Relevant bibliographies by topics / Contrats optimaux

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Contrats optimaux'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 3 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

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Guigou, Jean-Daniel. "Oligopole et contrats financiers optimaux." Revue française d'économie 15, no. 3 (2001): 167–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.2001.1500.

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Boyer, Martin. "Les clauses de valeur à neuf sont-elles optimales?" Articles 77, no. 1 (February 5, 2009): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/602344ar.

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RÉSUMÉ Le but de cet article est d’étudier le contrat d’assurance optimal dans un contexte où un assuré est soumis à de l’anti-sélection (qu’on appelle aussi dans ce contexte aléa moral ex post) et où un assureur est incapable de s’engager pleinement dans une stratégie de vérification. Le problème étudié se rapproche grandement de celui lié à la fraude à l’assurance où seul l’assuré connaît à coût nul l’état de la nature (s’il a subi un sinistre ou non). En modélisant le comportement de l’assureur et de l’assuré comme un jeu non coopératif, nous démontrons que les contrats d’assurance comportant une clause de valeur à neuf sont optimaux. Ces contrats, qui surindemnisent un assuré en cas de sinistre, permettent à l’assureur d’envoyer à l’assuré un signal crédible qu’il vérifiera avec une plus grande probabilité les réclamations de ce dernier.
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Rost, Katja, and Margit Osterloh. "Are top executives paid too much? Determinants of directors’ pay in Switzerland." Corporate Board role duties and composition 4, no. 2 (2008): 7–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv4i2art1.

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Executive compensation has become a fashionable topic: Cross-nationally, the earnings of executives and non-executive directors have risen significantly in recent years. Academic literature offers two hypotheses for this trend, a “fat cat” and an “optimal-contract” explanation. Proponents of the “fat cat” explanation state that directors are paid too much due to their unjustified power. Proponents of the “optimal-contract” hypothesis state that competition in the managerial labour market establishes an optimal compensation contract. This study contrasts both hypotheses and presents evidence that the level of directors’ pay in Swiss corporations is to be explained by “optimal contracts” and by managerial power. We give evidence to which degree the two explanations are valid.
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Kalife, Aymeric, Gabriela López Ruiz, Saad Mouti, and Xiaolu Tan. "Optimal behavior strategy in the GMIB product." Insurance Markets and Companies 9, no. 1 (September 26, 2018): 41–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ins.09(1).2018.05.

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Guaranteed Minimum Income benefit are variable annuities contract, which offer the policyholder the possibility to con- vert the guarantee level into an annuities income for life. This paper focuses on the optimal customer behavior assuming the maximization of the discounted expected future cash flows over the full life of the contract duration. Using convenient scaling properties of the contract value enables to reduce the complexity (dimension) of the problem and to characterize the policyholder’s decision as a function of the contract moneyness across four main choices: zero withdrawals, guaranteed withdrawals, lapse and the income period election. Sensitivities to key drivers such as the market volatility, the interest rate and the roll-up rate illustrate how crucial are not only the environment, but also the product design features, in order to ensure a fair and robust pricing for both customer and life insurer. In particular, the authors find that most empirical contracts are usually underpriced compared to mean optimal behavior pricing, which empirically translated into multiple updates of behavior assumptions and re-reserving by life insurers in the recent years.
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Kuang, Xi (Jason), and Donald V. Moser. "Reciprocity and the Effectiveness of Optimal Agency Contracts." Accounting Review 84, no. 5 (September 1, 2009): 1671–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1671.

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ABSTRACT: Optimal agency contracts pay the lowest wage necessary to induce profit-maximizing effort. Employees could view such contracts as violating reciprocity because, relative to more reciprocal contracts, they offer a lower wage in exchange for higher effort. Consequently, the profit-maximizing effectiveness of optimal contracts could be impaired if employees reject them or reduce their effort. We use experimental labor markets to examine (1) how employees respond to an optimal versus a suboptimal reciprocity-based contract when each contract is the only contract available, (2) how employees respond to these contracts when firms choose which one to offer, (3) whether the firms' contract offers depend on employees' reactions to those offers, and (4) how employees and firms react to a hybrid contract that incorporates features of both contracts. We find that the optimal contract is less effective than agency analysis predicts, the reciprocity-based contract can be equally effective, and the hybrid contract dominates a market in which all three contracts are available. Implications of these results are discussed.
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Iskenderov, A. D., and R. K. Tagiyev. "OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM WITH CONTROLS IN COEFFICIENTS OF QUASILINEAR ELLIPTIC EQUATION." Eurasian Journal of Mathematical and Computer Applications 1, no. 1 (2013): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.32523/2306-3172-2013-1-2-21-38.

