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1
Saral, Ali Seyhun. "Three Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Trento, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11572/242869.
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This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of cooperation and social preferences. We use experimental and computational methods to understand the role and extent of reciprocity on cooperation.
The first paper is a methodological contribution to the large literature on conditional preferences of cooperation. Cooperation generated by this type of preferences is notoriously unstable, as individuals reduce their contributions to the public good in reaction to other subjects' free-riding. This has led to the widely-shared conclusion that cooperation observed in experiments (and its collapse) is mostly driven by imperfect reciprocity. In this study, we explore the possibility that reciprocally cooperative preferences may themselves be unstable. We do so by observing the evolution of subjects' preferences in an anonymously repeated social dilemma. Our unsettling result is that, in the course of the experiment, a significant fraction of reciprocally cooperative subjects become egoistic, while the reverse is rarely observed. The non-selfish preferences that appear to be more stable are those most easily attributed to confusion. We are thus driven to the conclusion that egoism is more resistant to exposure to social dilemmas than reciprocity.
The second paper the evolutionary success of conditional preferences by using simulations. We use an agent-based model in which agents play a variation of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We estimate the likelihood of cooperation levels as well as the likelihood of the existence of conditional types for different continuation probabilities. We show that an all-or-none type of conditional cooperation strategy together with the perfect conditional cooperation strategy are most likely to emerge when the continuation probability is sufficiently high. Our most surprising finding is related to the so-called hump-shaped strategy, a conditional type that is commonly observed in experiments. Our simulations show that those types are likely to thrive for intermediate levels of the continuation probability due to their relative advantage when probability of interaction is not enough to sustain a full-cooperation, but instead merely sustains mid-level cooperation.
The third paper aims to understand the underlying reciprocal motives in altruistic behavior. We argue that the altruism that is revealed in dictator games can be explained by what we call presumptive reciprocity. Subjects may display non-selfish preferences because they presume that the other subjects would have revealed similar, non-selfish preferences if the roles had been reversed. This kind of intuitive reasoning, although partially captured by indirect reciprocity, is overlooked in the literature on social preferences, especially when it comes to explaining the behavior that appears to be purely altruistic. The experimental evidence we provide shows that people's choices reveal mostly presumptive reciprocity, while purely altruistic preferences play a much smaller role.
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Weber, Till O. "Strong reciprocity : norms and preferences governing cooperation and punishment behaviour." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51693/.
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Many problems that societies face have the character of social dilemmas, in which cooperation benefits the whole society but is costly to the individual. The recent literature in experimental economics has focused on uncovering driving factors of cooperative success in social dilemmas. This thesis contributes to this literature and includes three research studies that investigate the influence of individual cooperative dispositions, societal and cultural differences, as well as institutional differences on human cooperative behaviour. Chapter 1 introduces the research questions, discusses the research methods used, and outlines the substantive contributions of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents an experimental test of a common implicit assumption in the literature, which suggests that only people with a cooperative disposition engage in the punishment of defectors in social dilemmas. The experimental test rejects this assumption and shows that individual cooperativeness is independent of one's propensity to punish. Chapter 3 investigates the channels through which culture and societal differences affect cooperative behaviour. The experimental results show that societal differences in behaviour are mainly driven through differences in beliefs about other people's behaviour. Chapter 4 reports on an experimental comparison of informal and formal sanctioning institutions. These experiments show that informal sanctions like peer pressure are necessary to foster high and stable cooperation levels in the long run. Chapter 5 concludes.
3
Berger, Ulrich. "Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity." Elsevier, 2010. http://epub.wu.ac.at/3273/1/indirec_GEB_revised.pdf.
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Cooperating in the Prisoner's Dilemma is irrational and some supporting mechanism is needed to stabilize cooperation. Indirect reciprocity based on reputation is
one such mechanism. Assessing an individual's reputation requires first-order information,
i.e. knowledge about its previous behavior, as it is utilized under image
scoring. But there seems to be an agreement that in order to successfully stabilize
cooperation, higher-order information is necessary, i.e. knowledge of others' previous
reputations. We show here that such a conclusion might have been premature.
Tolerant scoring, a first-order assessment rule with built-in tolerance against single
defections, can lead a society to stable cooperation. (author's abstract)
4
Berger, Ulrich, and Ansgar Grüne. "On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information." Elsevier, 2016. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5067/1/2016_GEB.pdf.
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Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which
may explain the prevalence of cooperation in large groups where partners meet only once.
The first model for which this has been demonstrated was the image scoring mechanism.
But analytical work on the simplest possible case, the binary scoring model, has shown
that even small errors in implementation destabilize any cooperative regime. It has
thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, assessments of
reputation must be based on higher-order information. Is indirect reciprocity relying
on frst-order information doomed to fail? We use a simple analytical model of image
scoring to show that this need not be the case. Indeed, in the general image scoring
model the introduction of implementation errors has just the opposite effect as in the
binary scoring model: it may stabilize instead of destabilize cooperation.
5
Faas, Albert J. "Reciprocity and Development in Disaster-Induced Resettlement in Andean Ecuador." Scholar Commons, 2012. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4317.
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This dissertation addresses gaps in anthropological knowledge about how reciprocity--and a specifically Andean form of reciprocity--works in disaster and resettlement settings. This study looks at the practices of reciprocity in a disaster-affected community (Manzano) and a disaster-induced resettlement (Pusuca) in the Andean highlands of Ecuador. Specifically, it examines two aspects of reciprocal exchange practices in these sites. It first looks at some of the factors that affect the continuity of reciprocal exchange practices, which other studies have found to play a vital role in recovery from disasters and resettlement. It then looks to the roles of unequal power relations in the practices of reciprocity and a particularly Andean form of reciprocity and cooperative labor, the minga. The study identifies power-laden dynamics in the practice of reciprocity that tend to be overlooked in studies of social support and mutual aid in disasters and resettlements. I argue that these dynamics are critical to an examination of reciprocity in these contexts because they have important implications for the distribution of relief and development resources.
This study employed an iterative, mixed-method, 3-phase research strategy in the recursive discovery and corroboration of analytical domains and the evaluation of study hypotheses. In the first phase, exploratory observation, key informant interviews, and archival searches identified specific terms, practices, and events in order to design effective structured interview questions. In the second phase, I administered structured interviews to obtain quantitative indicators of reciprocal exchanges between group members, distribution of development benefits and collective resources, and occupational and socioeconomic data. In the third phase, I conducted focused observation and documentation of participation in decision-making, plus patterns of influence in public negotiations of development strategies and aid allocation.
The expectation of hypothesis 1 was that wage employment and residential distance would be negatively associated with minga participation. The results were mixed between the two sites. In Manzano, wage employment was not significantly associated with records of minga participation, but there was a significant negative correlation with residential distance and minga participation. In Pusuca, there were significant negative correlations with wage employment and residential distance with records of minga participation. The expectation of hypothesis 2 was that household exchange participation would be positively associated with minga participation. Multiple tests of the association between household minga attendance and total household exchange participation found positive associations between these two variables in Manzano, but not in Pusuca.
For hypothesis 3a, the expectation was that total household exchange participation would be positively associated with brokerage and decision-making power and statistical tests found a significant positive correlation between these variables in both sites. The implication is that one way that politically powerful individuals exercise and maintain their power is through forming reciprocal exchange ties. Those with more ties are more likely to act as brokers between their neighbors and scarce aid and development resources and more likely to have their views and agendas supported in local decision-making processes.
Hypothesis 3b tests the assumption that households connected through reciprocal exchange relations to highly connected households access a greater share of relief and development resources than others. Statistical tests indicated a significant positive association between being connected to highly connected households and project benefit inclusion in both sites. This suggests that it is not only the powerful that access scarce extra-local resources, but also their less connected allies, which can be taken as evidence of privileged inclusion as a form of power in both sites.
This study contributes to anthropological knowledge about the political economy of reciprocity in disaster-induced resettlements in two ways. First, it looks more broadly at the range of factors that could influence the continuity or disruption of practices of cooperation and reciprocal exchange in resettlement than other studies, which focuses on the narrow influence of policy practice. In this study, I draw on the economic anthropology of reciprocity and posit a possible role of wider political economic processes--growing integration into the capitalist wage labor economy--as an added explanatory factor for the dissolution of reciprocal exchange relations in post-disaster and resettlement contexts. The second way in which I seek to build upon these studies is by foregrounding the ways in which power relations are bound up in reciprocal exchange relations.
6
Mnguni, Peliwe Pelisa. "Mutuality, reciprocity and mature relatedness a psychodynamic perspective on sustainability /." Swinburne Research Bank, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.3/22485.
