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1
Ammereller, Erich. "Wittgenstein on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.295494.
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John, James R. 1975. "Consciousness and intentionality." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28838.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.Includes bibliographical references (p. 174-180).
(cont.) having perceptual experiences, subjects can be--and usually are--directly aware of material objects.
This dissertation is about phenomenal consciousness, its relation to intentionality, and the relation of both to issues in the philosophy of perception. My principal aim is (1) to defend an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious and (2) to develop, within the terms set forth by this account, a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness. Given the way these matters are usually understood, it probably is not obvious why I distinguish two philosophical tasks here. One might ask: "Isn't defending an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious the same thing as developing a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness?" I argue that it is not. In addition to my principal aim, I have three subsidiary aims. First, to shed some light on what it means for a perceptual experience to be an intentional mental event, one with representational content. Many philosophers regard the notion of perceptual intentionality as utterly unproblematic. Though I accept that experiences almost always have content, I subject this claim to more scrutiny than is usual. Second, to go some way towards better understanding the relationship between perceptual phenomenal consciousness and perceptual intentionality. In particular, I examine recent attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter. My conclusion is that there can be no such explanation. Finally, to show that, by improving our understanding of perceptual phenomenal consciousness, perceptual intentionality, and the relation between them, we can make headway on some very difficult problems in the philosophy of perception. I am especially interested in defending direct realism, the view that, in
by James R. John.
Ph.D.
3
Towse, Marcus John. "Intentionality, morality and humanity." Thesis, University of York, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.258731.
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Almäng, Jan. "Intentionality and intersubjectivity /." Göteborg : Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2077/4563.
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Follon, Derek. "Synthesis from numbers to intentionality." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/4600.
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Brandt, Stefan Geoffrey Heinrich. "Wittgenstein and Sellars on intentionality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0d9c1102-17bf-493b-a1a0-aa983d277717.
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The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.
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Allen, Benjamin T. "Searle on Intentionality." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1218134470.
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Tennenbaum, Christopher D. "Intentionality in Artificial Intelligence." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/269.
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This paper addresses the question of whether Artificial Intelligence can have intentionality. This question is part of a larger discussion of whether or not Artificial Intelligence can ever be 'conscious'. Ultimately, I come to the conclusion that while we can see how intentionality can be transferred, it has yet to be shown that intentionality can be created within Artificial Intelligence. To begin, I define intentionality. I then discuss the Turing Test (Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" and the Chinese Room (John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs"). I conclude by expressing my own opinions and where I believe Artificial Intelligence will be in the near future.
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Anderson, Blake M. "The logic-desire-belief structure of intentionality." Virtual Press, 2007. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1365171.
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Intentionality is the concept of how mental states and their content relate to each other. Although intentionality was re-introduced to philosophy by the psychologist Franz Brentano, psychology has not empirically researched the concept. The present study reviews the history of intentionality, as it relates to psychology, and argues that people recognize their own and other people's intentionality through a logic-desire-belief structure. The logic-desire-belief structure was tested by having participants in an experiment read situations containing the structure and an intentional state. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the logic-desire-belief structure, and the structure may allow people to recognize intentionality.Department of Psychological Science
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Turner, Sudan A. "Intrinsically semantic concepts and the intentionality of propositional attitudes /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5721.
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Malde, Neil. "[Convention and intention." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/716.
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Teixeira, J. F. "Motion, evolution and content : An essay on intentionality." Thesis, University of Essex, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.380554.
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McWeeny, Jennifer. "Knowing emotions : emotional intentionality and epistemological sense /." view abstract or download file of text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3201692.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2005.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 256-273). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Nes, Anders. "Experience, intentionality, and concepts : essays in the philosophy of perception /." Oslo : University of Oslo, 2008. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=017748684&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Di, Nucci Ezio. "Mind out of action : the intentionality of automatic actions." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/2587.