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Kumagae, Keiki. "Optimal Task Design for Intrinsically Motivated Workers with an Incomplete Contract." Journal of National Development 31, no. 1 (July 1, 2018): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.29070/31/57434.

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Lach, Saul, Zvika Neeman, and Mark Schankerman. "Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, no. 3 (August 1, 2021): 238–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190053.

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We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing and a second with a lower interest plus cofinancing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, the cost of public funds, and the effectiveness of the private venture capital industry. (JEL D82, D86, G24, L26, O31, G32, H81)
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Bock, Igor, and Ján Lovíšek. "Optimal control problems for variational inequalities with controls in coefficients and in unilateral constraints." Applications of Mathematics 32, no. 4 (1987): 301–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.21136/am.1987.104261.

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Jiang, Baojun, and Hongyan Shi. "Intercompetitor Licensing and Product Innovation." Journal of Marketing Research 55, no. 5 (October 2018): 738–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022243718802846.

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This article explores how intercompetitor licensing between an incumbent and an entrant affects market competition and the entrant’s optimal product quality. In the model, the incumbent has a noncore technology that is used for the noncore attribute of the final product, and the entrant has a new core technology to introduce a new, higher-quality product. For the noncore technology of its product, the entrant can either license it from the incumbent or develop it in-house. The authors show that a royalty licensing contract of the noncore technology between the incumbent and the entrant has a competition-alleviating effect. More important, the effect of such licensing on the entrant’s optimal quality depends on whether its core technology can significantly or only incrementally increase its product quality over the incumbent’s product quality. The royalty contract will tend to increase the entrant’s optimal quality when the entrant’s core technology can offer a significant quality improvement over the incumbent’s. By contrast, if the entrant’s technology can raise its product quality only incrementally over the incumbent’s product quality, the royalty contract will tend to reduce the entrant’s optimal quality. A wide range of royalty licensing contracts are mutually acceptable; the incumbent (entrant) can benefit from such a contract even when the entrant pays a total royalty fee that is lower (higher) than its alternative research-and-development cost. These results hold even when the incumbent endogenously chooses its royalty licensing fee. The main results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions (e.g., alternative game sequence, endogenous quality decision by the incumbent, alternative licensing contract).
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

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Eber, Nicolas. "Relations de long terme banque-entreprise, contrats de credit optimaux et equilibre macroeconomique." Strasbourg 1, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996STR1EC08.

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Les relations de long terme entre les banques et les entreprises sont souvent considerees comme un element favorable a l'activite economique. Au plan microeconomique, des contrats de credit de long terme sont preferables a des sequences de contrats de court terme grace aux economies de couts de controle qu'ils impliquent. Notre analyse insiste notamment sur l'importance des effets de reputation dans la determination de ces contrats et montre comment les relations de long terme peuvent conduire a l'emergence de nouveaux types de contrats bancaires combinant des caracteristiques de contrat de dette et de contrat d'action. Notre etude montre egalement que les relations de long terme peuvent conduire les banques a relacher le controle de leurs clients et impliquer, de ce fait, une inefficience dans l'allocation du credit ; cela rend alors ambigu l'effet final de telles relations sur l'equilibre macroeconomique
Long-term relationships between banks and firms are often considered as favourable to economic activity. At the microeconomic level, long-term loan contracts dominate sequences of short-term contracts because of the savings in monitoring costs they imply. Our analysis focuses notably on the importance of reputation effects as incentive devices and shows how long-term relationships can lead to the emergence of new kinds of banking contracts mixing features of debt and equity. Our study also shows that long-term relationships may lead banks to slacken monitoring. Such relationships may thus imply an inefficiency in the allocation of credit, which makes ambiguous the final effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium
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Pouyllau, Hélia. "Algorithmes distribués pour la négociation de contrats de qualité de service dans les réseaux multi-domaines." Rennes 1, 2007. ftp://ftp.irisa.fr/techreports/theses/2007/pouyllau.pdf.