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Thesis (PhD) - Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship, Swinburne University of Technology - 2008.Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Australian Graduate School of Entrepreneurship, Swinburne University of Technology, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 212-236).
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Dimitriadou, Sylvia. "Cooperation in a dynamic social environment." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/33704.
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Cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals is an evolutionary paradox. Research suggests that an individual’s propensity to cooperate and its response to experiencing cooperation or defection from its social environment consistently varies among individuals and as a function of external factors. The biological and psychological underpinnings of such behavioural variation remain unknown; they can, however, provide more insight into the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among non-kin. This thesis explores the proximate effects of experiences of cooperation or defection from the social environment, as well as possible proximate drivers of cooperative behaviour, using the Trinidadian guppy (Poecilia reticulata) as a study system. Firstly, the behavioural rules underpinning an individual’s decision to cooperate or not with unfamiliar individuals in the presence of specific or non-specific information were explored. When fish had information about their social partner’s cooperativeness, they behaved in a manner consistent with direct reciprocity, copying their partner’s last move. When paired with an ostensibly novel partner, a different, or at least additional, behavioural rule seemed to be employed. In order to help understand the drivers of individual variation in cooperative behaviour, phenotypic selection on cooperativeness was carried out over three filial generations, resulting in fish of high cooperativeness (HC) and low cooperativeness (LC). The divergence of individual cooperativeness observed between the two phenotypic selection lines suggests that cooperative behaviour in the context of predator inspection is at least in part heritable. Cooperative behaviour of F3 fish was found not to correlate with boldness or exploratory behaviour; HC and LC fish did, however, differ in some aspects of sociability and agonistic behaviour. Possible proximate neuromodulatory mechanisms underlying these differences in cooperativeness were also explored, focusing on brain expression patterns for the isotocin receptor (itr) gene in F3 females. HC females were found to have higher mid-section itr expression levels than LC females. Finally, I explored the effects of experiencing cooperation or defection on monoaminergic neurotransmission, which is thought to instantiate the effects of such experiences on the individual’s internal state. My findings suggest that experiencing cooperation or defection from the social environment affects internal state; this phenomenon may be crucial for the appropriate adjustment of the behavioural response to such experiences, and for the emergence of behavioural rules such as generalised reciprocity. Taken together these results suggest that neuromodulatory mechanisms are pivotal for the perception of stimuli from the social environment in the tested cooperative context and that variation in cooperative behaviour may be underpinned by individual differences in the structural properties of such systems. They also provide insight into how behavioural input may affect the behavioural response to such experiences, and ultimately how such mechanisms may lead to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.
8
Berger, Ulrich, and Ansgar Grüne. "Evolutionary Stability of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring." WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2014. http://epub.wu.ac.at/4087/1/wp168.pdf.
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Indirect reciprocity describes a class of reputation-based mechanisms which may explain the prevalence of cooperation in groups where partners meet only once. The first model for which this has analytically been shown was the binary image scoring mechanism, where one's reputation is only based on one's last action. But this mechanism is known to fail if errors in implementation occur. It has thus been claimed that for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation, reputation assessments must be of higher
order, i.e. contingent not only on past actions, but also on the reputations of the targets of these actions. We show here that this need not be the case. A simple image scoring
mechanism where more than just one past action is observed provides ample possibilities for stable cooperation to emerge even under substantial rates of implementation errors. (authors' abstract)Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
9
Furlong, Ellen Elizabeth. "Number Cognition and Cooperation." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1216999104.
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Dupuis, Michele. "The art of giving : cooperation, reciprocity and household economic strategies among soapstone carvers in Qimmirut (Lake Harbour). NWT." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=56931.
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This thesis examines soapstone carving among Inuit in Lake Harbour, NWT, as a socially adapted form of employment. A time allocation diary, participant observation and informal interviews were implemented. The empirical evidence reveals two important aspects of soapstone carving. First, carving acts as an important source of income for the mostly part-time carvers and their families in Lake Harbour. As such, carving functions as part of a household economic strategy that serves to capitalize the harvest of country food. Second, it notes that Inuit often produce carvings collectively, usually with the help of family members. Also, the returns from the carvings are shared not only among those who participate in the production of the sculpture, but among members of the extended family as a whole, following the patterns of kinship-based food-sharing. Thus, not only is carving an important supplement to other forms of income, it is an integral part of the existing social forms of Inuit society, most notably generalized reciprocity.
11
Mansell, Jordan. "Unpacking the adaptive significance of the political spectrum : do liberal and conservative ideological differences reflect alternative strategies for obtaining reciprocity?" Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:80591e62-c6b9-403c-8e7e-936bcfd716dc.
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In the following thesis I examine the possible evolutionary significance of behavioural differences associated with liberal and conservative ideological orientations. In investigating the evolutionary significance of these two orientations I have two primary research questions. First, how do liberal and conservative oriented individuals differ in their responses to the same socio-environmental stimuli? Second, do differences in their responses to socio-environmental stimuli represent alternative behavioural strategies for social interaction, specifically adaptive strategies to maximize returns from social interactions? To answer these research questions I evaluate how trust and cooperation among liberal and conservative oriented individuals are affected by conditions of social change and inequality. Previous research finds that attitudes and behaviours consistent with the tolerance or intolerance of social change and inequality are strong predictors of ideological orientation across a liberal-conservative scale. Based on a synthesis of behavioural research I construct two theoretical frameworks to account for the adaptive utility associated with a sensitivity to social change and inequality; 1) The Group Reciprocity Hypothesis, and 2) The Social Risk Hypothesis. I test these frameworks using an experimental research design. I predict that, if liberal and conservative orientations are reflective of alternative adaptive strategies to maximize returns from social interaction, then the willingness of liberal and conservative individuals to participate in a social interaction should be differentially affected by conditions related to social change and inequality.
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Bayor, Isaac. "Community Participation in Poverty Reduction Interventions: Examiningthe Factors that impact on the Community-Based Organisation (CBO) Empowerment Project in Ghana." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2010. http://etd.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=etd&action=viewtitle&id=gen8Srv25Nme4_2150_1298618279.
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Hence, in this mini-thesis I argue that community participation does not automatically facilitate gains for the poor. My main assumption is that internal rigidities in communities, such as weak social capital, culture, trust and reciprocity, affect mutual cooperation towards collective community gains. I used two communities, where a community empowerment project is implemented, as a case study to demonstrate that the success of community participation is contingent on the stocks of social capital in the community. The results show that the responsiveness of the two communities to the project activities differs with the stocks of social capital. I found that trust among community members facilitates information flow in the community. The level of trust is also related to the sources of information of community members about development activities in the community. I also found that solidarity is an important dimension of social capital, which determines community members&rsquo
willingness to help one another and to participate in activities towards collective community gain. The research also demonstrated that perception of community members about target beneficiaries of projects&ndash
whether they represent the interest of the majority of the community or only the interest of community leaders &ndash
influences the level of confidence and ownership of the project. From my research findings, I concluded that, in order for community participation to work successfully, development managers need to identify the stocks of social capital in the community that will form the basis to determine the level of engagement with community members in the participatory process.
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Volstorf, Jenny. "Against all noise." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät II, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16709.
