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Eber, Nicolas. "Relations de long terme banque-entreprise, contrats de credit optimaux et equilibre macroeconomique." Strasbourg 1, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996STR1EC08.
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Les relations de long terme entre les banques et les entreprises sont souvent considerees comme un element favorable a l'activite economique. Au plan microeconomique, des contrats de credit de long terme sont preferables a des sequences de contrats de court terme grace aux economies de couts de controle qu'ils impliquent. Notre analyse insiste notamment sur l'importance des effets de reputation dans la determination de ces contrats et montre comment les relations de long terme peuvent conduire a l'emergence de nouveaux types de contrats bancaires combinant des caracteristiques de contrat de dette et de contrat d'action. Notre etude montre egalement que les relations de long terme peuvent conduire les banques a relacher le controle de leurs clients et impliquer, de ce fait, une inefficience dans l'allocation du credit ; cela rend alors ambigu l'effet final de telles relations sur l'equilibre macroeconomiqueLong-term relationships between banks and firms are often considered as favourable to economic activity. At the microeconomic level, long-term loan contracts dominate sequences of short-term contracts because of the savings in monitoring costs they imply. Our analysis focuses notably on the importance of reputation effects as incentive devices and shows how long-term relationships can lead to the emergence of new kinds of banking contracts mixing features of debt and equity. Our study also shows that long-term relationships may lead banks to slacken monitoring. Such relationships may thus imply an inefficiency in the allocation of credit, which makes ambiguous the final effect on the macroeconomic equilibrium
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Pouyllau, Hélia. "Algorithmes distribués pour la négociation de contrats de qualité de service dans les réseaux multi-domaines." Rennes 1, 2007. ftp://ftp.irisa.fr/techreports/theses/2007/pouyllau.pdf.
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Déployer des services (ex: vidéo-conférence) sur la topologie multi-domaines ("X-domaines") d'Internet implique de garantir la Qualité de Service (QdS) de bout-en-bout agrégeant plusieurs paramètres. Ainsi, des contrats de QdS sont établis entre domaines. Les éléments clés à prendre en compte sont l'hétérogénéité, l'indépendance des domaines et la confidentialité des contrats. Avant d'établir un service, un processus de négociation de la QdS s'exécute: il s'agit de la sélection de contrats pair-à-pair formant une chaîne satisfaisant une QdS de bout-en-bout (sujette à des effets d'accumulations: les délais s'additionnent, les disponibilités se multiplient, etc. ) et optimisant une fonction objectif. Nous étudions différents problèmes de négociation. Ces problèmes se réduisent à des problèmes de "sac à dos", qui sont NP-difficiles. Nous proposons des algorithmes distribués utilisant la Programmation Dynamique et fournissons également des mécanismes d'auto-réparation en cas d'échec ou de violations de contrats. Négocier chaque requête peut s'avérer un processus lent. Il peut être préférable de pré-négocier des chaînes de contrats. Ainsi, nous considérons le problème de la négociation de tuyaux: un domaine sollicite un nombre de connexions pour une QdS requise. Nous proposons un modèle de flots et une version distribuée de l'algorithme de Busacker-Gowen pour résoudre ce problème. En outre, nous étudions la négociation avec exploration de plusieurs routes pour atteindre le domaine cible et y répondons par des mécanismes de détection de cycles et de terminaison. Enfin, nous discutons de l'application de la négociation en "milieu ouvert" où les domaines s'organisent éventuellement en cartels ou coalitionsDeploying services (e. G. Video-conference) over the Internet X-domain topology requires guaranteeing an end-to-end QoS composed of several parameters. For this, QoS contracts are committed between domains. The key factors to consider are the heterogeneity, independence of domains and privacy of contracts. Before establishing a service, a negotiation occurs: it consists in selecting a chain of pair-wise commitments that satisfies the end-to-end QoS requirements and optimizes an objective function, given that global QoS is subject to accumulation effects (e. G. Delays sum up along a path). We address different negotiation problems. They reduce to knapsack problems, which are NP-Hard. Domain independence and contract privacy constrain us to design distributed solutions based on Dynamic Programming principles. We develop also self-repairing mechanisms in case of negotiation failures and contract violations. Negotiation per request can be slow. It may be preferable to pre-negotiate QoS contract chains. Thus, we address the problem of pipe negotiation: a domain asks for a number of connections satisfying a required QoS. We propose a network flow model and a distributed version of the Busacker-Gowen algorithm. We also consider the negotiation when several routes are explored to reach the target domain and describe some mechanisms to detect cycles and termination. Finally, we study negotiation in an "open world" where domains potentially organize themselves as cartels or coalitions
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Spaeter-Loehrer, Sandrine. "Le role de la fonction de couts de l'assureur et du comportement de prudence de l'assure : une etude theorique des contrats d'assurance optimaux." Université Louis Pasteur (Strasbourg) (1971-2008), 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996STR1EC04.
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L'objectif principal de cette these est d'etudier l'impact de differentes structures de couts administratifs supportes par l'assureur sur la forme du contrat d'assurance qui constitue le meilleur partage de risque entre l'assure et l'assureur. Une nouvelle approche des contrats basees sur des caracterisations topologiques adaptees est proposee. Elle permet d'unifier et de generaliser les resultats de la litterature au sein d'un cadre d'analyse unique, valable pour toute fonction de couts continue (constante, lineaire, convexe, concave,. . . ). La prise en compte du comportement de prudence de l'assure permet encore d'affiner les caracteristiques des contrats et de mettre les resultats suivants en evidence. Un assure riscophobe prefere toujours une franchise strictement positive lorsque les couts administratifs sont strictement croissants avec les indemnites. L'evolution de la couverture des sinistres superieurs a cette franchise est essentiellement determinee par le sens de variation du cout marginal ; si les couts sont convexes (respectivement concaves), la solution presente une franchise avec coassurance au-dela (respectivement une franchise evanescente). Par ailleurs, lorsque les couts sont non lineaires (convexes ou concaves), l'assure fait encore face, apres assurance, a une perte nette aleatoire qu'il gere de maniere differente selon le comportement de prudence (kimball 1990) qu'il adopte. Ainsi, les contrats optimaux sont rarement lineaires par morceaux car le signe de la derivee troisieme de l'utilite influence l'evolution des indemnites marginales. Dans un dernier modele, un second risque non assurable est introduit dans l'economie. Dans un tel environnement, la prudence a egalement un impact sur la pente de la fonction d'indemnisation, contrairement aux cas a un seul risqueIn this work, we study the link existing between the design of the administrative costs borne by the insurer and the optimal insurance contracts. In order to deal with this subject, we propose a new methodology based on some adapted topological characterizations. This allows us to unify and to generalize the existing results in a unique framework which holds for any continuous cost function (constant, linear, convex, concave,. . . ). Further, by taking into account the prudence concept, we state more precisely the design of the optimal indemnity functions and we stress the following results. A risk-averse insured always prefers a strictly positive deductible when costs are increasing with indemnities. The design of insurance for damages higher than this deductible is essentially characterized by the sense of variation of the marginal cost : if costs are convex (respectively concave), the solution displays a straight deductible with coinsurance above (respectively a disappearing deductible). Moreover, when costs are non-linear (convex or concave), the insured still bears a risk after insurance, since his net loss remains random. Thus he manages this latter in a different manner, depending on whether he is prudent or not prudent (kimball 1990). Finally, optimal contracts are rarely piecewise linear because the sign of the third derivative of the utility function has an influence on the evolution of the marginal indemnities. In the last model, we introduce a background risk in the economy. In such an environment, the prudence has also an impact on the slope of the indemnity function, contrary to the one-risk cases
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Galvão, Raphael de Albuquerque. "Optimal regulation of oil fields under asymmetric information." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/9908.
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This work considers a relationship between a regulator and an oil company. There are many uncertainties inherent in this relationship and we focus on the e ects of asymmetric information. We characterize the optimal regulation under asymmetric information, when the regulator must design a mechanism that induces truthful revelation about the rm's private information. We show that, when the rm cannot commit not to quit the relationship, the regulator may not be able to implement the optimal rst-best regulatory outcome. In this case, the regulator cannot achieve the optimal risk-sharing with the rm. We also provide an example, in which we show that the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC) may not hold. As it turs out, this is a natural result in our model rather than an imposition.
Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.
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Hajjej, Ishak. "Contrat optimal pour les partenariats public-privé avec aléa moral : une approche de contrôle stochastique." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020IPPAG007.