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Déployer des services (ex: vidéo-conférence) sur la topologie multi-domaines ("X-domaines") d'Internet implique de garantir la Qualité de Service (QdS) de bout-en-bout agrégeant plusieurs paramètres. Ainsi, des contrats de QdS sont établis entre domaines. Les éléments clés à prendre en compte sont l'hétérogénéité, l'indépendance des domaines et la confidentialité des contrats. Avant d'établir un service, un processus de négociation de la QdS s'exécute: il s'agit de la sélection de contrats pair-à-pair formant une chaîne satisfaisant une QdS de bout-en-bout (sujette à des effets d'accumulations: les délais s'additionnent, les disponibilités se multiplient, etc. ) et optimisant une fonction objectif. Nous étudions différents problèmes de négociation. Ces problèmes se réduisent à des problèmes de "sac à dos", qui sont NP-difficiles. Nous proposons des algorithmes distribués utilisant la Programmation Dynamique et fournissons également des mécanismes d'auto-réparation en cas d'échec ou de violations de contrats. Négocier chaque requête peut s'avérer un processus lent. Il peut être préférable de pré-négocier des chaînes de contrats. Ainsi, nous considérons le problème de la négociation de tuyaux: un domaine sollicite un nombre de connexions pour une QdS requise. Nous proposons un modèle de flots et une version distribuée de l'algorithme de Busacker-Gowen pour résoudre ce problème. En outre, nous étudions la négociation avec exploration de plusieurs routes pour atteindre le domaine cible et y répondons par des mécanismes de détection de cycles et de terminaison. Enfin, nous discutons de l'application de la négociation en "milieu ouvert" où les domaines s'organisent éventuellement en cartels ou coalitions
Deploying services (e. G. Video-conference) over the Internet X-domain topology requires guaranteeing an end-to-end QoS composed of several parameters. For this, QoS contracts are committed between domains. The key factors to consider are the heterogeneity, independence of domains and privacy of contracts. Before establishing a service, a negotiation occurs: it consists in selecting a chain of pair-wise commitments that satisfies the end-to-end QoS requirements and optimizes an objective function, given that global QoS is subject to accumulation effects (e. G. Delays sum up along a path). We address different negotiation problems. They reduce to knapsack problems, which are NP-Hard. Domain independence and contract privacy constrain us to design distributed solutions based on Dynamic Programming principles. We develop also self-repairing mechanisms in case of negotiation failures and contract violations. Negotiation per request can be slow. It may be preferable to pre-negotiate QoS contract chains. Thus, we address the problem of pipe negotiation: a domain asks for a number of connections satisfying a required QoS. We propose a network flow model and a distributed version of the Busacker-Gowen algorithm. We also consider the negotiation when several routes are explored to reach the target domain and describe some mechanisms to detect cycles and termination. Finally, we study negotiation in an "open world" where domains potentially organize themselves as cartels or coalitions
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Spaeter-Loehrer, Sandrine. "Le role de la fonction de couts de l'assureur et du comportement de prudence de l'assure : une etude theorique des contrats d'assurance optimaux." Université Louis Pasteur (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996STR1EC04.