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Für Kooperation via direkte Reziprozität müssen Menschen das Handeln ihrer Partner nachverfolgen, um Ausbeutung zu verhindern. Störungen (d.h. Gedächtnis- oder Wahrnehmungs-/Entscheidungsfehler) beeinträchtigen aber das Nachverfolgen. In meiner Dissertation erkunde ich, ob Strategien zur Modellierung menschlichen Verhaltens kognitiv umsetzbar sind und wie sie mit Störungen umgehen und erforsche umsetzbare störrobuste Alternativen. Tit-For-Tat, berühmtestes Beispiel traditioneller 1-Schritt-Gedächtnis-Strategien, ist nicht störrobust, weil kleinste Störungen seinen Erfolg verringern. Da Störungen alltäglich sind, ist Tit-For-Tat kein ideales Modell menschlichen Verhaltens. Kapitel 1 zeigte hohe Gedächtnisfehlerraten, wenn Versuchspersonen die letzte Handlung ihrer Partner wiedergeben sollten (1-Schritt-Gedächtnis). In einer evolutionären Simulation ging Kooperation bei diesen Raten unter. Sich an die letzte Handlung zu erinnern, ist weder störrobust noch umsetzbar. In Kapitel 2 untersuchte ich, ob Menschen die kognitiv eher umsetzbare Strategie benutzen, ihre Partner in Typen einzuteilen und Kooperierer/Betrüger zu unterscheiden. Verglichen damit, sich die letzte Handlung jedes Partners zu merken, sollte das die Gedächtnisanforderungen senken. Die Ergebnisse deuten an, daß Menschen Partnertypen unterscheiden und ihre Strategie an die Typenverteilung in der Umgebung anpassen. Kapitel 3 erforschte Strategien, die den Vorgang der Einteilung von Partnertypen modellieren, indem sie einen Eindruck bilden. In einer Simulation waren eindrucksbasierte Strategien beim Aufrechterhalten von Kooperation störrobuster als traditionelle Strategien. Auch sagten eindrucksbasierte Strategien Versuchspersonenverhalten besser vorher als traditionelle Strategien. Gewinner von Simulation und Kreuzvalidierung waren jedoch partnerunabhängige Strategien. Menschen scheinen kognitiv noch einfacher umsetzbare störrobuste Strategien zu benutzen.For cooperation to evolve via direct reciprocity, individuals must track their partners’ behaviour to avoid exploitation. Noise (i.e., memory errors or perception/decision errors) compromises tracking, however. In my thesis, I investigate whether strategies proposed to model human behaviour are cognitively feasible and how they cope with noise, and explore feasible noise-robust alternatives. Tit-For-Tat, the most prominent example of 1-step memory strategies, is not robust to noise, because even little noise decreases its success. Since noise is quite common in everyday life, Tit-For-Tat is not an ideal candidate to model human behaviour. Chapter 1 showed that participants, when asked to remember their partners’ previous behaviour (1-step memory), had high memory error rates. In an evolutionary simulation, these rates let cooperation vanish. Remembering a partners’ previous behaviour is neither noise-robust nor cognitively feasible. In Chapter 2, I investigated whether people use the cognitively more feasible strategy of categorizing partners into types, distinguishing cooperators and cheaters. Compared to remembering each partners’ previous behaviour, this would reduce memory effort. The results indicate that people differentiate partner types and adjust their strategy to the proportion of types in their environment. Chapter 3 explored strategies that model the process of categorizing partners into types by building an impression. In a simulation, impression-based strategies were more robust to noise in maintaining cooperation than 1-step memory strategies. A cross-validation of strategies on data from Chapter 2 confirmed that impression-based strategies better predict participants’ behaviour than 1-step memory strategies. The winner of the simulation and the cross-validation were non-contingent strategies, though, indicating that people use cognitively even simpler noise-robust strategies.
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Kim, Yena. "The origin of prosociality and fairness: Perspectives from experiments with orangutans." Kyoto University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/227583.
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Tesche, Rubens Wladimir. "As relações de reciprocidade e redes de cooperação no desempenho socioeconômico da agricultura familiar : o caso dos produtores de leite do município de Sete de Setembro/RS." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/18305.
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Neste trabalho procura-se compreender a agricultura familiar brasileira (incluindo as famílias produtoras de leite do município de Sete de Setembro, na região Missões do Rio Grande do Sul) a partir das suas relações socioeconômicas endógenas e exógenas. Da análise das relações endógenas vem a compreensão da lógica econômica da unidade familiar agrícola, que é produzir o necessário para o auto-sustento com adequado uso da mão-de-obra familiar disponível (característica dos antigos camponeses ainda presente, mesmo que parcialmente modificada). A partir das relações exógenas dos agricultores familiares se compreende diversos costumes, tradições, culturas e simbolismos presentes nas suas relações sociais, incluindo as relações de reciprocidade, ao mesmo tempo em que se entende como e porque se transformam em agricultores integrados ao mercado e aos complexos agro-industriais. Assim, esta pesquisa demonstra a integração mercantil dos produtores de leite e confronto com o oligopsônio das indústrias de laticínio, que detém o poder de definição do preço do produto. Objetivando contrabalançar este poder, os produtores se organizam em redes de comercialização, aumentando sua capacidade de reivindicação por melhor preço e condições de produção. A compreensão desse processo de organização dos produtores em grupos informais ou formais envidou esforços desse estudo, formulando sua problematização investigatória e seus objetivos, a fim de compreender como se formam essas redes de cooperação e porque elas se formam entre tais produtores e não entre outros, além de verificar se essa organização oportuniza obter um melhor desempenho socioeconômico. As contribuições teórica da sociologia, economia e antropologia sobre a noção de reciprocidade mostram-se importantes para elucidar como as relações de reciprocidade produzem valores humanos de confiança e solidariedade, cimentando as relações sociais formadas nas redes de cooperação, como os grupos e condomínios de produtores de leite. Utilizou-se a abordagem metodológica do estudo de caso, que permitiu realizar métodos quantitativos e qualitativos, por meio de entrevistas e coleta de dados primários junto às famílias produtoras de leite. Também se utilizou pesquisa de dados secundários. Os resultados levam a conclusão de que as redes de cooperação formadas entre produtores de leite são geradas a partir de relações de trabalho e das relações sociais de reciprocidade, cabendo à dádiva (dar, receber e retribuir) um papel importante na formação de confiança entre eles, e assim obterem bons resultados dos indicadores sociais e econômicos.The present work tries to understand the Brazilian familiar agriculture (including the milk producer families in the city of Sete de Setembro, region of the Missions, state of Rio Grande do Sul) from the internal and external socio-economical relations. From the analysis of internal relations comes the comprehension of economic logic of the family of rural workers in producing only the necessary for their self-support with adequate use of available familiar labour (such characteristics are still present, although partially modified). The external relations of the rural workers are comprised of several traditions, culture and symbolism which are present on social relations in the family including the reciprocity relations and, at the same time, it is understood how and why the latter changes in rural workers integrated to the market and the agro-industrial complexes. Thus, this research shows the merchant integration of milk producers and the confrontation with the oligopsonies of dairy products, which have the power to dictate the price of products. In order to balance this power, the producers organize themselves into joint network trades in order to increase their bargain capabilities, better price and product conditions. The comprehension of the process of organization in formal and informal exerted the efforts of this study formulating its investigatory problem and its aims, in order to understand how these cooperation networks are formed and why they are formed amongst such producers and not amongst others. Besides, it may be verified whether this organization gives opportunities to obtain a better socioeconomical performance. The theoretical contributions about the reciprocity of sociology, economy and anthropology about the notion of reciprocity are important to show how social relations of reciprocity produce human values of trust and camaraderie, bonding the social relations formed from the cooperation network such as groups and condominium of milk producers. The research was a methodological study of case, where qualitative and quantitative methods were used through interviews and primary data collection with the families. It was also utilized the research of secondary data. The results led to the conclusion that the cooperation networks formed amongst milk producers are generated from the work and social relations of reciprocity, where the main concepts (giving, receiving and repaying) play an important role on trust formation amongst them and thus, get better results of the social and economical results.
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Caetano, Ana Isabel da Luz. "A reciprocidade enquanto princípio de justiça no Estado Providência : a aplicação ao rendimento mínimo garantido/rendimento social de inserção." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/4206.
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Mestrado em Sociologia Económica e das OrganizaçõesUma forma de olhar para a tendência de reforma dos Estados Providência no sentido da responsabilização de cada cidadão pelo seu próprio bem-estar é argumentar que se trata de uma resposta à pressão financeira e à crise de legitimidade geradas por políticas universalistas que negligenciam o princípio da reciprocidade, segundo o qual não é justo que um indivíduo beneficie da cooperação social sem que faça algum contributo para o excedente colectivo. O objectivo desta dissertação é questionar este argumento averiguando de que forma os agentes envolvidos numa medida de política social representativa desta tendência, nomeadamente o Rendimento Mínimo Garantido/Rendimento Social de Inserção, compreendem e adoptam o princípio da reciprocidade. Ao afastarmo-nos das visões sub e hiper socializadas do Homem, por um lado reconhecemos que para além do interesse próprio existem outras variáveis que explicam a atitude face a políticas redistributivas, nomeadamente a força constrangedora das normas sociais e a percepção sobre a responsabilidade e merecimento do beneficiário; por outro admitimos que os princípios justiça, mesmo aqueles com uma natureza simples e intuitiva como o da reciprocidade, ao serem aplicados a esquemas burocráticos e a circunstâncias muito diversas são sujeitos a interpretações e a ajustamentos por parte dos agentes, conduzindo a resultados necessariamente diferentes dos previstos e desejados. Concluímos que no caso do Rendimento Mínimo Garantido/Rendimento Social de Inserção o princípio da reciprocidade não é compreendido e adoptado plenamente por todos os agentes, sendo que tende a competir com o princípio da eficiência e com o da necessidade.