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Dans cette thèse, on s’intéresse aux contrats de partenariat public-privé (PPP). Un PPP est un contrat à long terme entre une entité publique et une partie privée, aussi appelée consortium, dans lequel le public externalise la construction et/ou la gestion d’un bien public. Le consortium prend le risque et la responsabilité de gérer le projet. Le public s’engage en contre partie à lui verser une rente. Cependant, les efforts du consortium pour améliorer la valeur sociale du projet ne sont pas observables par le public. C’est un problème de principal agent avec aléa moral où le principal est le public et l’agent est le privé. On suppose que le public paie le consortium continûment et l’effort de l’agent affecte le drift de la valeur sociale du projet. On suppose que le public est neutre au risque et le consortium est adverse au risque. Dans le chapitre 2 de la thèse, on considère un contrat perpétuel entre une entité publique et un consortium. On caractérise le contrat optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. On utilise une formulation forte : on considère différentes filtrations correspondant à différents niveaux d’informations comme dans le contexte de contrôle stochastique avec observation partielle. Dans cette approche, on utilise des méthodes de martingale et de contrôle stochastique. Dans le chapitre 3, on considère un problème du partenariat public-privé avec horizon aléatoire, dans lequel le public a la possibilité d’arrêter le contrat à une date aléatoire et donne une compensation au consortium. On résout ce problème de contrôle stochastique avec un problème d’arrêt optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. Dans ce chapitre, on utilise la formulation faible : on suppose que le consortium change la distribution de la valeur sociale du projet en changeant son drift et cela revient à considérer une nouvelle mesure de probabilité qui dépend de l’effort de l’agent. Dans le chapitre 4, on s’intéresse aussi au problème de partenariat public-privé avec un horizon aléatoire mais en utilisant la formulation forte. Puis, on traite la cadre de partage de risque : on suppose que le public et le consortium ont les mêmes informations. On analyse numériquement la valeur d’information. Dans le chapitre 5, on étudie l’existence d’une solution de l’équation d’Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman qui apparaît dans notre étude théorique. Puis, on développe des résultats numériques pour la résolution numérique d’une équation Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman et l’inéquation variationnelle dans le cadre de notre étude numériqueIn this thesis, we are interested in the contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships (PPP). PPP is defined as a long-term contract between a private party and a public entity, for the construction and/or the management of an asset or public service, in which the consortium takes the risks and a responsibility to manage the project. The public undertakes to pay him a rent. However, the effort that the consortium does to improve the social value of the project is not observable by the public. It is a principal-agent problem with moral hazard, in which the principal is the public and the agent is the consortium. We assume that the public pays the consortium continuously and the effort of the consortium affects the drift of the social value of the project. We assume that the agent is risk averse and the public is risk-neutral. In chapter 2 of the thesis, we consider a perpetual contract between a public entity and a consortium. We characterize the optimal contract in this moral hazard framework. We use the strong formulation : we consider different filtrations corresponding to the different level of information as in the context of stochastic control under partial observation. In this approach, we use martingale methods and stochastic control techniques. In chapter 3, we consider a public-private partnership problem with a random horizon, in which the public has the possibility to stop the contract at a fixed or a random time and gives compensation to the consortium. We solve this optimal stochastic control with optimal stopping problem in this context of moral hazard. We use the weak approach, that is the agent changes the distribution of the social value of the project by changing the drift and this amounts to considering a new probability that depends on the effort of the consortium. In the chapter 4, we also consider the problem of public-private partnership with a random horizon but using the strong formulation. Then, we deal with the risk-sharing framework, we assume that the public and the consortium have the same information. We analyze numerically the value of information. Chapter 5 focuses on the existence of a solution of the Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation that appears in our theoretical study. Then, we detail the numerical results for the numerical resolution of a Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation and variational inequality as part of our numerical study
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Huang, Fei, and 黄斐. "Optimal safety loading of reinsurance contracts." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2011. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B46935289.
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Johnson, Rodney Joseph. "Optimal contract appraisal for fine chemicals contract manufacturers." Thesis, Imperial College London, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/8749.
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Grandner, Thomas. "Optimal contracts for vertically connected, unionized duopolies." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2000. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1588/1/document.pdf.
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In this paper a vertically structured duopolistic market with unionized price setting firms is analyzed. The form of the contract of the transactions between upstream and downstream firms can be linear pricing, franchising or vertical integration. It is known from literature (Irmen 1997) that the price elasticity of the industry demand and the degree of product differentiation are the decisive factors in the determination of the profit maximizing form of the contract. In this paper it is shown that the bargaining power of the union is an additional factor. With a higher bargaining power linear pricing becomes less preferable. (author's abstract)Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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RIBEIRO, SYLVIA TELLES. "OPTIMAL PRICING OF NATURAL GAS FLEXIBLE CONTRACTS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2009. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=15892@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROO segmento industrial desempenha um importante papel no desenvolvimento do setor de gás Brasileiro. Em função dos baixos preços e dos incentivos dados pelo governo para a conversão dos processos industriais (muitos deles dependentes do óleo combustível) para o gás natural, criou-se uma fonte de demanda firme deste combustível. Como as termelétricas operam em regime de complementariedade ao sistema hidrelétrico (sendo coordenadas pelo Operador Nacional do Sistema (ONS) elétrico e chamadas a gerar apenas em situações hidrológicas desfavoráveis), o oconsumo de gás termelétrico ocorre de forma esporádica. Uma forma de se aumentar a eficiência do uso do gás, mesclando duas classes de consumidores se dá através dos contratos interruptíveis, que proporcionam ao produtor a capacidade de atender consumidores industriais bicombustível (gás e óleo por exemplo) com o gás ocioso das termelétricas. Como a atratividade deste contrato depende do desconto dado com relação ao preço do contrato firme, que não é interrompido, o objetivo deste trabalho é a construção de um modelo analítico para a determinação do preço ótimo dos contratos de fornecimento de gás interruptíveis, por parte de um produtor monopolista. O consumo de gás das termelétricas será considerado como principal fonte de incerteza do modelo, que por sua vez será caracterizada através de cenários de operação ótima do sistema elétrico, simulados conforme a metodologia utilizada pelo ONS. O perfil de risco do produtor será caracterizado pelo Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR).
Brazilian natural gas industry growth has been led by electricity supply. As hydro plants generate at lower costs, thermal units only produce when hydro electricity is insufficient. This makes natural gas consumption highly volatile: Either all thermal units generate together or don’t. When all units generate together, the gas trader has to buy LNG - Liquified Natural Gas at the spot market incurring price risk. This risk can be mitigated in case the gas trader is able to sell flexible contracts to the industrial sector that can be interrupted in case of thermal generation. Thus the gas volume sold under flexible contracts is used either by thermal generation or by the industrial sector, virtually reducing total demand and avoiding emergency LNG purchases. The determination of the optimal price for these contracts is the aim of this dissertation. The determination model proposed will try to maximize a convex combination of CVaR - Conditional Value at Risk NPV - Net Present Value and trader´s profit NPV.
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Beaulieu, Mathilde. "Imagerie optique à très haut contraste : une approche instrumentale optimale." Thesis, Université Côte d'Azur (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017AZUR4040/document.