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We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of intentional action can't explain the whole of agency. Causalist accounts such as Davidson's and Bratman's, according to which an action can be intentional only if it is caused by a particular mental state of the agent, don't work for every kind of action. So-called automatic actions, effortless performances over which the agent doesn't deliberate, and to which she doesn't need to pay attention, constitute exceptions to the causalist framework, or so I argue in this thesis. Not all actions are the result of a mental struggle, painful hesitation, or the weighting of evidence. Through practice, many performances become second nature. Think of familiar cases such as one's morning routines and habits: turning on the radio, brushing your teeth. Think of the highly skilled performances involved in sport and music: Jarrett's improvised piano playing, the footballer's touch. Think of agents' spontaneous reactions to their environment: ducking a blow, smiling. Psychological research has long acknowledged the distinctiveness and importance of automatic actions, while philosophy has so far explained them together with the rest of agency. Intuition tells us that automatic actions are intentional actions of ours all the same (I have run a survey which shows that this intuition is widely shared): not only our own autonomous deeds for which we are held responsible, but also necessary components in the execution and satisfaction of our general plans and goals. But do standard causal accounts deliver on the intentionality of automatic actions? I think not. Because, in automatic cases, standard appeals to intentions, beliefs, desires, and psychological states in general ring hollow. We just act: we don't think, either consciously or unconsciously. On the reductive side, Davidson's view can't but appeal to, at best, unconscious psychological states, the presence and causal role of which is, I argue, inferred from the needs of a theory, rather than from evidence in the world. On the non-reductive side, Bratman agrees, with his refutation of the Simple View, that we can't just attach an intention to every action that we want to explain. But Bratman’s own Single Phenomenon View, appealing to the mysterious notion of 'motivational potential', merely acknowledges the need for refinement without actually providing one. So I propose my own account of intentional action, the 'guidance view', according to which automatic actions are intentional: differently from Davidson and Bratman, who only offer necessary conditions in order to avoid the problem of causal deviance, I offer a full-blown account: E's phi-ing is intentional if and only If phi-ing is under E's guidance. This account resembles one developed by Frankfurt, with the crucial difference that Frankfurt – taking 'acting with an intention' and 'acting intentionally' to be synonymous – thinks that guidance is sufficient only for some movement being an action, but not for some movement being an intentional action. I argue that, on the other hand, Frankfurt's concept of guidance can be developed so that it is sufficient for intentional action too. In Chapter One I present and defend my definition of ‘automatic action’. In Chapter Two I show that such understanding of automatic actions finds confirmation in empirical psychology. In Chapter Three I show that Davidson's reductive account of intentional action does not work for automatic actions. In Chapter Four I show that the two most influential non-reductive accounts of intentional action, the Simple View and Bratman's Single Phenomenon View, don't work either. And in Chapter Five I put forward and defend my positive thesis, the 'guidance view'. Also, in the Appendix I present the findings of my survey on the intentionality of automatic actions.
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Reuter, George. "Acting in character a re-examination of the Hekousion in Aristotle /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/1396.
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Williamson, Francis Xavier. "Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153.
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Bibliography: pages 136-144.This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various sorts of objections which come in the form of rival compatibilist theories. In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case for explanatory incompatibilism. This prima facie case is then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the combatibilist theories which have been advanced. Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. This version is rejected for two main reasons: (1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and (2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a species of causal explanation. Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action are. This is found to involve· three main elements: physical indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed incompatible and something is said about the broad metaphysical view which is required to accommodate this fact.
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Golob, S. Y. J. "Intentionality, freedom, method : theoretical and practical philosophy in Kant and Heidegger." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599483.
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Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted more than one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the work of Immanuel Kant. The purpose of this thesis is to use that material as the basis for a sustained comparison between the two philosophies. Specifically, I aim to juxtapose and to analyse their positions on a range of foundational issues within metaphysics, within ethics – both broadly construed – and at the interface between those two fields. In doing so, I hope to contribute to three areas of research: the history of philosophy, contemporary analytic philosophy and an understanding of the methodological connections between philosophy and other disciplines. The thesis comprises five chapters and is divided into three parts, parts marked by the Kantian texts on which they are based: Part I concentrates on issues arising from the ‘theoretical’ philosophy of the Critique of Pure Reason; Part II addressed the ‘practical’ sphere of the second Critique and the Groundwork; Part III takes its orientation from the Critique of Judgement. Part I, Ch. 1: Heidegger’s Critique: The A Priori in Kant and Heidegger. Part I, Ch. 2: Language and Dasein: Intentionality and Methodology in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 3: Anxiety in Eden: Rational Choice and Public Reason in Kant and Heidegger. Part II, Ch. 4: The Reality of Freedom: The Interaction of ‘Theoretical’ and ‘Practical’ in Kant and Heidegger. Part III, Ch.5: System, Organism, Origin: Methodology and Unresolved Problems in Kant and the ‘Early Heidegger’.
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Ng, Pak-hung David, and 伍柏鴻. "The effects of self-chosen and assigned implementation intentions on goal completion." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2010. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B45589409.
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Haberman, Bonna Devora. "The intentionality view of moral experience : creating a moral philosophy of education." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1986. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10019609/.
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George, Michael. "Ethics and imagination: Contributions from the work of Paul Ricoeur to Bernard Lonergan's intentionality analysis." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/6854.
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Atytalla, John. "On the Explanatory Limits of Concepts and Causes: Intentionality, Biology, and the Space of Reasons." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/39449.
