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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Control takeover

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Academic literature on the topic 'Control takeover'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Control takeover"

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McDonald, Anthony D., Hananeh Alambeigi, Johan Engström, et al. "Toward Computational Simulations of Behavior During Automated Driving Takeovers: A Review of the Empirical and Modeling Literatures." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 4 (2019): 642–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720819829572.

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Objective: This article provides a review of empirical studies of automated vehicle takeovers and driver modeling to identify influential factors and their impacts on takeover performance and suggest driver models that can capture them. Background: Significant safety issues remain in automated-to-manual transitions of vehicle control. Developing models and computer simulations of automated vehicle control transitions may help designers mitigate these issues, but only if accurate models are used. Selecting accurate models requires estimating the impact of factors that influence takeovers. Metho

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Jones, Edward, Bing Xu, and Konstantin Kamp. "Agency costs in the market for corporate control: evidence from UK takeovers." Review of Accounting and Finance 20, no. 1 (2021): 23–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-04-2020-0083.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine whether agency costs predict disciplinary takeover likelihood for the UK listed companies between 1986 and 2015. Design/methodology/approach Using survival analysis, the approach is to identify candidates for disciplinary takeover on the basis of Tobin’s Q (TQ), which is consistent with the approach advocated by Manne (1965). This study then examines how indicators of agency costs affect takeover likelihood within the set of disciplinary candidates. Findings This paper provides evidence of the effectiveness of TQ, rather than excess return, in identifying dis

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Dignam, Alan. "The globalisation of General Principle 7: transforming the market for corporate control in Australia and Europe?" Legal Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 96–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2007.00076.x.

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The integration of national financial markets over the past 30 years has resulted in a globalised market for corporate control which has increased both the opportunities for companies to fund acquisitions and the possibility of being acquired. Takeovers and mergers have, as a result, become a matter of some concern for governments, as they try to encourage the development of financial markets but also deal with the consequences of a globalised market for corporate control, where even companies regarded as national champions are within the reach of a foreign takeover. In the course of the last

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Pandey, Ajay. "Takeover Announcements, Open Offers, and Shareholders' Returns in Target Firms." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 26, no. 3 (2001): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920010304.

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The empirical studies in the context of developed countries have consistently pointed out substantial valuation gains for target firms, particularly in case of successful takeovers. This effect has been "found to be higher for tender offers compared to mergers and proxy contests, the other forms of plays in the market for corporate control. Subsequent to enactment of takeover enabling regulations in 1997 in India, takeovers and substantial acquisition of shares necessitate making open offer to the investors. Based on the empirical investigation of 14 large (above Rs 10 crore) takeover related

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Sapra, Haresh, Ajay Subramanian, and Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian. "Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, no. 4 (2014): 957–1003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002210901400060x.

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AbstractWe develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by

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Belayeva, I. Yu, O. V. Danilova, and K. V. Uskov. "Takeover as a Form of Corporate Conflict and the Process of Transfer of Stock Ownership’s Rights." SHS Web of Conferences 91 (2021): 01001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20219101001.

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The article considers the problem of corporate conflicts in the Russian practice of corporate relations in the joint-stock companies. Today, corporate relations are changing, the role of intangible resources is growing, and a 100% share in the company capital does not always guarantee control over the company. In this regard, the range of ways to acquire corporate control is expanding. The purpose of the article is to develop a classification of the methods of joint stock companies takeovers. The proposed classification differs from existing classifications by differentiating takeover methods

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Turk, Thomas A. "Takeover Resistance, Information Leakage, and Target Firm Value." Journal of Management 18, no. 3 (1992): 503–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800305.

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This study examines the effect of management responses to takeovers on the value of the targetfirm. Three categories of takeover responses are identified: auction-inducing resistance, competitionreducing resistance, and support. Auction-inducing resistance is shown to increase competition for control of the target firm. This increased competition leads to increased gains to the target firm during the takeover battle relative to gains obtained when the initial takeover offer is supported. Competition-reducing resistance is shown to have the opposite effect.

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Roche, Fabienne, Anna Somieski, and Stefan Brandenburg. "Behavioral Changes to Repeated Takeovers in Highly Automated Driving: Effects of the Takeover-Request Design and the Nondriving-Related Task Modality." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 5 (2018): 839–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818814963.

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Objective: We investigated drivers’ behavior and subjective experience when repeatedly taking over their vehicles’ control depending on the design of the takeover request (TOR) and the modality of the nondriving-related task (NDRT). Background: Previous research has shown that taking over vehicle control after highly automated driving provides several problems for drivers. There is evidence that the TOR design and the NDRT modality may influence takeover behavior and that driver behavior changes with more experience. Method: Forty participants were requested to resume control of their simulate

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Easterwood, Cintia M. "Takeovers And Incentives For Earnings Management: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 14, no. 1 (2011): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v14i1.5726.

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This study tests the hypothesis that managers of firms that are targets of takeovers systematically increase reported earnings in the quarters immediately preceding and following initiation of the takeover attempt. Using both a modified version of the Jones method and the DeAngelo method, discretionary accounting accruals are examined for a sample of 100 firms that were targets of tender offers between 1985 and 1989, inclusive, and for a control group of nontargets. Results for the quarter ended prior to initiation support the hypothesis. Additional tests performed on the sub-samples of hostil

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Das, Varsha. "The New Takeover Code by the Securities and Exchange Board of India." Journal of Social and Development Sciences 4, no. 7 (2013): 303–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v4i7.765.

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Merger & Acquisition in India have been governed by the age-old takeover rules. It seems that now, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has realized that these rules need to be revamped to keep them in line with the ever-changing global scenario. On September 2011, the SEBI amended the new set of takeover rules i.e.; the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011. The main purpose is to prevent hostile takeovers and at the same time, provide some more opportunities of exit to innocent shareholders who do not wish to be associated with a particular

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Control takeover"

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Luthringshauser, Stefan. "The market for corporate control : takeover likelihood of underperforming firms." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2007. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/780/.

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Horn, Stefan. "Takeover Regulation in Europe An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? /." St. Gallen, 2005. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/02607869001/$FILE/02607869001.pdf.

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Thomas, Hardy Mathew. "The markets for corporate control in the UK : takeover target selection in the official list and in the unlisted securities markets." Thesis, University of Ulster, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240994.

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Cotrim, Eduardo Lucas. "Alienação de controle e benefícios privados no Brasil: uma releitura sob novo ambiente regulatório e de governança corporativa." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18774.

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Submitted by Eduardo Cotrim (edulucascotrim@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-09-11T21:41:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a754202cf (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Joana Martorini (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2017-09-11T22:25:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a754202cf (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-12T16:45:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ELC_final revisada.pdf: 901904 bytes, checksum: 34ced8d99037b195a9bf9d7a7

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Radix, Hess Jade. "Les prises de contrôle rampantes." Thesis, Paris 2, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA020085.

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Au centre de préoccupations économiques et financières d’importance, enjeux de pouvoirs, les prises de contrôle des sociétés cotées font l’objet de procédures spécifiques, au premier rang desquelles on trouve les offres publiques d’achat ou d’échange. L’information y est alors très large, les intentions de l’offrant très claires, les organes de la société cible prennent position et généralement ses actionnaires se voient offrir une prime leur permettant de choisir de répondre positivement ou non en toute liberté. Il en va tout autrement dans le cas de ce qu’on appelle en pratique les « prises

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Lee, Samuel. "Information and control in financial markets." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2009. http://www2.hhs.se/efi/summary/799.htm.

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Nedvědová, Nikola. "Převzetí společnosti skrze insolvenční řízení (SAZKA, a.s.)." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-162866.

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This thesis deals with takeovers in the Czech environment according to the Insolvency Act No. 182/2006 Coll., which passed an amendment to the 1. 1. 2008. There are methods of resolving insolvency of the debtor and principles of insolvency proceedings which should be followed during the insolvency process. Work distinguishes friendly and hostile takeover. The theoretical part provides an overview of possible ways of takeover, the reasons that motivate new owners to think about a possible takeover and globally applicable defense strategies. Another theoretical starting point is consideration of

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Danbolt, Johan Bernt Heiberg. "A comparative analysis of the wealth effects to target and bidding company shareholders from domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986-1991)." Thesis, Heriot-Watt University, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10399/1302.

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This thesis contains an analysis of the impact on shareholder wealth of domestic and cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies. The study covers the calendar years from 1986 to 1991 inclusive. For the cross-border acquisitions, data is available for an analysis of 143 targets, 71 bidders, and 55 matched pairs of targets and bidders. For domestic acquisitions, data was available for 568 targets, 414 bidders and 356 pairs of targets and bidders. Three different event study methodologies are applied; the capital asset pricing model, the market model, and the index model. UK target compan

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Renneboog, Luc D. R. "Ownership, managerial control and the governance of poorly performing companies listed on the London and Brussels stock exchanges." Thesis, London Business School (University of London), 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.244802.

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Hoffmann-Burchardi, Ulrike. "Dual-class shares, initial public offerings and the market for corporate control." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2000. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1551/.

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This dissertation focuses on two central capital market transactions, takeovers and initial public offerings (IPOs), from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. After an introductory chapter, the first two chapters analyse how minority shareholders are affected by a change in take-over regulation (introduction of the mandatory bid rule) in Germany in 1995. The last chapter focuses on the pricing and timing of going-public transactions. Chapter 2 focuses on the absolute wealth effect of the mandatory bid rule and formalises the trade-off minority shareholders of corporate raiders fa

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Books on the topic "Control takeover"

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Bebchuk, Lucian A. Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate control. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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Benson, Declan. The market for Corporate control, takeover defences and evidence of (leverage) managerial resistance. University College Dublin, 1994.

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Thomas, Hardy Mathew. The markets for corporate control in the UK: Takeover target selection in the official list and in the unlistedsecurities markets. The Author], 1994.

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J, Gray S. Mega-merger mayhem: Takeover strategies, battles & controls. Paul Chapman, 1989.

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Kester, W. Carl. Japanese takeovers: The global contest for corporate control. Harvard Business School Press, 1991.

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Colcera, Enrico. The market for corporate control in Japan: M&AS, hostile takeovers and regulatory framework. Springer, 2007.

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Zaugg, Mascha Tamara. The market for corporate control in Europe: Impact of hostile takeovers on strategic management. Haupt Verlag, 2005.

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O'Sullivan, Noel. Internal versus external control: An analysis of board composition and ownership structures in UK takeovers. Loughborough University Business School, 1996.

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Irish competition legislation: Competition acts 1991 and 1996, mergers and takeovers (control) acts, 1978-1996. Baikonur, 1996.

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Robin, Nuttall, and Seabright Paul, eds. Merger in daylight: The economics and politics of European merger control. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Control takeover"

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Foley, Michael. "Split-Party Control: Clinton On the Defensive." In The Republican Takeover of Congress. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26570-1_6.

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Shen, Zhaohui, Linyao Tang, and Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng. "The Role and Future of Self-Regulation in the Market for Corporate Control: A Comparative Narrative of the Two Models in the UK and China." In Takeover Law in the UK, the EU and China. Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72345-3_4.

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Clarke, Blanaid. "The Market for Corporate Control and the Implications of the Takeover Directive (2004/25)." In International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119201885.ch13.

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Politis, Ioannis, Patrick Langdon, Damilola Adebayo, et al. "An Evaluation of Inclusive Dialogue-Based Interfaces for the Takeover of Control in Autonomous Cars." In Designing Interaction and Interfaces for Automated Vehicles. CRC Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003050841-6.

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Kershaw, David. "The Market for Corporate Control: Value, Stakeholders, and Governance." In Principles of Takeover Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199659555.003.0001.

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This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.

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French, Derek. "9. Control of a company." In Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198841517.003.0009.

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This chapter discusses how control of a company can be identified and how it can change. It considers takeovers, the City Code and compulsory acquisition of remaining shares. There is full discussion of the provisions for disclosure of significant holdings both to warn of potential takeover moves and to disclose in the public interest who has significant control of a company. The statutory definitions of holding company, subsidiary and wholly owned subsidiary are considered.

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French, Derek. "9. Control of a company." In Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198870029.003.0009.

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This chapter discusses how control of a company can be identified and how it can change. The chapter considers takeovers, the City Code and compulsory acquisition of remaining shares. There is full discussion of the provisions for disclosure of significant holdings both to warn of potential takeover moves and to disclose in the public interest who has significant control of a company. Shares in public companies may be held by nominee owners and this may disguise the fact that one person is building up a significant holding. The statutory definitions of holding company, subsidiary and wholly owned subsidiary are considered.

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Hervey, Shannon. "Information Disembodiment Takeover." In Posthumanism in Young Adult Fiction. University Press of Mississippi, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.14325/mississippi/9781496816696.003.0002.

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Focusing on four YA novels-—#16thingsithoughtweretrue, The Future of Us, Feed, and The Unwritten—Shannon Hervey describes how adolescent anxiety results from the realization that teens are not just addicted to the Internet; they are tech-human hybrids. Social media demands self-commodification with the capitalistic return of followers and readers, feeding the fear that the virtual self seems to create or at least control the material self. Three of the novels offer unsatisfactory endings, as withdrawal from social media is the only answer. The Unwritten, though, tries to work through the process of actualization and the acceptance of posthumanist subjectivities.