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Cette thèse vise à investiguer des moyens d'optimiser les performances de l'imagerie à haut contraste dans l'optique et le proche infrarouge pour la détection d'exo-planètes. L'étude principale a été menée sur le contraste à faible séparation permettant l'imagerie d'exo-planètes dans leur zone habitable. Cette détection directe est rendue possible par le développement des futurs grands télescopes et de coronographes de plus en plus performants à faible séparation. L'approche retenue permet de créer une zone sombre à haut contraste grâce à la coronographie et au « wavefront shaping » (contrôle de l'amplitude et de la phase avec 2 miroirs déformables), mais qui est limité par les effets de propagation de Fresnel. Les résultats obtenus ont déterminé les limitations de configuration optique pour le « wavefront shaping ». Grâce à une approche semi-analytique soutenue par des simulations numériques et une approche Monte-Carlo, ces limitations ont été analysées et quantifiées pour extraire les configurations optimales. Les résultats ont été appliqués au banc SPEED dont l'objectif est d'optimiser et de tester le haut contraste à faible séparation. Une deuxième étude a été une contribution à une étude générale de stabilité, en traitant la stabilité temporelle comme un paramètre indispensable dans la conception en amont d'instrument haut contraste. Un travail préliminaire a été initié sur la stabilité des instruments de mesure eux-mêmes à travers l'étude thermique d'un système de métrologie. Enfin, un dernier volet a été une étude de simulation de performances d'un nouveau concept d'imagerie différentielle basé sur l'acquisition d'images réalisées avec différentes tailles de pupillesThis thesis aims to optimize high-contrast imaging performance in visible and near infrared for exoplanet detection. The main study focuses on high-contrast at small separation, to image exoplanets in their habitable zone. This direct detection is achievable with the next Extremely Large Telescopes and with the development of coronagraph providing high performance at small separation. The approach adopted for this study creates a high-contrast region (a dark hole) with the combination of coronagraphy and wavefront shaping (wavefront control of both phase and amplitude with 2 deformable mirrors) but is limited by the Fresnel propagation of phase aberrations. The goal of this work is to define the wavefront shaping limitation in optical configuration (deformable mirrors location, component optical quality, beam diameter). A semi-analytic approach followed by a Monte-Carlo analysis of numerical end-to-end simulations is studied, resulting in the definition of the optimal configuration. Results are then applied to SPEED, a test bench to optimize and test high-contrast imaging at small separation with a segmented pupil. Another aspect of this thesis is a contribution to a stability study to treat the temporal stability as a crucial parameter in high-contrast imaging instrumentation, at the conception level. A preliminary work is initiated during the thesis to analyse the stability of the measuring instrument itself. A metrology tool and its thermal behaviour are thus studied. Finally, the last part of this thesis is a performance analysis of a new differential imaging technique, developed to improve high contrast with observations with different diaphragm sizes
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De, Barros Cruz Julio Cesar. "Effects of Endogenous Risks in Contract Design : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Optimal Contract Design in the Swedish Construction Industry." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-298069.
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The architecture, engineering and construction industry faces challenges when dealing withprocurement contract design and risk-handling. The optimal contracting practices have beenworldwide studied in areas of contract theory which studies how the optimal incentivemechanism (“contracts”) can be designed to encourage the parties to behave more efficiently.The parties usually consist of a principal and an agent, where the principal hires an agent todeliver goods or services. However, the complexity of contract theory calls for a morepracticable approach in an attempt to understand the procurement problem in the industry andincrease knowledge-sharing between projects. The purpose of this study is to propose a model based on contract theory that can be used inpractice to investigate the effects of project endogenous risks in three different types ofprocurement contracts: fixed-price, time and material, and incentive. Thus, this study usesquantitative methods with the aim to explain the current procurement problem in the Swedisharchitecture, engineering, and construction industry, compare theory and practice, andcontribute to knowledge about the linkage between endogenous risks, optimal risk sharing andcontract design. The conclusions from this study are that the current contracting practices in the industry arenot aligned with the optimal contract design described by the theory. The theory in this researchshowed that, given endogenous project risks, the optimal incentives vary in the agent’saversion to risk resulting in a non-monotone relationship between optimal contract power andproject risk. Further, a contract becomes optimal and efficient when cost savings and qualityincentives are aligned. However, the analysis of real-world projects presented no clearrelationship between contract power and project risk, i.e. some projects with fixed-pricecontracts or time and material contracts presented the same risk level. Hence, this researchproposes a method for computing the optimal incentive contract which can be used in manycases where the other two types of contract are currently being used. Based on the theory, theoptimal incentive contract may add valuable benefits for both parties involved since it aims toefficiently share the project risk between them while providing the agent the right incentivesto work more efficiently to reduce costs and deliver high-quality services or goods.Byggbranschen står inför utmaningar när det gäller kontraktsdesign och riskhantering. Deoptimala upphandlingsmetoderna har studerats över hela världen inom områden avkontraktsteori som i sin tur studerar hur den optimala incitamentsmekanismen ("kontrakt") kanutformas för att uppmuntra parterna att agera mer effektivt. Parterna består vanligtvis av enprincipal och en agent, där principalen anställer en agent för att leverera varor eller tjänster.Men komplexiteten i kontraktsteori kräver ett mer praktiskt tillvägagångssätt i ett försök attbättre förstå upphandlingsproblemet i byggbranschen samt att öka kunskapsutbytet mellanprojekt. Syftet med denna studie är att föreslå en modell baserad på kontraktsteori som kan användas ipraktiken för att undersöka effekter av endogena risker i tre olika typer avupphandlingskontrakt: fastpris, rörligt pris (time and material) och incitament. Denna studieanvänder därmed kvantitativa metoder i syfte att förklara det aktuella upphandlingsproblemeti den svenska byggbranschen, jämföra teori och praktik, och bidra till utökad kunskap omsambandet mellan endogena risker, optimal riskdelning och kontraktsdesign. Slutsatsen från denna studie är att den nuvarande upphandlingspraxisen i branschen inte är ilinje med den optimala kontraktsdesignen som beskrivs av teorin. Teorin i denna studie visaratt, förutsatt endogena projektrisker, så varierar de optimala incitamenten med agentensriskaversion vilket resulterar i ett icke-monoton förhållande mellan optimal kontraktsdesignoch projektrisk. Dessutom blir ett kontrakt optimalt och effektivt när kostnadsbesparingar ochkvalitetsincitament är i linje med varandra. Men analysen av verkliga projekt visar inget tydligtsamband mellan kontraktsdesign och projektrisk, det vill säga en del projekt med fastpris ellerrörligt pris visade sig ha samma risknivå. Därför föreslår denna studie en metod för beräkningav det optimala incitamentet som kan användas i många fall där de andra två typerna avkontrakt för närvarande används. Teorin säger att det optimala incitamentet kan ge värdefullafördelar för de inblandade parterna eftersom det syftar till att på ett effektivt sätt fördelaprojektrisken mellan dem samtidigt som agenten får rätt incitament att arbeta mer effektivt föratt sänka kostnaderna och leverera högkvalitativa tjänster eller varor.
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Dam, My. "Essays on ambiguity and optimal growth with renewable resources." Thesis, université Paris-Saclay, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020UPASE011.