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L'objectif principal de cette these est d'etudier l'impact de differentes structures de couts administratifs supportes par l'assureur sur la forme du contrat d'assurance qui constitue le meilleur partage de risque entre l'assure et l'assureur. Une nouvelle approche des contrats basees sur des caracterisations topologiques adaptees est proposee. Elle permet d'unifier et de generaliser les resultats de la litterature au sein d'un cadre d'analyse unique, valable pour toute fonction de couts continue (constante, lineaire, convexe, concave,. . . ). La prise en compte du comportement de prudence de l'assure permet encore d'affiner les caracteristiques des contrats et de mettre les resultats suivants en evidence. Un assure riscophobe prefere toujours une franchise strictement positive lorsque les couts administratifs sont strictement croissants avec les indemnites. L'evolution de la couverture des sinistres superieurs a cette franchise est essentiellement determinee par le sens de variation du cout marginal ; si les couts sont convexes (respectivement concaves), la solution presente une franchise avec coassurance au-dela (respectivement une franchise evanescente). Par ailleurs, lorsque les couts sont non lineaires (convexes ou concaves), l'assure fait encore face, apres assurance, a une perte nette aleatoire qu'il gere de maniere differente selon le comportement de prudence (kimball 1990) qu'il adopte. Ainsi, les contrats optimaux sont rarement lineaires par morceaux car le signe de la derivee troisieme de l'utilite influence l'evolution des indemnites marginales. Dans un dernier modele, un second risque non assurable est introduit dans l'economie. Dans un tel environnement, la prudence a egalement un impact sur la pente de la fonction d'indemnisation, contrairement aux cas a un seul risque
In this work, we study the link existing between the design of the administrative costs borne by the insurer and the optimal insurance contracts. In order to deal with this subject, we propose a new methodology based on some adapted topological characterizations. This allows us to unify and to generalize the existing results in a unique framework which holds for any continuous cost function (constant, linear, convex, concave,. . . ). Further, by taking into account the prudence concept, we state more precisely the design of the optimal indemnity functions and we stress the following results. A risk-averse insured always prefers a strictly positive deductible when costs are increasing with indemnities. The design of insurance for damages higher than this deductible is essentially characterized by the sense of variation of the marginal cost : if costs are convex (respectively concave), the solution displays a straight deductible with coinsurance above (respectively a disappearing deductible). Moreover, when costs are non-linear (convex or concave), the insured still bears a risk after insurance, since his net loss remains random. Thus he manages this latter in a different manner, depending on whether he is prudent or not prudent (kimball 1990). Finally, optimal contracts are rarely piecewise linear because the sign of the third derivative of the utility function has an influence on the evolution of the marginal indemnities. In the last model, we introduce a background risk in the economy. In such an environment, the prudence has also an impact on the slope of the indemnity function, contrary to the one-risk cases
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Galvão, Raphael de Albuquerque. "Optimal regulation of oil fields under asymmetric information." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9908.

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This work considers a relationship between a regulator and an oil company. There are many uncertainties inherent in this relationship and we focus on the e ects of asymmetric information. We characterize the optimal regulation under asymmetric information, when the regulator must design a mechanism that induces truthful revelation about the rm's private information. We show that, when the rm cannot commit not to quit the relationship, the regulator may not be able to implement the optimal rst-best regulatory outcome. In this case, the regulator cannot achieve the optimal risk-sharing with the rm. We also provide an example, in which we show that the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC) may not hold. As it turs out, this is a natural result in our model rather than an imposition.
Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.
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Hajjej, Ishak. "Contrat optimal pour les partenariats public-privé avec aléa moral : une approche de contrôle stochastique." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020IPPAG007.

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Dans cette thèse, on s’intéresse aux contrats de partenariat public-privé (PPP). Un PPP est un contrat à long terme entre une entité publique et une partie privée, aussi appelée consortium, dans lequel le public externalise la construction et/ou la gestion d’un bien public. Le consortium prend le risque et la responsabilité de gérer le projet. Le public s’engage en contre partie à lui verser une rente. Cependant, les efforts du consortium pour améliorer la valeur sociale du projet ne sont pas observables par le public. C’est un problème de principal agent avec aléa moral où le principal est le public et l’agent est le privé. On suppose que le public paie le consortium continûment et l’effort de l’agent affecte le drift de la valeur sociale du projet. On suppose que le public est neutre au risque et le consortium est adverse au risque. Dans le chapitre 2 de la thèse, on considère un contrat perpétuel entre une entité publique et un consortium. On caractérise le contrat optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. On utilise une formulation forte : on considère différentes filtrations correspondant à différents niveaux d’informations comme dans le contexte de contrôle stochastique avec observation partielle. Dans cette approche, on utilise des méthodes de martingale et de contrôle stochastique. Dans le chapitre 3, on considère un problème du partenariat public-privé avec horizon aléatoire, dans lequel le public a la possibilité d’arrêter le contrat à une date aléatoire et donne une compensation au consortium. On résout ce problème de contrôle stochastique avec un problème d’arrêt optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. Dans ce chapitre, on utilise la formulation faible : on suppose que le consortium change la distribution de la valeur sociale du projet en changeant son drift et cela revient à considérer une nouvelle mesure de probabilité qui dépend de l’effort de l’agent. Dans le chapitre 4, on s’intéresse aussi au problème de partenariat public-privé avec un horizon aléatoire mais en utilisant la formulation forte. Puis, on traite la cadre de partage de risque : on suppose que le public et le consortium ont les mêmes informations. On analyse numériquement la valeur d’information. Dans le chapitre 5, on étudie l’existence d’une solution de l’équation d’Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman qui apparaît dans notre étude théorique. Puis, on développe des résultats numériques pour la résolution numérique d’une équation Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman et l’inéquation variationnelle dans le cadre de notre étude numérique
In this thesis, we are interested in the contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships (PPP). PPP is defined as a long-term contract between a private party and a public entity, for the construction and/or the management of an asset or public service, in which the consortium takes the risks and a responsibility to manage the project. The public undertakes to pay him a rent. However, the effort that the consortium does to improve the social value of the project is not observable by the public. It is a principal-agent problem with moral hazard, in which the principal is the public and the agent is the consortium. We assume that the public pays the consortium continuously and the effort of the consortium affects the drift of the social value of the project. We assume that the agent is risk averse and the public is risk-neutral. In chapter 2 of the thesis, we consider a perpetual contract between a public entity and a consortium. We characterize the optimal contract in this moral hazard framework. We use the strong formulation : we consider different filtrations corresponding to the different level of information as in the context of stochastic control under partial observation. In this approach, we use martingale methods and stochastic control techniques. In chapter 3, we consider a public-private partnership problem with a random horizon, in which the public has the possibility to stop the contract at a fixed or a random time and gives compensation to the consortium. We solve this optimal stochastic control with optimal stopping problem in this context of moral hazard. We use the weak approach, that is the agent changes the distribution of the social value of the project by changing the drift and this amounts to considering a new probability that depends on the effort of the consortium. In the chapter 4, we also consider the problem of public-private partnership with a random horizon but using the strong formulation. Then, we deal with the risk-sharing framework, we assume that the public and the consortium have the same information. We analyze numerically the value of information. Chapter 5 focuses on the existence of a solution of the Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation that appears in our theoretical study. Then, we detail the numerical results for the numerical resolution of a Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation and variational inequality as part of our numerical study
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Huang, Fei, and 黄斐. "Optimal safety loading of reinsurance contracts." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46935289.

