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1

McDonald, Anthony D., Hananeh Alambeigi, Johan Engström, et al. "Toward Computational Simulations of Behavior During Automated Driving Takeovers: A Review of the Empirical and Modeling Literatures." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 4 (2019): 642–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720819829572.

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Objective: This article provides a review of empirical studies of automated vehicle takeovers and driver modeling to identify influential factors and their impacts on takeover performance and suggest driver models that can capture them. Background: Significant safety issues remain in automated-to-manual transitions of vehicle control. Developing models and computer simulations of automated vehicle control transitions may help designers mitigate these issues, but only if accurate models are used. Selecting accurate models requires estimating the impact of factors that influence takeovers. Metho
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2

Jones, Edward, Bing Xu, and Konstantin Kamp. "Agency costs in the market for corporate control: evidence from UK takeovers." Review of Accounting and Finance 20, no. 1 (2021): 23–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-04-2020-0083.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine whether agency costs predict disciplinary takeover likelihood for the UK listed companies between 1986 and 2015. Design/methodology/approach Using survival analysis, the approach is to identify candidates for disciplinary takeover on the basis of Tobin’s Q (TQ), which is consistent with the approach advocated by Manne (1965). This study then examines how indicators of agency costs affect takeover likelihood within the set of disciplinary candidates. Findings This paper provides evidence of the effectiveness of TQ, rather than excess return, in identifying dis
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3

Dignam, Alan. "The globalisation of General Principle 7: transforming the market for corporate control in Australia and Europe?" Legal Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 96–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2007.00076.x.

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The integration of national financial markets over the past 30 years has resulted in a globalised market for corporate control which has increased both the opportunities for companies to fund acquisitions and the possibility of being acquired. Takeovers and mergers have, as a result, become a matter of some concern for governments, as they try to encourage the development of financial markets but also deal with the consequences of a globalised market for corporate control, where even companies regarded as national champions are within the reach of a foreign takeover. In the course of the last
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4

Pandey, Ajay. "Takeover Announcements, Open Offers, and Shareholders' Returns in Target Firms." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 26, no. 3 (2001): 19–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090920010304.

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The empirical studies in the context of developed countries have consistently pointed out substantial valuation gains for target firms, particularly in case of successful takeovers. This effect has been "found to be higher for tender offers compared to mergers and proxy contests, the other forms of plays in the market for corporate control. Subsequent to enactment of takeover enabling regulations in 1997 in India, takeovers and substantial acquisition of shares necessitate making open offer to the investors. Based on the empirical investigation of 14 large (above Rs 10 crore) takeover related
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5

Sapra, Haresh, Ajay Subramanian, and Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian. "Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, no. 4 (2014): 957–1003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002210901400060x.

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AbstractWe develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by
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6

Belayeva, I. Yu, O. V. Danilova, and K. V. Uskov. "Takeover as a Form of Corporate Conflict and the Process of Transfer of Stock Ownership’s Rights." SHS Web of Conferences 91 (2021): 01001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20219101001.

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The article considers the problem of corporate conflicts in the Russian practice of corporate relations in the joint-stock companies. Today, corporate relations are changing, the role of intangible resources is growing, and a 100% share in the company capital does not always guarantee control over the company. In this regard, the range of ways to acquire corporate control is expanding. The purpose of the article is to develop a classification of the methods of joint stock companies takeovers. The proposed classification differs from existing classifications by differentiating takeover methods
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7

Turk, Thomas A. "Takeover Resistance, Information Leakage, and Target Firm Value." Journal of Management 18, no. 3 (1992): 503–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639201800305.

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This study examines the effect of management responses to takeovers on the value of the targetfirm. Three categories of takeover responses are identified: auction-inducing resistance, competitionreducing resistance, and support. Auction-inducing resistance is shown to increase competition for control of the target firm. This increased competition leads to increased gains to the target firm during the takeover battle relative to gains obtained when the initial takeover offer is supported. Competition-reducing resistance is shown to have the opposite effect.
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8

Roche, Fabienne, Anna Somieski, and Stefan Brandenburg. "Behavioral Changes to Repeated Takeovers in Highly Automated Driving: Effects of the Takeover-Request Design and the Nondriving-Related Task Modality." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 5 (2018): 839–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818814963.

