Relevant bibliographies by topics / Cooperation and reciprocity

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers

Academic literature on the topic 'Cooperation and reciprocity'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Cooperation and reciprocity"

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Romano, Angelo, and Daniel Balliet. "Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation." Psychological Science 28, no. 10 (September 6, 2017): 1490–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714828.

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Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness of human cooperation observed among individuals who are not genetically related: reciprocity and conformity. We tested whether reciprocity outperformed conformity in promoting cooperation, especially when these psychological processes would promote a different cooperative or noncooperative response. To do so, across three studies, we observed participants’ cooperation with a partner after learning (a) that their partner had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials and (b) that their group members had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner. Although we found that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a stronger influence on cooperation. Moreover, we found that conformity can be partly explained by a concern about one’s reputation—a finding that supports a reciprocity framework.
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Della Rossa, Fabio, Fabio Dercole, and Anna Di Meglio. "Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks." Games 11, no. 1 (March 16, 2020): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11010016.

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Network reciprocity has been successfully put forward (since M. A. Nowak and R. May’s, 1992, influential paper) as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical complexity—supporting the evolution of cooperation in biological and socioeconomic systems. The mechanism is actually the network, which makes agents’ interactions localized, while network reciprocity is the property of the underlying evolutionary process to favor cooperation in sparse rather than dense networks. In theoretical models, the property holds under imitative evolutionary processes, whereas cooperation disappears in any network if imitation is replaced by the more rational best-response rule of strategy update. In social experiments, network reciprocity has been observed, although the imitative behavior did not emerge. What did emerge is a form of conditional cooperation based on direct reciprocity—the propensity to cooperate with neighbors who previously cooperated. To resolve this inconsistency, network reciprocity has been recently shown in a model that rationally confronts the two main behaviors emerging in experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—with rationality introduced by extending the best-response rule to a multi-step predictive horizon. However, direct reciprocity was implemented in a non-standard way, by allowing cooperative agents to temporarily cut the interaction with defecting neighbors. Here, we make this result robust to the way cooperators reciprocate, by implementing direct reciprocity with the standard tit-for-tat strategy and deriving similar results.
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Campennì, Marco, and Gabriele Schino. "Symmetry-based reciprocity: evolutionary constraints on a proximate mechanism." PeerJ 4 (March 15, 2016): e1812. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1812.

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Background.While the evolution of reciprocal cooperation has attracted an enormous attention, the proximate mechanisms underlying the ability of animals to cooperate reciprocally are comparatively neglected. Symmetry-based reciprocity is a hypothetical proximate mechanism that has been suggested to be widespread among cognitively unsophisticated animals.Methods.We developed two agent-based models of symmetry-based reciprocity (one relying on an arbitrary tag and the other on interindividual proximity) and tested their ability both to reproduce significant emergent features of cooperation in group living animals and to promote the evolution of cooperation.Results.Populations formed by agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity showed differentiated “social relationships” and a positive correlation between cooperation given and received: two common aspects of animal cooperation. However, when reproduction and selection across multiple generations were added to the models, agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity were outcompeted by selfish agents that never cooperated.Discussion.In order to evolve, hypothetical proximate mechanisms must be able to stand competition from alternative strategies. While the results of our simulations require confirmation using analytical methods, we provisionally suggest symmetry-based reciprocity is to be abandoned as a possible proximate mechanism underlying the ability of animals to reciprocate cooperative interactions.
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Li, Xuelong, Marko Jusup, Zhen Wang, Huijia Li, Lei Shi, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley, Shlomo Havlin, and Stefano Boccaletti. "Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 1 (December 19, 2017): 30–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707505115.

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Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.
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Reuben, Ernesto, and Sigrid Suetens. "Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error." Games 9, no. 3 (September 6, 2018): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030066.

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We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
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Feess, Eberhard. "Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159, no. 1 (2003): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456032975014.

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Fon, Vincy, and Francesco Parisi. "Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159, no. 1 (2003): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456032975032.

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Gilliam, David A., and Steven W. Rayburn. "Propensity for reciprocity among frontline employees." Journal of Services Marketing 30, no. 3 (May 9, 2016): 290–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsm-05-2015-0194.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine how other-regarding personality traits relate to reciprocity among frontline employees (FLEs). Design/methodology/approach Other-regarding personality variables were used to model the propensity for reciprocity and actual reciprocal behaviors with coworkers. Surveys of 276 FLEs were examined via structural equations modeling. Findings Other-regarding personality traits proved to be antecedents of reciprocity. Cynicism was particularly interesting in that it was positively related to reciprocity contrary to findings in other research. Research limitations/implications Among the interesting findings relating personality to reciprocity are a more affective type of reciprocity based on empathy and altruism, and a more calculative type based on cynicism related to Machiavellianism. Practical implications Managers can use the effects of personality traits on reciprocity and cooperation to hire and place FLEs in ways that provide superior service and increased profits. Social implications This paper indicates that certain individuals who might not typically be thought of as cooperative can in fact reciprocate. Specific ideas about cynicism and Machiavellian reciprocity in FLEs are discussed. Originality/value The findings will aid researchers and managers in understanding personality and FLEs cooperation. The findings on cynicism are particularly valuable in that they contradict some earlier research and commonly held managerial ideas.
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Gerber, Nina, Manon K. Schweinfurth, and Michael Taborsky. "The smell of cooperation: rats increase helpful behaviour when receiving odour cues of a conspecific performing a cooperative task." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287, no. 1939 (November 25, 2020): 20202327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.2327.

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Reciprocity can explain cooperative behaviour among non-kin, where individuals help others depending on their experience in previous interactions. Norway rats ( Rattus norvegicus ) cooperate reciprocally according to direct and generalized reciprocity. In a sequence of four consecutive experiments, we show that odour cues from a cooperating conspecific are sufficient to induce the altruistic help of rats in a food-exchange task. When rats were enabled to help a non-cooperative partner while receiving olfactory information from a rat helping a conspecific in a different room, they helped their non-cooperative partner as if it was a cooperative one. We further show that the cues inducing altruistic behaviour are released during the act of cooperation and do not depend on the identity of the cue provider. Remarkably, olfactory cues seem to be more important for cooperation decisions than experiencing a cooperative act per se . This suggests that rats may signal their cooperation propensity to social partners, which increases their chances to receive help in return.
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McCabe, Kevin. "Reciprocity, cooperation and fairness." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 72 (September 19, 2008): S03. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.72.0_s03.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Cooperation and reciprocity"

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Saral, Ali Seyhun. "Three Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trento, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11572/242869.

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This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of cooperation and social preferences. We use experimental and computational methods to understand the role and extent of reciprocity on cooperation. The first paper is a methodological contribution to the large literature on conditional preferences of cooperation. Cooperation generated by this type of preferences is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other subjects' free-riding. This has led to the widely-shared conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its collapse) is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study, we explore the possibility that reciprocally cooperative preferences may themselves be unstable. We do so by observing the evolution of subjects' preferences in an anonymously repeated social dilemma. Our unsettling result is that, in the course of the experiment, a significant fraction of reciprocally cooperative subjects become egoistic, while the reverse is rarely observed. The non-selfish preferences that appear to be more stable are those most easily attributed to confusion. We are thus driven to the conclusion that egoism is more resistant to exposure to social dilemmas than reciprocity. The second paper the evolutionary success of conditional preferences by using simulations. We use an agent-based model in which agents play a variation of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We estimate the likelihood of cooperation levels as well as the likelihood of the existence of conditional types for different continuation probabilities. We show that an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation strategy together with the perfect conditional cooperation strategy are most likely to emerge when the continuation probability is sufficiently high. Our most surprising finding is related to the so-called hump-shaped strategy, a conditional type that is commonly observed in experiments. Our simulations show that those types are likely to thrive for intermediate levels of the continuation probability due to their relative advantage when probability of interaction is not enough to sustain a full-cooperation, but instead merely sustains mid-level cooperation. The third paper aims to understand the underlying reciprocal motives in altruistic behavior. We argue that the altruism that is revealed in dictator games can be explained by what we call presumptive reciprocity. Subjects may display non-selfish preferences because they presume that the other subjects would have revealed similar, non-selfish preferences if the roles had been reversed. This kind of intuitive reasoning, although partially captured by indirect reciprocity, is overlooked in the literature on social preferences, especially when it comes to explaining the behavior that appears to be purely altruistic. The experimental evidence we provide shows that people's choices reveal mostly presumptive reciprocity, while purely altruistic preferences play a much smaller role.
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Weber, Till O. "Strong reciprocity : norms and preferences governing cooperation and punishment behaviour." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51693/.