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Johnson, Rodney Joseph. "Optimal contract appraisal for fine chemicals contract manufacturers." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/8749.

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Grandner, Thomas. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2000. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1588/1/document.pdf.

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In this paper a vertically structured duopolistic market with unionized price setting firms is analyzed. The form of the contract of the transactions between upstream and downstream firms can be linear pricing, franchising or vertical integration. It is known from literature (Irmen 1997) that the price elasticity of the industry demand and the degree of product differentiation are the decisive factors in the determination of the profit maximizing form of the contract. In this paper it is shown that the bargaining power of the union is an additional factor. With a higher bargaining power linear pricing becomes less preferable. (author's abstract)
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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RIBEIRO, SYLVIA TELLES. "OPTIMAL PRICING OF NATURAL GAS FLEXIBLE CONTRACTS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2009. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=15892@1.

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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
O segmento industrial desempenha um importante papel no desenvolvimento do setor de gás Brasileiro. Em função dos baixos preços e dos incentivos dados pelo governo para a conversão dos processos industriais (muitos deles dependentes do óleo combustível) para o gás natural, criou-se uma fonte de demanda firme deste combustível. Como as termelétricas operam em regime de complementariedade ao sistema hidrelétrico (sendo coordenadas pelo Operador Nacional do Sistema (ONS) elétrico e chamadas a gerar apenas em situações hidrológicas desfavoráveis), o oconsumo de gás termelétrico ocorre de forma esporádica. Uma forma de se aumentar a eficiência do uso do gás, mesclando duas classes de consumidores se dá através dos contratos interruptíveis, que proporcionam ao produtor a capacidade de atender consumidores industriais bicombustível (gás e óleo por exemplo) com o gás ocioso das termelétricas. Como a atratividade deste contrato depende do desconto dado com relação ao preço do contrato firme, que não é interrompido, o objetivo deste trabalho é a construção de um modelo analítico para a determinação do preço ótimo dos contratos de fornecimento de gás interruptíveis, por parte de um produtor monopolista. O consumo de gás das termelétricas será considerado como principal fonte de incerteza do modelo, que por sua vez será caracterizada através de cenários de operação ótima do sistema elétrico, simulados conforme a metodologia utilizada pelo ONS. O perfil de risco do produtor será caracterizado pelo Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR).
Brazilian natural gas industry growth has been led by electricity supply. As hydro plants generate at lower costs, thermal units only produce when hydro electricity is insufficient. This makes natural gas consumption highly volatile: Either all thermal units generate together or don’t. When all units generate together, the gas trader has to buy LNG - Liquified Natural Gas at the spot market incurring price risk. This risk can be mitigated in case the gas trader is able to sell flexible contracts to the industrial sector that can be interrupted in case of thermal generation. Thus the gas volume sold under flexible contracts is used either by thermal generation or by the industrial sector, virtually reducing total demand and avoiding emergency LNG purchases. The determination of the optimal price for these contracts is the aim of this dissertation. The determination model proposed will try to maximize a convex combination of CVaR - Conditional Value at Risk NPV - Net Present Value and trader´s profit NPV.
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Beaulieu, Mathilde. "Imagerie optique à très haut contraste : une approche instrumentale optimale." Thesis, Université Côte d'Azur (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017AZUR4040/document.