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Dans le deux premiers chapitres, nous étudions le problème du contrat optimal en présence de risque et de l'ambiguïté dans le cadre d'un problème du contrôle optimal. L'ambiguïté est modélisés selon Klibanoff et al. (2005). Notre approche généralise les analyses effectuées jusqu'à présent en considérant le contrat d'assurance comme la paire d'une prime et une fonction d'indemnisation à résoudre simultanément. Nous prouvons l'existence d'un contrat optimal dans le cas le plus général où tous les agents peuvent être simultanément averses à l'ambiguïté et au risque, ce qui englobe tous les cas précédemment examinés. Nous caractérisons non seulement le partage du risque mais aussi la règle du partage de l'ambiguïté entre les parties contractantes. Dans le cas de l'aversion vers l'ambiguïté unilatérale, nous montrons qu'une politique de franchise directe ne peut pas constituer un contrat d'assurance optimal. Au contraire, sous l'hypothèse que les densités conditionnelles puissent être classées selon le rapport de vraisemblance monotone, un contrat avec des franchises qui disparaissent est optimal, un résultat qui est cohérent avec Gollier (2014). En particulier, la méthodologie mise en œuvre complète l'analyse de Raviv (1979) pour le cas du risque pur avec un assureur neutre au risque, montrant qu'une couverture de limite supérieure ne peut pas constituer un optimum. Ce résultat est robuste à la neutralité de l'ambiguïté.Dans le troisième chapitre, j'ai examiné l'impact du risque et de l'ambiguïté sur l'investissement optimal dans le capital humain et le capital physique en utilisant le modèle de Ben-Porath (1967) à deux périodes. L'incertitude (à la fois dans le sens du risque et de l'ambiguïté) est introduite à l'accumulation de capital humain de deux façons. Lorsque l'incertitude porte sur le taux de dépréciation du capital humain (obsolescence incertaine des compétences), j'ai constaté que l'investissement optimal dans le capital humain augmente toujours, que soit présent ou non le capital physique. Cette réponse à l'incertitude d'un ménage représente le comportement typique de l'auto-assurance. En revanche, lorsque l'incertitude se porte sur l'efficacité de l'accumulation du capital humain, l'investissement optimal dans le capital humain diminue parmi les ménages avec l'aversion au risque relative constante inférieure à un. Cette réponse à l'incertitude est typique d'un ménage qui considère l'investissement comme un actif à rendement risqué au lieu d'une assurance.Le dernier chapitre (relativement indépendant des chapitres précédents) examine une question importante dans la théorie de la croissance: le rôle des ressources renouvelables et des externalités dans l'économie. L'introduction d'une fonction régénératrice (d'une ressource naturelle) non-concave par rapport à l'un des arguments rend le problème non convexe. En conséquence, nous ne pouvons plus utiliser les techniques traditionnelles de programmation dynamique. En attaquant ce probpème, nous proposons une nouvelle méthode pour étudier une économie à deux secteurs en présence des externalités. En l'occurrence, nous introduisons le concept de "gain net de stock", qui est une notion similaire au "gain net d'investissement" introduit par Kamihigashi et al. (2007). En absence des propriétés convexes ou supermodulaires habituelles, nous prouvons que l'économie évolue pour augmenter le gain net de stock et établissons les conditions assurant la convergence de l'économie à long terme. Cette approche peut être appliquée aux problèmes similaires précédemment posées, ou être étendu à l'analyse des économies multisectorielles en généralIn the first two chapters, we study the optimal contract problem in presence of risk and ambiguity as an optimal control problem. Ambiguity is modeled according to Klibanoff et al. (2005). Our approach generalizes all the analyses caried out so far by considering the insurance contract as a pair of an indemnity function and a premium to be solved for simultaneously. We prove the existence of an optimal contract in the most general case, allowing for the principal or the insurance to be averse or neutral to risk or ambiguity. We characterize both the risk and ambiguity sharing rule between the contracting parties. In the case of one-sided ambiguity aversion, we show that an optimal insurance contract cannot contain a straight deductible policy. Furthermore, under the hypothesis that the conditional densities can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio, we prove that a disappearing deductible contract is optimal, a result that is consistent with Gollier (2014). In particular, our method completes the analysis of Raviv (1979), showing that in the pure risk case with a risk-neutral insurer, a policy with an upper limit coverage cannot be optimal. This result also holds under ambiguity neutrality.In the third chapter, I examine the impact of risk and ambiguity on the optimal investment in human and physical capital in a two-period Ben-Porath (1967)'s model. Uncertainty (both in the form of risk and ambiguity) is introduced to the accumulation of human capital via two channels. When uncertainty is on the depreciation rate of human capital (uncertain obsolescence of skills), I have found that the optimal investment in human capital always increases, whether or not physical capital is present. This response to uncertainty of an optimizing household represents the typical self-insurance behavior. By contrast, when uncertainty is on the effectiveness of human capital accumulation, the optimal investment in human capital diminishes among the households with a degree of constant risk aversion less than one. This response to uncertainty is typical of a household who views human capital as an investment with risky/ambiguous return.The final chapter (relatively independent from the preceding chapters) examines an important subject in the theory of economic growth: the role of renewable resources and externalities in the economy. The introduction of a (natural resource) regenerating function that is non-concave with respect to one of its arguments renders the problem non-convex. In consequence, we can no longer apply traditional dynamic programming techniques to this model. We thus propose a new method to study two-sector economies with externalities. In particular, we introduce the notion of "the net gain of stock", which is a notion similar to "the net gain of investment" of Kamihigashi et al. (2007). In absence of the usual convex and supermodular requirements, we prove that the economy evolves to increase the net gain of stock, and establish conditions that ensure long-run convergence. This approach can be adapted to similar problems previously studied, or be extended to the analysis of multi-sector economies in general
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Qian, Zhengzheng. "Why Tenure? An Optimal Contract Perspective." FIU Digital Commons, 2017. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/3214.
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In academia, after a reasonable probationary period of service and upon the achievement of tenure, the recipients of tenure are entitled to a continuing appointment at an institution without mandatory retirement and with only limited grounds for revocation. Advocates of tenure argued that it protected academic freedom through economic security. Opponents of tenure argued that it fostered inefficient and unproductive behavior. This dissertation developed a framework for examining academic tenure in U.S. economics departments. I constructed a dataset of tenured U.S. economics professors who were Ph.D. recipients between 1990 and 2006 and tracked their publications. In the first chapter, based on difference-in-difference analysis I found that tenure has a direct effect on the choice of research direction/focus. In general, tenured groups had a higher degree of specialization than non-tenured groups after they received tenure. For some tenured groups, even if their extent of specialization decreased after tenure, when I controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, tenure still had a positive effect on extent of specialization. This result suggested that the job security provided by tenure made tenured faculty more narrowly
focused on their research. Using path analysis in the second chapter, my finding suggested that the extent of specialization was one of the key factors which might influence a scholar’s productivity. In addition, the extent of specialization helped explain gender differences in academic productivity. The results revealed that the effect of gender on productivity through the degree of specialization was more notable among older generations, and in most fields, gender differences in extent of research specialization mediated gender difference in research performance; although there were some fields in which gender difference in the research process could not explain gender difference in research performance. The third chapter expanded our understanding of advancement in academics by exploring a new dimension of inquiry: whether the extent of specialization in scholars’ research programs improved promotion prospects. Using discrete event analysis, my research showed that the extent of research specialization contributed to career acceleration, although gender difference on the prospects of advancement in academics was not significant.
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Xu, Junwei. "Topics in optimal liquidation and contract theory." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2017. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3567/.
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The thesis consists of three parts. The first one presents an exhaustive study of three new models arising in the context of the so-called optimal liquidation problem. This is the problem faced by an investor who aims at selling a large number of stock shares within a given time horizon and wants to maximise his expected utility of the cash resulting from the sale. Such an investor has to take into account the impact that his selling strategy has on the underlying stock price. The models studied in the thesis assume that market risk follows a fairly general L´evy process and that the investor has an exponential utility. In each of the three different model formulations, an explicit or semi-explicit expression for the optimal liquidation strategy is derived. The second part of the thesis presents a study of an optimal liquidation problem embedded in a contractual problem. In particular, a contractual relationship between an investor and a broker is modelled on the basis of a suitable liquidation strategy and the corresponding affected mark-to-market assert price. The analysis of the model determines the broker’s compensation and the liquidation strategy that maximise the broker’s as well as the investor’s expected utilities. The third part of the thesis studies a continuous time principal-agent problem in which the agent’s outside options depend on his past performance. In this new model, even if the agent does not expect any compensation from the principal at all, the agent may still apply work effort with a view to improving his outside options. Formulated as an optimal control and stopping problem for both the agent and the principal, the optimal contract is identified.
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Koufopoulos, Konstantinos. "Equilibrium and optimal financial and insurance contracts under asymmetric information." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2003. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2888/.
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This thesis studies financial and insurance markets under various specifications of asymmetric information. The opening chapter considers project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard. There are three main contributions. First, the issue of combinations of debt and equity is explained as the outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Second, it shows that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may result in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects leading to an improvement in social welfare. Third, it provides two rationales for the use of warrants. It also shows that, under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium. Chapter 2 examines insurance markets when some clients misperceive risk. Optimism may either increase or decrease precautionary effort and we show that this determines whether optimists or realists are quantity-constrained in equilibrium. Intervention may lead to a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibria. These results provide a more convincing justification for the imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard models as well as a case for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between coverage and accident rates. In contrast to the prediction of competitive models of asymmetric information that if all agents buy at least some insurance there must be positive correlation between coverage and accident probability, some recent empirical studies find either negative or zero correlation. If optimism discourages precautionary effort there exist separating equilibria that potentially explain the puzzling empirical findings. It is also shown that zero correlation between coverage and risk does not imply the absence of barriers to trade in insurance markets. We conclude with some implications for empirical testing.
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Prouvost, Amaury Louis. "In search of optimal contracts in the construction building industry." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87805.
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Song, Haili. "Optimal strategies for electric energy contract decision making /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/6125.
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Yoshima, Samy Osamu Abud. "Optimal performance fees and flow of funds in asset management contracts." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/213.
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Previous issue date: 2005-08-08This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.
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Lin, Zhengping. "A decision support system for determining the optimal contract size in a construction superproject." Tokyo : Construction Management & Infrastructure Systems Lab., Dept. of Civil Engineering, the University of Tokyo, 1999. http://books.google.com/books?id=XpBRAAAAMAAJ.
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Vu, Van Hoan. "Identification et simulation de la commande motrice des mouvements multi-articulés 3D non-contraints." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016SACLS509/document.
