–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/669965.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Teegerstrom, Trent, Gerard D’Souza, Phillip Osborne, and Kezelee Jones. "To Contract or Not to Contract? A Decision Theory and Portfolio Analysis of Cattle Contract Grazing." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 26, no. 2 (October 1997): 205–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500002677.

Full text
Abstract:
Contract grazing is compared with retained ownership of cattle using two frameworks—decision theory and portfolio analysis. The study area is West Virginia. Contracting is optimal under a wide range of price and weather scenarios and decision criteria. It also dominates other alternatives based on labor efficiency measures. The optimal portfolio consists of contract grazing and pasture rental, with the results insensitive to small changes in contract grazing returns. The decision theory and portfolio analyses are complementary; together, the two sets of results provide a comprehensive view of the optimal production alternative. Because different agents employ different decision criteria, this approach can increase the utility of results to decision makers and contribute to better decisions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Ackerman, David T. "International contracts a quantitative analysis of transnational contract formation." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/8.

Full text
Abstract:
Globalization is the promise of the future, and it presents, quite literally, a world of opportunities not available in the past. International collaborations in science, research, and business now enjoy increased probabilities of success, in part, because of the advance in technology and the possibility of instantaneous communications. The convenience, simplicity and affordability of technology are helping to make the world accessible to almost everyone. With new availability of international concerns and the growth of global partnerships in all areas of interest, an increased need arises for agreements that memorialize collaborators' commitments, responsibilities and obligations. There is a corresponding concern that the agreements be enforceable across national and international lines should anything go wrong. There is no collaboration, partnership or venture that will not be touched in some way by the law. Whose law governs and how rules and regulations of different nations will be applied are of escalating concern. Empirically examining the state of international contract law is the overarching focus of my research. Adopting a research methodology involving both quantitative and qualitative techniques, I am investigating whether any consistency exists between attorneys of different practice sectors (academic, government, corporate and private) considering choice of law, enforcement of contract provisions, and the inclusion of preventative measures of international contracts. My results contribute to the future success of international collaborations of all concerns by empirically identifying the need for increased education on various dispute resolution options, as well as the effect cultural awareness has on the drafting of international contracts.
ID: 030476559; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for honors in the major in Legal Studies.; Thesis (B.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.
B.S.
Bachelors
Health and Public Affairs
Legal Studies
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Zeng, Shuo. "Topics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/577498.

Full text
Abstract:
Consider companies who rely on revenue generating equipment that fails from time to time. Assume that a company owns one unit of equipment, whose maintenance and repair services are outsourced to a qualified service provider. We assume that the company (the principal) outsources the maintenance and repair services using performance based contracts. Such contractual relationships fall into economics' principal-agent framework. The owners of the revenue generating units are referred to as principals, and the service provider as the agent. We address the following questions: What are the optimal contracting strategies for a principal and an agent? Can the agent benefit from pooling the service demands from multiple principals? This dissertation contains two main bodies of work contained in chapters 2-7 and chapters 8-13 respectively. In the first part of this dissertation (chapters 2-7) we examine the contractual options between a single principal and a single agent. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal we identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer and the agent's service capacity response. In essence, we provide an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. That is, we derive mathematical formulas for the optimal contract offers and the agent's optimal service capacity. It turns out that a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions. In the second part of this dissertation (chapters 8-13), in a counter distinction to the vast literature in economics on principal-agent contractual interplay and its predominant concern with the principal, here we focus on the agent. In the case of performance based service contracts it is known that the principal extracts all the economic surplus and the agent breaks even. But this is not the case for an agent of good standing contracting with multiple principals. We show that an agent who contracts a collection of principals with interdependent failure characteristics does better than break-even - such an agent realizes a profit rate that is convexly increasing in the number of principals. The corresponding cooperative game assessing each principal's contribution to the agent's profit is convex and its easily computable Louderback's value seems always to be in its core. In chapter 14 we present the outline of a future study that compares several different options of contract structure faced by the principal and the agent, because the optimal contracting strategies for the principal and the agent may not necessarily be the same under different contract structures. We discuss briefly the agent's and the principal's behavior under different forms of performance based contract, which serves as a starting point for future extensions of this dissertation. To summarize, this dissertation provides practical mathematical results and important managerial insights into the principal-agent contract in equipment repair services industry.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Williams, Gail Antoinette. "Contract as organisation : an economic analysis of the joint contracts tribunal's standard form of building contract 1980." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/624.

