Academic literature on the topic 'Contributions in ethicsKant, Immanuel , 1724-1804'

This dissertation deals with the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I provide the background of transcendental philosophy before Kant, beginning from Aristotle. Kant transformed Aristotelian transcendental philosophy by using the method of the sciences in the Modern period. This method was initiated by Francis Bacon, in his method of induction. Isaac Newton transformed the method so that it could deal with verification and falsification. This Newtonian method was taken up into chemistry, serving as a guide for the analysis and synthesis of elements. Kant used this method in his transcendental philosophy, with a view to putting metaphysics onto the path of a science. Kant was first awakened to transcendental idealism in 1769, though he did not put forth a full transcendental philosophy until 1781. In his mature transcendental philosophy, he not only uses the scientific method, but he also illustrates the categories using biological imagery. After looking at the broad contours of Kant's transcendental philosophy, I deal with the first criticism of his transcendental philosophy. In replying to his critic, Kant made explicit his scientific method, while drawing from the thought of David Hume and Thomas Reid. With Kant's explanations of his transcendental philosophy in hand, I turn to an element of his non-transcendental philosophy, namely moral philosophy, in order to provide a contrast that serves to illuminate the precise nature of his transcendental philosophy.

This thesis looks at two theories of universalizability: Immanuel Kant's deontological one and R. M. Hare's utilitarian one. It also looks at criticisms of both theories by David Wiggins. It concludes that his arguments against Hare are decisive because the moral theory that follows from Hare's version of the claim that moral judgements must be universalizable is incompatible with several basic requirements on moral theories. Wiggins' criticism of Kant, on the other hand, centres on a technical point that is overcome by an interpretation of Kant's tests for the universalizability of maxims that is given by Onora Nell. Finally the thesis argues that Kant's rational theory of ethics is superior to Wiggins' subjectivist claims because it both reflects our common sense conception of ethics and provides a rational basis for evaluating moral judgements.

Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.

康德在《單純理性範圍內的宗教》一書中非常重視「思慮品格」(Gesinnung)這個概念，並把它視為所有行動的「終極基本格準」。首先，他認為一個人或道德行動者為善或是惡取決於這種「傾向」。再者，「思慮品格」在康德的行動理論中亦扮演非常重要的角色，它解釋了理性行動者作惡的可能條件。故此，「思慮品格」是評價康德關於「根本惡」以及理性行動理論的重要概念。進一步說，「道德完整」的可能性以及「道德歷程」的可理解性也都建基於此概念。因此，「思慮品格」對於康德道德哲學的整體計劃而言也甚為關鍵。儘管康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》及《實踐理性批判》兩本書中曾數度提及「思慮品格」，但這概念在康德《單純理性範圍內的宗教》之前的著作中卻似未受到充分的重視。本文將要指出，康德並非在其後期作品中才突然提出「思慮品格」這概念，事實上，在許多較早的著作中，這個關鍵的概念早已留下重要的理論線索。
本文嘗試指出，康德在討論《實踐理性之批判》裡的「自由範疇」理論，特別是論及「道德人格」範疇時，早已舖排有關「思慮品格」的理論。「道德人格」範疇與「思慮品格」分別為道德罪責提供智性及心理根據，而後者正是以前者作為根據。對康德而言，「道德人格」並非一個心理概念，而是實踐判斷的先驗形式，正如「實體/屬性」這個在時間中連結不同直覺之基礎的「自然範疇」一般，作為它的同位範疇 (isomorphic category)，「道德人格」是關聯個別實踐判斷的基礎。然而，我們仍然需要解釋，行動的證成理由如何推動我們的意志，因為對「有限理性行動者」而言，純粹理性並不一定具有實踐性，或者說，一個行動的證成理由並不一定是我們的動力。康德正是以「思慮品格」這個概念來闡明採納「格準」的心理基礎。當我們釐清了採納「格準」的心理基礎後，便能明白人在甚麼意義下要為自己的行動負責。本文希望能夠清楚闡明「思慮品格」與「道德人格」的關係，更希望由此說明這兩個概念以及「自由範疇表」的理論關係，並對有關問題引起更多關注和討論。
In religion within the limit of reason alone Kant deliberately proposes the concept Gesinnung and regards it as the “ultimate underlying maxim“ of all actions. Firstly, whether a certain person or a moral agent should be regarded as good or evil depends on this ‘disposition’. Moreover, Gesinnung assumes an important role in Kant's theory of action, namely to explain how it is possible for a rational agent to act evil. It is thus an important aspect of evaluating Kant's account of radical evil and rational agency. Furthermore, the possibility of moral integrity and the intelligibility of moral progress also lie in this concept, rendering it important also in Kant's whole project of moral philosophy. Although Gesinnung appears in Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason for a few times, very little had been said about the use of the term until Religion was written. It would be strange to for Kant to propose this important concept all of a sudden without any previous clues. I shall argue that the clues can already be found in the discussion of Categories of Freedom (the category of Personality) in the Critique of Practical Reason. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the category “personality“ and Gesinnung serve to provide the rational and psychological grounds of moral imputation respectively, and that the latter arises from the foundation built from the former. The category “personality“ is not a psychological concept but an a priori form of practical judgment: as isomorphic to the categories, “personality“ serves as the ground of relating discrete practical judgments just as “subsistence and inherence“ in categories of nature serves as the ground of relating intuitions in time. But we also need a psychological ground for moral imputation to explain how the justifying reason motivates our will, as for a finite rational agent pure reason may not always be practical, i.e. the justifying reasons for certain actions may not always be our motivation for the actions. Kant uses Gesinnung as a conceptual apparatus to explain the psychological ground for the adoption of maxims and hence how we impute our actions. Through this essay, I hope that I have explained the relation between Gesinnung and “personality“ clearly and more importantly, shown that the theoretical significance of these two concepts and the table of the Categories of Freedom deserve closer attention.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Detailed summary in vernacular field only.
Ng, Yat Kan.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121).
Abstracts also in Chinese.
Abstract --- p.i
Table of contents --- p.v
Chapter 0.1 --- Prelude: structure of the essay --- p.1
Chapter 1.01 --- Searching for the unchanged in the midst of changes- legacy of western philosophy --- p.3
Chapter 1.1 --- Kant and the category of Subsistence and Inherence --- p.5
Chapter 1.11 --- The ‘placement problem’ in the Categories of the Understanding --- p.5
Chapter 1.111 --- Mathematical categories as a priori conditions of intuition --- p.10
Chapter 1.2 --- “Substance and its transcendental time-determination --- p.15
Chapter 1.3 --- Kant’s critique of the a-temporal treatment of Substance --- p.20
Chapter 2 --- Kant’s on the problem of the personal identity: Transcendental “I“, Refutation of Idealism and brief remarks on “personality“ in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.26
Chapter 2.1 --- Transcendental apperception --- p.26
Chapter 2.11 --- Kant’s refutation of idealism --- p.30
Chapter 2.2 --- Preliminary remark: “Person and its genealogy --- p.38
Chapter 2.21 --- Personality: Remarks from Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.41
Chapter 3 --- Interlude: Brief accounts on the Moral Law and Autonomy --- p.45
Chapter 3.1 --- The Moral Law 45
Chapter 3.2 --- On autonomy: an explication on the role of “self“ in “self-legislation“ --- p.51
Chapter 3.2.1 --- Wood’s etymological mistake --- p.52
Chapter 3.2.2 --- Kant’s distinction on the “author and the “legislator“ of the law --- p.53
Chapter 3.2.3 --- Typic as a “procedure and the significance of “autos --- p.57
Chapter 3.3 --- Intelligible noumenal character and the Empirical phenomenal character --- p.61
Chapter 4 --- “Personality“ in Kant’s moral philosophy --- p.69
Chapter 4.1 --- Overview of the problem --- p.69
Chapter 4.2 --- The Categories of Freedom: a complete failure? --- p.71
Chapter 4.3 --- “Personality as the “substratum of moral actions 85
Chapter 5 --- The Analysis of the Will and Radical Evil --- p.94
Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction: The Good Will and the Absolutely Good Will --- p.94
Chapter 5.11 --- The Good and the Evil --- p.95
Chapter 5.2 --- Autonomy part two: Wille and Willkür --- p.101
Chapter 5.3 --- The Gesinnung --- p.104
Chapter 5.31 --- Gesinnung and Personality: the psychological and rational grounds of moral imputation --- p.105
Chapter 5.32 --- Gesinnung and Radical Evil --- p.110
Chapter 6 --- Concluding remarks --- p.118
Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.120

劉桂標.