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Objective: We investigated drivers’ behavior and subjective experience when repeatedly taking over their vehicles’ control depending on the design of the takeover request (TOR) and the modality of the nondriving-related task (NDRT). Background: Previous research has shown that taking over vehicle control after highly automated driving provides several problems for drivers. There is evidence that the TOR design and the NDRT modality may influence takeover behavior and that driver behavior changes with more experience. Method: Forty participants were requested to resume control of their simulate
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9

Easterwood, Cintia M. "Takeovers And Incentives For Earnings Management: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 14, no. 1 (2011): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v14i1.5726.

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This study tests the hypothesis that managers of firms that are targets of takeovers systematically increase reported earnings in the quarters immediately preceding and following initiation of the takeover attempt. Using both a modified version of the Jones method and the DeAngelo method, discretionary accounting accruals are examined for a sample of 100 firms that were targets of tender offers between 1985 and 1989, inclusive, and for a control group of nontargets. Results for the quarter ended prior to initiation support the hypothesis. Additional tests performed on the sub-samples of hostil
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10

Das, Varsha. "The New Takeover Code by the Securities and Exchange Board of India." Journal of Social and Development Sciences 4, no. 7 (2013): 303–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.22610/jsds.v4i7.765.

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Merger & Acquisition in India have been governed by the age-old takeover rules. It seems that now, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has realized that these rules need to be revamped to keep them in line with the ever-changing global scenario. On September 2011, the SEBI amended the new set of takeover rules i.e.; the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011. The main purpose is to prevent hostile takeovers and at the same time, provide some more opportunities of exit to innocent shareholders who do not wish to be associated with a particular
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11

Chamberlain, Trevor, and Maxime Fabre. "Management Control and Takeover Premiums." International Advances in Economic Research 22, no. 4 (2016): 471–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11294-016-9606-8.

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12

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (1988): 7–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.7.

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Like the rest of us, corporate managers have many personal goals and ambitions, only one of which is to get rich. The way they try to run their companies reflects these personal goals. Shareholders, in contrast, deprived of the pleasures of running the company, only care about getting rich from the stock they own. The takeover wave of the 1980s put the managershareholder conflict to a new test. Where other checks on management failed, hostile takeovers could now wrest control from managers who ignored the interests of their shareholders. More so than ever before, fear of such disciplinary take
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Clark, Hallie, Anne Collins McLaughlin, and Jing Feng. "Situational Awareness and Time to Takeover: Exploring an Alternative Method to Measure Engagement with High-Level Automation." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 61, no. 1 (2017): 1452–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1541931213601848.

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Within human factors research of highly automated driving, in addition to examining the design of notifications of expected takeovers of vehicle control, understanding how drivers handle unexpected takeovers is of critical importance. Given a sufficient level of situational awareness has been shown as a premise for task performance in various domains, this study aims to establish a situational awareness measure in the context of highly automated driving using a simple platform for experimentation. In this study, we measured participants’ situational awareness when viewing a video of simulated
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14

Costa, Eduardo, and Ana Marques. "Corporate governance and takeovers: Insights from past research and suggestions for future research." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 3 (2009): 211–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c1p5.

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This paper reviews the literature on the association between corporate governance and takeovers. It approaches takeovers as an effective external corporate governance mechanism. The main conclusions to be drawn is that although the mere threat of an active market for corporate control may be positively correlated with good internal governance, takeovers will always take place independently of good internal corporate governance by targets and that managerial ownership is crucial for a favorable shareholder outcome in a takeover event. We believe future research on corporate boards, cross-nation
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15

Demidova, E. "Hostile Takeovers and Anti-takeover Defenses in the Russian Corporate Market." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 4 (April 20, 2007): 70–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2007-4-70-84.