Full text
Abstract:
The objective of this thesis is to consider whether the institutionalist hypothesis that the choice of organisational form functions to limit the transaction costs of organising productive activities explains a major standard-form contract which is used in building production. I approach this task by demarcating three models of contract which represent different points along a "contracting continuum". Each of the three governance structures - classical contract, relational contracting and the firm - represents a distinct patterning of resource co-ordination and each generates its own configuration of transaction costs. Thus the contracting continuum provides a basis for comparing the cost-reducing strengths and weaknesses of governance structures that vary with respect to their characterisation of relations between economic actors, and of the form and substance of both planning and implementation of decisions. The second part of the thesis focuses on the standardform building contract and its location along the contracting continuum. This part of the thesis addresses the question of "transactional fit" between the building contract and the activity which it purports to regulate. The analysis proceeds by identifying sources of transaction costs in the context and in the practices of building production and examining the governance implications of the contractual responses to such costs. 11 In its conclusions the thesis attempts to evaluate the contribution of institutional analysis our understanding of legal conceptions of contract. By using an industry-wide standard-form contract as a focus, I hope to illustrate some of the strengths and also the limitations of this approach. Building contracts have received little academic attention in the UK., and transaction cost analysis of governance structures is a young science which has been pursued with more enthusiasm by economists than by lawyers. As yet there has been little attempt to relate substantive aspects of the lawyer's understanding of contract to the "new institutional economics". It is hoped that this thesis will make a contribution to that exercise.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Marquardt, Gerdis. "Economic analysis of contract choice, feelings of entitlement and contract enforcement in relationships governed by incomplete contracts." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/23573.

Full text
Abstract:
The first chapter of this thesis considers a contractual principal-agent relationship in an unstable environment. The players are uncertain whether repeated interaction is possible. I examine the role that the deliberate choice of an incomplete (non-verifiable and unenforceable) contract plays in signalling stability and trust. In this model, contractors may privately observe shocks that force them to end the relationship after the current period. Complete (verifiable) contracts, which are assumed to be feasible, ensure cooperation in compliance with the contract. With incomplete contracts, the players make themselves vulnerable to exploitation by their partners. But if cooperation occurs notwithstanding, the contractors update their beliefs about each other’s willingness to interact again. When the agent observes that her partner and herself are able to continue the relationship, she undertakes a non-contractible, mutually beneficial investment. The second chapter is based on the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008) that regards contracts as reference points for feelings of entitlement. Parties’ ex post performance depends on whether they receive what they feel entitled to, which is assumed to be the best possible outcome permitted by the contract. Consequentially, there exists a trade-off between contractual flexibility (agreement on a price interval) and rigidity (agreement on a single price). Hart and Moore do not analyse the role that third party contract enforcement plays for parties’ feelings of entitlement, shading on performance and contract choice. I demonstrate that Hart and Moore’s results rely on a number of assumptions that can be challenged when incorporating litigation into the model. They assume that trade is voluntary but renegotiation is prohibited. I argue that either trade is voluntary but renegotiation is possible or courts compel parties to trade according to the contract. In the former scenario, fixed price contracts may not act as reference points and the parties feel entitled to the best possible outcomes from renegotiation. In the latter scenario, contracts may act as reference points because of the option of contract enforcement. However, potential flexibility incorporated in the contract is lost. The third chapter provides an experimental examination of the effect of contract enforcement on contractors’ reference points for feelings of entitlement. Previous experiments by Fehr, Hart and Zehnder (AER 2011) analyse and support the theory by Hart and Moore (QJE, 2008) that contracts are reference points. Both theory and experiments ignore the role of contract enforcement for contractors’ feelings of entitlement. I replicate and confirm Fehr, Hart and Zehnder’s baseline experiment. I also run an additional treatment in which buyers can offer sellers more or less favourable prices than specified in the contract, whereas sellers can request enforcement of contracts as written. I find that contract enforcement matters, without being invoked, for sellers’ punishment behaviour through feelings of entitlement. Without explicit contract enforcement, flexible contracts (agreement on a price range instead of a single price) leave sellers feel entitled to the best possible price permitted by the contract. However, buyers rarely offer such a price which leads to disappointment and punishment. With the option of contract enforcement, sellers feel entitled to the price which the court would enforce, even if it is equally unfavourable than in the no court treatment. The presence of the court provides an outside validation for which prices are reasonable and thereby limits disappointment and punishment.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Sieke, Marcel. "Supply chain contract management a performance analysis of efficient supply chain contracts." Köln Kölner Wiss.-Verl, 2008. http://d-nb.info/989792722/04.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Younesi, Hamid. "Preserving the contractual equilibrium of international petroleum contracts : a relational contract analysis." Thesis, University of York, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18874/.