論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部,1994.
參考文獻: leaves [1-4] (3rd group)
Liu Guibiao.
引文簡稱
序言 --- p.1
Chapter 第一章： --- 道德原則的基礎一意志及義務 --- p.5
Chapter (一） --- 廣義的意志及意志與意念的區分 --- p.5
Chapter (1) --- <<原則>>中的幾處不同的說明 --- p.5
Chapter (2) --- <<形上學>>中的有關引文及其闡釋-Wi lie和 Wi1lkur 的異同和關係 --- p.6
Chapter (3) --- 廣義的Wille、狹義的Wille和Willkur的番翻譯及<< 原則>>中幾處說明的意義 --- p.17
Chapter (二） --- 善的意志 --- p.20
Chapter (1) --- 善的意志是道德原則的唯一的決定根據 --- p.20
Chapter (2) --- 經驗事物只具相對價值 --- p.22
Chapter (3) --- 唯有善意才具絶對價值 --- p.30
Chapter (三） --- 義務、人類意念及道德情感. --- p.36
Chapter (1) --- 義務的主觀的和客觀的意義 --- p.36
Chapter (2) --- 人類意念和行動的強制性 --- p.38
Chapter (3) --- 道德感是服從法則的一種動力 --- p.45
Chapter (4) --- 康德“道德情感´ح說商榷 --- p.57
Chapter 第二章： --- 道德的最高原則-定然律令與意志自律原則 --- p.63
Chapter (一） --- 定然律令的意志及其與假然律令的區別 --- p.63
Chapter (1) --- 命令與律令的意義 --- p.63
Chapter (2) --- 兩種律令的區分及其與兩種命題形式的關係 --- p.65
Chapter (3) --- 略述假然律令的進一步區分 --- p.69
Chapter (二） --- 定然律令程式的意義及其區分 --- p.70
Chapter (1) --- 定然律令程式的意義 --- p.70
Chapter (2) --- 定然律令的基本程式及其附屬程式的區分 --- p.72
Chapter (3) --- 三基本程式的意義及其相互關係 --- p.74
Chapter (4) --- 略述三附屬程式的意義及其作用 --- p.75
Chapter (三） --- 定然律令三基本程式及意志自律原則 --- p.79
Chapter (1) --- 第一程式的意義 --- p.79
Chapter (2) --- 例證的意義 --- p.85
Chapter (3) --- 意義務的分類 --- p.86
Chapter (4) --- 四個實例的分析與商權P --- p.92
Chapter (5) --- 第二程式及其例證分析與商榷 --- p.98
Chapter (6) --- 第三程式及意志自律的意義 --- p.107
Chapter (7) --- 意志自律是唯一真正的道德原則 --- p.110
結語 --- p.123
註釋 --- p.135
參考書目

劉宇光.
論文(神學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1997.
參考文獻: leaves 67-69.
Liu Yuguang.
導論 --- p.3
Chapter 第一章 --- 「幸福」槪念的分疏 --- p.6
Chapter 第二章 --- 「幸福」在倫理學原理論中的消極角色 --- p.19
Chapter 第三章 --- 「幸福」作爲自然目的 --- p.38
Chapter 第四章 --- 「幸福」作爲道德的手段 --- p.50
Chapter 第五章 --- 「幸福」與圓善 --- p.56
參考書目: --- p.67

梁耀明.
論文(神學碩士) -- 香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部, 1997.
參考文獻: leaves 113-115.
Liang Yaoming.