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Kershaw, David. "Deal Structures." In Principles of Takeover Regulation. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199659555.003.0002.

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This Chapter considers the nature and characteristics of different deal structures: the different ways in which a control transaction can be effected. It commences with an analysis of asset deals, which - although we do not encounter in the context of the takeovers of publicly traded companies which are the subject of this book – assist in understanding the nature of other deal structures as well as understanding the ways in which deal risk can be managed and, to a limited but important extent, assist in understanding certain Code rules. The Chapter then considers direct share offers (otherwise known as contractual offers). It analyses their structure as well as the corporate, Listing Rule and third party approvals required to effect a share deal. It also considers the use of compulsory acquisition powers to acquire all the shares in the company following the contractual offer. The Chapter then considers the use of Schemes of Arrangements in control transactions. It details the different types of control schemes, namely transfer schemes and merger schemes, and considers their advantages and disadvantages as compared to contractual offers. It analyses the different stages of the scheme process and the role of the courts in each stage. The final part of the Chapter considers the operation of the UK’s cross border merger regime, introduced to implement the European Union’s Cross Border Mergers Directive.

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Anand, Anita Indira. "Shareholders and Takeover Bids: Revisiting the Poison Pill." In Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.003.0006.

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This chapter assesses change-of-control transactions and the use of the defensive tactic known as the poison pill, a governance tool that often puts boards, rather than shareholders, in charge of a corporation’s response to a takeover. Much as in the MVS context, this separation of ownership of the corporation from its control may invite conflicts of interest, here between boards and shareholders. The chapter then asks how shareholder-driven corporate governance (SCG) can and should inform regulation of this defensive tactic. It also considers management entrenchment theory and the shareholder-primacy norm in the context of changes of control. Both the normative and the positive aspects of SCG make it necessary to revisit the current legal balance between the interests of directors and the interests of target shareholders in takeovers.

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Conference papers on the topic "Control takeover"

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Lee, Phillip, Andrew Clark, Basel Alomair, Linda Bushnell, and Radha Poovendran. "A host takeover game model for competing malware." In 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2015.7402926.

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Zhou, Heng, Yong Zhao, and Zhijun Chen. "Adaptive Terminal Sliding Mode Control for the Combined Spacecraft Takeover Control." In 2020 39th Chinese Control Conference (CCC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/ccc50068.2020.9188722.

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Peng, Mao, Chen Jin, and Sun Dihua. "Risk Status Identification During the Takeover of Conditionally Automated Vehicles." In 2020 Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc49329.2020.9164302.

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Jia, Cheng, Zhongjie Meng, Zhibin Zhang, and Panfeng Huang. "Adaptive attitude takeover control for noncooperative targets using robust allocation." In 2018 33rd Youth Academic Annual Conference of Chinese Association of Automation (YAC). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/yac.2018.8406389.

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Zubovic, Antonija. "CALCULATING PROXY VOTES IN THE CONTROL THRESHOLD IN CROATIAN TAKEOVER LAW." In 4th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2017. Stef92 Technology, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2017/12/s02.045.

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Chen, Keyu, and Yunhai Geng. "Adaptive Attitude Takeover Control for Spacecraft with Input Quantization and Saturation." In 2020 IEEE 6th International Conference on Control Science and Systems Engineering (ICCSSE). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccsse50399.2020.9171938.

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Chang, Haitao, Panfeng Huang, Zhenyu Lu, Zhongjie Meng, Zhengxiong Liu, and Yizhai Zhang. "Cellular space robot and its interactive model identification for spacecraft takeover control." In 2016 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iros.2016.7759475.

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Liu, Yuhan, Lv Yueyong, Guangfu Ma, and Yanning Guo. "Learning-based Attitude Takeover Control Strategy for Noncooperative Targets with Gaussian Processes." In AIAA Scitech 2020 Forum. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2020-0459.

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Păsăreanu, Corina S. "Analysis of neural network takeover-time predictions for shared-control autonomous driving." In CPS-IoT Week '21: Cyber-Physical Systems and Internet of Things Week 2021. ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3459086.3459630.

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Liu, Yuhan, Lv Yueyong, Guangfu Ma, and Yanning Guo. "Withdrawal: Learning-based Attitude Takeover Control Strategy for Noncooperative Targets with Gaussian Processes." In AIAA Scitech 2020 Forum. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/6.2020-0459.c1.

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Reports on the topic "Control takeover"

1

Bebchuk, Lucian, and Oliver Hart. Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8633.

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