Full text
Abstract:
The viability of long-term investment contracts is dependent on the effective and efficient distribution of risk and reward between the parties, while retaining the potential for flexibility in the face of future pressures for alteration. Petroleum contracts as long-term state contracts have complex economic and legal aspects, and their performance depends upon a durable relationship between the investor, whether foreign or domestic, and the host government. Such contracts cannot be seen as discrete commercial transactions or isolated agreements. Hence, the sustained contractual relationship for petroleum transactions is based on the ability to accommodate changing expectations in changing circumstances, and on the ongoing balance and adjustment of contractual rights and obligations in changed framework. International energy investment agreements are very vulnerable and exposed to a range of actions or inactions by public authorities (government or state agencies) which could considerably affect the profitability of a project. Amongst the principal reasons for the risk of expropriation is that the host state seeks to obtain a greater share of the return from a successful operation, by raising taxes or tightening other provisions in the investment contract without necessarily taking over ownership of the investment or to drive the investor out of business. As a result, the business relationship between the foreign oil company and host government resembles a model of an ‘obsolescing bargain’, (OBM). The thesis explores the role of the contractual equilibrium and bargaining positions and their interactions with contractual clauses in a relational model of relationship to reduce and manage risk of expropriation in international energy investment transactions. The thesis examines the classical and the relational theories of contract and their response to contractual obligations, and then suggests an adaptive contractual mechanism to maintain the equilibrium of the contract in order to protect the contracting parties’ interests and resolve disputes.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Bastola, Jatan, Kenneth E. Findley, and Nathan T. Woodward. "Analysis of contract source selection strategy." Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45810.

Full text
Abstract:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions acquiring weapons systems, supplies, and services. The contract management process has to be executed diligently to ensure the government is receiving the highest return on investment. The process has six steps, two of which relate to the source selection strategy: solicitation planning and source selection. Once the acquisition team determines whether to use a lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) or Tradeoff source selection strategy, they evaluate proposals to determine which offer presents the best value to the government. The purpose of this research is to explore potential relationships between the source selection strategy (LPTA or Tradeoff) and resultant contract outcomes. This research uses data collected from contract files and related documentation from two major systems commands (Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea Systems Command) to show the implication of the LPTA and Tradeoff source selection strategies. The findings suggest that an LPTA source selection strategy has a significantly shorter lead-time to contract award. The findings should be viewed with caution, however, as the sample size consisted of only six LPTA contracts. This report concludes with two recommendations to improve further research on choosing a source selection strategy and contract outcomes.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Lara, Luis F. "Analysis of the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) contract." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2001. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA401453.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Lui, Qiao. "Anticipatory breach of contract : A critical analysis." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530051.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Parsons, Robert Douglas. "Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: analysis of sustained decisions on DOD supply contract disputes." Thesis, Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/18617.