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In Mind and World John McDowell argues that our attempts to understand how it
is that our thoughts are rationally answerable to the world are in vain. Whether one
takes Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology or Phenomenology to be capable of answering this question, such attempts are, he claims, merely a consequence of failing to see that they are already gripped by a picture of the world which precludes the possibility of such answers. In particular, he suggests that if we render Nature as that which is circumscribed by the intelligibility of the natural sciences, we leave no room for rationality conceived of in terms of the spontaneity and freedom that Kant associated with it. While McDowell claims to be a `quietist' who is not putting forward his own theory of mind, he is, at the very least, suggesting a theory of nature, one which he dubs `liberal' insofar as it suggests that we widen the scope of nature so that it can be hospitable to the normative features of thought.
This thesis will propose a theory of mind which attempts to show how the causal,
normative, and phenomenological can be seen as continuous features of the natural world. It demonstrates that a careful appraisal of causal or scientific accounts of intentionality can be made compatible with McDowell's commitment to the normativity of thought. By revealing that a biological account of the mind, suitably expanded to include an account of history as a Dynamic Ecological Milieu, generates biological interrogatives for the human organism, we can show that the normative manifests as an emergent property of the nomological. This allows second nature to retain its sui generis status while being continuous with the causal descriptions of first nature. This thesis will also draw from the Phenomenological tradition, as a means of critiquing McDowell's account of “the Myth of the Given" and his rejection of pre-conceptual content. In particular, it will follow Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus in affirming that we should view experience, not in terms of that which provides epistemic foundations, but as the domain of pre-reflective embodiment. This is essential to showing how the biological sciences can inform us about the causal background which makes embodied coping so unreflectively natural. Furthermore, phenomenology has provided a means of engaging with the biological sciences in a non-reductive way, as is evidenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behavior and the more recent neurophenomenological tradition which is largely inspired by his work. Finally, by drawing on these resources, the desideratum of
this thesis is a scientifically informed understanding of what McDowell calls “second nature" and “the space of reasons" in terms of what I have called “biological interrogatives" and the “phenomenology of epistemic agency".
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Cohen, Aviva. "The impact of Franz Brentano's early intentionality thesis on the psychoanalytic writings of Sigmund Freud." Thesis, University of Essex, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.287565.
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Puttergill, Julian Gatenby. "Dennett's compatibilism considered." Thesis, Rhodes University, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002848.
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My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
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Jafarov, Anar [Verfasser], and Andreas [Akademischer Betreuer] Kemmerling. "Intentionality and Perception: A Study of John Searle’s Philosophy / Anar Jafarov ; Betreuer: Andreas Kemmerling." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1198014539/34.
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SMITH, JOHN-CHRISTIAN. "COMMONSENSE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY: REIDIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE (FUNCTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY, MIND, REPRESENTATION)." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188133.
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This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.
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Tao, Ruoting. "Understanding object-directed intentionality in Capuchin monkeys and humans." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9304.
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Understanding intentionality, i.e. coding the object directedness of agents towards objects, is a fundamental component of Theory of Mind abilities. Yet it is unclear how it is perceived and coded in different species. In this thesis, we present a series of comparative studies to explore human adults' and Capuchin monkeys' ability to infer intentional objects from actions. First we studied whether capuchin monkeys and adult humans infer a potential object from observing an object-directed action. With no direct information about the goal-object, neither species inferred the object from the action. However, when the object was revealed, the monkeys retrospectively encoded the directedness of the object-directed action; unexpectedly, in an adapted version of the task adult humans did not show a similar ability. We then adapted another paradigm, originally designed by Kovács et al (2010), to examine whether the two species implicitly register the intentional relation between an agent and an object. We manipulated an animated agent and the participants' belief about a ball's presence behind a hiding screen. We found no evidence showing that humans or monkeys coded object-directedness or belief. More importantly, we failed to replicate the original results from Kovács et al's study, and through a series of follow up studies, we questioned their conclusions regarding implicit ToM understanding. We suggested that, instead of implicit ToM, results like Kovacs et al's might be interpreted as driven by “sub-mentalizing” processes, as suggested by Heyes (2014). We conclude that so called ‘implicit ToM' may be based upon the computation of intentional relations between perceived agents and objects. But, these computations might present limitations, and some results attributed to implicit ToM may in fact reflect “sub-mentalizing” processes.
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Simon, Steven H. 1957. "Contributions to a physicalistic theory of action." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8145.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-141).
My project of giving a general physicalistic reduction of action contrasts with Donald Davidson's view that only individual actions can be explained in physicalistic terms. The main reason for his view is that he thinks the problem of internal causal deviance is insoluble. In the first chapter, I reconstruct the theory of action Davidson develops in Essays and Events and extend the theory to solve the deviance problem. The idea of the solution is that action requires "modulated movement," an ongoing process of monitoring and modulating the movements in which actions consist. In the second chapter, I develop the theory of modulated movement in more detail and argue that it can explain a number of cases of defective agency. I defend my contention that the analysis of modulated movement solves the deviance problem against several objections. In doing so, one of the main points I argue is that "ballistic movements," movements the agent cannot modify, cannot be actions. The psychological states in terms of which I analyze modulated movement are belief and desire, and in the third chapter I develop a reductive physicalistic account of a component of belief, indication. I start with a theory of indication that Robert Stalnaker presents in Inquiry, anddevelop the theory to cope with some problems for it that I identify. In the second part of the chapter, I extend the theory to explain cases of indication in which indicators are combined so that together they indicate propositions more specific or precise than any of the propositions they indicate alone, thus reducing complex cases of indication to simpler ones.
by Steven H. Simon.
Ph.D.
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Lachapelle, Dominic. "Stakeholder theory contributions to the corporate responsibility debate." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/26684.
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Different approaches to corporate responsibility can be identified throughout the business ethics and corporate responsibility literature. Stakeholder theory, one of these approaches, has emerged in recent years as the most prominent. This approach calls for a shift from the supremacy of economic interests of stockholders and attempts to derive alternatives for corporate governance that include and balance the interests of all those affected by corporate conduct. This thesis consists of a review of relevant literature to identify three major contributions stakeholder theory brings to the CR debate: (1) it implicitly introduces the organic model into the CR debate and thereby forces a fundamental change in the way corporations are conceived within ethics frameworks; (2) in recognition of the expanding ethical sphere of corporations, it extends corporate responsibility beyond economic performance, the owners of the corporation, expertise, and the law and government regulations; and (3) it provides a foundation for identifying what responsibilities corporations do have.
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Harp, Lisa. "Contributions of Silicone Hydrogel Transmissibility and Tear Exchange to Corneal Oxygen Supply." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275496222.
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Greve, Sebastian. "Skill and scepticism : an enquiry concerning the nature and epistemic value of intuitive judgement." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2018. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1bd76173-f478-4f31-9a1d-8f6a5e3923ce.
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This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value of intuition with a new account of philosophical skill. The general account of the nature of intuitive judgement mainly consists in drawing a distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive appearance which is analogous to a distinction that can be drawn between perceptual judgement and perceptual appearance. It is argued that a common type of paradox entails the distinction for the non-perceptual case; it is then demonstrated how various related notions, such as intuitive belief, intuitive thinking and intuition as a cognitive faculty, can be derived from the notion of intuitive judgement. The epistemological account receives additional support from a new theory regarding the objects of intuition, according to which the analogy between intuition and perception holds specifically for what is sometimes called 'aspect perception': it is argued that some intuitive appearances are partially constituted by an appearance of meaning and that, consequently, the analysis of intuitive judgement must distinguish between two types of object, an intentional object (typically, a thought) and a causal one (typically, an expression of thought). It is further argued that the focus on evidential value that has been prevalent in the philosophical literature is too restrictive. By contrast with the prevalent view, it is demonstrated that intuition plays a significant role in human thinking, including in philosophical and scientific enquiry, independently of whether intuition is of great or only of minimal evidential value.
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Abbott, Marianne. "Dangerous intervention an analysis of humanitarian fatalities in assistance contexts /." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1134419987.
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Forrest, Peter V. "Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?" Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:83967922-db20-4f05-bdc9-0ac4b361ba07.
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This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.
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Kennedy, Desmond Joseph. "Healing perception : the application of the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to the theoretical structures of Gestalt Psychotherapy." Thesis, University of Derby, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10545/314237.
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This is the first time such an extensive application has been attempted. The thesis argues that Gestalt therapy as a modality of perception, can best come to a recognition of itself in the Phenomenology oj Perception. That Gestalt therapy requires such a support is apparent right from its flawed foundation in the writings of Paul Goodman. Its weak philosophical foundation has diverted its development away from the lived body, impoverished its view of phenomenology, constrained its language so that the articulation of its theoretical structures lacks depth, left it vulnerable to the distortions of post-modem constructivism, rendered unclear the domain proper to it as a psychotherapy, and bequeathed to those who would work to construct a consistent, organic and cohesive theoretical structure, an impossible task. The epistemological foundation of the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy is to be found in what Merleau-Ponty calls 'primordial contact' or belief. This is that timeless pre-conceptual 'moment', when, without theme or image, a world begins to form itself about me. In this 'moment' I experience myself as 'given' to me in my body. This primordial experience of givenness is henceforth the ever-present anchorage of all subsequent experience. It is this which authenticates the therapist's immediacy to his/her client which constitutes the dialogue between them as healing. The argument in the thesis hinges upon the congeniality between Gestalt therapy and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: they are both experiential, radically holistic and centred upon the lived body. They both claim to transcend the subject/object, mind/body dualism and view the human being in his/her embodiment as the Gestalt, actualizing being-in-theworld. The thesis demonstrates how, with the application of four key concepts from Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy-intentionality, anonymity, transcendence and intersubjectivity - there emerge new horizons of understanding for such Gestalt therapy concepts as field theory, immediacy, holism, personal relationship and the body as a carrier of our history. Such an application also reveals to us the 'phenomenal field' as the domain of operation proper to a therapy of bodily presence, awareness and exploration. The thesis concludes that the development of Gestalt therapy theory lies in a more profound development of its phenomenology along the lines of the analysis made by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception. Such a direction will at once correct its list towards scientism, and the penchant for involvement in distracting philosophical debates. The thesis also points up the need for development at the training level of skills in reflection upon the experiential learning of the Gestalt therapy concepts, the paramount importance of relationship between trainers and trainees based upon an exacting personal authenticity and transparency.