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L’objectif de cette thèse vise à identifier les principes sous-tendant la planification des mouvements 3D du membre supérieur tout en tenant compte des différences inter-individuelles régulièrement observées dans ce domaine. Dans cette optique, l’approche choisie combine des expériences originales précisément des tâches de pointage laissant le choix du point final libre) avec des techniques de calcul avancées (ici des méthodes de contrôle optimal inverse numérique). Des mouvements de pointage du bras sans position finale précisément prescrite sont examinés dans différentes conditions de vitesse et/ou de masse afin de laisser émerger des stratégies motrices variées et d’évaluer les éventuels principes de planification motrice sous-jacents. L’idée centrale est de s’écarter du paradigme classique consistant à étudier des mouvements point-à-point (où la cible est généralement indiquée par un point dans l’espace, par exemple une cible lumineuse) et porte sur l’étude d’une tâche dans laquelle le choix du point final du mouvement est laissé libre aux participants afin de faire surgir les différences interindividuelles ainsi que le processus de sélection ou de décision motrice qui a conduit aux stratégies observées. Ce type de tâche permet de mieux décoder les caractéristiques du contrôleur moteur humain. Les résultats empiriques sont ensuite modélisés et interprétés grâce au contrôle optimal inverse dont l’hypothèse associée estque les trajectoires expérimentales découlent de la minimisation d’une certaine fonction de coût qui est éventuellement composite. Cette approche combinée vise à révéler les principes ou règles qui gouvernent le processus de planification de ce type de mouvement des membres supérieurs et d’établir un lien entre les paramètres pertinents du geste, les fonctions de coûts et les caractéristiques individuelles.Les résultats montrent que les sujets produisent des stratégies motrices différentes aux niveaux cinématique et dynamique en fonction de la façon dont ils s’adaptent aux changements de vitesse et/ou de masse. Dans l’ensemble, ces changements ont des effets significatifs sur les trajectoires de la main (par exemple l’emplacement des points finaux choisis par les sujets) et les commandes motrices (notamment sur l’utilisation des couples d’interaction). Pourtant, certains sujets présentaient des dépendances plus exacerbées que d’autres qui ne variaient que peu leur stratégie de pointage par rapport aux changements de vitesse ou de masse induits par la tâche. L’investigation par contrôle optimal inverse a montré que ces résultats pouvaient être expliqués par une optimisation d’un coût composite mélangeant essentiellement des variables cinématique et dynamique durant la phase de planification motrice. Un tel modèle composite surpassait les prédictions des modèles séparés soit cinématique soit dynamique dans la prédiction de l’évolution des caractéristiques importantes du mouvement et des différences interindividuelles. En outre, il a permis de réconcilier des résultats controversés débattus dans des études antérieures en montrant que des comportements adaptatifs divergents peuvent émerger en fonction du poids des fonctions de coût élémentaires qui composent la fonction de coût totale. Dans l’ensemble, nos résultats suggèrent que la planification motrice des mouvements 3D non-contraints du bras mêle nécessairement des variables cinématiques et cinétiques, et que ce compromis semble être idiosyncrasique et ainsi conduire à des différences interindividuelles subtilesThe purpose of this thesis is to identify principles that could guide the planning of 3D upper-limb movements for different individuals. To this aim, the chosen approach combines novel experiments (namely, a “free reach-endpoint" motor task) with advanced computational techniques (here numerical inverse optimal control). Arm pointing movements without a prescribed final hand position are examined under different conditions of speed or load in order to let emerge various motor control strategies and assess the possible underlying motor planning principles. A core idea is to depart from classical point-to-point reaching paradigms (where the target is generally a dot, e.g. a spotlight target) to study a task in which the endpoint is left free to theparticipants in order to emphasize inter-individual differences as well as the selection process and motor decision that led to the observed strategies. This paradigm thus allows to better decipher the characteristics of the human motor controller. Empirical results are then modeled and interpreted in the inverse optimal control framework, hypothesizing that empirical arm trajectories derive from the minimization of a certain, possibly composite, cost function. This combined approach aims at revealing which principle or rule conceivably drives the planning process of these unrestrained upper-limb movements and to stablish a link between relevant motion parameters, cost functions and inter-individual peculiarities.The results show that subjects produced different motor strategies at both kinematic and dynamic levels depending on how they adapted to speed and/or load variations. Overall, significant motor adaptation of hand trajectories (e.g. location of reach endpoints) and motor commands (e.g. use of interaction torque) were found. Yet, some subjects exhibited stronger dependences than others who varied only little their reach strategies with respect to task-induced speed or load changes. When investigated from the optimal control viewpoint, these results could be accounted for by a composite cost essentially weighting kinematic and dynamic variables differentially at the motor planning stage. Such a composite model outperformed separate kinematic and dynamic ones in predicting the evolution of many important motion features and in explaining inter individual differences. Moreover, it allowed reconciling controversial findings of previous studies by showing that divergent adaptive behaviors can emerge depending on the weights of the elementary cost that may compose the total cost function. In sum, the present results suggest that motor planningof unrestrained3D arm movements necessarily mixes kinematic and kinetic variables and that this trade-off may be idiosyncratic and lead to subtle inter individual differences
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Frascatore, Mark R. "Optimal tenure choice and collusive behavior in contract negotiation models." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/38560.
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he assumption of a purely self-interested supervisor in a three-tier hierarchy (a principal-supervisor-agent framework) gives rise to the possibility of supervisor-agent collusion which lowers the principal's profits. It has also been shown that the transfer of information in side contract negotiations between the supervisor and the agent may hinder collusion and maintain high principal profits. In chapter 2, I show that imposing "credible" updating of type beliefs during negotiations can guarantee one of two outcomes that are Pareto superior for the supervisor-agent coalition. I further refine the equilibria by endogenizing the decision of who makes the side contract proposal, and a unique collusive equilibrium results. In allowing the principal to form a collusion-proof incentive contract, I find that the only plausible solution is for the principal to ignore the supervisor. It is clear that there is no value at all to the principal in hiring a self-interested supervisor. This casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that the supervisor is self-interested, and I discuss some possible alternatives.
Chapter 3 studies job matching inefficiencies under two-sided uncertainty. I examine these inefficiencies in a setting of a single-stage, simultaneous-offer bargaining situation, where the applicant does not know his productivity with the firm, and the employer does not know the applicant's reservation wage. I compare linear bid strategy equilibria between the cases where the applicant is uninformed of his productivity and where he is informed. I find that the payoff to the applicant is higher if he is informed. He is thus willing to collude with an informed person within the firm, paying him up to the difference in payoffs to obtain his productivity information. It is noteworthy that the collusive equilibrium is always more efficient than the non-collusive equilibrium, and that most types of employer prefer the applicant to have the knowledge. In the cases that the employer does not wish the applicant to possess the information, I examine possible reward schemes for the employer to use to deter collusion. I find, however, that a successful reward scheme is too costly to the employer, and coalition formation always occurs in equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies the strategic choice of job tenures to maximize lifetime earnings. A worker's salary typically increases with tenure, and the possible net starting salary at a new job depends on such factors as search costs, training period duration, rate of human capital accumulation, and experience. The worker thus wishes to choose appropriate tenures considering the levels of these factors for the industry in which he works. I set up a general framework for the problem, and solve using specific functional forms for salary increments and the new starting salary. I find that these factors are important in determining the optimal number of jobs to work, and the optimal distribution of tenures among the jobs. It is easy to see how variations in these factors across industries can help explain variations in turnover rates and tenure choices of individuals at different points in their working lifetimes. Also, we see how realistic variations in these values over the course of a worker's lifetime yield results consistent with empirical findings.Ph. D.
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Duvaut, Patrick. "Contraste et détection application à la quantité et aux filtres de Volterra optimaux pour la détection /." Grenoble 2 : ANRT, 1987. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37611008k.
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Duvaut, Patrick. "Contraste et détection : application à la quantification et aux filtres de Volterra optimaux pour la détection." Paris 11, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987PA112040.
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Evaluation des performances des dispositifs de détection adaptative. On utilise comme critère de détection; le contraste qui utilise la notion de rapport signal sur bruit. Pour obtenir un contraste maximum il faut trouver un meilleur estimateur en moyenne quadratique d'un filtre fonction du rapport de vraisemblance. On utilisera les filtres de Volterra
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André, Marine Charlotte. "Implications of adaptive learning for the design of optimal monetary policy." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAB004.