Full text
Abstract:
The purpose of this thesis is to identify deficiencies in the Federal Government's acquisition process through an analysis of ASBCA decisions for the period 1981 through 1985. The study focused upon Department of Defense contract default terminations whose conversion to terminations for the convenience of the Government resulted from Board decisions. The essence of the study was to determine if meaningful conclusions could be drawn from the analysis that could be used to improve the acquisition process. Using this research methodology several deficiencies were found, such as, actions and inactions by the acquisition team that waived the Government's right to subsequently pursue a default termination, lack of communications and basic contract knowledge, inadequate training, and a general misunderstanding of the substantial compliance aspects in contracts requiring first article units. Additional research is required, however this study concluded that analysis of sustained ASBCA appeals could be a useful technique for making improvements to the acquisition process.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Wiening, Eric A. Insurance contract analysis. Malvern, Pa: American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Marcel, Fontaine. Drafting international contracts: Analysis of contract clauses. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2006.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Fontaine, Marcel. Drafting international contracts: An analysis of contract clauses. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Filip, De Ly, ed. Drafting international contracts: An analysis of contract clauses. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Institute of Leisure & Amenity Management., ed. Estimating and contract cost analysis. Reading: Institute of Leisure and Amenity Management, 1999.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bag, Sugata. Economic Analysis of Contract Law. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Zhang, Yuqing, Rainer Schröder, and Immanuel Gebhardt. Comparative analysis on the Chinese contract Law. Berlin: BWV, Berliner Wiss.-Verl., 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Hughes, W. P. An analysis of the JCT management contract. Ascot: Chartered Institute of Building, 1991.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Tribunal, Joint Contracts. Practice note 23: A contract sum analysis. London: RIBA Publications, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Johnston, Daniel. International exploration economics, risk, and contract analysis. Tulsa, Okla: PennWell, 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Boardman, Marty. "Contract Analysis." In Fixing and Flipping Real Estate, 123–32. Berkeley, CA: Apress, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4302-4645-9_12.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Gössler, Gregor, Daniel Le Métayer, and Jean-Baptiste Raclet. "Causality Analysis in Contract Violation." In Runtime Verification, 270–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16612-9_21.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Norman, Gethin, and Vitaly Shmatikov. "Analysis of Probabilistic Contract Signing." In Formal Aspects of Security, 81–96. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-40981-6_9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Bag, Sugata. "Introduction." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 1–22. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Bag, Sugata. "Basics of Economic Theory of Contract." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 23–58. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bag, Sugata. "Economics of Damage Remedies I: Unilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 59–90. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Bag, Sugata. "Economics of Damage Remedies II: Bilateral Reliance, One-Sided Information Asymmetry." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 91–110. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bag, Sugata. "Economics of Damage Remedies III: Incentives Under Expectation Damage With One-Sided Private Information – A Mechanism Design Approach." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 111–45. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Bag, Sugata. "Economics of Damage Remedies IV: Incomplete Contracts, Bilateral Reliance, Two-Sided Asymmetric Information." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 147–89. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_6.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Bag, Sugata. "Concluding Notes." In Economic Analysis of Contract Law, 191–98. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9_7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Saito, Kimihiro, and Seiji Kobayashi. "Analysis of micro-reflector 3D optical disc recording." In Contract Proceedings 2006, edited by Ryuichi Katayama and Tuviah E. Schlesinger. SPIE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.685231.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Cifuentes, A., J. Arasa, and C. Pizarro. "Forward tracing technique for diffraction analysis of apertures in optical systems." In Contract Proceedings 2006, edited by G. Groot Gregory, Joseph M. Howard, and R. John Koshel. SPIE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.692245.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Paniagua, Cristina, and Jerker Delsing. "Service Contract Definition Analysis." In IECON 2020 - 46th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society. IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iecon43393.2020.9254403.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Ghaleb, Asem, and Karthik Pattabiraman. "How effective are smart contract analysis tools? evaluating smart contract static analysis tools using bug injection." In ISSTA '20: 29th ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3395363.3397385.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Xue, Yinxing, Mingliang Ma, Yun Lin, Yulei Sui, Jiaming Ye, and Tianyong Peng. "Cross-contract static analysis for detecting practical reentrancy vulnerabilities in smart contracts." In ASE '20: 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3324884.3416553.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Wang, Aihe, Yifang Tang, and Yan Li. "A comparative analysis of contract models." In 2012 IEEE International Conference on Information Science and Technology (ICIST). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icist.2012.6221667.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Alshanqiti, Abdullah, Reiko Heckel, and Timo Kehrer. "Visual contract extractor: a tool for reverse engineering visual contracts using dynamic analysis." In ASE'16: ACM/IEEE International Conference on Automated Software Engineering. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2970276.2970287.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Zhang, Yuyao, Siqi Ma, Juanru Li, Kailai Li, Surya Nepal, and Dawu Gu. "SMARTSHIELD: Automatic Smart Contract Protection Made Easy." In 2020 IEEE 27th International Conference on Software Analysis, Evolution and Reengineering (SANER). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/saner48275.2020.9054825.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Damm, Werner, Bernhard Josko, and Thomas Peikenkamp. "Contract Based ISO CD 26262 Safety Analysis." In SAE World Congress & Exhibition. 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA, United States: SAE International, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4271/2009-01-0754.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Wang, Shaohui, Anaheed Ayoub, Radoslav Ivanov, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee. "Contract-based blame assignment by trace analysis." In the 2nd ACM international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2461446.2461463.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Contract analysis"

1

Wooten, William. Financial Analysis of Contract Berthing. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada460296.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Contract Law. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9696.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Bastola, Jatan, Kenneth E. Findley, and Nathan T. Woodward. Analysis of Contract Source Selection Strategy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, July 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1016672.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Bastola, Jatan, Kenneth E. Findley, and Nathan T. Woodward. Analysis of Contract Source Selection Strategy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, June 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada632334.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Jackson, Jr, and Carl J. Analysis of the 314th Contracting Squadrons Contract Management Capability Using the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada475941.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Kimsey, Sara D. An Analysis of Current Operational Contract Support Planning Doctrine. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1009074.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Rendon, Juanita M., and Rene G. Rendon. Defense Procurement: An Analysis of Contract Management Internal Controls. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1016670.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Hidaka, Daisuke, and Jared L. Owen. An Analysis of Internal Controls for DoD Contract Management. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada632250.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Jeffers, Dina T. Contract Specialist Turnover Rate and Contract Management Maturity in the National Capital Region Contracting Center: An Analysis. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada514011.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Graham, La-Hesh A., Scott J. Lewis, III Wallace, and Alexander D. Analysis of Contract Management Processes at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada536402.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Contract analysis' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography