Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Contributions in philosophy of intentionality / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Contributions in philosophy of intentionality.

Journal articles on the topic 'Contributions in philosophy of intentionality'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 5 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Contributions in philosophy of intentionality.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Angelino, Lucia. "Motor intentionality and the intentionality of improvisation: a contribution to a phenomenology of musical improvisation." Continental Philosophy Review 52, no. 2 (November 11, 2018): 203–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-018-9452-x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Collins, Stephanie, and Niels de Haan. "Interconnected Blameworthiness." Monist 104, no. 2 (March 11, 2021): 195–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa032.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial (and some resultant) luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Pietersma, Henry. "A Critique of Two Recent Husserl Interpretations." Dialogue 26, no. 4 (1987): 695–704. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300018278.

Full text

Abstract:

In an article which appeared in The Philosophical Review Karl Ameriks argues in favour of the rather surprising thesis that Husserl, his own statements and a host of commentators and critics notwithstanding, was a realist, i.e., a philosopher who held that “there are physical objects which exist outside consciousness and are not wholly dependent on it” (498). More recently, Harrison Hall, in his contribution to the volume Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science, has argued that in Husserl's view there is no legitimate philosophical issue between realism and idealism, because philosophy is concerned exclusively with meanings. Both interpretations are careful, documenting each point with texts, and contain several elements that are illuminating. Yet they are fundamentally mistaken as regards their main thesis, as I shall argue in this paper.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Bergo, Bettina. "Ontology, Transcendence, and Immanence in Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophy." Research in Phenomenology 35, no. 1 (2005): 141–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569164054905474.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis essay studies the unfolding of Levinas' concept of transcendence from 1935 to his 1984 talk entitled "Transcendence and Intelligibility." I discuss how Levinas frames transcendence in light of enjoyment, shame, and nausea in his youthful project of a counter-ontology to Heidegger's Being and Time. In Levinas' essay, transcendence is the human urge to get out of being. I show the ways in which Levinas' early ontology is conditioned by historical circumstances, but I argue that its primary aim is formal and phenomenological; it adumbrates formal structures of human existence. Levinas' 1940s ontology accentuates the dualism in being, between what amount to a light and a dark principle. This shift in emphasis ushers in a new focus for transcendence, which is now both sensuous and temporal, thanks to the promise of fecundity. Totality and Infinity (1961) pursues a similar onto-logic, while shifting the locus of transcendence to a non-sexuate other. The final great work, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1974) offers a hermeneutic phenomenology of transcendence-in-immanence. It rethinks Husserl's focus on the transcendence of intentionality and its condition of possibility in the passive synthesis of complex temporality. If the 1974 strategy 'burrows beneath' the classical phenomenological syntheses, it also incorporates unsuspected influences from French psychology and phenomenology. This allows Levinas to develop a philosophical conception of transcendence that is neither Husserl's intentionality nor Heidegger's temporal ecstases, in what amounts to an original contribution to a phenomenology both hermeneutic and descriptive.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Mendie, John Gabriel, and Stephen Nwanaokuo Udofia. "A Philosophical Analysis of Jacques Derrida’s Contributions to Language and Meaning." International Journal of Humanities, Management and Social Science 3, no. 1 (June 27, 2020): 20–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.36079/lamintang.ij-humass-0301.109.

Full text

Abstract:

Far from being a banality or a philosophical naivety, there is a quintessential nexus between language and meaning, in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). The thrust of Derrida’s idea is that, language is chaotic and meaning is never fixed, in a way that allows us to effectively determine it (that is, meaning is unstable, undecided, provisional and ever differed). As a Poststructuralist, Derrida’s quarrel was with Logocentrism, which privileges speech over writing, and hitherto assume that, we have an idea in our minds, which our writing or speaking attempts to express. But, this, for Derrida, is not the case, for no one possesses the full significance of their words. Texts, in some sense write themselves: that is, are independent of an author or his intentions. Thus, in Derrida’s thinking, intentionality does not play quite the same role, as is traditionally conceived in the philosophy of language; our intention does not determine the meaning of what we are saying. Instead, the meaning of the words we use, determines our intention, when we speak. This does not mean that we do not mean what we are saying, or that we cannot have intentions in communicating. But, since language is a social structure that developed long before and exists prior to our use of it as individuals, we have to learn to use it and tap into its web of meanings, in order to communicate with others; hence, the need for deconstruction. It is this process of deconstruction, which can point the way to an understanding of language, freed from all forms of structuralism, logo centrism, phono centrism, phallogocentrism, the myth or metaphysics of presence and also open up a leeway, to the idea of difference. Thus, this paper, attempts an expository-philosophical analysis of Derrida’s eclectic contributions to language and meaning, by drawing insights from his magnus opus, captioned De la grammatologie (of Grammatology).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Mendie, John Gabriel, and Stephen Nwanaokuo Udofia. "A Philosophical Analysis of Jacques Derrida’s Contributions to Language and Meaning." PINISI Discretion Review 4, no. 1 (July 30, 2020): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/pdr.v4i1.14528.

Full text

Abstract:

Far from being a banality or a philosophical naivety, there is a quintessential nexus between language and meaning, in the philosophy of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). The thrust of Derrida’s idea is that, language is chaotic and meaning is never fixed, in a way that allows us to effectively determine it (that is, meaning is unstable, undecided, provisional and ever differed). As a Poststructuralist, Derrida’s quarrel was with Logocentrism, which privileges speech over writing, and hitherto assume that, we have an idea in our minds, which our writing or speaking attempts to express. But, this, for Derrida, is not the case, for no one possesses the full significance of their words. Texts, in some sense write themselves: that is, are independent of an author or his intentions. Thus, in Derrida’s thinking, intentionality does not play quite the same role, as is traditionally conceived in the philosophy of language; our intention does not determine the meaning of what we are saying. Instead, the meaning of the words we use, determines our intention, when we speak. This does not mean that we do not mean what we are saying, or that we cannot have intentions in communicating. But, since language is a social structure that developed long before and exists prior to our use of it as individuals, we have to learn to use it and tap into its web of meanings, in order to communicate with others; hence, the need for deconstruction. It is this process of deconstruction, which can point the way to an understanding of language, freed from all forms of structuralism, logocentrism, phonocentrism, phallogocentrism, the myth or metaphysics of presence and also open up a leeway, to the idea of différance. Thus, this paper, attempts an expository-philosophical analysis of Derrida’s eclectic contributions to language and meaning, by drawing insights from his magnus opus, captioned De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Nuyts, Jan. "The intentional and the socio-cultural in language use." Pragmatics and Cognition 2, no. 2 (January 1, 1994): 237–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.2.2.03nuy.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper is a contribution to the recent debate between a number of anthropologists and philosophers concerning the role of intentions in a theory of verbal behavior. It reviews a number of arguments put forward by ethno- and anthro-polinguists against the intention-centered view of human behavior common in current cognitively oriented language research, and typically represented in John Searle's theory of intentionality and of speech acts. It is argued that these arguments do not affect the assumption that intentions are always and necessarily present in (verbal) behavior (they are based on a much too simplistic view of intentionality), but they do show that intentions as such are insufficient to understand (verbal) behavior. These matters are discussed against the background of Searle's theory of intentionality.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Mladenovic, Ivan. "Searle's conception of institutional reality." Filozofija i drustvo 20, no. 3 (2009): 185–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid0903185m.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper aims to present Searle's conception of institutional reality as an important contribution to contemporary political philosophy and social theory. Its importance notwithstanding, the two objections will be raised concerning the central notion of collective intentionality. Searle thinks of this notion as crucial for explaining human cooperation and social reality. The first objection is that Searle missed to take into account the rationality assumption in his explanation of cooperation and human interaction. The second objection is related to the previous one. Additionally, Serle missed to investigate the role of autonomous moral agent in the procedure of constructing social reality. Given this shortcoming there is no possibility for addressing the question of justice within Serle's theory of institutional reality.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Blumenfeld, Jacob. "After Marx, the Deluge." Historical Materialism 26, no. 1 (September 29, 2018): 194–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341530.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract ‘After Marx’ or ‘According to Marx’. Thus translates the intentionally ambiguous title of ‘Nach Marx’, an international collection of twenty diverse essays in German on Marx and social philosophy today. ‘Nach Marx’ contains over five hundred pages of contributions from twelve prominent German philosophers and sociologists (Hauke Brunkhorst, Alex Demirović, Rainer Forst, Axel Honneth, Rahel Jaeggi, Daniel Loick, Andrea Maihofer, Oliver Marchart, Christoph Menke, Hartmut Rosa, Michael Quante, Titus Stahl), six American political philosophers, German idealists, and historians (Wendy Brown, Daniel Brudney, Raymond Geuss, Frederick Neuhouser, Terry Pinkard, Moishe Postone), along with a British Hegelian philosopher (Andrew Chitty) and a French political thinker (Étienne Balibar). Although the book is divided into six themed parts (I. Freedom and Community, II. Normativity and Critique, III. Truth and Ideology, IV. Right and Subjectivity, V. Critique of Capitalism and Class Struggle, VI. Political Praxis), the essays are mostly individual excurses in Marx scholarship.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Zowisło, Maria. "THE CONTRIBUTION OF ”FOLIA TURISTICA” IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND POPULARISATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH ON TOURISM." Folia Turistica 50 (September 30, 2019): 21–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.4503.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose. A review and discussion of philosophical works published in the "Folia Turistica" journal and the categorical, thematic and problematic contribution of philosophical reflections contained in them to multidisciplinary research on tourism. Method. Query of 49 issues of "Folia Turistica", selection of articles and reviews on tourism from the perspective of philosophical disciplines or selected philosophical concepts. Analysis, comparison, interpretation oriented towards an existential sense, values and ideas, synthesis. Findings. The review of philosophical publications in the "Folia Turistica" journal has demonstrated the quantitatively and qualitatively significant contribution of philosophical approaches, interpretation and conceptualisation of tourism and the mobility of human travel to tourism research. The specificity of the philosophical problematisation of the phenomenon of travel consists in highlighting and analysing its ideal, essential, existential, epistemic and symbolic qualities and meanings that find its significance in the axiological preferences, in the area of intentionality, attitudes and experiences. Research and conclusions limitations. The work is limited to the description and comparative analysis of articles published on the pages of one journal, its results and generalisations are, therefore, not a universal concept. Practical implications. Promotion of the "Folia Turistica" journal in the Polish and global academic debate on the multi-faceted phenomenon of tourism. Outlining the philosophy of tourism as an innovative and inspirational field of research. Originality. The work is a discussion and interpretation of publications by other authors-philosophers, but it contains elements of independent interpretation and synthetic recapitulation. Type of work. Presentation, description and qualitative interpretation of theoretical analyses of tourism in the field of philosophy and its sub-disciplines, as well as investigations conducted from the perspective of selected philosophical positions (phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, metaphysics of hope, etc.).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Zowisło, Maria. "The Contribution of ”Folia Turistica” to the Development and Popularisation of Philosophical Research on Tourism." Folia Turistica 50, no. 2 (October 31, 2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.5104.