導言 --- p.1
Chapter 第一章 --- 超驗神學的謬誤--康德對思辯神學之 上帝存在論證的批判
Chapter I. --- 啓蒙時代的上帝言說 --- p.5
Chapter II. --- 《純粹理性批判´Ø辯證論》中神學批判的重點 --- p.10
Chapter III. --- 超驗神學的體系及論證 --- p.14
Chapter 1. --- 超驗神學所依據的先驗原理 --- p.14
Chapter 2. --- 宇宙論論證 --- p.15
Chapter 3. --- 存有論論證 --- p.16
Chapter 4. --- 宇宙論論證與存有論論證的關係 --- p.18
Chapter IV. --- 超驗神學論證的謬誤 --- p.20
Chapter 1. --- 「絶對必然性」（absolute necessity)之問題 --- p.21
Chapter 2. --- 「存在」意義的誤差 --- p.22
Chapter 3. --- 「存在」的經驗性 --- p.24
Chapter V. --- 小結 --- p.26
Chapter 第二章 --- 「可能性論證」--康德早期的神學觀念
Chapter I. --- 差異的源起--矛盾律的地位問題 --- p.27
Chapter 1. --- 萊布尼茲-胡爾夫學派的矛盾律 --- p.28
Chapter 2. --- 「同一律」與「矛盾律」 --- p.31
Chapter II. --- 可能性證明--上帝存在的另一種構想 --- p.34
Chapter 1. --- 「可能性論證」的基本內容 --- p.35
Chapter 2. --- 「可能性論證」的意義 --- p.41
Chapter III. --- 存在、實在性、現實性一´ؤ可能性論證的根本問題 --- p.49
Chapter 1. --- 「存在」槪念之歧義 --- p.50
Chapter 2. --- 槪念中的實在性 --- p.54
Chapter 3. --- 歧義的源頭--康德早期神學思想與傳統形而上學 理論的關連 --- p.59
Chapter IV. --- 小結 --- p.63
Chapter 第三章 --- 超驗理想--超驗哲學中的上帝理念
Chapter I. --- 「超驗理想」槪述 --- p.65
Chapter 1. --- 「超驗理想」作爲理性的最高理念 --- p.65
Chapter 2. --- 從理性之理念到超驗理想 --- p.66
Chapter II. --- 「超驗理想」作爲一種理性的辯證推論 --- p.68
Chapter 1. --- 「物」之界定與「完全確定原理」 --- p.68
Chapter 2. --- 「可能性的綜集」（the sum of possibility)作爲 「實在性的全體」（a total of reality ) --- p.69
Chapter 3. --- 超驗理想與「物」之基型 --- p.70
Chapter 4. --- 超驗理想作爲超驗神學的「上帝」理念 --- p.73
Chapter III. --- 超驗理想推論作爲可能性論證的重構 --- p.75
Chapter 1. --- 前提的釐淸一一「『事物』的可能性」 --- p.75
Chapter 2. --- 「事物」作爲「物之一般」 --- p.78
Chapter 3. --- 上帝作爲事物可能性質料的源頭 --- p.80
Chapter 4. --- 「實在性」與「現實性」一´ؤ揚棄可能性論證的理由 --- p.83
Chapter 5. --- 「事物的可能性」一一一個易受誤解的槪念 --- p.86
Chapter IV. --- 「超驗理想」溯源 --- p.90
Chapter V. --- 超驗理想推論的評價 --- p.100
Chapter 1. --- 超驗理想的必須性問題 --- p.100
Chapter 2. --- 超驗理想作爲理性必須產生之理念 --- p.101
Chapter 3. --- 餘論 --- p.110
參考書目 --- p.113

吳宏基.
"二零零零年一月三十日"
論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2000.
參考文獻 (leaves 114-121)
附中英文摘要.
"Er ling ling ling nian yi yue san shi ri"
Wu Hongji.
Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000.
Can kao wen xian (leaves 114-121)
Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao.
Chapter 第一章 --- 題目析義與問題之提出 --- p.4
Chapter 第一節 --- 緒言 --- p.4
Chapter 第二節 --- 題目析義 --- p.8
Chapter 第三節 --- 硏究目的及意義 --- p.10
Chapter 第二章 --- 硏究方法與文獻 --- p.13
Chapter 第一節 --- 硏究方法 --- p.13
Chapter ´一Ø --- 哲學思辨
Chapter ´二Ø --- 硏究步驟
Chapter 第二節 --- 文獻回顧 --- p.18
Chapter 第三節 --- 硏究限制 --- p.21
Chapter 第三章 --- 幾個道德學說對道德本質之論述 --- p.26
Chapter 第一節 --- 社會學派論社會乃道德之根本 --- p.26
Chapter 第二節 --- 功利主義論道德乃幸福之趨求 --- p.29
Chapter 第三節 --- 基督教論道德乃人神關之成果 --- p.33
Chapter 第四節 --- 孟子論道德乃本心之自律 --- p.35
Chapter ´一Ø --- 道德之本義
Chapter ´二Ø --- 仁義內在之辨說
Chapter ´三Ø --- 性善之確立
Chapter ´四Ø --- 小結
Chapter 第五節 --- 論道德之本質涵義 --- p.40
一從外在法則之內在化至意志之自律
Chapter 第四章 --- 康德道德教育之基本路向 --- p.49
Chapter 第一節 --- 康德的哥白尼式革命 --- p.49
Chapter 第二節 --- 康德的道德教育目標 --- p.50
Chapter ´一Ø --- 格準之界定
Chapter ´二Ø --- 方法論之界定
Chapter 第五章 --- 康德對道德本質之辨析 --- p.57
一使主觀地決意的格準直接地爲客觀的自由法則所決定
Chapter 第一節 --- 由道德之根源以論說善的觀念 --- p.58
Chapter 第二節 --- 論道德之義務性及其律令 --- p.61
Chapter 一
Chapter 二
Chapter 第三節 --- 論道德行動乃依自由法則之決意 --- p.67
Chapter ´一Ø --- 實踐道德之必然性
Chapter ´二Ø --- 自由法則之決意
Chapter 第四節 --- 小結 --- p.73
Chapter 第五節 --- 回應批評 --- p.75
Chapter 第六章 --- 康德論自律人格之培養 --- p.83
一使客觀地實踐的理性成爲亦是主觀地實踐的
Chapter 第一節 --- 實踐道德之動力 --- p.83
Chapter 第二節 --- 違背道德之性癖 --- p.86
Chapter 第三節 --- 向善能力之恢復 --- p.89
Chapter 第四節 --- 品格培養之步驟 --- p.91
Chapter ´一Ø --- 消極性的道德教育原則
Chapter ´二Ø --- 積極性的道德教育原則
Chapter 第五節 --- 小結 --- p.96
Chapter 第六節 --- 回應批評 --- p.98
Chapter 第七章 --- 總結及建議 --- p.103
Chapter 第一節 --- 總結：道德本質涵義之辨解和道德教育基本原則之建構 --- p.103
Chapter 第二節 --- 總結：德性發展與道德教育 --- p.106
Chapter 第二節 --- 建議 --- p.111
參考書目 --- p.114

Yeung, Kwok-Wing Anthony.
Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-84).
Preface --- p.1
Chapter Chapter 1. --- Comparison of Freedom in Kant's and Sartre's Theories
Introduction --- p.4
Chapter Section A: --- Kant's Theory on Freedom --- p.6
Chapter 1) --- On Kant's Conception of Freedom --- p.6
Chapter 2) --- Kant's Argument for Human Freedom --- p.17
Chapter Section B: --- Sartre's Theory on Freedom --- p.21
Chapter 1) --- on Sartre's Conception of Freedom --- p.21
Chapter 2) --- Sartre's Argument for Human Freedom --- p.29
Chapter Section C: --- Comparison and Reflections --- p.32
Chapter Chapter 2. --- Comparison of Universality of Morality in Kant's and Sartre's Theories --- p.44
Introduction --- p.44
Chapter Section A: --- Kant's Theory on Universality of Morality --- p.46
Chapter 1) --- on Kant's Conception of Universality --- p.46
Chapter 2) --- Kant's Argument for Universality of Morality --- p.50
Chapter Section A: --- Sartre's Theory of Universality of Morality --- p.55
Chapter 1) --- On Sartre's Conception of Universality --- p.55
Chapter 2) --- Sartre's Argument for Universality for Morality --- p.60
Chapter Section C: --- Comparison and Reflections --- p.64
Conclusion --- p.76
Bibliography --- p.80

李敬國.
"2001年9月"
論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001.