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Many problems that societies face have the character of social dilemmas, in which cooperation benefits the whole society but is costly to the individual. The recent literature in experimental economics has focused on uncovering driving factors of cooperative success in social dilemmas. This thesis contributes to this literature and includes three research studies that investigate the influence of individual cooperative dispositions, societal and cultural differences, as well as institutional differences on human cooperative behaviour. Chapter 1 introduces the research questions, discusses the research methods used, and outlines the substantive contributions of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents an experimental test of a common implicit assumption in the literature, which suggests that only people with a cooperative disposition engage in the punishment of defectors in social dilemmas. The experimental test rejects this assumption and shows that individual cooperativeness is independent of one's propensity to punish. Chapter 3 investigates the channels through which culture and societal differences affect cooperative behaviour. The experimental results show that societal differences in behaviour are mainly driven through differences in beliefs about other people's behaviour. Chapter 4 reports on an experimental comparison of informal and formal sanctioning institutions. These experiments show that informal sanctions like peer pressure are necessary to foster high and stable cooperation levels in the long run. Chapter 5 concludes.
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Berger, Ulrich. "Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity." Elsevier, 2010. http://epub.wu.ac.at/3273/1/indirec_GEB_revised.pdf.

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Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information, i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature. Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation. (author's abstract)
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Berger, Ulrich, and Ansgar Grüne. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information." Elsevier, 2016. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5067/1/2016_GEB.pdf.

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Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation in large groups where partners meet only once. The first model for which this has been demonstrated was the image scoring mechanism. But analytical work on the simplest possible case, the binary scoring model, has shown that even small errors in implementation destabilize any cooperative regime. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, assessments of reputation must be based on higher-order information. Is indirect reciprocity relying on frst-order information doomed to fail? We use a simple analytical model of image scoring to show that this need not be the case. Indeed, in the general image scoring model the introduction of implementation errors has just the opposite effect as in the binary scoring model: it may stabilize instead of destabilize cooperation.
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Faas, Albert J. "Reciprocity and Development in Disaster-Induced Resettlement in Andean Ecuador." Scholar Commons, 2012. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4317.