Full text

Abstract:

Purpose. A review and discussion of philosophical works published in the “Folia Turistica” journal and the categorical, thematic and problematic contribution of philosophical reflections contained in them to multidisciplinary research on tourism. Method. Query of 49 issues of “Folia Turistica”, selection of articles and reviews on tourism from the perspective of philosophical disciplines or selected philosophical concepts. Analysis, comparison, interpretation oriented towards an existential sense, values and ideas, synthesis. Findings. The review of philosophical publications in the “Folia Turistica” journal has demonstrated the quantitatively and qualitatively significant contribution of philosophical approaches, interpretation and conceptualisation of tourism and the mobility of human travel to tourism research. The specificity of the philosophical problematisation of the phenomenon of travel consists in highlighting and analysing its ideal, essential, existential, epistemic and symbolic qualities and meanings that find its significance in the axiological preferences, in the area of intentionality, attitudes and experiences. Research and conclusions limitations. The work is limited to the description and comparative analysis of articles published on the pages of one journal, its results and generalisations are, therefore, not a universal concept. Practical implications. Promotion of the “Folia Turistica” journal in the Polish and global academic debate on the multi-faceted phenomenon of tourism. Outlining the philosophy of tourism as an innovative and inspirational field of research. Originality. The work is a discussion and interpretation of publications of other authors-philosophers, but it contains elements of independent interpretation and synthetic recapitulation. Type of work. Presentation, description and qualitative interpretation of theoretical analyses of tourism in the field of philosophy and its sub-disciplines, as well as investigations conducted from the perspective of selected philosophical positions (phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, metaphysics of hope, etc.).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Hammelman, Colleen, Cesar Buitrago Arias, Uriel Cuadros, Allison Hayes-Conroy, Diana Muñoz, Ximena Quintero, and Alexis Saenz Montoya. "Reflections on the affective contributions to research success in two participatory projects in Colombia." Qualitative Research 20, no. 4 (May 29, 2019): 378–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468794119851338.

Full text

Abstract:

Participatory research increasingly seeks tangible outcomes contributing to social transformation. We reflexively examine the role of affect in two participatory research projects in Colombia to argue that intentionally making space for and reflecting on affective experiences can help generate more effective research. Such ‘praxis of affect’ focused on building social bonds, demonstrating solidarity, distributing expertise, and sharing hope were critical for sustaining motivation toward the research endeavor and social transformation efforts. This article contributes to literature on participatory research by considering ways to implement socially-responsible research that creates momentarily affective spaces and recasts the desire for more durable outcomes in such spaces.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Schmidl, Alexander. "Actions in Slow Motion: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections on Temporality in Actions and Intersubjective Understanding." Human Studies 44, no. 3 (June 23, 2021): 433–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09586-3.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis article examines the connection between actions, temporality, and media-based observation. Slow motion technology is currently being used especially in sports to examine and evaluate athletes’ actions more precisely in order to identify potential infringements of rules. Starting with a phenomenological perspective, this article engages in a critical assessment of the degree to which the intentions underlying athletes’ actions become clearer if their actions are slowed down using slow motion. It transpires that a more in-depth understanding is not possible because the process of time-stretching using media technology tends to obscure intersubjective understanding. Nevertheless, the use of different playback speeds does increase observers’ sensitivity to the temporality of action and observation. This is particularly the case when greater emphasis is placed on the body and its role in the formation and carrying out of intentions. With the phenomenological view and in special consideration of the body and the subjective intentionality, the paper contributes to a discussion about the connection of time and (inter-)action already led in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. These findings mark a contribution to empirical social research as well, which is increasingly using video material in action analysis and should take slow motion as a possible augmented but also manipulated access to actions into account adequately. To this end, this article suggests a method for identifying the merits and demerits of using slow motion to analyse actions, and discusses the methodological implications of temporality in observation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Putnam, Hilary. "Logical Positivism and Intentionality." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (September 1991): 105–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007712.

Full text

Abstract:

When ‘Freddy’ Ayer asked me to contribute to his volume in the Library of Living Philosophers series (which, regrettably, has still not been published), I was delighted, and while the main topic of my contribution was the sense (if any) in which it can be a ‘necessary’ truth that water is H2O, I devoted a section of that essay to problems that I saw with Ayer's account of the paradigm intentional notion, the notion of reference. Ayer ended his reply by saying that he could not satisfactorily meet my objections, and with characteristic modesty and good humour he added that it was only small consolation that, in his opinion, no one else could satisfactorily account for reference either. The thoughtfulness, fairness, and responsiveness of Ayer's entire reply reminded me of the way in which the same qualities were displayed in Carnap's reply to my contribution to his volume in the same series. These two replies—Carnap's and Ayer's—display the virtues of the philosopher who searches for truth, and who genuinely welcomes serious criticism, in a truly exemplary way. I treasure both of them, and they are bound up with my memories of those two wonderful philosophers.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Saha, Santosh. "Tolerant Values and Practices in India: Amartya Sen’s ‘Positional Observation’ and Parameterization of Ethical Rules." Tattva - Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2015): 51–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.12726/tjp.13.4.

Full text

Abstract:

In explaining the reasons for sustained existence of tolerance in Indian philosophical mind and continuation of tolerant practices in socio-political life, Amartya Sen argues that tolerance is inherently a social enterprise, which may appear as contingent, but for all intents and purposes is persistent. Basing his thesis that is opposed to Cartesian dualism, which makes a distinction between mind and body, Sen submits that Indian system of universalizing perception finds a subtle form of connection between mind and body. He expands the ancient core worldview, Vasundhara kutumbakam (entire world as one family) as a secular tolerant civil code,1which makes a connection between the transcendental and the pragmatic planes of consciousness, and reconstructs a thesis about tolerance around human consciousness, which is collectivized and anchored in an acknowledged public space in society that is joined together psychologically as well as philosophically. Tolerance as consciousness can be regarded a necessary condition for playing the role of intentionality as stipulated by classical philosophy (Advaita Vedanta; buddhi, or intelligence as in Samkhya and Yoga). Aware of this ancient wisdom that accepts relativism as an impasse over some evaluative matter, Sen avoids the pitfalls of cultural relativism in tolerance by offering an argument that is based on the metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta and other religious and secular literature, and epitomizes an internationalizing virtue in tolerant traditions. I would examine some interconnected issues, such as the ethical “perimeter” of Sen’s philosophical observation of totalized value system and Indian tolerant attitudes in real life, etc., raising the broader question about the location of cultural identity in relation to supranational state organization. My chief argument is that Sen has been able to observe a connection between the Advaita Vedantic moral philosophy that informs that viewed from the Brahmanic perspective of absolute knowledge in unity, the apparent subject of duality is not the ultimate subject. My conclusion is that valuing of tolerance, individual liberty as well as civil rights is a particular contribution of Western thinking and philosophy; the Western advocates of these rights often provide ammunition to the non-Western critics of tolerance and human rights.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Horgan, Terence. "Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality." Monist 96, no. 2 (2013): 232–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist201396212.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Holland, Nancy J., and John R. Searle. "Intentionality." Noûs 20, no. 1 (March 1986): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215293.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Wreen, Michael. "Intentionality." International Studies in Philosophy 19, no. 3 (1987): 113–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil1987193102.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Le Morvan, Pierre. "Intentionality." Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (2005): 283–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20053039.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Rosenthal, David M. "Intentionality." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1986): 151–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00538.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Doyle, John. "On the Pure Intentionality of Pure Intentionality." Modern Schoolman 79, no. 1 (2001): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman20017914.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Mikki, Said. "Homo Philosophicus: Reflections on the Nature and Function of Philosophical Thought." Philosophies 6, no. 3 (September 17, 2021): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6030077.

Full text

Abstract:

The philosopher is a fundamental mode of existence of the human being, yet it is experienced only by a minority, an elite. Those constitute, among themselves, a subspecies of Homo sapiens that is sometimes dubbed Homo philosophicus. Our goal here is to investigate, in depth, the philosophical foundations of this ontological-anthropological concept. We analyze the concept of the philosopher into three basic components: the thinker, the artist, and the mathematician, arguing that the three fundamentally participate in maintaining the operation of the philosopher machine. The following text can be considered a contribution to metaphilosophy, written as a structured opinion piece, encompassing a series of reflections drawn from the writer’s own experience as a philosopher. The mode of the presentation is a mixture of personal and experimental writing styles, intentionally avoiding the rigid form of overtly analytical and argumentative discussions. Although numerous philosophers will be discussed below, four key figures, Nietzsche, Russell, Heidegger, and Guattari, occupy a special position in our overall opinionated view on the nature of philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Doukhan, Abi. "Beyond Intentionality?" Philosophy Today 58, no. 3 (2014): 427–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday20145628.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Loar, Brian. "Subjective Intentionality." Philosophical Topics 15, no. 1 (1987): 89–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198715113.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Voltolini, Alberto. "Intentionality Deflated?" Philosophical Issues 8 (1997): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1522998.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Hill, Christopher S. "INTENTIONALITY DOWNSIZED." Philosophical Issues 20, no. 1 (October 2010): 144–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00183.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Howard, Scott Alexander. "Metaemotional Intentionality." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, no. 3 (September 18, 2015): 406–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12093.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Mendelovici, Angela, and David Bourget. "Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories." Philosophy Compass 9, no. 5 (April 7, 2014): 325–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12123.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Sonesson, Göran. "Meaning Redefined." American Journal of Semiotics 34, no. 1 (2018): 65–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ajs201851436.

Full text

Abstract:

From the point of view of semiotics, the essential contribution of John Deely consists in having made us all aware of the richness of the Scholastic heritage, and to have explained it to us latter-day semioticians. Even for those, who, like the present author, think that semiotics was alive and well between the dawn of the Latin Age, and the rediscovery of Scholastic realism by Peirce, the notions coined by the Scholastic philosophers are intriguing. To make sense of scholastic notions such as ens reale and ens rationis is not a straightforward matter, but it is worthwhile trying to do so, in particular by adapting these notions to ideas more familiar in the present age. Starting out from the notions of Scholastic Realism, we try in the following to make sense of the different meanings of meaning, only one of which is the sign. It will be suggested that there are counterparts to ens rationis, not only in the thinking of some contemporary philosophers, but also, in a more convoluted way, in the discussion within cognitive science about different extensions to the mind. The recurrent theme of the paper will be Deely’s musing, according to which signs, unlike any other kind of being, form relations which may connect things which are mind-dependent (ens rationis) and mind-independent (ens reale). The import of this proposition is quite different if is applied to what we will call the Augustinian notion of the sign, or to the Fonseca notion, which is better termed intentionality. In both cases, however, mind-dependence will be shown to have a fundamental part to play. Following upon the redefinition of Medieval philosophy suggested by Deely, we will broach a redefinition of something even wider: meaning even beyond signs.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Meixner, Uwe. "Classical Intentionality." Erkenntnis 65, no. 1 (October 17, 2006): 25–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9013-2.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Barevičiūtė, Jovilė. "Editorial. Dialogue, Communication and Collaboration: Aspects of Philosophy and Communication." Coactivity: Philosophy, Communication 24, no. 1 (March 31, 2016): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/cpc.2016.246.

Full text

Abstract:

Acting as a usual means of everyday communication and collaboration, dialogue is also a fundamental mode of human presence in the world. It is innate and, therefore, feels organic to people. Nothing but a dialogue determines and defines the inborn human potential of reflexivity, empathy and communitivity. Naturally, it is hardly surprising that as a phenomenon, a dialogue constantly fell within the purview of most prominent European thinkers and throughout different historical epochs, in the spaces of philosophy and communication, it unfolded in a diverse and multidimensional manner. Ancient Greek philosopher Plato wrote in the form of dialogue, this way opening the possibility to a reader to learn about the world and the order of things as well as defining a certain relationship between the perceiving subject and the perceivable object. In the early Middle Ages, writings of Saint Augustine encouraged people to immerse into themselves and start a conversation with God, which established a certain living relationship between spaces empirical and transcendental. Much later, towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, who developed the theory of the intentionality of the consciousness, perceived that no living relationship between people is feasible without intersubjectivity. In this case, the communication is conditioned on the focus of at least two subjects on a certain object. This object, in particular, ensures the potential of the meaning, content and the purpose of communication. Another German author Martin Buber treated the dialogue as a phenomenon, in which an individual establishes a personal relationship with the Christian God, and this gives rise to a certain immediacy: a confrontation with the Ruler of the Kingdom of Heaven gives meaning to all the other interpersonal relationships. These are but few different philosophical interpretations of dialogue as a phenomenon. The universe of issues related to dialogue emerges from thinking perspectives of philosophers as well as communication theorists. On the one hand, the perspective of communication trivializes the phenomenon of dialogue, depriving it of its depth and profoundness; and on the other hand, it defines and specifies the concept of dialogue, assigning to it a form or function. This issue of the journal is devoted to the analysis of the phenomenon of dialogue both in the fields of philosophy and communication, inquiring into different contexts of its development. In her article Communication Solutions by Improving Interactive Art Projects, Gintarė Vainalavičiūtė analyses the relationship between visual arts and contemporary technologies, which determines both the rise of the forms of dialogue and non-traditional understanding of works of art. Mindaugas Stoškus contributed an article entitled Disciplines of Political Philosophy and Political Science: Antagonism, Cooperation or Indifference? in which he investigates the relationship between these two disciplines, conditions and problems pertaining to their dialogue, and the particularly intensified dynamics of the dialogue in the fifties of the 20th century. In their article Online Artistic Activism: Case-Study of Hungarian-Romanian Intercultural Communication, Gizela Horváth and Rozália Klára Bakó delve into the interactive relationship between works of art and their perceiver, as these works of art send messages via the social media environment. Moral Perception, Cognition, and Dialogue is an article authored by Vojko Strahovnik, in which he examines the causes for the rise of cases that hinder intercommunication and mutual understanding, such as disagreement, intercultural dialogues, etc. Problems of visual communication and the specificity of visual languages, bringing together subjects into dialogue are discussed by Arto Mutanen in his article Relativity of Visual Communication. Another article entitled Scientific Realism versus Antirealism in Science Education is a contribution by Seungbae Park, in which he attempts to define how the dialogue between teachers and students is possible, as he takes the position stating that the doctrine of scientific realism is much more effective than provided opportunities of scientific antirealism. And finally, Algis Mickūnas, in his article The Different Other and Dialogue, discusses the reasons why members of different communities find it difficult to establish dialogue-based relationships and why in some cases they remain imprisoned in the state of a monologue. This issue of the journal presents a truly wide field of investigations into opportunities and obstacles for communication, interaction and collaboration. It is pleasing to see that representatives of various humanities and social sciences joined the same dialogue. Looking forward to the productive insights in the future, the Editor would like to express her gratitude to the authors of this issue.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Stoljar, Daniel. "Nominalism and Intentionality." Noûs 30, no. 2 (June 1996): 221. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2216294.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Chamberlain, Stephen. "Intentionality and Semiotics." International Philosophical Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2008): 537–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200848468.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Oyler, David. "Intentionality of Feelings." Philosophy Today 35, no. 4 (1991): 339–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday19913543.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Wrathall, Mark A. "Intentionality Without Representations." Philosophy Today 42, no. 9999 (1998): 182–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199842supplement76.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Doyon, Maxime. "Intentionality and Normativity." Philosophy Today 60, no. 1 (2016): 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday2016113105.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Sosa, Ernest. "Experience and Intentionality." Philosophical Topics 14, no. 1 (1986): 67–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198614114.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Georgalis, Nicholas. "Intentionality and Representation." International Studies in Philosophy 18, no. 3 (1986): 45–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil19861834.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Crosson, Frederick J. "Intentionality and Atheism." Modern Schoolman 64, no. 3 (1987): 151–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/schoolman198764337.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Stich, Stephen P., and Stephen Laurence. "Intentionality and Naturalism." Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 159–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00284.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Stalnaker, Robert. "Lewis on Intentionality." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 199–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659796.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Bortolotti, Lisa. "INTENTIONALITY WITHOUT RATIONALITY." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105, no. 3 (May 2005): 385–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2005.00181.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Rankin, Kenneth. "Intentionality and Tense." Dialogue 32, no. 2 (1993): 383–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300014517.

Full text

Abstract:

Contemporary writing on human action sometimes distinguishes a presentoriented form of intentionality from a future-oriented form. Tense is then invoked mainly for a classificatory purpose, with little regard in this context to whether it may not have analytical (and therefore closer) connections with intentionality in general. That merits some surprise, in view of the crucial role assumed, in current debate between A- and B-theories of time on the subject of tense, by a wider intentionality that extends to cognitive and other mental states. In the wider context there is room for an interesting antithesis between analyses of the temporal in terms of intentionalistic concepts and retroanalyses that go the other way.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Kriegel, Uriah. "INTENTIONALITY AND NORMATIVITY." Philosophical Issues 20, no. 1 (October 2010): 185–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00182.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Bortolotti, Lisa. "INTENTIONALITY WITHOUT RATIONALITY." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 105, no. 1 (June 2005): 369–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00119.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Webb, C. W. "Intentionality and Privacy." Idealistic Studies 17, no. 2 (1987): 97–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies198717216.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Vallicella, William. "Consciousness and Intentionality." Idealistic Studies 21, no. 1 (1991): 79–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies19912113.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Ogilvy, Jay. "Strategy and Intentionality." World Futures 66, no. 2 (January 29, 2010): 73–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02604020903423717.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Duran, Jane. "COLLINGWOOD AND INTENTIONALITY." British Journal of Aesthetics 27, no. 1 (1987): 32–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/27.1.32.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Wilson, Robert A. "INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, no. 4 (December 2003): 413–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-0114.2003.00183.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!