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Books on the topic 'Conversational Implicature'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 April 2022

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1

Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000.

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2

Hirschberg, Julia Linn Bell. A theory of scalar implicature. New York: Garland Pub., 1991.

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3

Welker, Katherine Alice. Plans in the common ground: Toward a generative account of conversational implicature : dissertation presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University. Columbus, Ohio: Department of Linguistics, 1994.

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4

Logic, meaning, and conversation: Semantical underdeterminacy, implicature, and their interface. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004.

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5

Davis, Wayne A. Implicature. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.21.

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Implicature for speakers is meaning one thing by saying something else. Semantic implicatures are part of sentence meaning, whereas conversational implicatures depend on the utterance context. Conventional forms of conversational implicature include figures and modes of speech like irony and relevance implicature. A sentence has an implicature when speakers conventionally use sentences of that form with the corresponding implicature. Speakers implicate things for many reasons. Some apply to saying (communication, self-expression, record creation), others do not (verbal efficiency, misleading without lying, veiling, good social relations, style, and entertainment). A sentence has an implicature today because that use became self-perpetuating. The dependence of implicature on intention and convention, and the variety of conflicting goals implicature serves, show that implicatures cannot be derived from conversational principles. Interpreting implicatures is largely the automatic exercise of a competence acquired with one’s native language rather than calculation.

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6

Huang, Yan. Implicature. Edited by Yan Huang. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.013.7.

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The concept of implicature (both conversational and conventional) has its origin in the work of the late English philosopher H. P. Grice, though some proto-Gricean ideas can be traced back to classical times. Since its inception, the notion of conversational implicature has become one of the single most important pragmatic ideas in linguistics and the philosophy of language. It has spurred numerous new concepts such as explicature, the ‘pragmatically enriched said’, and impliciture in various neo- and post-Gricean enterprises. This chapter provides a critical overview of the current state of play in implicature (both conversational and conventional) and its related concepts in linguistics and the philosophy of language.

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7

Davis, Wayne A. Calculability, Convention, and Conversational Implicature. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791492.003.0004.

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I applaud the arguments in Lepore and Stone (2015) that Gricean, Neo-Gricean, and Relevance theories of conversational implicature and utterance interpretation are deeply flawed because the additional meanings speakers convey when using sentences are conventional rather than calculable. I then go on to rebut several conclusions Lepore and Stone endorse that do not follow: that there is no such thing as conversational implicature; that in figurative speech speakers do not mean anything beyond what the sentences they utter mean; that anything a speaker means is something the speaker directly intends and says; and that any meanings conveyed conventionally are given by the grammar or semantics of the language. Along the way, I argue that conventions are constituted by certain causal processes, not mutual expectations, and I distinguish two types of speaker meaning.

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8

Papafragou, Anna, and Dimitrios Skordos. Scalar Implicature. Edited by Jeffrey L. Lidz, William Snyder, and Joe Pater. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199601264.013.26.

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We review experimental evidence regarding the development of scalar implicature in children. Scalar implicatures are inferences that arise when utterances like “Mary ate some of the cakes” are interpreted as “Mary ate some but not all of the cakes.” The evidence suggests that, even though the mechanism for generating scalar implicatures in children is in many respects adult-like, children nevertheless face limitations in computing such conversational inferences from what the speaker said. We highlight the importance of the findings for the development of pragmatic inference, language acquisition, and communication in general. We also identify open questions and promising areas for future research.

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9

Huang, Yan. Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Theory of Conversational Implicature. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199544004.013.0024.

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10

Green, Mitchell S. Assertion. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.8.

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Assertion is here approached as a social practice developed through cultural evolution. This perspective will facilitate inquiry into questions concerning what role assertion plays in communicative life, what norms it is subject to, and whether every viable linguistic community must have a practice of assertion. The author’s evolutionary perspective will further enable us to ask how assertion relates to other communicative practices such as conversational implicature, indirect speech acts, presupposition, and, more broadly, the kinematics of conversation. It will also motivate a resolution of debates between conventionalist and intentionalist approaches to this speech act by explaining how those who make assertions can embody their intentions to perform an act of a certain kind. The chapter closes with a discussion of how assertoric practice can be compromised by patterns of malfeasance on the part of a speaker and by injustice within her milieu.

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11

Stainton, Robert J., and Christopher Viger. Two Questions about Interpretive Effects. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791492.003.0002.

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Our exposition is framed around two questions: What interpretive effects can linguistic utterances have? What causes those effects? Lepore and Stone make an empirical case that some effects are contributions to the public record of a conversation determined by linguistic conventions—following Lewis—while non-contributions (our term) produced by imagination offer no determinate content—following Davidson. They thereby replace the old semantics–pragmatics divide by eliminating conversational implicature altogether. We critique Lepore and Stone’s position on empirical grounds, presenting cases in which contributions are made non-conventionally. We also critique their view methodologically, presenting a dilemma by which they either cannot handle many cases using their framework or they do so in an ad hoc fashion. We conclude by suggesting Relevance Theory as an alternative that follows Lepore and Stone’s purported methodology and handles many of their empirical cases.