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This dissertation addresses gaps in anthropological knowledge about how reciprocity--and a specifically Andean form of reciprocity--works in disaster and resettlement settings. This study looks at the practices of reciprocity in a disaster-affected community (Manzano) and a disaster-induced resettlement (Pusuca) in the Andean highlands of Ecuador. Specifically, it examines two aspects of reciprocal exchange practices in these sites. It first looks at some of the factors that affect the continuity of reciprocal exchange practices, which other studies have found to play a vital role in recovery from disasters and resettlement. It then looks to the roles of unequal power relations in the practices of reciprocity and a particularly Andean form of reciprocity and cooperative labor, the minga. The study identifies power-laden dynamics in the practice of reciprocity that tend to be overlooked in studies of social support and mutual aid in disasters and resettlements. I argue that these dynamics are critical to an examination of reciprocity in these contexts because they have important implications for the distribution of relief and development resources. This study employed an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase research strategy in the recursive discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study hypotheses. In the first phase, exploratory observation, key informant interviews, and archival searches identified specific terms, practices, and events in order to design effective structured interview questions. In the second phase, I administered structured interviews to obtain quantitative indicators of reciprocal exchanges between group members, distribution of development benefits and collective resources, and occupational and socioeconomic data. In the third phase, I conducted focused observation and documentation of participation in decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public negotiations of development strategies and aid allocation. The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and residential distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results were mixed between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly associated with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation with residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were significant negative correlations with wage employment and residential distance with records of minga participation. The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange participation would be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of the association between household minga attendance and total household exchange participation found positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not in Pusuca. For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making processes. Hypothesis 3b tests the assumption that households connected through reciprocal exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater share of relief and development resources than others. Statistical tests indicated a significant positive association between being connected to highly connected households and project benefit inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful that access scarce extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which can be taken as evidence of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites. This study contributes to anthropological knowledge about the political economy of reciprocity in disaster-induced resettlements in two ways. First, it looks more broadly at the range of factors that could influence the continuity or disruption of practices of cooperation and reciprocal exchange in resettlement than other studies, which focuses on the narrow influence of policy practice. In this study, I draw on the economic anthropology of reciprocity and posit a possible role of wider political economic processes--growing integration into the capitalist wage labor economy--as an added explanatory factor for the dissolution of reciprocal exchange relations in post-disaster and resettlement contexts. The second way in which I seek to build upon these studies is by foregrounding the ways in which power relations are bound up in reciprocal exchange relations.
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Mnguni, Peliwe Pelisa. "Mutuality, reciprocity and mature relatedness a psychodynamic perspective on sustainability /." Swinburne Research Bank, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/22485.

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Thesis (PhD) - Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship, Swinburne University of Technology - 2008.
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship, Swinburne University of Technology, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 212-236).
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Dimitriadou, Sylvia. "Cooperation in a dynamic social environment." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33704.

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Cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals is an evolutionary paradox. Research suggests that an individual’s propensity to cooperate and its response to experiencing cooperation or defection from its social environment consistently varies among individuals and as a function of external factors. The biological and psychological underpinnings of such behavioural variation remain unknown; they can, however, provide more insight into the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among non-kin. This thesis explores the proximate effects of experiences of cooperation or defection from the social environment, as well as possible proximate drivers of cooperative behaviour, using the Trinidadian guppy (Poecilia reticulata) as a study system. Firstly, the behavioural rules underpinning an individual’s decision to cooperate or not with unfamiliar individuals in the presence of specific or non-specific information were explored. When fish had information about their social partner’s cooperativeness, they behaved in a manner consistent with direct reciprocity, copying their partner’s last move. When paired with an ostensibly novel partner, a different, or at least additional, behavioural rule seemed to be employed. In order to help understand the drivers of individual variation in cooperative behaviour, phenotypic selection on cooperativeness was carried out over three filial generations, resulting in fish of high cooperativeness (HC) and low cooperativeness (LC). The divergence of individual cooperativeness observed between the two phenotypic selection lines suggests that cooperative behaviour in the context of predator inspection is at least in part heritable. Cooperative behaviour of F3 fish was found not to correlate with boldness or exploratory behaviour; HC and LC fish did, however, differ in some aspects of sociability and agonistic behaviour. Possible proximate neuromodulatory mechanisms underlying these differences in cooperativeness were also explored, focusing on brain expression patterns for the isotocin receptor (itr) gene in F3 females. HC females were found to have higher mid-section itr expression levels than LC females. Finally, I explored the effects of experiencing cooperation or defection on monoaminergic neurotransmission, which is thought to instantiate the effects of such experiences on the individual’s internal state. My findings suggest that experiencing cooperation or defection from the social environment affects internal state; this phenomenon may be crucial for the appropriate adjustment of the behavioural response to such experiences, and for the emergence of behavioural rules such as generalised reciprocity. Taken together these results suggest that neuromodulatory mechanisms are pivotal for the perception of stimuli from the social environment in the tested cooperative context and that variation in cooperative behaviour may be underpinned by individual differences in the structural properties of such systems. They also provide insight into how behavioural input may affect the behavioural response to such experiences, and ultimately how such mechanisms may lead to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.
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Berger, Ulrich, and Ansgar Grüne. "Evolutionary Stability of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2014. http://epub.wu.ac.at/4087/1/wp168.pdf.