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Cette thèse vise à investiguer des moyens d'optimiser les performances de l'imagerie à haut contraste dans l'optique et le proche infrarouge pour la détection d'exo-planètes. L'étude principale a été menée sur le contraste à faible séparation permettant l'imagerie d'exo-planètes dans leur zone habitable. Cette détection directe est rendue possible par le développement des futurs grands télescopes et de coronographes de plus en plus performants à faible séparation. L'approche retenue permet de créer une zone sombre à haut contraste grâce à la coronographie et au « wavefront shaping » (contrôle de l'amplitude et de la phase avec 2 miroirs déformables), mais qui est limité par les effets de propagation de Fresnel. Les résultats obtenus ont déterminé les limitations de configuration optique pour le « wavefront shaping ». Grâce à une approche semi-analytique soutenue par des simulations numériques et une approche Monte-Carlo, ces limitations ont été analysées et quantifiées pour extraire les configurations optimales. Les résultats ont été appliqués au banc SPEED dont l'objectif est d'optimiser et de tester le haut contraste à faible séparation. Une deuxième étude a été une contribution à une étude générale de stabilité, en traitant la stabilité temporelle comme un paramètre indispensable dans la conception en amont d'instrument haut contraste. Un travail préliminaire a été initié sur la stabilité des instruments de mesure eux-mêmes à travers l'étude thermique d'un système de métrologie. Enfin, un dernier volet a été une étude de simulation de performances d'un nouveau concept d'imagerie différentielle basé sur l'acquisition d'images réalisées avec différentes tailles de pupilles
This thesis aims to optimize high-contrast imaging performance in visible and near infrared for exoplanet detection. The main study focuses on high-contrast at small separation, to image exoplanets in their habitable zone. This direct detection is achievable with the next Extremely Large Telescopes and with the development of coronagraph providing high performance at small separation. The approach adopted for this study creates a high-contrast region (a dark hole) with the combination of coronagraphy and wavefront shaping (wavefront control of both phase and amplitude with 2 deformable mirrors) but is limited by the Fresnel propagation of phase aberrations. The goal of this work is to define the wavefront shaping limitation in optical configuration (deformable mirrors location, component optical quality, beam diameter). A semi-analytic approach followed by a Monte-Carlo analysis of numerical end-to-end simulations is studied, resulting in the definition of the optimal configuration. Results are then applied to SPEED, a test bench to optimize and test high-contrast imaging at small separation with a segmented pupil. Another aspect of this thesis is a contribution to a stability study to treat the temporal stability as a crucial parameter in high-contrast imaging instrumentation, at the conception level. A preliminary work is initiated during the thesis to analyse the stability of the measuring instrument itself. A metrology tool and its thermal behaviour are thus studied. Finally, the last part of this thesis is a performance analysis of a new differential imaging technique, developed to improve high contrast with observations with different diaphragm sizes
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Books on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

1

Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1988.

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Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1989.

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Chronis, Panagiotis. On optimal contracts for central bankers. [s.l.]: typescript, 1997.

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Monahan, George E. Monotonicity of second-best optimal contracts. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1987.

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Englmaier, Florian. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

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Mishkin, Frederic S. Inflation band targeting and optimal inflation contracts. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Basov, Suren. Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5.

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P, Baker George. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

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Danziger, Leif. Extension of labor contracts and optimal backpay. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2006.

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Chemla, Gilles. Implicit contracts, optimal union power and takeovers. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1994.

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Book chapters on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

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Belov, Mikhail V., and Dmitry A. Novikov. "Contracts." In Optimal Enterprise, 119–50. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003128564-6.

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Zweifel, Peter, Friedrich Breyer, and Mathias Kifmann. "Optimal Health Insurance Contracts." In Health Economics, 203–52. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68540-1_6.