One way to look at the Welfare State reform initiatives designed to make each citizen responsible for its own well being, is to argue it is an answer to the financial pressure and legitimacy crisis created by universalist social policies, which neglect the principle of reciprocity. According to this principle it isn't fair that an individual benefits from the cooperative efforts without making some contribution to the cooperation scheme in return. The main purpose of this dissertation is to question this argument by analysing the way the agents involved with a welfare program representative of this trend, namely the Portuguese Minimum Guaranteed Income, understand and adopt the principle of reciprocity. In our attempt to find an alternative to the over socialized and under socialized conceptions of human action we recognize that, besides the income, there are other factors determining the attitudes towards redistributive policies, in particular the limitations imposed by social norms and the perception about the responsibility and deservedness of the individuals most beneficiated by those policies. However, we also accept that the principles of justice, even those with a simple and intuitive nature like the principle of reciprocity, when applied to burocratic environments are the object of interpretations and adjustments, leading to results very different from the expected. We conclude that the principle of reciprocity isn't fully understood and adopted by all the agents involved in the Portuguese Minimum Guaranteed Income and that tends to compete with the principles of need and efficiency.
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Araujo, Guilherme David. "Jogos evolucionários de reciprocidade indireta via interações opcionais." Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/76/76132/tde-02052016-111205/.
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Em uma perspectiva evolutiva, a emergência e a manutenção de comportamentos altruísticos e de cooperação não é de fácil entendimento. O impulso por ajudar um indivíduo desconhecido não pode significar um prejuízo na capacidade reprodutiva, o que muitas vezes parece ser o mais óbvio. Muito se tem feito no sentido de compreender os ganhos indiretos da cooperação, ou o que se espera em retorno por este comportamento. A espera por reciprocidade é um dos modos de se tornar a cooperação atraente. Os seres humanos possuem uma capacidade singular de expandir a reciprocidade para interações organizadas em que não necessariamente se recebe a retribuição de um favor, mas sim o favor de um terceiro indivíduo. Para estes sistemas, de reciprocidade indireta, são necessários elaborados processos cognitivos que sustentam uma capacidade para linguagem, julgamentos morais e organização social. Entende-se que esta forma de cooperação é um fator essencial para a evolução do intelecto e da estrutura social atuais dos seres humanos. A teoria dos jogos evolucionária é uma ferramenta matemática muito utilizada na sistematização analítica dos problemas envolvendo cooperação e processos evolutivos no geral. A capacidade reprodutiva é traduzida em termos de funções matemáticas, sendo possível realizar dinâmicas populacionais que modelam a pressão seletiva. Neste trabalho, utilizamos métodos de teoria dos jogos evolucionária para explorar modelos de reciprocidade indireta, expandindo o tratamento de um modelo para interações opcionais envolvendo estratégias de cooperadores condicionais. Mostramos que a presença de cooperadores incondicionais ameaça a estabilidade da cooperação e que erros de execução podem ser uma solução.At an evolutionary perspective, the emergence and maintenance of altruistic and cooperative behaviours is of no easy understanding. The impulse of helping an unrelated individual cannot mean a loss of reproductive fitness, as many times may seem the obvious. Much has been done in the way of knowing the indirect benefits of cooperation, or what to expect in retribution for this behaviour. To expect reciprocity is one way of looking at cooperation as more attractive. Human beings have a singular capacity of expanding reciprocity to organized interactions where retribution of a favour is not necessary, but one can expect the favour of a third-party. For these systems, of indirect reciprocity, elaborate cognitive processes are necessary, ones that maintain the capacity for language, moral judgements and social organization. One can understand this form of cooperation as an essential factor for the evolution of humans nowadays´ intellect and social structure. Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical tool that is largely used in the analytical systematization of problems involving cooperation and evolutionary processes in general. Reproductive fitness is understood in terms of mathematical functions, making possible the work on population dynamics that model selective pressure. In this work, we use methods in evolutionary game theory to explore models of indirect reciprocity, expanding the treatment of a model for optional interactions involving conditional cooperators strategies. We show that the presence of unconditional cooperators threatens the stability of cooperation and that execution errors might be a solution.
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Mour?o, Rochele Vasconcelos Castelo Branco. "Fatores que influenciam a coopera??o em humanos." Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2012. http://repositorio.ufrn.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/17225.
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Previous issue date: 2012-02-24Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior
Human cooperation is fundamentally affected by reciprocal exchange, but it is also remarkably common on the context of large and symbolically marked in-groups, which promote cooperation through the feeling of belonging to a group. In this thesis, two empirical articles were produced in order to investigate how human cooperation is affected by factors such as reciprocity, in-group behavior, in-group markers and gender. We investigated this subject through the administration of online games consisting of token donations, on which the subjects faced virtual players controlled by the experiment. We found that cooperative behavior is strongly influenced by reciprocity, and it is also affected by the in-group behavior, observed on the context of the social variables place of birth, ethnicity, and religions, once all of them acted as in-group markers. The subjects? in-group behavior was enhanced when they played with generous in-group opponents, but weakened when their in-group opponents were non-generous. It was also found that cooperation is not affected by gender, but men and women cooperated in different ways under the influence of reciprocity and in-group behavior. Women are much more reciprocal on their cooperative behavior and men are less willing to cooperate with outgroupers, even when they act generously. The overall results contribute to a better understanding of the adaptive value of cooperation, reciprocity and in-group behavior on the solution of important challenges through the human evolutionary history
A coopera??o humana, al?m ser fundamentada pelas trocas rec?procas, desenvolve-se notadamente dentro de grupos extensos e simbolicamente marcados, nos quais existe a presen?a de marcadores de grupos, elementos que promovem a coopera??o por indicar pertin?ncia compartilhada. Na presente tese de doutorado, foram produzidos dois artigos emp?ricos que investigaram como a coopera??o humana se organiza diante dos fatores reciprocidade, comportamento de favorecimento de grupos, influ?ncia de marcadores de grupo e sexo dos indiv?duos. O m?todo de investiga??o consistiu no emprego de jogos online de doa??o de fichas, nos quais os sujeitos interagiam com jogadores virtuais controlados pelo experimento. Em linhas gerais, verificamos que o comportamento cooperativo sofre forte influ?ncia da reciprocidade. A coopera??o tamb?m ? afetada pelo favorecimento de grupos, comportamento que emergiu sob a influ?ncia das vari?veis naturalidade, etnia e religi?o, as quais atuaram como marcadores de grupo. O comportamento de favorecimento de grupos dos sujeitos mostrou-se amplificado na condi??o em que os parceiros de grupo cooperaram de forma generosa e enfraquecido na condi??o em que os parceiros de grupo foram pouco generosos. Verificamos tamb?m que a coopera??o n?o ? afetada pelo sexo dos indiv?duos. Por outro lado, homens e mulheres cooperam de forma diferenciada sob a influ?ncia da reciprocidade e do comportamento de favorecimento de grupos: as mulheres apresentam um perfil mais rec?proco na coopera??o e os homens cooperam pouco com os indiv?duos que n?o pertencem ao seu grupo, mesmo quando estes s?o generosos. Os resultados dos trabalhos, tomados em conjunto, contribuem para a compreens?o do valor adaptativo da coopera??o, da reciprocidade e do comportamento de favorecimento de grupos na solu??o de desafios na hist?ria evolutiva do homem
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Niklasson, Agneta. "Politisk samverkan mellan kommuner och landsting, bygger den på tillit? : En studie av Läns-SLAKO i Östergötland." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Institutionen för ekonomisk och industriell utveckling, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-88442.
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Syftet är att undersöka Läns-SLAKO, samrådsorganet inom vård- och omsorgsområdet mellan kommunerna och landstinget i Östergötland. Målsättningen är att ge kunskap om de bakomliggande orsakerna till uppbyggnaden av Läns-SLAKO, att ge kunskap om hur samrådet fungerar idag samt möjliga förklaringar till varför samverkan fungerar eller inte. Fokus ligger på att undersöka vilken betydelse tillit mellan de ingående parterna har, för att åstadkomma en fungerande samverkan. Syftet är också att undersöka huruvida graden av tillit påverkar legitimiteten för Läns-SLAKO som politiskt organ. Studien har utförts som en fallstudie med Läns-SLAKO som enda undersökningsobjekt. Det är en lämplig metod när syftet är att undersöka en nutida företeelse på djupet och i dess verkliga sammanhang. Den empiriska undersökningen bygger på skriftlig dokumentation, huvudsakligen sammanträdesprotokoll, och på samtalsintervjuer. Undersökningen visar ett klart samband mellan parternas ömsesidiga förtroende för varandra och en fungerande samverkan som kommer medborgarna till del. Nödvändigheten av att nå konsensus i Läns-SLAKO försvåras av att såväl kommuner som landsting är komplexa organisationer med sinsemellan olika styrlogiker. Statliga beslut inom vård-och omsorgsområdet påverkar såväl vilka uppgifter Läns-SLAKO arbetar med som hur väl samrådet fungerar och detta har varierat över tid. För närvarande står frågan om överflyttning av hemsjukvården från landstinget till kommunerna på agendan. Om Läns-SLAKO misslyckas att finna en konsensuslösning kan det få allvarliga följder för den fortsatta samverkan. Om tilliten försvinner mellan parterna kan processen att återuppbygga den bli både lång och mödosam.The purpose was to examine Läns-SLAKO as a model for cooperation in healthcare issues for municipalities and the County Council of Östergötland, Sweden. The study aimed at increasing the knowledge concerning the forming and development of Läns-SLAKO. The study also aimed at finding relevant factors to explain why or why not the cooperation is successful. The study focuses on evaluating if the organization of the network the degree of trust and reciprocity the link between trust and legitimacy are factors of relevance. The study was designed as a case study. The method is suitable for an empirical study investigating a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context. The empirical study is based on interviews with key-persons and mainly on meeting protocols. The study suggests a clear connection between reciprocity and trust and successful cooperation. The influence of the precondition to reach consensus highly increases complexity. The participants need to have the same weight of mandate within their own organizations. With a lower degree of trust and reciprocity the cooperation may be at risk although the participants know they may benefit. The trust and reciprocity is currently under pressure by the central decision to transfer part of the responsibility for the home based care from the county council to the municipality. The government has left the organizations to find an agreement. If Läns-SLAKO fails a severe lack of trust may result. This may impact future cooperation. To loose trust may be a quick process. To regain trust takes time.