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This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.
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16

Campbell, Kevin, and Magdalena Jerzemowska. "Contested takeovers of family firms and socioemotional wealth: a case study." Baltic Journal of Management 12, no. 4 (2017): 447–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/bjm-12-2016-0277.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of the importance of socioemotional wealth (SEW) to family firms in Poland viewed through the lens of the events surrounding the first hostile takeover bid of the post-communist era on the Warsaw Stock Exchange when the clothing company Vistula & Wólczanka (V&W) made an unsolicited, leveraged bid for the family-controlled jewelry company W. Kruk. Design/methodology/approach The 2008 takeover and its aftermath are described in the context of the corporate governance and legal environment in Poland. The case study events de
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17

Gürtler, Oliver, and Matthias Kräkel. "Hostile takeover and costly merger control." Public Choice 141, no. 3-4 (2009): 371–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9457-4.

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18

Campbell IIa, Terry L., and Raj Varma. "The effect of Delaware law on firm value: Evidence from poison pill adoptions." Corporate Board role duties and composition 6, no. 2 (2010): 53–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv6i2art4.

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As the leading location for firm incorporations and corporate law, Delaware occupies a unique place in corporate governance and control. In this paper, we provide fresh evidence on whether Delaware’s dominance arises from its takeover laws being in the best interest of shareholders versus managers by investigating the role of the state in which a firm is incorporated on the firm’s adoption of a poison pill. Our results indicate that announcements of adoptions of poison pills by Delaware firms are associated with returns not significantly different from those for non-Delaware firms. Moreover, D
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19

Kim, Daehwan, and Taeyoon Sung. "Cross-ownership, takeover threat and control benefit." Applied Financial Economics 19, no. 8 (2009): 659–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09603100801982638.

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20

Kaneko, Kunihiko. "Question 9: Minority Control and Genetic Takeover." Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 37, no. 4-5 (2007): 465–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11084-007-9083-4.

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21

Wang, Wenyu, and Yufeng Wu. "Managerial control benefits and takeover market efficiency." Journal of Financial Economics 136, no. 3 (2020): 857–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.11.003.

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22

Maul, Silja, and Athanasios Kouloridas. "The Takeover bids Directive." German Law Journal 5, no. 4 (2004): 355–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200012517.

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On 27 November 2003 a political agreement has been reached in the Council on the compromise proposal for the Takeover bids Directive. On 16 December, the Parliament gave its approval and the proposal has still to receive the formal voting of the Council under the Irish Presidency in March 2004. Member States are required to transpose it into national law by 2006. The Directive regulates how a company or an investor that already has control in a listed company or seeks to obtain control can acquire securities in that company and applies to both voluntary and mandatory bids.
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23

Nickels, Ashley E., Amanda D. Clark, and Zachary D. Wood. "How Municipal Takeovers Reshape Urban Democracy: Comparing the Experiences of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan." Urban Affairs Review 56, no. 3 (2019): 790–822. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087418824670.

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Municipal takeovers are a state policy ostensibly designed to address urban fiscal crises by “temporarily” taking over local government, suspending local control, and implementing sweeping austerity measures. Although framed as “apolitical,” takeovers have the capacity to reshape local democracy. These changes radically rearrange how decisions are made, who has access to decision makers, and, ultimately, who is in power. Using a policy-centered approach, we compare the cases of Camden, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan, illustrating how variations in policy design and localized implementation res
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Welsh, Richard O., Sheneka Williams, Shafiqua Little, and Jerome Graham. "Right Cause, Wrong Method? Examining the Politics of State Takeover in Georgia." Urban Affairs Review 55, no. 3 (2017): 703–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087417714061.

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A growing number of states are using state-run school districts to take over and improve persistently underperforming schools. This article uses Georgia to examine the politics of state takeover. We analyze the supporting and opposing coalitions as well as the alignment between state takeover and charter schools in the campaign for the constitutional amendment to create a statewide turnaround district. Our findings show that corporate interests, the governor, and nonprofit organizations supported state takeover, whereas educators, parents, and community organizations opposed state takeover. Th
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So, Jaehyun Jason, Sungho Park, Jonghwa Kim, Jejin Park, and Ilsoo Yun. "Investigating the Impacts of Road Traffic Conditions and Driver’s Characteristics on Automated Vehicle Takeover Time and Quality Using a Driving Simulator." Journal of Advanced Transportation 2021 (June 23, 2021): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8859553.