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McAnally, Elizabeth Ann. "Contributions to an Integral Water Ethic| Cultivating Love and Compassion for Water." Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10279472.
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Water is one of the most precious elements on Earth. Yet we find ourselves in a global water crisis, struggling to address freshwater scarcity, pollution, climate change, and the need for safe drinking water and sanitation. Given the urgency of the global water crisis, it is imperative that we reinvent our relationship to water and cultivate an integral water ethic.
This dissertation, and the ethic it explores, is grounded in an integral approach to ecology that studies phenomena across multiple perspectives (e.g., natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities). Relating to water in an integral mode entails acknowledging that water has not only exterior, objective dimensions but also interior, subjective qualities. Thus, an integral water ethic holds that water is not a mere passive object to be exploited for human purposes; instead, this approach recognizes that water is an intrinsically valuable, vital member of the Earth community. An integral water ethic encourages humans to learn to cultivate love and compassion for water and for those suffering from the global water crisis. Through the cultivation of love and compassion for water, humans will be better able to see water not as a mere resource and commodity, but rather as a loving and compassionate member of the Earth community who nourishes all beings.
This dissertation explores three world religions (Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism) and considers the following contributions to an integral water ethic: sacramental consciousness of baptism, loving service of the Yamuna River, and compassionate wisdom of the bodhisattva. Contemplative practices for developing love and compassion for water are also shared. The purpose of this study is to draw attention to creative avenues for cultivating mutually enhancing relations between humans and water and thereby to help overcome destructive attitudes toward the natural world.
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Delaney, Jesse. "HUSSERL'S DYADIC SEMANTICS." UKnowledge, 2014. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/4.
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Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength.
Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts.
Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.
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Clément, Pierre. "Lacan et Saussure : une étude des contributions théoriques de Saussure en linguistique à la notion de "langage" chez Lacan." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5746.
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Kvaran, Trevor. "Dual-process theories and the rationality debate contributions from cognitive neuroscience /." unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08032007-161242/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.Title from file title page. Andrea Scarantino, Eddy Nahmias, committee co-chairs; Erin McClure, committee member. Electronic text (68 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan. 7, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-68).
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Stovall, Preston John. "Toward a normative theory of rationality." [College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2811.
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Kvaran, Trevor Hannesson. "Dual-Process Theories and the Rationality Debate: Contributions from Cognitive Neuroscience." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/20.
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The past 40 years have seen an enormous amount of research aimed at investigating human reasoning and decision-making abilities. This research has led to an extended debate about the extent to which humans meet the standards of normative theories of rationality. Recently, it has been proposed that dual-process theories, which posit that there are two distinct types of cognitive systems, offer a way to resolve this debate over human rationality. I will propose that the two systems of dual-process theories are best understood as investigative kinds. I will then examine recent empirical research from the cognitive neuroscience of decision-making that lends empirical support to the theoretical claims of dual-process theorists. I will lastly argue that dual-process theories not only offer an explanation for much of the conflicting data seen in decision-making and reasoning research, but that they ultimately offer reason to be optimistic about the prospects of human rationality.
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Lugtig, Joan F. (Joan Frances). "Philosophy, history, language and education : the hermeneutic epistemology underlying scientific linguistics." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23854.
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This thesis attempts to clarify a particular epistemological problem which surfaces in Chomsky's attempt to attain an objective psychological distance from the language used in his scientific theorizing, in taking language as an epistemological object. This is accomplished by examining the presumed objectivity underlying the theoretical basis of Chomskyan linguistics in its hermeneutical relation to the theories of language advocated by Quine, Wittgenstein, and other philosophers.The thesis begins by situating the "metalanguage" in which the argumentation between Chomsky and Quine takes place in the Western philosophical tradition. It continues by outlining an historic-hermeneutic link between classical philosophy, early modernism and some twentieth century philosophies of language, most particularly those articulated by Wittgenstein in his two major works. Finally, the thesis concludes by identifying the hermeneutical nature of the philosophical discourse from which Chomsky's linguistics gains its epistemological force.
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Jonker, Christine. "The self in the thought of Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/52575.