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Dreber, Almenberg Anna. "Determinants of economic preferences." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-430.
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Graminho, Juliana de Moura Jorge. "Contribuições da teoria dos jogos à gestão de desempenho: estudo de múltiplos casos com líderes da indústria." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2013. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/1088.
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Previous issue date: 2013-10-24Ties and cooperation between employer and employee has been hurt by the current environment that emphasizes short term predominantly. Thus, to influence coopera-tion and, therefore, to get engagement and high performance from employees has been a major challenge for employers and leaders in companies. In this sense, this dissertation aims to investigate cooperatives and/or deserters (non-cooperative) de-cisions regarding to the binomial reward-performance between employee and em-ployer, within the organizational context, through Game Theory applied to a study of multiple cases, in an adapted version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The survey, con-ducted with ten employees of an industry, showed that over the last seven years there was no complete congruence and reciprocity between performance delivered by the employee to the employer and the reward given by the employer to the em-ployee. These results reinforce the premise that not all decisions regarding the re-ward and performance take into account past decisions and no seek to maximize results. Consequently, high performance is not reinforced and perpetuated, and in the same way the poor performance finds conditions for spreading. Finally, these re-search findings allowed reflect on what policies and practices can be adopted to achieve cooperation, engagement, high performance and a best collective result
Vínculo e cooperação entre empregador e empregado têm sido afetados pelo ambi-ente organizacional que enfatiza resultados de curto prazo. Estimular cooperação para obter engajamento e alto desempenho dos empregados é um grande desafio para empregadores e líderes nas empresas. Considerando as tensões entre compe-tição e cooperação, esta dissertação objetiva investigar as decisões cooperativas e/ou desertoras (não cooperativas) relativamente ao binômio recompensa-desempenho entre empregado e empregador no âmbito organizacional, à luz da Teoria dos jogos. Trata-se de um estudo de múltiplos casos em uma versão adapta-da do Dilema do Prisioneiro. A pesquisa, realizada com dez empregados de uma indústria, demonstrou que, no decorrer dos últimos sete anos, não houve plena con-gruência e reciprocidade entre desempenho entregue pelo empregado ao emprega-dor e a recompensa oferecida pelo empregador ao empregado. Os resultados mos-tram, não é sempre que todas as decisões quanto à recompensa e desempenho consideraram decisões passadas e que também não é sempre que todas buscam maximizar resultados. Consequentemente, o alto desempenho não é reforçado e perpetuado, da mesma forma que o baixo desempenho encontra condições para se propagar. A pesquisa permitiu ainda a reflexão sobre quais políticas e práticas po-dem ser adotadas para alcançar a cooperação, o engajamento, alto desempenho e um melhor resultado coletivo
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Staron, Joséphine. "La solidarité intra-européenne : questions de principe et stratégie d’application pour une refondation du projet européen." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2020. http://accesdistant.sorbonne-universite.fr/login?url=http://theses.paris-sorbonne.fr/2020SORUL033.pdf.
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Notre thèse retrace le parcours inédit de solidarisation entre les États et les peuples européens que constitue le processus de l’intégration européenne. Elle interroge les conditions, les justifications et les obstacles de ce que Robert Schuman identifiait comme le passage d’une « solidarité de fait à une solidarité de production », c’est-à-dire d’une solidarité négative entendue au sens d’interdépendance, à une solidarité positive, souhaitée, choisie. Cet objectif ambitieux souffre de nombreux obstacles. Progressivement, la solidarité européenne s’est vue dépolitisée pour devenir une entreprise technique, suivant la méthode fonctionnaliste, engendrant une perte de sens et des finalités du projet européen. Dès lors, la question des justifications légitimes de la solidarité européenne est devenue impérieuse, tout comme la recherche des conditions d’un renouvellement du consentement des États et des peuples à la solidarité européenne. En effet, pourquoi et comment les États ont-ils consenti par le passé à un projet d’intégration qui impliquait des sacrifices en termes de souveraineté, et pourquoi et comment pourraient-ils à nouveau y consentir demain ? La crise de confiance et de légitimité que traverse l’UE est révélatrice d’une crise plus profonde de la solidarité intra-européenne. Nous identifions ainsi les conditions normatives et empiriques de la solidarité que nous confrontons à l’expérience européenne. Puis, par l’identification des finalités de la solidarité européenne, nous définissons les contours d’un cadre d’intégration capable de répondre aux attentes des européens en matière de solidarité, moyen de protection complémentaire des solidarités nationalesOur thesis traces the unprecedent path of solidarity between European States and Peoples made possible by the process of European integration. It questions the conditions, the justifications and the obstacles of what Robert Schuman identified as the transition from “de facto solidarity to production solidarity”, that is to say from negative solidarity understood in the sense of interdependence, to positive, desired, chosen solidarity. This ambitious goal encounters many obstacles. Gradually, European solidarity has been depoliticized and thus became a technical enterprise, following the functionalist method, which caused a loss of meaning and of the aims of the European project. Consequently, the question of legitimate justifications for European solidarity has become imperative, as has the search for conditions for a renewal of the consent of States and Peoples to European solidarity. Indeed, why and how have States consented in the past to an integration project that involved sacrifices in terms of sovereignty, and why and how could they consent to it again tomorrow? The crisis of trust and legitimacy in the EU is indicative of a deeper crisis of intra-European solidarity. We thus identify the normative and empirical conditions of solidarity that we confront with the European experience. Then, by identifying the purposes of European solidarity, we define the contours of an integration framework capable of meeting the expectations of Europeans in terms of solidarity, a means of added protection
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Velez, John A. "A Test of Bounded Generalized Reciprocity and Social Identity Theory in a Social Video Game Play Context." The Ohio State University, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1397671422.
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Hawkins, Michelle. "Global Equality: A Normative Defence with Practical Considerations." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/33184.
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In this thesis I aim to build a normative argument for equality of access to advantage at the global level, and motivate action conducive to the realization of this ideal.
The normative argument is presented over the course of the first two chapters. In Chapter One I ask, ‘How should we conceive of distributive equality?’ Following G.A. Cohen, I argue that equality is best conceived as equality of access to advantage. I interpret this to require equal access to both ‘worldly autonomy’—a term I invoke to describe a certain basic threshold level of autonomy—and subjective preference satisfaction.
In Chapter Two, I establish a justificatory basis for equality on a global scale. I argue that equality is justified at the global level on the basis of justice as reciprocity for the mutual provision of the global system of state-enforced borders, in which the participation of all people is equally necessary, and that makes possible a wide variety of institutional goods predominately enjoyed by people in rich developed countries.
In Chapter Three, I take up the second aim of the thesis: to motivate action conducive to the realization of this global distributive ideal. I engage the concern that global equality is a poor ideal, demanding too much change in the attitudes and lifestyles of the well-off to motivate them to pursue it. I aim to show that, even if most people are not motivated to pursue global equality, there are alternative grounds for immediately feasible global reforms and redistributions likely to have greater motivational purchase on people’s sensibilities. Alternative grounds for redistribution and reform include reparative justice, cooperative justice, respect for basic human rights, and self-interest. Making these redistributions and reforms would not only be desirable from the perspective of the alternative grounds that explain them, but will have the further happy result of bringing the world closer to the global distributive ideal of equality of access to advantage. Plausibly, it will bring the world sufficiently close to this ideal that people will be motivated to pursue it for its own sake.