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This study investigates the impacts of road traffic conditions and driver’s characteristics on the takeover time in automated vehicles using a driving simulator. Automated vehicles are barely expected to maintain their fully automated driving capability at all times based on the current technologies, and the automated vehicle system transfers the vehicle control to a driver when the system can no longer be automatically operated. The takeover time is the duration from when the driver requested the vehicle control transition from the automated vehicle system to when the driver takes full contro
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26

Ali, Ruhani, and G. S. Gupta. "Motivation and Outcome of Malaysian Takeovers: An International Perspective." Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers 24, no. 3 (1999): 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0256090919990306.

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This paper examines the potential motives and effects of corporate takeovers that occurred in Malaysia during the period 1980 through 1993. The Mueller's methodology, which has been adopted for Australia, USA, UK, and five European countries, is employed in order to provide an analysis of the Malaysian takeovers on an international perspective. The findings indicate that the Malaysian takeovers were motivated by size, growth, and profit considerations, and supported by the desire of having a balanced leverage, thus favouring the eclectic theory of takeovers. In terms of the outcomes, the paper
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Corcoran, Nicole M., Daniel V. McGehee, and T. Zachary Noonan. "A temporal analysis of safety drivers taking back control in public roadway automated driving trials." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 63, no. 1 (2019): 1532–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1071181319631377.

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In 2019, industry is in the testing stages of level 4 SAE/NHTSA automated vehicles. While in testing, L4 vehicles require a safety driver to monitor the driving task at all times. These specially trained drivers must take back control if the vehicle doesn’t seem to be responding correctly to the ever-changing roadway and environment. Research suggests that monitoring the driving task can lead to a decrease in vigilance over time. Recently, Waymo publicly released takeover request and mileage data on its 2018 L4 autonomous vehicle takeover requests. From this data, which was represented in mile
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Jarosch, Oliver, Hanna Bellem, and Klaus Bengler. "Effects of Task-Induced Fatigue in Prolonged Conditional Automated Driving." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 7 (2019): 1186–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818816226.

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Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of task-induced fatigue in prolonged conditional automated driving on takeover performance. Background: In conditional automated driving, the driver can engage in non–driving related tasks (NDRTs) and does not have to monitor the system and the driving environment. In the event that the system hits its limits, the human driver must regain control of the car. To ensure safety, adequate driver fallback performance is necessary. Effects of the drivers’ state and the engagement in NDRTs need to be investigated. Method: Seventy-three p
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CHAPMAN, D. R., and C. W. JUNOR. "INFLATION, FIRM CONTROL-TYPE AND VULNERABILITY TO TAKEOVER." Oxford Economic Papers 39, no. 3 (1987): 500–515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041802.

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30

Naujoks, Frederik, Christian Purucker, Katharina Wiedemann, and Claus Marberger. "Noncritical State Transitions During Conditionally Automated Driving on German Freeways: Effects of Non–Driving Related Tasks on Takeover Time and Takeover Quality." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 61, no. 4 (2019): 596–613. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818824002.

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Objective: This study aimed at investigating the driver’s takeover performance when switching from working on different non–driving related tasks (NDRTs) while driving with a conditionally automated driving function (SAE L3), which was simulated by a Wizard of Oz vehicle, to manual vehicle control under naturalistic driving conditions. Background: Conditionally automated driving systems, which are currently close to market introduction, require the user to stay fallback ready. As users will be allowed to engage in more complex NDRTs during the automated drive than when driving manually, the ti
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Joensuu-Salo, Sanna, Anmari Viljamaa, and Elina Varamäki. "Understanding Business Takeover Intentions—The Role of Theory of Planned Behavior and Entrepreneurship Competence." Administrative Sciences 11, no. 3 (2021): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/admsci11030061.

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Entrepreneurial intentions have been extensively studied, but little is known about the intended mode of entry into entrepreneurship and its antecedents. This study tests the utility of the theory of planned behavior in a new, more specific context, namely business takeover intentions. The impact of entrepreneurship competence on antecedents of takeover intentions is explored. Entrepreneurship competence is measured using a scale based on the EntreComp framework. Data (N = 1373) were gathered from two institutes of higher education in Finland and analyzed using logistic regression. The results
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Wandtner, Bernhard, Nadja Schömig, and Gerald Schmidt. "Effects of Non-Driving Related Task Modalities on Takeover Performance in Highly Automated Driving." Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 60, no. 6 (2018): 870–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018720818768199.

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Objective: Aim of the study was to evaluate the impact of different non-driving related tasks (NDR tasks) on takeover performance in highly automated driving. Background: During highly automated driving, it is allowed to engage in NDR tasks temporarily. However, drivers must be able to take over control when reaching a system limit. There is evidence that the type of NDR task has an impact on takeover performance, but little is known about the specific task characteristics that account for performance decrements. Method: Thirty participants drove in a simulator using a highly automated driving
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Huang, Gaojian, Christine Petersen, and Brandon J. Pitts. "The Impact of Mental States on Semi-autonomous Driving Takeover Performance: A Systematic Review." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 64, no. 1 (2020): 1372–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1071181320641328.

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Semi-autonomous vehicles still require drivers to occasionally resume manual control. However, drivers of these vehicles may have different mental states. For example, drivers may be engaged in non-driving related tasks or may exhibit mind wandering behavior. Also, monitoring monotonous driving environments can result in passive fatigue. Given the potential for different types of mental states to negatively affect takeover performance, it will be critical to highlight how mental states affect semi-autonomous takeover. A systematic review was conducted to synthesize the literature on mental sta
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Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn, Pornsit Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee, Ali Uyar, and Merve Kilic. "Does board gender diversity matter? Evidence from hostile takeover vulnerability." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 21, no. 5 (2021): 845–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2020-0353.

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Purpose Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity. Design/methodology/approach This paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was i
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Scharfe, Marlene Susanne Lisa, Kathrin Zeeb, and Nele Russwinkel. "The Impact of Situational Complexity and Familiarity on Takeover Quality in Uncritical Highly Automated Driving Scenarios." Information 11, no. 2 (2020): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info11020115.

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In the development of highly automated driving systems (L3 and 4), much research has been done on the subject of driver takeover. Strong focus has been placed on the takeover quality. Previous research has shown that one of the main influencing factors is the complexity of a traffic situation that has not been sufficiently addressed so far, as different approaches towards complexity exist. This paper differentiates between the objective complexity and the subjectively perceived complexity. In addition, the familiarity with a takeover situation is examined. Gold et al. show that repetition of t
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Van Dijck, Gijs. "Control and Takeover of Companies as Strategy of Growth." Prague Economic Papers 26, no. 2 (2017): 253–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.612.

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Trillas, Francesc. "The takeover of Enersis: the control of privatized utilities." Utilities Policy 10, no. 1 (2001): 25–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0957-1787(02)00008-5.

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38

Shvydka, Tetiana. "Regulation and control of merger and takeover of undertakings." Entrepreneurship, Economy and Law, no. 2 (2021): 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.32849/2663-5313/2021.2.11.

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Chang, Haitao, Panfeng Huang, Yizhai Zhang, Zhongjie Meng, and Zhengxiong Liu. "Distributed Control Allocation for Spacecraft Attitude Takeover Control via Cellular Space Robot." Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics 41, no. 11 (2018): 2499–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.2514/1.g003626.

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Lee, Joseph, and Yonghui Bao. "The Prospect of Regulatory Alignment for an Interconnected Capital Market between the United Kingdom and China: A Takeover Law Perspective." Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 8, no. 2 (2020): 450–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa020.

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Abstract The United Kingdom (UK) and China have launched the London–Shanghai Stock Connect Scheme to achieve an integrated capital market. In this article, the takeover market is used as an example to examine the extent to which regulatory alignment between the UK and China is possible. The focus is on the role of financial intermediaries in the two markets and how they may influence the governance model of the transfer of corporate control by an open offer to the shareholders of the target company (a takeover bid). This article argues that without regulatory alignment such an integrated marke
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Covrig, Vincent, Daniel L. McConaughy, and Mary Ann K. Travers. "Takeover Premia and Leverage: Theory, Empirical Observations and Recommendations." Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis 12, no. 1 (2017): 123–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jbvela-2015-0002.

