Journal articles: 'Cooperation and reciprocity'

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Romano, Angelo, and Daniel Balliet. "Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation." Psychological Science 28, no. 10 (September 6, 2017): 1490–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797617714828.

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Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness of human cooperation observed among individuals who are not genetically related: reciprocity and conformity. We tested whether reciprocity outperformed conformity in promoting cooperation, especially when these psychological processes would promote a different cooperative or noncooperative response. To do so, across three studies, we observed participants’ cooperation with a partner after learning (a) that their partner had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials and (b) that their group members had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner. Although we found that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a stronger influence on cooperation. Moreover, we found that conformity can be partly explained by a concern about one’s reputation—a finding that supports a reciprocity framework.

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Della Rossa, Fabio, Fabio Dercole, and Anna Di Meglio. "Direct Reciprocity and Model-Predictive Strategy Update Explain the Network Reciprocity Observed in Socioeconomic Networks." Games 11, no. 1 (March 16, 2020): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11010016.

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Network reciprocity has been successfully put forward (since M. A. Nowak and R. May’s, 1992, influential paper) as the simplest mechanism—requiring no strategical complexity—supporting the evolution of cooperation in biological and socioeconomic systems. The mechanism is actually the network, which makes agents’ interactions localized, while network reciprocity is the property of the underlying evolutionary process to favor cooperation in sparse rather than dense networks. In theoretical models, the property holds under imitative evolutionary processes, whereas cooperation disappears in any network if imitation is replaced by the more rational best-response rule of strategy update. In social experiments, network reciprocity has been observed, although the imitative behavior did not emerge. What did emerge is a form of conditional cooperation based on direct reciprocity—the propensity to cooperate with neighbors who previously cooperated. To resolve this inconsistency, network reciprocity has been recently shown in a model that rationally confronts the two main behaviors emerging in experiments—reciprocal cooperation and unconditional defection—with rationality introduced by extending the best-response rule to a multi-step predictive horizon. However, direct reciprocity was implemented in a non-standard way, by allowing cooperative agents to temporarily cut the interaction with defecting neighbors. Here, we make this result robust to the way cooperators reciprocate, by implementing direct reciprocity with the standard tit-for-tat strategy and deriving similar results.

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Campennì, Marco, and Gabriele Schino. "Symmetry-based reciprocity: evolutionary constraints on a proximate mechanism." PeerJ 4 (March 15, 2016): e1812. http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj.1812.

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Background.While the evolution of reciprocal cooperation has attracted an enormous attention, the proximate mechanisms underlying the ability of animals to cooperate reciprocally are comparatively neglected. Symmetry-based reciprocity is a hypothetical proximate mechanism that has been suggested to be widespread among cognitively unsophisticated animals.Methods.We developed two agent-based models of symmetry-based reciprocity (one relying on an arbitrary tag and the other on interindividual proximity) and tested their ability both to reproduce significant emergent features of cooperation in group living animals and to promote the evolution of cooperation.Results.Populations formed by agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity showed differentiated “social relationships” and a positive correlation between cooperation given and received: two common aspects of animal cooperation. However, when reproduction and selection across multiple generations were added to the models, agents adopting symmetry-based reciprocity were outcompeted by selfish agents that never cooperated.Discussion.In order to evolve, hypothetical proximate mechanisms must be able to stand competition from alternative strategies. While the results of our simulations require confirmation using analytical methods, we provisionally suggest symmetry-based reciprocity is to be abandoned as a possible proximate mechanism underlying the ability of animals to reciprocate cooperative interactions.

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Li, Xuelong, Marko Jusup, Zhen Wang, Huijia Li, Lei Shi, Boris Podobnik, H. Eugene Stanley, Shlomo Havlin, and Stefano Boccaletti. "Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 1 (December 19, 2017): 30–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1707505115.

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Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks.

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Reuben, Ernesto, and Sigrid Suetens. "Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error." Games 9, no. 3 (September 6, 2018): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030066.

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We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.

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Feess, Eberhard. "Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159, no. 1 (2003): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456032975014.

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Fon, Vincy, and Francesco Parisi. "Reciprocity-Induced Cooperation." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 159, no. 1 (2003): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456032975032.

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Gilliam, David A., and Steven W. Rayburn. "Propensity for reciprocity among frontline employees." Journal of Services Marketing 30, no. 3 (May 9, 2016): 290–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsm-05-2015-0194.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine how other-regarding personality traits relate to reciprocity among frontline employees (FLEs). Design/methodology/approach Other-regarding personality variables were used to model the propensity for reciprocity and actual reciprocal behaviors with coworkers. Surveys of 276 FLEs were examined via structural equations modeling. Findings Other-regarding personality traits proved to be antecedents of reciprocity. Cynicism was particularly interesting in that it was positively related to reciprocity contrary to findings in other research. Research limitations/implications Among the interesting findings relating personality to reciprocity are a more affective type of reciprocity based on empathy and altruism, and a more calculative type based on cynicism related to Machiavellianism. Practical implications Managers can use the effects of personality traits on reciprocity and cooperation to hire and place FLEs in ways that provide superior service and increased profits. Social implications This paper indicates that certain individuals who might not typically be thought of as cooperative can in fact reciprocate. Specific ideas about cynicism and Machiavellian reciprocity in FLEs are discussed. Originality/value The findings will aid researchers and managers in understanding personality and FLEs cooperation. The findings on cynicism are particularly valuable in that they contradict some earlier research and commonly held managerial ideas.

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Gerber, Nina, Manon K. Schweinfurth, and Michael Taborsky. "The smell of cooperation: rats increase helpful behaviour when receiving odour cues of a conspecific performing a cooperative task." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 287, no. 1939 (November 25, 2020): 20202327. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.2327.

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Reciprocity can explain cooperative behaviour among non-kin, where individuals help others depending on their experience in previous interactions. Norway rats ( Rattus norvegicus ) cooperate reciprocally according to direct and generalized reciprocity. In a sequence of four consecutive experiments, we show that odour cues from a cooperating conspecific are sufficient to induce the altruistic help of rats in a food-exchange task. When rats were enabled to help a non-cooperative partner while receiving olfactory information from a rat helping a conspecific in a different room, they helped their non-cooperative partner as if it was a cooperative one. We further show that the cues inducing altruistic behaviour are released during the act of cooperation and do not depend on the identity of the cue provider. Remarkably, olfactory cues seem to be more important for cooperation decisions than experiencing a cooperative act per se . This suggests that rats may signal their cooperation propensity to social partners, which increases their chances to receive help in return.

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McCabe, Kevin. "Reciprocity, cooperation and fairness." Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Japanese Psychological Association 72 (September 19, 2008): S03. http://dx.doi.org/10.4992/pacjpa.72.0_s03.

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Clauset, Aaron. "Global reciprocity drives cooperation." Science 359, no. 6371 (January 4, 2018): 43.7–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.359.6371.43-g.

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Horita, Yutaka. "Greater effects of mutual cooperation and defection on subsequent cooperation in direct reciprocity games than generalized reciprocity games: Behavioral experiments and analysis using multilevel models." PLOS ONE 15, no. 11 (November 19, 2020): e0242607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0242607.

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Reciprocity toward a partner’s cooperation is a fundamental behavioral strategy underlying human cooperation not only in interactions with familiar persons but also with strangers. However, a strategy that takes into account not only one’s partner’s previous action but also one’s own previous action—such as a win-stay lose-shift strategy or variants of reinforcement learning—has also been considered an advantageous strategy. This study investigated empirically how behavioral models can be used to explain the variances in cooperative behavior among people. To do this, we considered games involving either direct reciprocity (an iterated prisoner’s dilemma) or generalized reciprocity (a gift-giving game). Multilevel models incorporating inter-individual behavioral differences were fitted to experimental data using Bayesian inference. The results indicate that for these two types of games, a model that considers both one’s own and one’s partner’s previous actions fits the empirical data better than the other models. In the direct reciprocity game, mutual cooperation or defection—rather than relying solely on one’s partner’s previous actions—affected the increase or decrease, respectively, in subsequent cooperation. Whereas in the generalized reciprocity game, a weaker effect of mutual cooperation or defection on subsequent cooperation was observed.

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Gfrerer, Nastassja, and Michael Taborsky. "Working dogs transfer different tasks in reciprocal cooperation." Biology Letters 14, no. 2 (February 2018): 20170460. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2017.0460.

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Direct reciprocity can establish stable cooperation among unrelated individuals. It is a common assumption of direct reciprocity models that agents exchange like with like, but this is not necessarily true for natural interactions. It is yet unclear whether animals apply direct reciprocity rules when successive altruistic help involves different tasks. Here, we tested whether working dogs transfer help from one to another cooperative task in an iterated prisoner's dilemma paradigm. In our experiment, individual dogs received help to obtain food from a conspecific, which involved a specific task. Subsequently, the focal subject could return received favour by using a different task. Working dogs transferred the cooperative experience received through one task by applying an alternative task when they helped a previously cooperative partner. By contrast, they refrained from helping previously defecting partners. This suggests that dogs realize the cooperative act of a conspecific, which changes their propensity to provide help to that partner by different means. The ability of animals to transfer different tasks when helping a social partner by satisfying the criteria of direct reciprocity might explain the frequent occurrence of reciprocal cooperation in nature.

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Connor, Richard C. "Cooperation beyond the dyad: on simple models and a complex society." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1553 (September 12, 2010): 2687–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2010.0150.

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Players in Axelrod and Hamilton's model of cooperation were not only in a Prisoner's Dilemma, but by definition, they were also trapped in a dyad. But animals are rarely so restricted and even the option to interact with third parties allows individuals to escape from the Prisoner's Dilemma into a much more interesting and varied world of cooperation, from the apparently rare ‘parcelling’ to the widespread phenomenon of market effects. Our understanding of by-product mutualism, pseudo-reciprocity and the snowdrift game is also enriched by thinking ‘beyond the dyad’. The concepts of by-product mutualism and pseudo-reciprocity force us to think again about our basic definitions of cooperative behaviour (behaviour by a single individual) and cooperation (the outcome of an interaction between two or more individuals). Reciprocity is surprisingly rare outside of humans, even among large-brained ‘intelligent’ birds and mammals. Are humans unique in having extensive cooperative interactions among non-kin and an integrated cognitive system for mediating reciprocity? Perhaps, but our best chance for finding a similar phenomenon may be in delphinids, which also live in large societies with extensive cooperative interactions among non-relatives. A system of nested male alliances in bottlenose dolphins illustrates the potential and difficulties of finding a complex system of cooperation close to our own.

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Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. "Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict." American Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (September 1997): 515–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2952072.

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Although the role of reciprocity in international cooperation is central to neoliberal institutionalism, empirical understanding of the concept remains weak. We analyze strategic response patterns—the use of reciprocity or inverse response (bullying)—in the Bosnia conflict from 1992 to 1995. We construct weekly time series of conflict and cooperation among the parties to the Bosnia war, using machine-coded events data. Time-series statistical analysis identifies several important patterns of strategic response, both reciprocal and inverse. These include bilateral responses, which are central to the concepts of reciprocity and evolution of cooperation, and triangular responses, which are central to the debates on containment versus accommodation in regional conflicts. Specifically, Serb forces displayed inverse triangular response, cooperating toward Bosnia after being punished by NATO. Outside powers displayed triangular reciprocity, increasing hostility toward Serb forces after Serbian attacks on the Bosnian government.

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Riolo, Rick L., Michael D. Cohen, and Robert Axelrod. "Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity." Nature 414, no. 6862 (November 2001): 441–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/35106555.

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Schweinfurth, Manon K., and Michael Taborsky. "Relatedness decreases and reciprocity increases cooperation in Norway rats." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1874 (March 7, 2018): 20180035. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.0035.

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Kin selection and reciprocity are two mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation, but the relative importance of kinship and reciprocity for decisions to cooperate are yet unclear for most cases of cooperation. Here, we experimentally tested the relative importance of relatedness and received cooperation for decisions to help a conspecific in wild-type Norway rats ( Rattus norvegicus ). Test rats provided more food to non-kin than to siblings, and they generally donated more food to previously helpful social partners than to those that had refused help. The rats thus applied reciprocal cooperation rules irrespective of relatedness, highlighting the importance of reciprocal help for cooperative interactions among both related and unrelated conspecifics.

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Okada, Isamu. "Evolution of cooperative study." Impact 2020, no. 8 (December 16, 2020): 76–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.21820/23987073.2020.8.76.

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Associate Professor Isamu Okada is based at the Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University in Japan, as well as a visiting professor of Department of Information Systems and Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business in Austria. Okada has dedicated his career to understanding more about the evolution of cooperation which is a strand of thought that falls under evolutionary biology. Academics around the world have long considered the issues relating to the evolution of cooperation. In these studies, cooperation is taken to mean providing benefits to others by paying some kind of cost, whether that be money, time, effort, etc. One of the most fascinating aspects of the theory is that rational thought holds a person has no incentive to cooperate. Indeed, despite decades of research and huge numbers of studies, a rational reason for cooperating has still not been cultivated properly. One of the mechanisms that lie behind cooperation are known as reciprocity and there are many different types. Three specific types have been studied in great detail; direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and network reciprocity. Okada's team has conducted investigations that shine new light on indirect reciprocity which could open up new directions for the field of evolutionary biology.

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Bereby-Meyer, Yoella. "Reciprocity and uncertainty." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 18–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001178.

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AbstractGuala points to a discrepancy between strong negative reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained “in the wild.” This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the players' actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain environment.

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Yang, Zhong, Ya Zheng, Guochun Yang, Qi Li, and Xun Liu. "Neural signatures of cooperation enforcement and violation: a coordinate-based meta-analysis." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 14, no. 9 (September 2019): 919–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsz073.

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Abstract The social norms of fairness and reciprocity are fundamental to cooperation and constitute core behavioral principles. Warm glow theory suggests that cooperative behavior is driven by positive emotions, whereas inequity aversion theory proposes that cooperative behavior is necessary to avoid negative feelings. However, the precise characteristics underlying the enforcement (fairness or reciprocity) and violation (unfairness or betrayal) of cooperation remain elusive. Moreover, whether the neural mechanism of cooperation as a partner or a spectator is the same remains unclear. To resolve the above issues, we summarized the findings of human cooperation neuroimaging studies through a meta-analysis. Based on our results, cooperation enforcement activates reward-related brain areas, such as the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, only during other-cooperation. In contrast, cooperation violation is associated with the negative emotion-related insula in both self- and other-noncooperation. Thus, people expect others to cooperate rather than themselves; however, people are disgusted when cooperation is violated by themselves or others. Taken together, cooperative behavior might be mainly driven by a process designed to avoid negative emotion, which supports the inequity aversion theory but not the warm glow theory, thereby improving our understanding of cooperation theory.

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Dahanukar, Neelesh, and Milind Watve. "Group Selection and Reciprocity among Kin." Open Biology Journal 2, no. 1 (July 8, 2009): 66–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1874196700902010066.

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The question how Darwinian mechanisms lead to the evolution of individually costly cooperative behavior has given rise to a number of hypotheses. However, attempts to build a synthesis where different types of mechanisms coexist and interact at different levels of selections are still scarce. Here we derive simple game theoretical models where the group level conflicts are resolved by group selection while simultaneously within group competition is resolved by kin selection and reciprocity. We show that none of the mechanisms, when alone, is as robust in evolving and maintaining cooperation as a synthesis of all. Furthermore, we show that initially within group conflicts can be overcome only by kin selection and not reciprocity. However, once common, different types of reciprocities can maintain high levels of cooperation even if average relatedness among individuals is lowered, groups become large, and the benefits of cooperation are reduced. Based on the synthesis we also propose a possible route to the evolution of social and eusocial systems.

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Keohane, Robert O. "Reciprocity in international relations." International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300004458.

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World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian “war of all against all” does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

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Taborsky, Michael, Joachim G. Frommen, and Christina Riehl. "Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 371, no. 1687 (February 5, 2016): 20150084. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0084.

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The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as ‘help anyone if helped by someone’ should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

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Clark, Daniel, Drew Fudenberg, and Alexander Wolitzky. "Indirect reciprocity with simple records." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117, no. 21 (May 12, 2020): 11344–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1921984117.