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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The problem explored in this study concerns authenticity, and can be formulated as the question: 'How does one become oneself? In order to answer this query, related issues must be addressed, for example: the nature of consciousness/ self-awareness; the individual's relationship to society; the meaning of existence, and so forth. The reply's of three thinkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, will be discussed in this investigation. They have been selected for several reasons: Each of their respective theories addresses issues that are generally pertinent in contemporary society, such as: the alienation and dissociation of individuals from each other and themselves through mass-mindedness and the impersonal nature of state and religious institutions; the anxiety that many experience due to, firstly, a lack of confidence in the abovementioned institutions and, secondly, a loss of trust in existing (political, religious, moral, social) life-strategies, because these often fail to give a convincing sense of meaning and purpose to life. Each of the three thinkers places the 'self at the center of their philosophy, and addresses many similar themes which share between them a family resemblance that admits of comparison. The theories are presented in an order that · allows for a dialectical approach to the problem of self: Kierkegaard's fundamentally Christian theory is presented as thesis, and Sartre's atheistic position as anti-thesis. Jung's theory of the psyche is presented as synthesis, because it is antimetaphysical, but nevertheless claims to prove empirically that a convincing religious/ spiritual experience is the key ingredient for authenticity. The outcome of the enquiry will show that the three thinkers point from different directions towards the same basic conceptualization of the 'self: The self is both a project and a goal or, to put it differently, a journey and a destination, the goal/destination being the synthesis of the various disparate and conflicting elements that influence or make up the personality. The study as a whole echoes the three individual approaches in describing the condition of modem man as a malady or sickness, which is the lack of authenticity, of which the symptoms are falsehood, anxiety, alienation, crippled relationships, lack of responsibility and adaptibility, and perhaps, on a larger scale, issues such as social/ political injustice and conflict. The cure for this malady is an enhancement of consciousness/ awareness that is known as 'the self. The self is seen as a 'becoming' and a choice, a dynamic synthesis, something which is not given and cannot be taken for granted, but must be actively striven for. The study outlines and explores the nature and value of such a project towards the self.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie beskou die probleem van outentisiteit, wat as die vraag, 'Hoe word ek myself?', gestel kan word. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord, moet verdere kwessies, soos byvoorbeeld die aard van (self)bewussyn, die verhouding waarin die indivudu tot die samelewing staan, en die betekenis van 'bestaan' ( eksistensie ), ook aangespreek word. Die voorstelle van drie denkers, Kierkegaard, Sartre and Jung, word bespreek in hierdie tesis. Die drie is vir verskeie redes uitgesoek: Elkeen van hulle spreek pertinente kwessies rondom die modeme samelewing aan, byvoorbeeld: individue se vervreemding en verwydering van hulself en ander weens die massa-mentaliteit en onpersoonlike aard van staats- en godsdienstige instellings; die angs en spanning wat baie ervaar as gevolg van 'n gebrek aan vertroue in bogenoemde instellings, asook 'n gebrekkige geloof in bestaande (politiese, godsdienstige, more le, so si ale) lewensstrategiee wat nie meer daarin slaag om sin of rede aan die lewe te gee nie. Elkeen van die drie denkers plaas die 'self sentraal tot hulle filosofie, en spreek temas aan wat onderling familie-ooreenkomste vertoon, en daarom onderlinge vergelyking toelaat. Die teoriee word aangebied in 'n volgorde wat 'n dialekti~se aanslag tot die probleem moontlik maak: Kierkegaard se Christelike teorie word as tese aangebied, en Sartre se ateistiese posisie as anti-tese. Jung se teorie van die psige word as sintese voorgehou, want, alhoewel dit geen metafisiese aansprake maak nie, beskou dit 'n oortuigende religieuse/ geestelike ervaring as die hoofbestandeel vir outentisiteit. Die gevolgtrekking van die ondersoek sal wys dat die drie denkers vanuit verskillende rigtings na dieselfde konsepsie van die 'self wys: Die self is sowel 'n projek as 'n doel, of, anders gestel, 'n reis en 'n bestemming. Die doel/ bestemming is 'n sintese van die verskillende, onderling botsend~ elemente waaruit die self bestaan en waardeur dit beinvloed word. Die studie in geheel volg die voorbeeld van die drie denkers deur die modeme mens se 'toestand' as 'n soort siekte te beskryf. Die simptome van hierdie siekte, of gebrek aan outentisiteit, is valsheid, angs, vervreemding, gebrekkige verhoudings, die afwesigheid van persoonlike verantwoordelikheid en aanpasbaarheid, en ook miskien kwessies soos sosiale en politiese onreg en konflik. Die remedie vir so 'n siekte is die 'self: 'n verheldering en intensifisering van bewussyn, wat gesien kan word as 'n 'wording' en 'n keuse, 'n dinamiese sintese, iets wat nie as voor-die-hand-liggend beskou kan word nie, maar wat aktief nagestreef moet word. Hierdie studie ondersoek die aard en waarde van so 'n projek gerig op die self
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Smith, Nicholas. "Towards a Phenomenology of Repression : a Husserlian Reply to the Freudian Challenge." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-43512.