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12

Sawada, Osamu. Landscape of scalar meanings. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198714224.003.0002.

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Chapter 2 provides the landscape of scalar meanings and highlights the target phenomenon of this book—the phenomenon of the dual use of scalar modifiers. More specifically, four kinds of scalar meanings are introduced: at-issue scalar meaning, conversational scalar meaning, presuppositional scalar meaning, and conventional implicature (CI) scalar meaning. There follows an informal examination of the dual-use phenomenon of scalar modifiers where a scalar modifier can express an at-issue scalar meaning and a CI scalar meaning. The similarities and differences between a CI and a presupposition are also considered. It is claimed that a CI and a presupposition belong to a different class of meaning and should theoretically be treated differently.

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13

Atlas, Jay David. Logic, Meaning, and Conversation: Semantical Underdeterminacy, Implicature, and Their Interface. Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.

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14

Gibbs, Raymond W. Experimental Pragmatics. Edited by Yan Huang. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199697960.013.30.

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This chapter describes some of the important research in experimental pragmatics, most notably studies related to recovering speakers’ intentions, inferring conversational implicatures, and the role of common ground in discourse understanding. My aim is to demonstrate the utility of different experimental methods for studying pragmatics, and how research findings in the field are relevant to traditional concerns within the linguistic pragmatics community. But I will also argue that experimental pragmatic studies show great regularities and significant variation, both within and across individuals, in the ways people speak and understand language. My alternative view claims that dynamical, self-organizing processes form the critical background from which meaningful pragmatic actions emerge. The implications of this position for interdisciplinary pragmatic research will be discussed.

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15

Stokke, Andreas. The Difference between Lying and Misleading. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825968.003.0005.

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The notions of what is said and assertion, as relative to questions under discussion, are used to provide an account of the lying-misleading distinction. The chapter argues that utterances are sometimes interpreted relative to the so-called Big Question, roughly paraphrased by “What is the world like?” This observation is shown to account for the fact that, when conveying standard conversational implicatures, what is asserted is likewise proposed for the common ground. The chapter applies the resulting account of the lying-misleading distinction to ways of lying and misleading with incomplete predicates, possessives, presuppositions, pronouns, and prosodic focus. A formal notion of contextual questionentailment is defined which shows when it is possible to mislead with respect to a question under discussion while avoiding outright lying.

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16

Corazza, Eros. Proper names. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198714217.003.0003.

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In English, Italian, French, and Spanish (to name only a few languages), people’s names tend to suggest the referent’s gender. Thus “Paul,” “Paolo,” “Pierre,” and “Jesús” strongly suggest that their referent is male, while “Ortensia,” “Mary,” “Paola,” “Pauline,” and “Lizbeth” suggest that the referent is a female. To borrow the terminology introduced by Putnam, we can characterize the additional information conveyed by a name as stereotypical information. It doesn’t affect someone’s linguistic and semantic competence: one is not linguistically incompetent if one doesn’t know that “Sue” is used to refer to females. The argument here is that the stereotypical information conveyed by a name can be characterized along the lines of Grice’s treatment of generalized conversational implicatures and that anaphoric resolution exploits it.

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17

Gerken, Mikkel. The Epistemic Norms of Assertion. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803454.003.0008.

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Chapter 7 extends the discussion of epistemic norms to the linguistic realm. Again, it is argued that a Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNAS) is inadequate and should be replaced with a Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (WASA). According to WASA, S must be adequately warranted in believing that p relative to her conversational context in order to meet the epistemic requirements for asserting that p. This epistemic norm is developed and extended to assertive speech acts that carry implicatures or illocutionary forces. Particular attention is given to the development of a species of WASA that accounts for assertive speech acts having a directive force, such as a recommendation. Thus, Chapter 7 contributes to the debates concerning epistemic norms of assertions.

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18

Stokke, Andreas. Common Ground. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198825968.003.0003.

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This chapter provides a detailed account of the notion of the common ground of conversations, which plays a central role in the Stalnakerian account of assertion that the book relies on for its characterization of lying. The chapter specifies that common ground information is defined in terms of acceptance, rather than belief, and shows how this feature allows that bald-faced lies are assertions. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates how the Stalnakerian conception of communication makes room for bald-faced implicatures. A number of objections to this picture of assertion and the common ground definition of lying are rebutted, including issues concerning the notion of proposing information for common ground uptake, as well as problems involving metaphor and malapropism.

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