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Mugabe, T. C. "Fair trade in the Eastern Cape: an examination of its socio-economic impact and challenges among emerging Black farmers." Thesis, University of Fort Hare, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10353/441.
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This study examines the socio-economic impact of fair trade on black emerging citrus fruit farmers in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It is a comparative analysis of farmers involved in fair trade and those who are not. Farmers from Riverside Enterprise and Sundays River Citrus Cooperative were examined to evaluate the impact of fair trade. Such impact was analyzed through looking at access farmers have to foreign markets and their ability to receive high income returns from these markets. The study also discusses the influence fair trade has on the social and economic development of the farmers’ communities. The findings of the study indicate how most fair trade communities have benefited financially and through public infrastructure such as crèches, learning centers and access to computers for both farmers and workers. Such public developments are funded through the fair trade social dividend which is a premium farmers receive for selling their fruit under fair trade. However, the study findings also indicate the limitations of fair trade; farmers have to incur high costs to become fair trade accredited. The study also examines the commodity value chains (hereinafter referred to as CVC) for citrus fair trade farmers and non fair trade farmers. This analysis reveals the procedure of value chains, their benefits and constraints.
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Tunaru, Iulia. "Physical layer secret key generation for decentralized wireless networks." Thesis, Rennes 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015REN1S081/document.
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Dans cette thèse on s’est intéressé aux méthodes de génération de clés secrètes symétriques en utilisant la couche physique ultra large bande impulsionnelle (IR-UWB). Les travaux ont été réalisés selon trois axes, les deux premiers concernant la communication point-à-point et le dernier, les communications coopératives. Tout d’abord, la quantification des signaux typiques IR-UWB (soit directement échantillonnés, soit estimés) a été investiguée, principalement du point de vue du compromis entre la robustesse (ou réciprocité) des séquences binaires obtenues et leur caractère aléatoire. Différents algorithmes de quantification valorisant l’information temporelle offerte par les canaux IR-UWB pour améliorer ce compromis ont alors été proposés. Ensuite, des études concernant les échanges publics nécessaires à l’étape de réconciliation (visant la correction d’éventuels désaccords entre les séquences binaires générées de part et d’autre du lien) ont montré qu’il était possible d’être plus robuste face aux attaques passives en utilisant des informations de plus haut niveau, inhérentes à cette technologie et disponibles à moindre coût (ex. via une estimation précise du temps de vol aller-retour). Finalement, une nouvelle méthode a été développée afin d’étendre les schémas de génération de clé point-à-point à plusieurs nœuds (trois dans nos études) en utilisant directement la couche physique fournie par les liens radio entre les nœudsEmerging decentralized wireless systems, such as sensor or ad-hoc networks, will demand an adequate level of security in order to protect the private and often sensitive information that they carry. The main security mechanism for confidentiality in such networks is symmetric cryptography, which requires the sharing of a symmetric key between the two legitimate parties. According to the principles of physical layer security, wireless devices within the communication range can exploit the wireless channel in order to protect their communications. Due to the theoretical reciprocity of wireless channels, the spatial decorrelation property (e.g., in rich scattering environments), as well as the fine temporal resolution of the Impulse Radio - Ultra Wideband (IR-UWB) technology, directly sampled received signals or estimated channel impulse responses (CIRs) can be used for symmetric secret key extraction under the information-theoretic source model. Firstly, we are interested in the impact of quantization and channel estimation algorithms on the reciprocity and on the random aspect of the generated keys. Secondly, we investigate alternative ways of limiting public exchanges needed for the reconciliation phase. Finally, we develop a new signal-based method that extends the point-to-point source model to cooperative contexts with several nodes intending to establish a group key
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Roy, Nilanjan. "Essays on Cooperation and Reciprocity." Thesis, 2013. https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/7745/1/thesis%20Nilanjan%20Roy%202013.pdf.
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This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.
Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.
Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.
Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.
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Tzeng, Yu-fang, and 曾郁芳. "Reciprocity, Punishment, and Cooperation in a Social Group." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53831409689116061490.
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碩士國立中山大學
政治學研究所
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Why do people cooperate? Why does not every individuals in their groups choose to be a free-rider all the time? Based on two series of experiments, the author finds that reciprocity and punishment contribute to cooperation. When a group allows positive reciprocity where people can choose to cooperate, positive reciprocity facilitates cooperation. When reciprocity between group members turns to negative, however, group members make little contribution to the group and start to retaliate against their partners. Once punishment is incorporated into the experiment, people’s behavior of cooperation varies. In the high positive reciprocity environment where punishment is used, people, as expected, continue to give more of their resources to their group. But it is worth noting that negative reciprocity did not get worse if punishment is used in group dynamics.
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Prisbrey, Jeffrey Emig. "Cooperation in Reciprocity Games and in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism." Thesis, 1993. https://thesis.library.caltech.edu/7362/1/Prisbrey_je_1993.pdf.
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Each of the three independent chapters of this dissertation examines or justifies cooperative behavior in one of two specific public goods environments.
The first chapter presents experimental evidence documenting a subject's behavior when faced with simple games that require turn taking for efficiency. Both symmetric and asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment actions are studied and compared. The length of the game is a treatment variable; experiments simulating one-shot, finite and infinite repetition games are conducted. Group outcomes are sorted by the player's average payoffs and the importance of focal solution concepts like group welfare, equality, and symmetry are inferred. Individual strategies used in the experiments are also sorted and compared enabling a discussion of endgame effects and conflict within the games.
Standard non-cooperative game theory is not selective enough to discriminate among many of the possible outcomes of the games examined in Chapter One. Relying on focal and axiomatic solution concepts allows discrimination, yet these procedures are inherently ad-hoc. The second chapter examines the outcome to a population game with evolutionary dynamics in order to theoreticly justify the results of the first chapter in a less ad-hoc manner. In particular, the second chapter applies the Replicator Dynamic. It is shown that under an assumption of limited rationality, specifically limited memory, there is a unique global equilibrium. The unique equilibrium contains a trio of outcomes: non-cooperative Nash play, payoff irrational play, and cooperative turn-taking.
The third chapter presents findings from a second series of experiments, a series designed to study free riding and the voluntary contribution mechanism. In the experimental environment, subjects arc randomly assigned constant marginal rates of substitution between the public and the private good. These random assignments arc changed each decision period, allowing the measurement of player response functions. These response functions are analogous to the bidding functions obtained in private good, sealed-bid auction experiments. The results are quite different from the results of others in environments with little or no heterogeneity. There is much more free riding, very little evidence of decay across periods, and only sparse evidence of anomalous behavior such as splitting and spite.
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Tusicisny, Andrej. "Reciprocity and Prejudice: An Experiment of Hindu-Muslim Cooperation in the Slums of Mumbai." Thesis, 2013. https://doi.org/10.7916/D88P5ZTN.
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The dissertation develops and tests a new theory to explain intergroup cooperation and outgroup discrimination. The theoretical part specifies under what conditions ethnic differences undermine public goods provision and exacerbate ethnic discrimination. It posits that people cooperate more with and discriminate less against the groups expected to reciprocate cooperative behavior. Conditional cooperators rationally update their group stereotypes based on their experience with the groups' individual members. This change in turn reduces prejudice and discrimination. I tested observable implications of the model on a representative sample of more than 400 slum-dwellers in Mumbai. The field research in India combined laboratory experiments, an original survey, and interviews. Once I manipulated expectations of reciprocity, ethnically heterogeneous groups produced as much public goods as the homogeneous ones. The experimental treatment also radically increased trust and reduced ethnic discrimination of the generally mistrusted Muslim minority. The survey analysis compared the real-life effect of reciprocity with prominent alternative explanations from the literature. Compared to other factors, positive reciprocity provides a powerful explanation of why people choose to discriminate against some, but not other ethnic groups. The cross-national chapter of the dissertation extends the analysis beyond India. Using surveys from 87 countries, it shows that generalized trust moderates the negative effect of ethnic diversity on people's willingness to contribute to public goods.
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Caisl, Jakub. "Kooperace za neúplného monitoringu." Master's thesis, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-305711.
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We approach the topic of provision of public goods in an experimental economic study using the Public Goods Game setting. We allow subjects to punish each other but vary the structure and amount of information they can base their decisions upon. We try to add to the current literature on reciprocity and study whether people are willing to punish under such incomplete information. Since punishment under uncertain conditions can be quite destructive in terms of welfare, this closely relates to whether people are able to provide public good themselves or whether they need some external assistance. In terms of public policy, this can add to the debate on when should government provide certain services and when it should be left to individuals. In terms of behaviour inside of an enterprise, our study could be well applied to problems that arise when teams work on a common project but some people free-ride on effort of others.