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Yong, Jiongmin, and Xun Yu Zhou. "Stochastic Optimal Control Problems." In Stochastic Controls, 51–100. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1466-3_2.

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Yong, Jiongmin, and Xun Yu Zhou. "Linear Quadratic Optimal Control Problems." In Stochastic Controls, 281–344. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1466-3_6.

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Basov, Suren. "Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts." In Studies in Economic Theory, 57–68. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_4.

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Basov, Suren. "Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts." In Studies in Economic Theory, 69–106. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_5.

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Basov, Suren. "Social Norms and Optimal Contracts." In Studies in Economic Theory, 119–46. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_7.

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Pham, Viet, M. H. R. Khouzani, and Carlos Cid. "Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 79–98. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_5.

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Basov, Suren. "Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts." In Studies in Economic Theory, 107–17. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_6.

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Sieke, Marcel. "Optimal Channel Selection and Efficient Contracts." In Supply Chain Contract Management, 109–41. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24382-1_6.

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Conference papers on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

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Dütting, Paul, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. "Simple versus Optimal Contracts." In EC '19: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329591.

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Dutta, Partha Sarathi, and Sandip Sen. "Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts." In the first international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/544862.544887.

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Mamageishvili, Akaki, and Jan Christoph Schlegel. "Optimal Smart Contracts with Costly Verification." In 2020 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icbc48266.2020.9169407.

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Guenther, D. A., and W. F. Walker. "2C-6 Optimal Contrast Resolution Beamforming." In 2007 IEEE Ultrasonics Symposium. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ultsym.2007.23.

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Daum, Frederick E. "Nonlinear optimal semirecursive filtering." In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by Oliver E. Drummond. SPIE, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.241177.

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Chen, Chun-Hung, Liyi Dai, and Enver Yucesan. "Optimal way to find the optimal design for discrete-event stimulation experiments." In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by Alex F. Sisti. SPIE, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.319339.

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Yuan, Pin-Jar. "Optimal guidance of proportional navigation." In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by Michael K. Masten and Larry A. Stockum. SPIE, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.241942.

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Tocher, John L., and Ren E. Curry. "Benefits of optimal flight plans." In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by Robert G. Otto, James Lenz, and Russell Targ. SPIE, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.241066.

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Kastella, Keith D., and Stanton Musick. "Search for optimal sensor management." In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by Oliver E. Drummond. SPIE, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.241194.

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Hartman, Richard L., Keith B. Farr, and Michele W. McColgan. "Optimum filters, or are they?" In Aerospace/Defense Sensing and Controls, edited by David P. Casasent and Tien-Hsin Chao. SPIE, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.304771.

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Reports on the topic "Contrats optimaux"

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Lentz, Rasmus. Optimal Employment Contracts with Hidden Search. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19988.

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Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4480.

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Mishkin, Frederic, and Niklas Westelius. Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12384.

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Engel, Eduardo, and Ronald Fischer. Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat of Expropriation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13742.

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Andreasen, Eugenia, Sofía Bauducco, and Evangelina Dardati. Welfare Effects of Capital Controls. Inter-American Development Bank, June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003307.

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This paper studies the effect of capital controls on misallocation and welfare in an economy with financial constraints. We build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms, financial constraints and international trade and calibrate it to the Chilean economy. Since high-productivity and exporting firms need to borrow more to reach their optimal scale, capital controls that tax international borrowing hit them harder. As a result, misallocation increases relatively more for this group of firms, and for young firms that are still trying to reach their optimal scale. In terms of welfare, the model predicts a sizable aggregate loss of 2.39 percent when capital controls are introduced, with welfare decreasing twice as much for high-productivity firms. We empirically corroborate the main insights in terms of misallocation obtained from the model using Chilean manufacturing firm data from 1990 to 2007.
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Svensson, Lars E. O. Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w5251.

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Fitzpatrick, Brian J. Determining the Optimal Work Breakdown Structure for Defense Acquisition Contracts. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, March 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ad1008478.

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Kaplow, Louis. Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing The Amount of Losses is Costly. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4290.

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Kushner, Harold J., and R. M. Ramachandran. Nearly Optimal Singular Controls for Wideband Noise Driven Systems. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, August 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada186682.

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Cooper, Russell. Optimal Labor Contracts, Imperfect Competition and Underemployment Equilibria: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2060.

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