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This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud.
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Sweatt, Catherine Parker. "Une Éthique de La Modestie dans Les Essais de Montaigne (Towards a Modest Ethics in Montaigne's Essays)." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/91.
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La plupart des lectures contemporaines des Essais ignore la pensée morale de Montaigne. Ici, je maintiens que Montaigne épouse ‘une éthique de la modestie’ en même temps qu’il rejette toute éthique normative. En particulier, je cherche à aborder comment Montaigne suggère que nous connaissons la vertu et agissons si deux individus ne partagent pas le même perspective et on ne peut pas être le même sujet éthique deux fois. Je vais commencer par discuter la position épistémique de Montaigne par rapport aux universels pour illustrer comment Montaigne met en question l’universalité des lois éthiques et un bien connu a priori comme certains nominalistes et comment la notion de la contingence qui accompagne cette attitude a des implications pour le sujet. Ensuite, je vais explorer comment Montaigne partage et part des penseurs anciens, surtout les sceptiques, afin de façonner une méthode empirique qui a son point de départ dans l’individu. En fouillant sa méthode, qui a son modèle dans le chapitre « De l’expérience », je vais démontrer comment cet aspect de la pensée de Montaigne empêche sa morale de succomber au nihilisme, parce qu’il affirme qu’il reste des phénomènes qu’on peut connaître à posteriori. Je voudrais montrer comment la méthode des Essais aide les individus à exercer leur jugement pratique et former leur intention face aux circonstances changeantes indépendamment des croyances.
English Translation :
[Most contemporary readings of the Essays ignore Montaigne’s moral thought. In this paper, I assert that Montaigne espouses ‘a modest ethics’ at the same time that he rejects all normative ethical systems. Specifically, I seek to address how Montaigne suggests that we can know virtue and act if no two individuals share the same epistemological position and an individual can never be the same ethical subject twice. I will argue that Montaigne denies human knowledge of metaphysical universals and in this regard resembles medieval nominalists, who held that humans only know individuals and particular instances a posteriori. I will demonstrate that Montaigne’s epistemological modesty influences his ethical position, as he repudiates our capacity to identify an a priori good or a télos to which we should all strive. Because I think that this negative aspect of the Essays does not lead to moral nihilism, I will explore how Montaigne draws and departs from classical thinkers, specifically the Skeptics, in order to fashion an empirical method with the individual ethical subject at its center. I will show how the study of experience outlined in the Essays helps the moral subject to make practical judgments and form intentions with regard to particular circumstances, independently of belief.]
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Hanasyk, Matthew. "Uniqueness and the event : rethinking the horizonal in Martin Heidegger's Contributions to philosophy (of the event)." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/61284.
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This thesis explores the idea of uniqueness in Martin Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). Written between 1936 and 1938, Contributions is an in-depth account of what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation [Ereignis]. It is written as a critique of the history of philosophy and a call to think this history from out of another beginning, which it attempts to sketch out in terms of what Heidegger calls beyng-historical thinking. This thesis focuses on the uniqueness of the event by focusing on what it means for the unique to emerge historically. This thesis challenges other scholarly research on the text by placing the idea of uniqueness within the context of its own horizon. Previously, the horizonal, as a concept, was inextricably bound to the concept of transcendence that Heidegger abandons as beholden to the metaphysical way of thinking in which he distances himself. This thesis attempts to show that the horizonal is in fact rethought in Contributions in terms of the unique. As a result, this thesis challenges the idea that only transcendence can be thought horizonally. This thesis focuses primarily on the chapter in Contributions titled, The Grounding. This thesis is itself divided into three chapters: Da-sein, Selfhood, Imagination; The Essence of Truth and the Simplicity of the Unique; Time-space and the Persistence of Fathoming. Each of these chapters focuses primarily on one or more of the subsections within the chapter of Contributions mentioned above. I argue that the uniqueness of the event can be thought of in terms of the separation between the horizon of uniqueness and the uniqueness of the horizon that opens up within uniqueness itself with respect to the grounding of Da-sein, or “there-being,” in its self-assignment to the event. It is the persistence of fathoming the simplicity of this uniqueness in the appropriation of the truth of beyng that opens up the time-space of the event for the coming to presence of the historical moment. Furthermore, I explore the possibility that uniqueness holds for giving a positive account of nothingness, which is an imperative expressed by Heidegger himself within the text.Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
Graduate
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Luik, John C. "So ist Freihet nicht zu retten : nature, man and freedom : a prolegomenon to Kant's political philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:68dad52a-0beb-48d2-b767-0ff585729ef6.