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La thèse étudie les implications des anticipations des agents privés formées avec l’apprentissage adaptatif pour la politique monétaire optimale dans des modèles Nouveau Keynésien. Les résultats obtenus sont comparés avec la littérature adoptant l’hypothèse d’anticipations rationnelles. La banque centrale fait l’arbitrage intertemporel introduit par les anticipations à apprentissage adaptatif entre stabiliser l’inflation maintenant et dans le futur. La distorsion générée par ces anticipations rend la politique monétaire davantage agressive, même si la présence du marché financier diminue légèrement l’agressivité de la politique monétaire. Il est optimal pour le gouvernement de choisir un banquier central libéral, ce résultat peut être mitigé par un contrat d’inflation linéaire. Un autre résultat est qu’il est optimal pour la banque centrale d’être moins indépendante en termes d’instruments par rapport aux anticipations rationnelles. La possibilité de contrôle robuste de la politique monétaire est limitée par l’apprentissage adaptatif en économie fermée, et encore plus limitée en économie ouverte. Mes travaux de recherche donnent des recommandations nouvellesThe dissertation studies the implications of private agents expectations formed with adaptive learning for the optimal monetary policy using New Keynesian models. The obtained results are compared with the literature adopting the hypothesis of rational expectations. The central bank makes the intertemporal trade-off between stabilizing current inflation or the future one that is introduced by adaptive learning expectations. The distortion which is introduced by this latter makes the monetary policy more aggressive, even if the presence of financial market slightly reduces the aggressiveness of the monetary policy. It is optimal for the government to choose a liberal central banker, but this result may be mitigated by adopting a linear inflation contract. Another result is that it is optimal for the central bank to be less instrument-independent compared to rational expectations. The possibility of robust control for monetary policy is limited by adaptive learning in a closed economy, and even more limited in an open economy. My research works give new recommendations for policy making
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Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane. "Private resource management and public trust, optimal design of forest conservation contracts in Ontario." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2001. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/NQ58305.pdf.
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Adie, Steven G. "Enhancement of contrast in optical coherence tomography : new modes, methods and technology." University of Western Australia. School of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, 2007. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2007.0127.
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This thesis is concerned with exploiting the native optical coherence tomography (OCT) contrast mechanism in new ways and with a new contrast mechanism, in both cases to enhance the information content of the tomographic image. Through experiments in microsphere solutions, we show that static speckle contains information about local particle density when the effective number of scatterers in the OCT resolution volume is less than about five. This potentially provides contrast enhancement in OCT images based on local scatterer density, and we discuss the experimental conditions suited to utilising this in biological tissue. We also describe the corrupting effects of multiple scattering, a ubiquitous phenomenon in OCT, on the information content of the static speckle. Consequently, we detail the development of polarisation-based metrics for characterising multiple scattering in OCT images of solid biological tissues. We exploit a detection scheme used for polarisation-sensitive contrast for a new purpose. We present experiments demonstrating the behaviour of these metrics in liquid phantoms, and in biological tissues, ranging from homogeneous non-birefringent to highly heterogeneous and birefringent samples. We discuss the conditions under which these metrics could be used to characterise the relative contribution of single and multiple scattering and, thus, aid in the study of penetration depth limits in OCT. We present a study of a new contrast mechanism - dynamic elastography which seeks to determine the dynamic mechanical properties of tissues. We present a framework for describing the OCT signal in samples undergoing vibrations, and perform experiments at vibration frequencies in the order of tens to hundreds of Hertz, to confirm the theory, and demonstrate the modes of measurement possible with this technique. These modes of measurement, including acoustic amplitude-sweep and frequency-sweep, could provide new information about the local mechanical properties of a sample. We describe a technological advancement enabling, in principle, measurements of local tissue refractive index contrast much deeper within a sample, than is possible with conventional OCT imaging. The design is based on measurement of the optical path length through tissue filling a fixed-width channel situated at the tip of a needle. The needle design and calibration is presented, as well as measurements of scattering phantoms and various biological tissues. This design potentially enables the use of refractive index-based contrast enhancement in the guidance of breast biopsy procedures.
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Leboulleux, Lucie. "Contrôle de front d'onde optimal pour l'imagerie à très haut contraste : application au cophasage de miroirs segmentés." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018AIXM0561/document.
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Imager une exo-terre à proximité d’une étoile est une tâche complexe : le signal de la planète est noyé dans le flux immense de l’étoile, très proche. Doivent donc être combinés :- de grands télescopes spatiaux segmentés. La segmentation du miroir primaire facilite le transport mais crée des erreurs liées à l’alignement.- un coronographe, permettant d’éteindre la lumière stellaire. - enfin, toute aberration optique crée un résidu lumineux nuisible dans l’image. La mesure et le contrôle des aberrations d’un système coronographique, notamment celles liées à la segmentation du télescope, sont donc primordiaux et constituent le sujet de ma thèse.Tout d’abord, j’ai développé PASTIS, un modèle simplifié du contraste d’un coronographe en présence d’une pupille segmentée, permettant d’analyser facilement les performances pour contraindre les aberrations optiques lors du design de l’instrument. PASTIS prend en compte les spécificités des instruments : structure de la pupille, aberrations optiques dues à la segmentation, coronographe. Je l’ai appliqué au télescope LUVOIR afin d’analyser les modes limitant le contraste et ainsi mieux répartir les contraintes sur les segments. Par la suite, j’ai travaillé sur l’analyse de front d’onde coronographique en présence d’un télescope segmenté sur le banc expérimental HiCAT avec une première démonstration de l’analyseur COFFEE permettant de reconstruire les erreurs de phasage avec une grande précision. Enfin, j’ai mené une analyse comparative des multiples méthodes de contrôle de front d’onde existantes et validé l’une d’elles (Dark Hole Non Linéaire) expérimentalement dans un cadre simplifié sur le banc MITHIC du LAMDirect imaging of exo-Earths is extremely complex: the star is by far brighter and very close to the planet. Several tools have to be combined:- a giant primary mirror. For manufacturing and transportation reasons, we tend to use segmented mirrors, ie. mirrors made of smaller mirrors but that have to be well-aligned and stabilised.- a coronagraph, enabling to remove the starlight.- the smallest residual wavefront aberration into residual light that decreases the image quality. The measurement and control of the aberrations, including the ones due to the telescope segmentation, are crucial and consist in the topic of my thesis.First, I developed PASTIS, a model of the contrast of a coronagraphic system in presence of a segmented pupil, enabling to analyze the performance to set up constraints on the optical aberrations during the instrument design. PASTIS takes into account the specificities of high-contrast instruments: pupil structure, optical aberrations due to the segmentation, coronagraph. I applied it to the LUVOIR telescope to analyze the main modes limiting the contrast and therefore optimizing the repartition of the constraints on the segments. In parallel, I worked on the analysis of the coronagraphic wavefront in presence of a segmented telescope on the experimental testbed called HiCAT, with a first demonstration of the COFFEE sensor enabling to reconstruct phasing errors with a high precision.Eventually, I ran a comparative analysis of existing methods of wavefront control and experimentally validated one of them (Non Linear Dark Hole) in a simplified case on the MITHIC testbed at LAM
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Chisholm, Darlene C. "Optimal contract design : a theoretical and empirical investigation of profit-sharing in the U.S. motion-pictures industry /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/7479.
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Roberts, Stephen Paul, and Stephen Paul Roberts. "Effects of Incomplete Information: Partial Buyer Information, Optimal Risk Incentivization, and Use of Non-Monotonic Contracts." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/621122.
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This dissertation considers three problems related to the issue of asymmetric information. The first problem is that of increased information in markets with unknown quality. I show that an increase in information need not produce an increase in market efficiency, even if the volume of trade in the market increases. The second problem is the use of non-monotonic contracts. I show that subjects do not typically employ non-monotonic contracts when they are optimal, although they will more frequently if they know the agent receiving the contract is fully rational and profit-maximizing. The third problem is the use of relative performance evaluation in situations where agents make risky decisions. I show that relative performance evaluation is rarely better, and frequently worse, than other contracting structures.
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Li, Jingyuan. "Essays on monetary policy and banking regulation." Thesis, Texas A&M University, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/1041.
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A central bank is usually assigned two functions: the control of inflation and the maintenance of a safetybanking sector. What are the precise conditions under which trigger strategies from the private sector can solve the time inconsistency problem and induce the central bank to choose zero inflation under a nonstationary natural rate? Can an optimal contract be used together with reputation forces to implement a desired socially optimal monetary policy rule? How to design a truthtelling contract to control the risk taking behaviors of the bank? My dissertation attempts to deal with these issues using three primary methodologies: monetary economics, game theory and optimal stochastic control theory.
