Books on the topic 'Contrats optimaux'

Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1988.

Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1989.

Chronis, Panagiotis. On optimal contracts for central bankers. [s.l.]: typescript, 1997.

Monahan, George E. Monotonicity of second-best optimal contracts. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1987.

Englmaier, Florian. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

Mishkin, Frederic S. Inflation band targeting and optimal inflation contracts. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

Basov, Suren. Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5.

P, Baker George. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Danziger, Leif. Extension of labor contracts and optimal backpay. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2006.

Chemla, Gilles. Implicit contracts, optimal union power and takeovers. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1994.

Vaidya, Tushar S. [Standard-debt contract's optimal monitoring policy]. [s.l.]: typescript, 1993.

Cooper, Ian. Forward contracts: Pricing, default risk and optimal use. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1990.

Cooper, Ian. Forward contracts: Pricing, default risk and optimal use. Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1990.

Krasa, Stefan. Intertemporal contracts and a theory of optimal auditing. Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1993.

Engel, Eduardo. Optimal resource extraction contracts under threat of expropriation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

Ayotte, Kenneth Michael. Optimal property rights in financial contracting. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

Krasa, Stefan. Optimal contracts with costly state verification: The multilateral case. Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992.

Dhami, Sanjit S. A multitask agency theory of optimal agrarian labor contracts. Colchester: Essex University, Department of Economics, 1998.

Dessi, Roberta. Financing entrepreneurs: Optimal contracts and the role of intermediaries. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1999.

Gazioglou, S. Optimal financing rules and overlapping contracts with rational expectations. London: London Business School, 1985.

Borland, Jeff. Optimal labor contracts with moral hazard and limited liability. Melbourne: University of Melbourne,Dept. of Economics, 1988.

Alan, Manning. Asymmetric information and the optimal length of labour contracts. London: Birkbeck College, Dept.of Economics, 1986.

Krasa, Stefan. Optimal contracts with costly state verification: The multilateral case. Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991.

Svensson, Lars E. O. Optimal inflation targets, 'conservative' central banks, and linear inflation contracts. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.

Arvan, Lanny David. Optimal long term labor contracts when workers have heterogenous opportunities. [Urbana]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1985.

Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. Optimal monetary policy in a model of overlapping price contracts. [Boston]: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994.

Sercu, Piet. The optimal number of contracts in cross- or delta-hedges. Kowloon, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, 1997.

Svensson, Lars E. O. Optimal inflation targets, "conservative" central banks, and linear inflation contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995.

Svensson, Lars E. O. Optimal inflation targets, "conservative" central banks, and linear inflation contracts. Stockholm: Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies, 1995.

Optimale Verträge bei Investitionen in Humankapital. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1996.

Roider, Andreas. Delegation of authority as an optimal (in)complete contract. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2004.

Kaplow, Louis. Optimal insurance contracts when establishing the amount of losses is costly. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Pissarides, Christopher A. Consumption and savings with unemployment risk: Implications for optimal employment contracts. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2004.

Engelhardt, Bryan. Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts. Cleveland, Ohio]: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2007.

Edlin, Aaron S. Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995.

Gollier, Christian. The design of optimal insurance contracts without the nonnegativity constraint on claims. Louvain-la-Neuve: CORE, 1985.

Gibbons, Robert. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Cambridge, Mass: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.

Faure-Grimaud, Antoine. Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: The limited liability effect revisited. London: London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1997.

Muscatelli, V. Anton. Delegation versus optimal inflation contracts: Do we really need conservative central bankers? Glasgow: Glasgow University, Department of Political Economy, 1995.

Gibbons, Robert. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

service), SpringerLink (Online, ed. Relational Supply Contracts: Optimal Concessions in Return Policies for Continuous Quality Improvements. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2010.

Ayres, Ian. Strategic contractual inefficiency and the optimal choice of legal rules. Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1991.

Weinberg, John A. Private information and optimal contracts in the allocation of resources to inventive activity. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1990.

Wilson, Berry Kene. The demise of double liability as an optimal contract for large-bank stockholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

Chapman, John W. M. Richard Sorge, the GRU and the Pacific War. GB Folkestone: Amsterdam University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/9781912961085.

Kahn, Charles. Existence and characterization of optimal employment contracts. [Urbana, Ill.] : College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991.

Basov, Suren. Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts. Springer, 2018.

Pinnells, James, and Arndt Eversberg. Internationale Kaufverträge optimal gestalten. Leitfaden mit zahlreichen Musterklauseln. Gabler, 2003.

Reichlin, Pietro. Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2000.

A, Swartz A., and United States. National Aeronautics and Space Administration., eds. The optimal polarizations for achieving maximum contrast in radar images. [Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1988.