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Indirect reciprocity is a foundational mechanism of human cooperation. Existing models of indirect reciprocity fail to robustly support social cooperation: Image-scoring models fail to provide robust incentives, while social-standing models are not informationally robust. Here we provide a model of indirect reciprocity based on simple, decentralized records: Each individual’s record depends on the individual’s own past behavior alone, and not on the individual’s partners’ past behavior or their partners’ partners’ past behavior. When social dilemmas exhibit a coordination motive (or strategic complementarity), tolerant trigger strategies based on simple records can robustly support positive social cooperation and exhibit strong stability properties. In the opposite case of strategic substitutability, positive social cooperation cannot be robustly supported. Thus, the strength of short-run coordination motives in social dilemmas determines the prospects for robust long-run cooperation.

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Gao, Yang, Yan Chen, and K. J. Ray Liu. "Cooperation Stimulation for Multiuser Cooperative Communications Using Indirect Reciprocity Game." IEEE Transactions on Communications 60, no. 12 (December 2012): 3650–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tcomm.2012.091212.110678.

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Gintis, Herbert, and Ernst Fehr. "The social structure of cooperation and punishment." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000914.

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AbstractThe standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.

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Sylwester, Karolina, and Gilbert Roberts. "Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games." Biology Letters 6, no. 5 (April 21, 2010): 659–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2010.0209.

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Explaining unconditional cooperation, such as donations to charities or contributions to public goods, continues to present a problem. One possibility is that cooperation can pay through developing a reputation that makes one more likely to be chosen for a profitable cooperative partnership, a process termed competitive altruism (CA) or reputation-based partner choice. Here, we show, to our knowledge, for the first time, that investing in a cooperative reputation can bring net benefits through access to more cooperative partners. Participants played a public goods game (PGG) followed by an opportunity to select a partner for a second cooperative game. We found that those who gave more in the PGG were more often selected as desired partners and received more in the paired cooperative game. Reputational competition was even stronger when it was possible for participants to receive a higher payoff from partner choice. The benefits of being selected by a more cooperative partner outweighed the costs of cooperation in the reputation building phase. CA therefore provides an alternative to indirect reciprocity as an explanation for reputation-building behaviour. Furthermore, while indirect reciprocity depends upon individuals giving preference to those of good standing, CA can explain unconditional cooperation.

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Semmann, D. "Conditional cooperation can hinder network reciprocity." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, no. 32 (July 27, 2012): 12846–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210294109.

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Anderberg, Dan. "Marriage, Divorce and Reciprocity-based Cooperation." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109, no. 1 (March 2007): 25–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00479.x.

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Komorita, S. S., J. A. Hilty, and C. D. Parks. "Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas." Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991): 494–518. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035003005.

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Leimar, Olof, and Peter Hammerstein. "Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 268, no. 1468 (April 7, 2001): 745–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2000.1573.

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Pfeiffer, Thomas, Claudia Rutte, Timothy Killingback, Michael Taborsky, and Sebastian Bonhoeffer. "Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 272, no. 1568 (June 2, 2005): 1115–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2004.2988.

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The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter—even if it was with a different partner.

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Rand, David G., Erez Yoeli, and Moshe Hoffman. "Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods." Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, no. 1 (October 2014): 263–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2372732214548426.

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How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but benefit everyone, thus creating a social dilemma: Individual and collective interests are in tension. Although individuals may want a public good to be produced, they typically would prefer not to be the ones who have to pay for it. Understanding how to motivate individuals to pay these costs is therefore of great importance for policy makers. Research provides advice on how to promote this type of “cooperative” behavior. Synthesizing a large body of research demonstrates the power of “reciprocity” for inducing cooperation: When others know that you have helped them, or acted to benefit the greater good, they are often more likely to reciprocate and help you in turn. Several conclusions stem from this line of thinking: People will be more likely to do their part when their actions are observable by others; people will pay more attention to how effective those actions are when efficacy is also observable; people will try to avoid situations where they could help, but often will help if asked directly; people are more likely to cooperate if they think others are also cooperating; and people can develop habits of cooperation that shape their default inclinations.

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Wiener, Joshua Lyle, and Tabitha A. Doescher. "Cooperation and Expectations of Cooperation." Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 13, no. 2 (September 1994): 259–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/074391569401300207.