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AbstractThe greater a target company’s leverage, the less cash or shares an acquirer needs to control the target enterprise. Given the benefits of acquiring a target, the equity takeover premium is spread over relatively more assets in a more highly leveraged target, thus reducing the premium paid relative to the entire enterprise. This suggests that more levered targets may receive greater equity premia, expressed as a percent of the unaffected share price, other things equal. To test this, we examine takeover transactions that occurred during the 2003–2013 time period. We find that higher eq
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Leitterstorf, Max P., and Maximilian M. Wachter. "Takeover Premiums and Family Blockholders." Family Business Review 29, no. 2 (2015): 214–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0894486515622721.

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Blockholders impact strategic firm decisions because they are better at monitoring managers than dispersed shareholder groups. Nevertheless, we do not sufficiently understand how preferences of different blockholder types impact strategic firm decisions. We discuss this in the context of takeover premiums offered for publicly listed firms. Prior studies have argued that managers are often tempted to offer excessively high premiums. Consistently, blockholders might better control managers and ensure lower premiums. To better understand the impact of blockholder preferences, we focus on the spec
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Sampaio, Rodolfo S., Michael Jones, and Christian Walko. "Evaluation of Novel Concepts for Takeover Control Using Electronically Coupled Sidesticks." Journal of the American Helicopter Society 65, no. 1 (2020): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.4050/jahs.65.012004.

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The state of the of art in flight control systems geared toward dual-pilot helicopters is the use of active inceptor systems to replace the traditional mechanical linkage between pilot and copilot inceptors. This work investigates the introduction of priority functions, which act to actively decouple inceptors in one control station. This approach has the potential to assist pilots to take over control in low-level flight and aid to mitigate loss-of-control accidents that occur in such conditions. Takeover control maneuvers are tested in a dual-pilot helicopter simulation environment to evalua
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Favarò, Francesca M., Philipp Seewald, Maike Scholtes, and Sky Eurich. "Quality of control takeover following disengagements in semi-automated vehicles." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 64 (July 2019): 196–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2019.05.004.

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Siriopoulos, Costas, Antonios Georgopoulos, and Athanasios Tsagkanos. "Does the ‘Market for Corporate Control’ hypothesis explain takeover targets?" Applied Economics Letters 13, no. 9 (2006): 557–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504850600731329.

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Kennedy, V. A., and R. J. Limmack. "TAKEOVER ACTIVITY, CEO TURNOVER, AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 23, no. 2 (1996): 267–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1996.tb00912.x.

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47

Höpner, Martin, and Gregory Jackson. "Revisiting the Mannesmann takeover: how markets for corporate control emerge." European Management Review 3, no. 3 (2006): 142–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500061.

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48

Mudzamiri, Justice, and Patrick Osode. "Reconciling the "Bittersweet Chemistry" between Technology and Corporate Takeovers through Reinforcing National Security Interests in Merger Control." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 24 (August 23, 2021): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2021/v24i0a10741.

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This article argues that company takeover regulation regimes must carefully balance two opposing notions. On the one hand, the regime must be designed to enable or facilitate the initiation and successful implementation of takeovers and mergers in the interests of economic growth and technological advancement. On the other hand, such a regulatory framework ought to be sensitive to the ever-increasing need to protect national security interests, especially from veiled threats. These threats include cybercrimes, private data hacking and espionage, which are endemic to takeovers contemplated by f
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Amel-Zadeh, Amir, and Yuan Zhang. "The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control." Accounting Review 90, no. 1 (2014): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-50869.

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ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our
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Jensen, Michael C. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences." Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, no. 1 (1988): 21–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.2.1.21.

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Economists have accumulated considerable evidence and knowledge on the effects of the takeover market. Here, I focus on current aspects of the controversy. My assessment is that the market for corporate control is creating large benefits for shareholders and for the economy as a whole by loosening control over vast amounts of resources and enabling them to move more quickly to their highest-valued use. This is a healthy market in operation, on both the takeover side and the divestiture side, and it is playing an important role in helping the American economy adjust to major changes in competit
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