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"Governance, Reciprocity, Redistribution and Food Security among Tseltales in Los Altos." Doctoral diss., 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.30008.
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abstract: In Latin America food insecurity is still prevailing in those regions where extreme poverty and political instability are common. Tseltal communities are experiencing changes due to religious conversions and the incursion of external political institutions. These changes have diminished the importance of traditional reciprocal and redistributive institutions that historically have been essential for personal and community survival. This dissertation investigated the impact that variations on governance systems and presence of reciprocal and distributional exchanges have on the food security status of communities. Qualitative data collected in four communities through 117 free lists and 117 semi-structured interviews was used to elaborate six scales that correspond to the traditional and civic authority system and to inter-community and intra-community reciprocity and redistribution. I explore the relationship that the scores of four communities on those scales have on the food security status of their inhabitants based on their results on the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2012. Findings from this study suggest that in marginalized communities that many scientists would described as experiencing market failure, participation in inter-community reciprocal, intra-community reciprocal and intra-community redistribution are better predictors of food security than enrollment in food security programs. Additionally, communities that participated the most in these non-market mechanisms have stronger traditional institutions. In contrast, communities that participated more in inter-community redistribution scored higher on the civic authority scale, are enrolled in more food aid programs, but are less food secure.Dissertation/Thesis
Doctoral Dissertation Environmental Social Science 2015
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Cardoso, Maria de Lurdes Dias. "A Convenção de Lomé e a diferenciação dos ACP." Master's thesis, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/18482.
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Instituto Superior de Economia e GestãoO tema tratado nesta dissertação centra-se na diferenciação entre os países do espaço África. Caraíbas e Pacífico, e na cooperação estabelecida com estes países pela UE no âmbito da Convenção de Lomé. As negociações de um novo acordo entre a UE e os países ACP poderão ter implicações sobre a questão da cobertura geográfica da Convenção de Lome O grupo ACP existe apenas no contexto da Convenção de Lome e e constituído por 71 países. Todos eles são países em desenvolvimento, com excepção da Africa do Sul, mas podem ser sub-divididos entre países menos avançados (PMA) e não-PMA. A dissertação estrutura-se da seguinte forma: em primeiro é apresentado, na Introdução, o tema abordado assim como a sequência utilizada. De seguida, no Capítulo 1 faz-se uma retrospectiva da cooperação para o desenvolvimento realizada pela UE em favor dos países ACP. No Capítulo 2 são descritos a ajuda prestada pela UE, os instrumentos dessa ajuda utilizados no âmbito de Lomé e as instituições criadas. O Capitulo 3 destina-se a descrever as mudanças que ocorreram, a nível mundial, desde a primeira Convenção de Lomé e os pontos fortes e fracos de cerca de 25 anos de cooperação. No Capítulo 4 analisa-se a questão do regime comercial de Lomé e da necessidade de compatibilização com as regras da Organização Mundial de Comércio. No Capitulo 5 é abordada a cobertura geográfica e alternativas para um novo acordo. Por fim. no Capítulo 6 são apresentadas as conclusões.
The main issue of this dissertation is held on the differentiation between the countries of Africa. Caribbean and Pacific space, and in the cooperation maintained vvith these countries by the European Union in the Lomé Convention. The negotiation of a new commitment between European Union and the ACP States may have some implications in the geographical cover of the Lome Convention. The ACP group exists only in the Lomé Convention context and 71 countries compose it. Ali these are developing countries, less South Africa, and they can be divided in two groups least-developing countries and non-least-developing countries. In this dissertation it is presented in first place, in Introduction. the issue studied as the structure used. Next. in Chapter 1 is made a retrospective of the cooperation to development made by the European Union in favour of the ACP countries. In Chapter 2 is described the aid paid by the EU, the instruments used by the Lomé Convention and the institutions created. Chapter 3 describes the changes that occurred. in the world, since the first Lomé Convention and the strong and weak points of 25 years of cooperation. In Chapter 4 is analysed the issue of the commercial regime of Lome and the necessity of making it compatible with the World Trade Organisation rules. Chapter 5 deals vvith the matter of the geographical cover and the alternatives for a new deal. Finally, in Chapter 6 the conclusions are presented.
N/A
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Lankau, Matthias. "Institutional Designs of Public Goods in the Context of Cultural Property." Doctoral thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-1735-0000-0022-5E27-A.
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Die vorliegende Arbeit gliedert sich in zwei Teile. Der erste Teil widmet sich der Fragestellung inwiefern formelle Gruppeneigentumsrechte Herkunftsgemeinschaften vor unautorisierten Verwendungen ihrer traditionellen kulturellen Ausdrucksweisen (TKAs) schützen können. Kapitel 2 und 3 führen hierzu einen ökonomischen Vergleich fünf so genannter sui generis Rechte zum Schutz jener TKAs durch und leiten Politikempfehlungen ab. Zum einen bilden die Beiträge eine Rangfolge der Transaktionskosten, die bei Verhandlung über Verwendungen der TKAs entstehen können. Zum anderen vergleichen die Kapitel, ob die Schutzpräferenzen der Ursprungsgemeinschaft durch die Modelgesetze geschützt wären. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass ein Prinzipal-Agenten-Problem auftritt sollten staatliche Behörden über zu viel Verhandlungsmacht verfügen. In diesem Fall werden Bürokraten eher ihre eigenen Interessen als die der Eigentümer der TKAs durchsetzen. Letztendlich existiert zwischen beiden Effekten ein klarer Trade-Off: Je mehr ein Gesetz die Schutzinteressen der Ursprungsgemeinschaften schützt desto höher sind seine Transaktions- und somit sozialen Kosten.
Der zweite Teil dieser Arbeit behandelt – auf Basis ökonomischer Laborexperimente – den Fragenkomplex wie Gruppenmitglieder öffentliche Güter im Kontext kulturellen Eigentums – so wie TKAs – bereitstellen. Der Fokus liegt hierbei auf dem Einfluss sozialer Identität auf das Ausmaß an positiver sowie negativer Reziprozität der Individuen als Determinanten der sozialen Wohlfahrt. Die bedingte Kooperation der Gruppenmitglieder sowie das gegenseitige Bestrafungsverhalten untereinander bilden hierfür Maße für positive und negative Reziprozität.
Kapitel 4 zeigt, dass Individuen unter dem Einfluss sozialer Identität grundsätzlich divergierende Kooperationspräferenzen abhängig davon mit wem sie interagieren aufzeigen. Auf Basis eines Within-Subject-Designs und mehreren ein-Perioden Spielen in Strategiemethode, zeigt der Beitrag, dass Individuen in identitäts-homogenen Gruppen (In-Group) die Präferenz für eine höhere bedingte Kooperation und weniger Eigennutzorientierung als in einer heterogenen Gruppe (Out-Group) zeigen. Zusätzlich neigen Individuen in heterogenen Gruppen eher zu einem vollständigen Trittbrettfahrerverhalten. Somit könnten Politikinstitutionen, die den Zusammenhalt einer Gruppe betonen, die soziale Wohlfahrt steigern.
Auf der Basis eines zehn-Perioden-Spiels zeigt Kapitel 5, dass hauptsächlich vergleichsweise höhere Erwartungen an die Kooperation der Mitglieder in einer In-Group als an die in einer Out-Group Wohlfahrtsgewinne in homogenen Gruppen im Zuge mehrperiodischer Interaktionen auslösen. Die bedingte Kooperation – hier die Erwiderung der eigenen Erwartungen an die Kooperation der Gruppenmitglieder durch eigene Beiträge – ist hingegen in In- und Out- Groups ähnlich. Insgesamt belegt dieser Beitrag somit, dass Erwartungen der Individuen der entscheidende Faktor für das Beitragsverhalten der Gruppenmitglieder unter sozialer Identität ist.
Kapitel 6 analysiert inwiefern die Möglichkeit einer gegenseitigen Bestrafung die Kooperationsbereitschaft unter dem Einfluss sozialer Identität ändert. Hierzu verwendet der Beitrag ein-Perioden-Spiele in Strategiemethode sowohl mit als auch ohne Bestrafung. Es zeigt sich, dass die Antizipation einer Bestrafung in heterogenen Gruppen zur größten Anhebung der Kooperationsbereitschaft führt, was am deutlichsten durch das Verhalten der Free-Rider ausgelöst wird. Darüber hinaus hebt die Bestrafungsinstitution unterschiede in der Kooperationsbereitschaft zwischen homo- und heterogenen Gruppen auf, die sich typischer Weise zugunsten homogener Gruppen verlagert. Letztlich deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass im Vergleich zu einer Situation in der ausschließlich eine Bestrafungsinstitution vorliegt, eine zusätzliche Identitätszuschreibung die Wohlfahrt zusätzlich erhöht.