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Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation in groups where partners meet only once. The first model for which this has analytically been shown was the binary image scoring mechanism, where one's reputation is only based on one's last action. But this mechanism is known to fail if errors in implementation occur. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, reputation assessments must be of higher order, i.e. contingent not only on past actions, but also on the reputations of the targets of these actions. We show here that this need not be the case. A simple image scoring mechanism where more than just one past action is observed provides ample possibilities for stable cooperation to emerge even under substantial rates of implementation errors. (authors' abstract)
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Furlong, Ellen Elizabeth. "Number Cognition and Cooperation." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1216999104.

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Dupuis, Michele. "The art of giving : cooperation, reciprocity and household economic strategies among soapstone carvers in Qimmirut (Lake Harbour). NWT." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=56931.

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This thesis examines soapstone carving among Inuit in Lake Harbour, NWT, as a socially adapted form of employment. A time allocation diary, participant observation and informal interviews were implemented. The empirical evidence reveals two important aspects of soapstone carving. First, carving acts as an important source of income for the mostly part-time carvers and their families in Lake Harbour. As such, carving functions as part of a household economic strategy that serves to capitalize the harvest of country food. Second, it notes that Inuit often produce carvings collectively, usually with the help of family members. Also, the returns from the carvings are shared not only among those who participate in the production of the sculpture, but among members of the extended family as a whole, following the patterns of kinship-based food-sharing. Thus, not only is carving an important supplement to other forms of income, it is an integral part of the existing social forms of Inuit society, most notably generalized reciprocity.
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Books on the topic "Cooperation and reciprocity"

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Samuel, Bowles. A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

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Orsi, Cosma. The value of reciprocity: Arguing for a plural political economy. Roskilde: Federico Caffè Centre Publisher, Roskilde University, Dept. of Social Science, 2006.

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Orsi, Cosma. The value of reciprocity: Arguing for a plural political economy. Roskilde: Federico Caffè Centre Publisher, Roskilde University, Dept. of Social Science, 2006.

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Itkonen, Panu. Skolt Sami cooperation: Forms of reciprocity in work situations of the Sevettijärvi reindeer herding community at the beginning of the 21st century and actions of state administration. Helsinki: Unigrafia, 2012.

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National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, on H.R. 822, September 13, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.

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Rizzi, Felice, Stefania Gandolfi, and Stefania Gandolfi. Diritti dell'uomo e cooperazione internazionale: L'etica della reciprocità. Bergamo: Bergamo University Press, 2013.

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Salas, Paula Cordero. Cooperation and Reciprocity in Carbon Sequestration Contracts. The World Bank, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6521.

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Woodward, James. Cooperation and Reciprocity: Empirical Evidence and Normative Implications. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195392753.013.0024.

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Samuel, Bowles, and Herbert M. Gintis. Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution. Princeton University Press, 2011.

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Samuel, Bowles, and Herbert M. Gintis. Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution. Princeton University Press, 2011.

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Book chapters on the topic "Cooperation and reciprocity"

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Nishibe, Makoto. "Ethics in Exchange and Reciprocity." In Competition, Trust, and Cooperation, 77–95. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56836-7_4.

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Niv-Solomon, Anat. "When Reciprocity Sometimes Fails." In Cooperation and Protracted Conflict in International Affairs, 1–22. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-45805-2_1.