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This work is an effort to develop an interpretative framework for Kant's political philosophy that will illuminate not merely the political philosophy itself, but will have the additional advantage of showing the integral rather than the peripheral connexion of that philosophy with Kant's wider philosophical concerns. In this sense the essay is not an extended explication or critical commentary on Kant's political theory so much as an attempt to establish a context within which such commentary might proceed. The context which is suggested is Kant's anthropology, that is to say, his concept of persons, a notion which is foundational to both his political philosophy and the entire Critical philosophy. The difficulty with such an approach is that Kant no where develops in an explicit and extended fashion his concept of persons, and thus the essay is in one way an effort of recovery, first from the historical accounts of human origins and progress, next from the teleological theories of the third Critique and the Anthropology, then from the doctrine of man as end, and finally from Religion, of a systematic account of what Kant believes persons to be. In all of these diverse efforts to make sense of man, it is argued that Kant's central concept for discussing persons is the idea of freedom, though depending on the context this notion is often linked to another, for instance, in the historical works with Nature, in the Groundwork with reason and morality, and in Religion with evil. Thus all of these other ideas become either extensions of or elucidations of freedom. The idea of Freedom as the foundation of personhood is, however, given its most crucial role in Kant's characterization of persons as ends in themselves. It is this doctrine which is foundational for much of subsequent Western political theory, and which is essential for Kant's political and moral theory. Chapters Three, Four, and Five are thus the core of the essay in that they suggest first that Kant's very strong claims about persons as ends will not work in terms of his own arguments and are rendered even more conceptually suspect in light of his subsequent account of radical evil, and second an alternative reading, proposed by Kant if not finally entirely accepted by him which might provide a more plausible foundation for his basic insights about persons.
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Matthews, Barbara G. (Barbara Gayle). "The Professional Contributions of Ruth I. Anderson to Business Education." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1990. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc331356/.
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This study explored the professional contributions of Ruth I. Anderson, retired professor of Business Administration, The University of North Texas, Denton, Texas.
The data for this study were gained through questionnaire responses, a telephone interview, and personal interviews with faculty, staff, students, and business people who have worked closely with Anderson and an interview with Anderson herself. During a literature review, many of the journal articles written by Anderson were read in order to obtain insight into the thoughts and ideas Anderson had toward business education.
The dissertation, divided into six chapters, begins with an introduction to the study. Chapter 1 includes the statement of the problem, purposes of the study, research questions, significance of the study, rationale for the study, and design of the study. Chapter 2 contains a biographical sketch of Ruth Anderson and offers a chronology of her career in business education. Anderson's educational philosophy is the focus of Chapter 3. Chapter 4 addresses her major accomplishments and contributions to business education. Anderson's impact on business education is the topic of Chapter 5. A summary is provided in Chapter 6.
This study recognized Ruth Anderson as a significant person in the field of business education. Anderson, who was employed in the field for more than forty years, is the author, or co-author, of six books and the contributor of more than eighty articles published in professional journals.
Major educational contributions of Ruth Anderson included publications, research, and involvement in professional organizations at the local, state, and national levels. Anderson made an impact on the field of business education through being a role model for former students, being a well-respected colleague, and being well known in the business education profession.
Perhaps her greatest gift to the profession was her superior classroom teaching ability. Ruth Anderson's greatest contribution continues today through the work of her former students who have gone on to be business education teachers and professional educators.
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Braithwaite, Murray James. "A dynamics theory of justice : Nietzsche, Holmes, and self-organizing criticality." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ48609.pdf.
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DORAN, NICOLE ELLEN. "A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC AND THE ARTS: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCHAEFFER FAMILY AND THE L'ABRI COMMUNITY." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1023192423.
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Love, Brandon Joel. "Kant's Baconian method as a transformation of Aristotelian transcendental philosophy: a propaedeutic." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2018. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/521.
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This dissertation deals with the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I provide the background of transcendental philosophy before Kant, beginning from Aristotle. Kant transformed Aristotelian transcendental philosophy by using the method of the sciences in the Modern period. This method was initiated by Francis Bacon, in his method of induction. Isaac Newton transformed the method so that it could deal with verification and falsification. This Newtonian method was taken up into chemistry, serving as a guide for the analysis and synthesis of elements. Kant used this method in his transcendental philosophy, with a view to putting metaphysics onto the path of a science. Kant was first awakened to transcendental idealism in 1769, though he did not put forth a full transcendental philosophy until 1781. In his mature transcendental philosophy, he not only uses the scientific method, but he also illustrates the categories using biological imagery. After looking at the broad contours of Kant's transcendental philosophy, I deal with the first criticism of his transcendental philosophy. In replying to his critic, Kant made explicit his scientific method, while drawing from the thought of David Hume and Thomas Reid. With Kant's explanations of his transcendental philosophy in hand, I turn to an element of his non-transcendental philosophy, namely moral philosophy, in order to provide a contrast that serves to illuminate the precise nature of his transcendental philosophy.