Mit Fokus auf negativer Reziprozität untersucht Kapitel 7 die Frage inwiefern soziale Identität das Bestrafungsverhalten gegenüber Gruppenmitgliedern beeinflusst, die weniger zum öffentlichen Gut beitragen als der Bestrafende. Hier zeigt sich, dass Mitglieder identitäts-homogener Gruppen seltener und in geringerer Höhe bestrafen, als es in heterogenen Gruppen der Fall ist. Darüber hinaus ist das Bestrafungsverhalten in heterogenen Gruppen signifikant stärker durch Ärger-ähnliche Emotionen motiviert als in homogenen Gruppen.
Insgesamt zeigt der zweite Teil dieser Dissertation, dass Identitätszuschreibungen sowohl positive als auch negative Reziprozität beeinflussen und somit die soziale Wohlfahrt bei der Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter – auch im Kontext kulturellen Eigentums – beeinflussen. Diese Ergebnisse sind demzufolge für Verhaltensabschätzungen im Rahmen von Politikempfehlungen relevant, die sich auf Situation mit dem Charakter öffentlicher Güter beziehen.
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"Siguiendo Las Huellas De La Chola En Bolivia: Levantamiento De Una Cartografía Cultural Alteña." Doctoral diss., 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.53478.
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abstract: The surge of the chola alteña in Bolivia as a woman who, after being historically discriminated, has achieved her empowerment through her practices of resistance and agency is a very particular and new phenomenon hardly studied. The contribution of this research is in principle to describe and discover the complexity of this occurrence, but at the same time to open a field of understanding the works of the chola as a preliminary input for alternative feminisms, in accordance to the particularity of each context. As a result, an eclectic perspective from different non-canonical theories stemming from the Americas has been adopted. For example, intersectionality stemming from various social, cultural, racial, and gender contexts is addressed by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Dora Inés Munévar, Ann Phoenix, Breny Mendoza y Sonia Montecinos. Research from Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo and María Lugones proposes the decolonization of knowledge. From a Bolivian perspective, the proposal of communitarian feminism by Julieta Paredes and the chi’xi approach by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. At the same time, the documenting of the chola practices has been obtained from non-conventional digital and oral sources. Thus, this research becomes a referent for future feminist research about the chola, but also for understanding other movements and practices of subaltern and discriminated women in similar or different contexts.
The chola is characterized by her peculiar garment which was imposed by the colonizer in the XVIII century, nullifying her indigenous identity. However, this woman has continued to wear it to the present day as much as a tactic of resistance as of empowerment and agency and has transformed it into a current fashion for the valorization of her identity. She is a chi’xi subject who complements or antagonizes opposites without subsuming them. Finally, what guides her practices and strategies are her native cultural values, such as the principle of Living Well, cooperation, reciprocity, and godfatherhood.
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Doctoral Dissertation Spanish 2019
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Nováková, Julie. "Využití metod experimentálních her ke studiu kooperace, altruismu a férovosti a jejich biologických prediktorů." Master's thesis, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-331199.
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Cooperative, altruistic and fairness-exhibiting behavior is an important topic in evolutionary and behavioral biology and the mechanisms leading to its evolution, ultimate as well as proximate precursors, are subject of much research in biological as well as social sciences, theoretical as well as experimental work. In light of the life history theory, I focused on the connection of one's health state and cooperative behavior in humans and tested the hypothesis that more healthy individuals would manifest more cooperative tendencies (as they would have more opportunities of future interactions and long-term benefits), and conversely. The data, obtained from a sample of university students engaged in experimental games (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Expanded Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, and Reversed Dictator Game) and a health and personality-focused questionnaire, did not corroborate this hypothesis. My other hypotheses - that better memory and lower temporal discounting would be related to more cooperative behavior (stemming from the conditions for reciprocal cooperation) - were supported by the data, albeit only partially in the case of memory. I also used the data from the five experimental games to briefly describe the proportions of different types of behavior (self-regarding, altruistic,...
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Ebenhöh, Eva. "Modelling human behaviour in social dilemmas using attributes and heuristics." Doctoral thesis, 2007. https://repositorium.ub.uni-osnabrueck.de/handle/urn:nbn:de:gbv:700-2007101719.
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A question concerning not only modellers but also practitioners is: Under what circumstances can mutual cooperation be established and maintained by a group of people facing a common pool dilemma" A step before this question of institutional influences there is need for a different way of modelling human behaviour that does not draw on the rational actor paradigm, because this kind of modelling needs to be able to integrate various deviations from this theory shown in economic experiments. We have chosen a new approach based on observations in form of laboratory and field observations of actual human behaviour. We model human decision making as using an adaptive toolbox following the notion of Gigerenzer. Humans draw on a number of simple heuristics that are meaningful in a certain situation but may be useless in another. This is incorporated into our agent-based model by having agents perceive their environment, draw on a pool of heuristics to choose an appropriate one and use that heuristic.Behavioural differences can be incorporated in two ways. First, each agent has a number of attributes that differ in values, for example there are more and less cooperative agents. The second behavioural difference lies in the way, in which heuristics are chosen. With this modelling approach we contribute to a new way of modelling human behaviour, which is simple enough to be included into morecomplex models while at the same time realistic enough to cover actual decision making processes of humans. Modellers should be able to use this approach without a need to get deep into psychological, sociological or economic theory. Stakeholders in social dilemmas, who may be confronted with such a model should understand, why an agent decides in the way it does.
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Lounnas, Djallil. "La sécurité collective dans l’unipolarité : la crise nucléaire iranienne." Thèse, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/4513.
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L’argument central de notre thèse est qu’une structure internationale unipolaire non hégémonique favorise la sécurité collective. Après avoir montré que telle est la structure actuelle et avoir justifié notre positionnement théorique néolibéral, nous avons eu recours au modèle d’interaction du « leader-suiveur de Stackelberg », pour démontrer qu’une coopération conflictuelle entre États rationnels est possible, ce qui leur permet de surmonter leur dilemme de l’action collective. Une coopération possible en raison de l’existence d’un intérêt mutuel et d’un leader favorisant la coopération entre ces États, ainsi que de conditions leur permettant de mettre en place une ‘stratégie de la réciprocité’. Ils forment alors ce qu’on appelle le « groupe de Stackelberg ». Le suiveur de la périphérie, ou ‘défecteur’ doit, pour sa part, non seulement s’ajuster à l’intérêt mutuel ainsi défini, mais aussi coopérer et négocier avec le groupe, et ce, sous la pression de sanctions, voire d’un usage ultime de la force si besoin est. Après l’éventuel succès de ces négociations, un équilibre de Stackelberg favorisé par le leader, soit la puissance unipolaire et non hégémonique, est alors atteint et la coopération permet, alors, à chacun de retirer un bénéfice de cet intérêt mutuel.
Dans notre cas, le groupe de Stackelberg est constitué des membres du G5 + 1, soit les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU et de l’Allemagne, agissant sous le leadership américain; l’Iran est un suiveur de la périphérie, soupçonné de défection, et l’intérêt mutuel est celui de la lutte contre la prolifération des ADM. Notre évaluation empirique montre que les conditions de la réciprocité des membres de ce groupe sont réunies et que celles de l’Iran sont en cours de négociation.The main argument of our thesis is that a unipolar and non hegemonic structure of the international system furthers collective security. After having shown that the present international structure is as such and having justified our neoliberal theoretical approach, we have adopted the interaction model of the Stackelberg leadership model to demonstrate that a conflicting cooperation between rational States, that are respectful of the international order, is possible, which allows them to overcome their collective action dilemma. This cooperation depends on the existence of shared interests, on the ability of the leader to foster cooperation among them, and on structural conditions as well, which enable the setting up of “a reciprocity strategy”. They, thus, form what we call as a “Stackelberg’s group”. With regard to the periphery follower, or defector, he should adjust to the mutual interest of the group, as defined by this latter, as well as cooperate and negotiate with it, under the pressure of sanctions or the use of force if necessary. In the event of a successful negotiation, a Stackelberg equilibrium, furthered by the leader of the group, that is the unipolar and non hegemonic power, is then reached where cooperation between the members of the group, i.e. the States, allows them to get their share, that is a benefit from their mutual interest. In our case study, the Stackelberg’s group includes the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council plus Germany, all acting under the US leadership. Iran is a periphery follower suspected of defection, and the mutual interest is the international security against WMD proliferation. Our empirical assessment shows that the respective conditions, which enable a reciprocity strategy within the Stackelberg’s group, are then met by its members, whereas those of Iran are still under negotiations.
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Fehl, Katrin. "Experimental and theoretical investigations of the emergence and sustenance of prosocial behavior in groups." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-1735-0000-0006-AE29-8.
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