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The results of both a survey of utility customers and an experiment using role-playing students support the hypothesis that a person is more likely to install load control devices on their heating or cooling units (cooperate) if he or she thinks that others will cooperate. In addition, we find that, as predicted by the norm of reciprocity, customers who are more concerned about conservation are more influenced by thier expectations of the cooperative intentions of others than are customers who are less concerned.

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Güney, Şule, and Ben R. Newell. "Is strong reciprocity really strong in the lab, let alone in the real world?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001257.

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AbstractWe argue that standard experiments supporting the existence of “strong reciprocity” do not represent many cooperative situations outside the laboratory. More representative experiments that incorporate “earned” rather than “windfall” wealth also do not provide evidence for the impact of strong reciprocity on cooperation in contemporary real-life situations or in evolutionary history, supporting the main conclusions of the target article.

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Suzuki, Shinsuke, and Eizo Akiyama. "Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 272, no. 1570 (June 21, 2005): 1373–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3072.

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The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communities where the effect of reputation is included. We investigate the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups in which the reputation of individuals affects the decision-making process. This paper presents the following: (i) cooperation can evolve in a four-person case, (ii) the evolution of cooperation becomes difficult as group size increases, even if the effect of reputation is included, and (iii) three kinds of final social states exist. In medium-sized communities, cooperative species can coexist in a stable manner with betrayal species.

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Tanaka, Hiroki, Hisashi Ohtsuki, and Yohsuke Ohtsubo. "The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 283, no. 1835 (July 27, 2016): 20160694. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.0694.

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Cooperation among strangers is a marked characteristic of human sociality. One prominent evolutionary explanation for this form of human cooperation is indirect reciprocity, whereby each individual selectively helps people with a ‘good’ reputation, but not those with a ‘bad’ reputation. Some evolutionary analyses have underscored the importance of second-order reputation information (the reputation of a current partner's previous partner) for indirect reciprocity as it allows players to discriminate justified ‘good’ defectors, who selectively deny giving help to ‘bad’ partners, from unjustified ‘bad’ defectors. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether people in fact make use of second-order information in indirect reciprocity settings. As an alternative, we propose the intention signalling strategy, whereby defectors are given the option to abandon a resource as a means of expunging their ‘bad’ reputation. Our model deviates from traditional modelling approaches in the indirect reciprocity literature in a crucial way—we show that first-order information is sufficient to maintain cooperation if players are given an option to signal their intention. Importantly, our model is robust against invasion by both unconditionally cooperative and uncooperative strategies, a first step towards demonstrating its viability as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Furthermore, in two behavioural experiments, when participants were given the option to abandon a resource so as to mend a tarnished reputation, participants not only spontaneously began to use this option, they also interpreted others' use of this option as a signal of cooperative intent.

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Su, Qi, Aming Li, Long Wang, and H. Eugene Stanley. "Spatial reciprocity in the evolution of cooperation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1900 (April 3, 2019): 20190041. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0041.

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Cooperation is key to the survival of all biological systems. The spatial structure of a system constrains who interacts with whom (interaction partner) and who acquires new traits from whom (role model). Understanding when and to what degree a spatial structure affects the evolution of cooperation is an important and challenging topic. Here, we provide an analytical formula to predict when natural selection favours cooperation where the effects of a spatial structure are described by a single parameter. We find that a spatial structure promotes cooperation (spatial reciprocity) when interaction partners overlap role models. When they do not, spatial structure inhibits cooperation even without cooperation dilemmas. Furthermore, a spatial structure in which individuals interact with their role models more often shows stronger reciprocity. Thus, imitating individuals with frequent interactions facilitates cooperation. Our findings are applicable to both pairwise and group interactions and show that strong social ties might hinder, while asymmetric spatial structures for interaction and trait dispersal could promote cooperation.

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Sasaki, Tatsuya, Isamu Okada, and Yutaka Nakai. "Indirect reciprocity can overcome free-rider problems on costly moral assessment." Biology Letters 12, no. 7 (July 2016): 20160341. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2016.0341.

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Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.

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Martinez-Vaquero, Luis A., Francisco C. Santos, and Vito Trianni. "Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 17, no. 172 (November 2020): 20200635. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2020.0635.