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de Waal, Frans B. M., and Sarah F. Brosnan. "Simple and complex reciprocity in primates." In Cooperation in Primates and Humans, 85–105. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28277-7_5.

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Calvo, Patrici. "Reciprocity Approaches: The Possibility of Human Cooperation." In The Cordial Economy - Ethics, Recognition and Reciprocity, 55–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90784-0_4.

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Du, Peng, Yanmei Li, and Weixuan Xu. "Cooperation Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Discrimination." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 768–76. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11600930_77.

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Elfers, John, and Patty Hlava. "Foundations of Gratitude: Human Cooperation and Reciprocity." In The Spectrum of Gratitude Experience, 9–29. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41030-2_2.

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Calvo, Patrici. "Cordial Rationality: The Language of Human Cooperation." In The Cordial Economy - Ethics, Recognition and Reciprocity, 105–26. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90784-0_7.

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Calvo, Patrici. "Cordial Reciprocity: The Ethical Basis of Human Cooperation." In The Cordial Economy - Ethics, Recognition and Reciprocity, 91–104. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90784-0_6.

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Verbeek, Bruno. "Motives for Conditional Cooperation: Reciprocity, Trust and Fairness." In Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy, 125–58. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9982-5_4.

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Liu, Aizhi, Lei Wang, Yanling Zhang, and Changyin Sun. "Coevolution of Cooperation and Complex Networks via Indirect Reciprocity." In Neural Information Processing, 919–26. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70139-4_93.

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Conference papers on the topic "Cooperation and reciprocity"

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Gao, Yang, Yan Chen, and K. J. Ray Liu. "Cooperation stimulation in cooperative communications: An indirect reciprocity game." In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364007.

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De Lucena Falcao, Eduardo, Francisco Brasileiro, Andrey Brito, and Jose Luis Vivas. "Enhancing P2P Cooperation through Transitive Indirect Reciprocity." In 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems: Workshops (ICDCSW). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icdcsw.2016.24.

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Si, Nan, Linlin Tian, and Wenlin Yao. "Cooperation Enhanced by Indirect Reciprocity and Spatial Reciprocity in Social P2P Reputation Systems." In 2015 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Communication Networks (CICN). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cicn.2015.303.

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Righi, Simone, and Karoly Takacs. "Blind Vs. Embedded Indirect Reciprocity And The Evolution Of Cooperation." In 31st Conference on Modelling and Simulation. ECMS, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7148/2017-0060.

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Hutter, Christian, Raphael Lorch, and Klemens Bohm. "Evolving Cooperation through Reciprocity Using a Centrality-Based Reputation System." In 2011 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat.2011.204.

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Chen, Yan, and K. J. Ray Liu. "Cooperation Stimulation in Cognitive Networks Using Indirect Reciprocity Game Modelling." In 2010 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2010.5683332.

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Cui, Guanghai, Yizhi Ren, Shengwen Tian, Ting Wu, and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. "Evolution of Resource Sharing Cooperation Based on Reciprocity in Social Networks." In 2018 27th International Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icccn.2018.8487402.

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Seredynski, Marcin, and Pascal Bouvry. "The Cost of Altruistic Punishment in Indirect Reciprocity-based Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks." In 2010 IEEE/IFIP 8th International Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing (EUC) (Co-Located with CSE 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/euc.2010.118.

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Neymark, M., E. Petuchov, and K. Sinkin. "Proper observance of the principle of reciprocity as a guarantee for the sustainable development of cooperation between the subjects of cross-border territories in the field of criminal justice: the moral and legal aspect." In Proceedings of the International Conference on Sustainable Development of Cross-Border Regions: Economic, Social and Security Challenges (ICSDCBR 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icsdcbr-19.2019.92.

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Zhang, Wentao, Zhiqiang Zuo, and Yijing Wang. "Cooperative control in the presence of antagonistic reciprocity." In 2017 11th Asian Control Conference (ASCC). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ascc.2017.8287263.

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