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Bensabbah, Abdelkrim. "Développement d'une palette tridimensionnelle en vue de l'utilisation optimale des représentations colorimétriques : exemples d'applications industrielles et médicales." Nancy 1, 1992. http://www.theses.fr/1992NAN10271.
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Le travail réalisé durant cette thèse traite essentiellement de la notion de couleur, du choix de sa représentation tridimensionnelle et de son utilisation optimale dans les applications nécessitant détection, modification ou encore création de couleurs. Afin de mieux cerner les difficultés liées à cette notion, une approche globale du problème basée sur la comparaison des différents espaces de représentation a été nécessaire; elle permet de dégager avec précision les avantages et les faiblesses de chacun d'eux. Grace a cette synthèse, un ensemble de méthodes permettant d'effectuer une détection ou une modification de couleurs dans une image réelle a pu être dégagé; ces méthodes sont ensuite exploitées dans des applications industrielles et artistiques. Notre étude s'est enfin penchée sur le délicat problème du choix judicieux des couleurs d'une palette exploitée dans la technique de simulation de phénomènes en image (raster)
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Hachicha, Farah. "Qualité des Produits, Qualité de la main d’oeuvre et Sanctions optimales dans la Théorie de l’Agence." Thesis, Paris 2, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA020032/document.
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Après une introduction générale et un survey de littérature, l’apport de cette thèse est d’établir un lien entre le marché des biens et le marché de travail et de proposer un système légal optimal pour dissuader les comportements opportunistes au sein de l’entreprise. Tout au long de la thèse, le cadre d’analyse utilisé est le cas d’un monopole qui produit deux types de biens. Les consommateurs sont hétérogènes selon leurs préférences à la qualité. Le chapitre 2 analyse différentes structures d’agence afin de déterminer la meilleure structure qui permet à la fois de maximiser le profit de l’entreprise et de maximiser le bien-être des consommateurs et des employés. Le chapitre 3 examine la distorsion de la qualité des biens et du niveau d’effort des employés en asymétrie d’information avec sélection adverse sur le marché des biens et le marché de travail par rapport à l’information parfaite. Le chapitre 4 étend le chapitre 3 en étudiant la même problématique avec un problème d’aléa-moral sur le marché de travail en présence d’une collusion entre le superviseur et l’employé. Ce chapitre questionne le rôle du consommateur et du juge à dissuader cette forme de comportement opportunisteAfter a general introduction and a survey of literature, the contribution of this thesis is to establish a link between the goods market and the labor market and to propose optimal legal system to deter opportunistic behavior within the company. Throughout the thesis, we consider a monopoly that produces two types of good. Consumers are heterogeneous according to their preferences to quality. Chapter 2 analyzes different agency structures to determine the best structure that allows both to maximize the profit of the company and maximize the welfare of consumers and employees. Chapter 3 examines distortion of the quality of goods and the level of the workers’ effort with adverse selection on the goods market and the labor market compared with perfect information. This chapter examines the role of the consumer and the judge to discourage this kind of opportunistic behavior.Keywords: Quality of goods, quality of labor, optimal contract, portfolio of contract, opportunism, collusion, social welfare, optimal sanctions, firm design, law and economics
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Johnson, Larry A. "A comparison of optimum grain hedging strategies using commodity options and futures contracts: an application of portfolio theory." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/49803.
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Cots, Olivier. "Contrôle optimal géométrique : méthodes homotopiques et applications." Phd thesis, Université de Bourgogne, 2012. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00742927.
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Le contexte de ce travail est le contrôle optimal géométrique appliqué à la mécanique céleste et au contrôle quantique. On s'est tout d'abord intéressé au problème de transfert orbital de satellite autour de la Terre à consommation minimale, qui amena à la réalisation du code HamPath, permettant tout d'abord la résolution de problèmes de contrôle optimal dont la loi de commande est lisse. Il se base sur le Principe du Maximum de Pontryagin (PMP) et sur la notion de point conjugué. Ce programme combine méthodes de tir, méthodes homotopiques différentielles et calcul des conditions d'optimalité du deuxième ordre. Nous nous intéressons par la suite au contrôle quantique. On étudie tout d'abord le contrôle d'un système composé de deux types de particules de spin 1/2 ayant des temps de relaxation différents et dont la dynamique est gouvernée par les équations de Bloch. Ces deux sous-systèmes, correspondant aux deux types de particules, sont couplés par un même contrôle (un champ electromagnétique), le but étant alors d'amener la magnétisation des particules du premier type à zéro tout en maximisant celle du second (dans un système de coordonnées bien choisi). Ce modèle intervient en imagerie médicale par Résonance Magnétique Nucléaire et consiste à maximiser le contraste entre deux régions d'une même image. L'utilisation des outils géométriques et numériques aura permis de donner une très bonne synthèse sous-optimale pour deux cas particuliers (mélange sang oxygéné/désoxygéné et liquide cérébrospinal/eau). La dernière contribution de cette thèse porte sur l'étude d'un système quantique à deux niveaux d'énergie dont la dynamique est régie par les équations de Lindblad. Le modèle est basé sur la minimisation d'énergie du transfert. On se restreint à un cas particulier pour lequel le Hamiltonien donné par le PMP est Liouville intégrable. On décrit alors les lieux conjugué et de coupure pour ce problème riemannien avec dérive.
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Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline. "Equity financing and covenants in venture capital an augmented contracting approach to optimal German contract design /." Wiesbaden : Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2006. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10231791.
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Jung-Senssfelder, Karoline. "Equity financing and covenants in venture capital : an augmented contracting approach to optimal German contract design /." Wiesbaden : Dt. Univ.-Verl, 2005. https://www.lib.umn.edu/slog.phtml?url=http://www.myilibrary.com?id=134354.
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Lamirande, Patrick de. "Trois essais en théorie microéconomique." Thèse, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/1480.
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Paredes, Esperanza. "Optimal contracts for trade restrictions." Thesis, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/13769.
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This paper addresses the question of how the government should elicit cost information from a high or low domestic industry to determine socially optimal levels of imports. The results are shown to depend on whether firms in the domestic industry are represented by a trade organization. When firms act independently the optimal contract is costless for the government and two different types of incentive constraints are used to determine it. One of these applies when the costs announced by firms coincide. The other applies when one firm reveals a cost structure and its competitor reveals the opposite cost structure. If a contract to elicit cost information is used and trade organizations are the channel of communication between industry and government only one type of incentive constraint is necessary.
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Huang, Jui-ching, and 黃瑞卿. "Revisiting the Optimal Insurance Contract." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93047204729341202431.
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博士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
91
This thesis includes two papers to discuss the optimal insurance contract. The fist paper studies the optimal insurance contract when the insured and the insurer have deviant beliefs about risk. The second one explores the possible reasons that make an optimal insurance contract violate the principle of indemnity, i.e., the indemnity would not be larger than loss amount. By adopting monotone likelihood ratio dominance to describe the relative optimism regarding risks, the first paper could address some properties of an optimal insurance contract. This complements Marshall's (1991) ``any form would be possible" conclusion when second order stochastic dominance is employed in his paper. We find that a non-zero deductible may exist even when there are no administrating costs. We also identify a new cause for market failure and find an exception for well-known full-coverage prediction. Furthermore, we find that, because of deviant beliefs, the optimal insurance contract could settle on full coverage for small losses and partial coverage for large losses. The second paper demonstrates that an optimal insurance contract may be accompanied by a violation of the indemnity principle if (1) the insurer or the insured has deviant beliefs in the loss distribution; (2) there are transaction costs from the insured's side, or; (3) there are background risk for the insured. This type of optimal insurance contract loosens the principle of indemnity to ease the relative pessimism of the insured and to cover the transaction costs and background risks of the insured.
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Yang, Yu-ting, and 楊玉婷. "The optimal labor contracts with pure intrinsic motivation." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/f39sfq.
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碩士國立中山大學
經濟學研究所
103
We adopt the model of Auriol and Brilon (2014) to discuss how the workers with intrinsic motivation affect the optimal labor contracts in nonprofit and profit sectors. Most of the models suppose that the intrinsic motivation of workers was impure altruism, but in fact, both the pure and impure altruism may arise when workers face different organizations. We assume that the workers are pure altruism if they are good workers. There are also some workers with anti-social behavior such that they can obtain pleasure from this destructive behavior. This paper applies principal-agent model by involving intrinsic motivation to determine the optimal contract. We find that without anti-social behavior, the nonprofit sector with the pure altruism of workers can offer lower wage and bonus payments than the profit sector does whereas monitoring is at the same level as in the profit sector. With the presence of anti-social behavior, both sectors only can employ higher monitoring to avoid the damage caused by such behavior. Furthermore, the profit sector is more attractive to the workers with anti-social behavior so it has to impose a higher monitoring level to deter these workers from entering the sector.