參考文獻 (leaves 133-140)
附中英文摘要.
"2001 nian 9 yue"
Li Jingguo.
Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001.
Can kao wen xian (leaves 133-140)
Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao.
凡例 --- p.1
前言 --- p.4
Chapter 第一章 --- 康德的前驅：希臘及代關於「自由」的學說 --- p.8
Chapter 〈一〉 --- 導言 --- p.8
Chapter 〈二〉 --- 自由意志與自由槪念的發展 --- p.9
Chapter 〔I〕 --- 多德 --- p.9
Chapter 〔II〕 --- 笛卡爾 --- p.13
Chapter 〔III〕 --- 斯賓諾莎 --- p.16
Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 休謨 --- p.21
Chapter 〔V〕 --- 萊布尼茲 --- p.25
Chapter 〈三〉 --- 小結 --- p.30
Chapter 第二章 --- 康德的自由槪念 --- p.32
Chapter 〈一〉 --- 自由槪念底價値與意義 --- p.32
Chapter 〈二〉 --- 自由槪念 --- p.39
Chapter 〔I〕 --- 《純粹理性之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.39
Chapter (A) --- <超驗辯證論> 〉 --- p.39
Chapter (1) --- 「二律背反」底推述 --- p.39
Chapter (2) --- 「超驗自由」與兩重世界之界分 --- p.45
Chapter (B) --- <純粹理性底法規> 〉 --- p.47
Chapter (C) --- 自由底任意與天然自由之關係 --- p.51
Chapter 〔II〕 --- 《道德底形而上學之基礎》中的自由槪念 --- p.53
Chapter (1) --- 從《純粹理性之批判》到「實踐理性之批判 」 --- p.54
Chapter (2) --- 自由槪念底發現 --- p.56
Chapter (3) --- 自由槪念底兩種意義 --- p.61
Chapter (4) --- 「自由」與有理性者底關係 --- p.63
Chapter (5) --- 關於循環論證底問題 --- p.65
Chapter 〔III〕 --- （實踐理性之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.67
Chapter (1) --- 自由與道德底關係 --- p.67
Chapter (2) --- 「自由」理念一作爲實踐理念底公設 --- p.72
Chapter 〔IV〕 --- （判斷力之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.74
Chapter (1) --- 從「自由」至「自然」之過 渡 --- p.74
Chapter (2) --- 「自由」與「合目的性」槪念 --- p.77
Chapter 第三章 --- 康德哲學中的自由意志 --- p.81
Chapter 〈一〉 --- 引言 --- p.81
Chapter 〈二〉 --- 意志概念 --- p.81
Chapter 〔I〕 --- 意志槪念底基本義 --- p.81
Chapter 〔II〕 --- 意志與理性 --- p.85
Chapter 〔III〕 --- "“Wille´ح 與""Willkur´ح 之意義" --- p.87
Chapter (1) --- 《純粹理性之批判》中的「意志 」 --- p.87
Chapter (2) --- 《道德底形而上學之基礎》中的「意志 」 --- p.89
Chapter (3) --- 《實踐理性之批判》中的「意志」 --- p.91
Chapter (4) --- 《道德底形而上學》中的/意志 」 --- p.92
Chapter (5) --- 「意願」與「意念」之區分 --- p.96
Chapter (6) --- 「意念」與「意志」之區 分 --- p.98
Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 善的意志 --- p.100
Chapter 〈三〉 --- 義務槪念 --- p.103
Chapter 〔I〕 --- 義務槪念乃唯有理性者所專屬 --- p.103
Chapter 〔II〕 --- 「出於義務」與「合乎義務」 --- p.104
Chapter 〔III〕 --- 「義務」與「愛好」 --- p.106
Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 善的意志與義務間底關係 --- p.108
Chapter 〈四〉 --- 定言令式 --- p.117
Chapter 〔I〕 --- 道德律則僅唯一定言令式 --- p.118
Chapter 〔II〕 --- 定言令式底原則 --- p.121
Chapter 〔III〕 --- 目的王國與意志自律 --- p.122
Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 意志自律爲一切道德律則所依據底惟一原則 --- p.125
結語 --- p.128
參考書目 --- p.133