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Wei, Hung-Hsien, and 魏宏憲. "Optimal Transmitted Frequency Selection in Ultrasound Contrast Imaging." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49962150148658727508.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
電信工程學研究所
102
The main goal of this study is that through a complete theory, simulate with adaptive control of transmission signal frequency which can approach to best CTR(Contrast-to-Tissue Ratio).In the progressing of optimal frequency, the microbubble size distribution will be one key factor affecting the optimal frequency; most of previous study using one- bubble simulation, which is not practical. By adding microbubble distribution model into consideration, we can acquire the optimal frequency more precisely. Using fixed shell properties microbubbles analysis optimal frequency range from linear oscillation theory, illustrate the probe, tissue, and bubbles stochastic effects on the received PSD, and use the nonlinear oscillation simulation, with different emission signal frequency to find the optimal frequency. Transducer’s center frequency and bandwidth should be choose to matched with tissue attenuation along with bubble size distribution, otherwise the optimal frequency will be meaningless because of high power loss. Considering bubble flow velocity, solution need to be derived from average reference traces, and the numbers depends on the bubble changing rate. Using the signal frequency sweep estimate the optimal frequency range, still need to radius of bubble size distribution of information, and the result will be more close to the ideal value if emission signal using the narrowband signal. In the situation of low bubble replace rate (lower than 20%), the maximum power and optimal frequency can be obtained with gradient decent algorithm, and the result backscatter power is 7dB higher than obtained power in transducer central frequency.
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Lan, Ching-Yu, and 藍青玉. "Optimal Leaseing Contract under Asymmetric Information." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/47037668810176864626.
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"Optimal contract of research and development." Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5887202.
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by Wong Tak-Kwong.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-81).
Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1
Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7
Chapter 3 --- R&D Activities and Competing for a Researcher --- p.12
Chapter 3.1 --- Licensing Decision of a Successful Innovator --- p.16
Benefits of Firm i with Licensing
Benefits of Firm j with Licensing
Chapter 3.2 --- Competing for the Researcher --- p.23
Characterization of Equilibrium
Chapter 3.3 --- Concluding Remark --- p.29
Chapter 4 --- Innovation from An Independent Researcher --- p.30
Chapter 4.1 --- Licensing with Bargaining --- p.34
Licensing Decision of the Researcher
Licensing Decision of Firm i
Licensing Decision of Firm j
Chapter 4.2 --- Ownership Re-allocation --- p.44
Chapter 4.3 --- Concluding Remark --- p.48
Chapter 5 --- An Analysis of Sequential Innovation --- p.50
Chapter 5.1 --- Choices of Licensing and Conducting R&D --- p.55
Decision of the Follower
Licensing by the Successful Innovator
Chapter 5.2 --- Equilibrium of Sequential R&D --- p.65
Chapter 5.3 --- Simultaneous R&D or Sequential R&D --- p.68
Chapter 5.4 --- Concluding Remark --- p.74
Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.75
Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.76
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Guenther, Drake Andrew. "Optimal beamforming strategies for enhanced contrast in medical ultrasound /." 2008. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3312119.
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Huang, chienying, and 黃千瑛. "The Optimal Licensing Contract Of An Insider." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/83135276186295862661.
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碩士國立中正大學
國際經濟研究所
99
The paper discusses the optimal licensing of an insider innovative firm, who considers to license a cost-reducing innovation to some or to all of the production firms in the market. The paper sets up a three-stage game model, in which the R&D firm chooses the level of R&D investment, then it chooses the licensing contract to production firms, and lastly the production firms Cournot-compete in the market. In the case of licensing to only some of the competing firms, we find that the innovative firm prefers adopting royalty fee when the innovation is a highly advanced technology, while it prefers using a fixed fee with an innovation of low technology. However, in the equilibrium level of R&D investment, the degree of difficulty in R&D determines the format of the optimal licensing contract for a highly advanced technology. With a low advanced technology to be licensed out, a fixed fee is always preferred by the innovative firm. We also analyze the optimal licensing contract when the innovative firm licenses its innovation to all the production firms and find a similar result as the existing literature. That is, the innovative firm uses a royalty fee all the time. Key word：patent licensing, R&D activities, non-drastic innovation, royalty, fixed fee
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Fang, In-maun, and 方英懋. "Self-control and Optimal Insurance Contract Design." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/10514617240268429159.
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碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
93
Under the concept of human’s self-control and the process of dynamic interaction between insurance principal and insured’s experience, this paper constructs a theory of optimal insurance contract. The theory shows that: 1.Under information symmetric situation, the contract is a dynamic negotiate form to allow each party to select a beneficial premium and proceeds. In the long-run dynamic process, the self-enforcement stationary insurance contract is an optimal contract. 2.In the situation of information asymmetric, we find that principal’s contingent payment under high effort is positive related to the effort of insured self-control. When the payment is increasing in the insurance market, principal must provide more strong incentive for induce insured’s high effort. On the contrary, when payment is decreasing, insurance principal can induce insured s high effort without any incentive. If the principal desires to induce insured’s low effort of the self-control, the principal and insured’s contingent payment is constant and unrelated to market insurance payment.
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Kung, Sheng-Chiao, and 龔聖喬. "Optimal Contract for Disclosure of Know-how." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94555729645092403580.
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Chou, Yu-Hui, and 周玉慧. "The Optimal Loan Contract of Cash Card." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01365709278615147385.
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碩士國立中山大學
經濟學研究所
93
The cash card emphasizes is the fast nuclear card facilitates the loan to be allowed to borrow the loan immediately, therefore its verification procedure is more loose. Also the cash card verification basis majority of all is extends with the credit card service pattern written credit comments the chronometer, this to the loan latent credit risk appraisal effect and the ability is very limited.Therefore, how completes the credit risk the appraisal, correct distinguishes the loan risk degree, this for this research center of gravity. But this research mainly emphatically analyzes in monopolizes with under the market mechanism which completely competes, how does the bank subscribe decides the most suitable cash card to lend money the contract to avoid the counter choice question the production, causes to be supposed to lend money the contract to be able to satisfy the bilateral biggest expectation benefit. When market mechanism for monopolizes, the bank cannot use collaterals to come the loan which the area weight plants the different type. If in perfect information, low risk type loan payment interest rate and handling charge higher risk for high, also this time bank cannot to be high, the low risk loan implementation credit ration. If in asymmetry information, can have two kind of possibilities the conclusions: First kind with to perfect information situation, but silver guild to high risk loan implementation credit ration; The second kind pays the same interest rate and the handling charge for all loans, but the bank cannot to the loan implementation credit ration. When the market mechanism for completely competes also the perfect information, the bank does not request the loan to provide collaterals, also cannot to its implementation credit ration, but the low risk loan pays interest rate and the handling charge higher risk loan comes low. If when asymmetry information, the bank can request the low risk type the loan proposes collaterals, the use collaterals differentiates the loan type, this time the loan which lends money the agreement to be allowed to differentiate the different risk degree, is a separation is balanced (Separating Equilibrium).
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Hung, mei hui, and 黃美惠. "Optimal Deposit Insurance Contract unter Asymmetric Information." Thesis, 1996. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61498768461317000252.
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HUANG, WEN-PIN, and 黃文彬. "Optimal Surrender Decision of Life Insurance Contract." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62641608072163575200.
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碩士逢甲大學
風險管理與保險學系
105
In this paper, we use an example for the current Taiwan life insurance contract to explore the optimal surrender decision of life insurance contract. This study builds an utility function for insureds who don’t want to pay the premiums. On the basis of surrender, lapse and reduced paid-up ratio to find the maximum utility value. We choose an optimal decision in every year of the policy. Then, we add sensitivity analysis to analyze utility value that change interest rate and risk avoidance parameters. The results show that every type, age and gender has the optimal decision. The increase of interest rate cause reduction in utility value rate and lead to shorten lapse time. Then we change risk avoidance parameters. When insureds are risk avoidance, chooseing reduced paid-up in term insurance and whole insurance. When γ = 0.1、γ = 0.05, we should choose surrender this decision. But the result is different with my expectation in endowment insurance. I think the repayment policy is the reason for this result.