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Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions among individuals. Signals and quorum dynamics may also drive cooperation. Here, we resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical model to jointly analyse these two mechanisms and study the conditions in which evolution selects for direct reciprocity, signalling, or their combination. We show that signalling alone leads to higher levels of cooperation than when combined with reciprocity, while offering additional robustness against errors. Specifically, successful strategies in the realm of direct reciprocity are often not selected in the presence of signalling, and memory of past interactions is only exploited opportunistically in the case of earlier coordination failure. Differently, signalling always evolves, even when costly. In the light of these results, it may be easier to understand why direct reciprocity has been observed only in a limited number of cases among non-humans, whereas signalling is widespread at all levels of complexity.

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Li, Wenjian, Yang Zhang, Yuanyuan Wu, Xue Han, Benhai Guo, and Gang Xie. "Enterprise Reciprocity and Risk Preferences and the Sustainable Cooperation of Innovation Activities in Industrial Parks." Sustainability 13, no. 17 (August 27, 2021): 9639. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13179639.

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The sustainable cooperation of innovation in industrial parks is of great significance to the sustainable development of enterprises and parks. Factors explaining enterprise innovation cooperation activities in industrial parks have attracted great attention in scholarly research. In this article, a preference-based snowdrift game model on complex networks is proposed, where different combinations of enterprise reciprocity and risk preferences are introduced into the game model. The impact of these preferences on the sustainability of cooperation in mature and less-mature parks, characterized by different network styles, is examined through simulations. The investigation reveals that reciprocity and risk preferences have an effect on the sustainable emergence of enterprise cooperation under the constraints of a loss-to-profit ratio of cooperation, network average degree, and network style. Reciprocity preferences of enterprises are shown to have a greater impact on the sustainable emergence of cooperation than risk preference in two types of parks. Additionally, this advantage is more significant in less-mature parks. The results show the positive relationships between combinations of risk aversion and reciprocity preferences and the emergence of cooperation from a long-term perspective. This study concludes with a discussion of management suggestions and policy implications. The findings shed light on the understanding of the sustainable emergence of innovation cooperation in industrial parks.

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Inaba, Misato, and Nobuyuki Takahashi. "The use of reputation in repeated dyadic interactions." Rationality and Society 30, no. 1 (July 9, 2017): 54–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463117717232.

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How cooperation is possible has been one of the major puzzles in social sciences. Traditionally, two mechanisms have been proposed to explain cooperation. Cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions has been explained by direct reciprocity, while cooperation between more than two individuals has been explained by indirect reciprocity. Although reputation is theoretically unnecessary to achieve mutual cooperation in repeated dyadic interactions, several experimental studies indicated that people do make use of reputation even in such situations. Therefore, we conducted two experiments to investigate why people make use of reputation in dyadic interactions. Our results revealed that people use reputation because they assume that reputation enables them to predict their partners’ future behaviors in dyadic interactions. We conclude that there is a need to reexamine the system of mechanisms posited to explain the problem of cooperation in particular by expanding the scope of indirect reciprocity.

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Wubs, Matthias, Redouan Bshary, and Laurent Lehmann. "Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 283, no. 1832 (June 15, 2016): 20160488. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.0488.

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Cooperation based on mutual investments can occur between unrelated individuals when they are engaged in repeated interactions. Individuals then need to use a conditional strategy to deter their interaction partners from defecting. Responding to defection such that the future payoff of a defector is reduced relative to cooperating with it is called a partner control mechanism. Three main partner control mechanisms are (i) to switch from cooperation to defection when being defected (‘positive reciprocity’), (ii) to actively reduce the payoff of a defecting partner (‘punishment’), or (iii) to stop interacting and switch partner (‘partner switching’). However, such mechanisms to stabilize cooperation are often studied in isolation from each other. In order to better understand the conditions under which each partner control mechanism tends to be favoured by selection, we here analyse by way of individual-based simulations the coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching. We show that random interactions in an unstructured population and a high number of rounds increase the likelihood that selection favours partner switching. In contrast, interactions localized in small groups (without genetic structure) increase the likelihood that selection favours punishment and/or positive reciprocity. This study thus highlights the importance of comparing different control mechanisms for cooperation under different conditions.

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Rosas, Alejandro. "Towards a unified theory of reciprocity." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (January 31, 2012): 36–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001312.

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AbstractIn a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.

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Voelkl, Bernhard, and Claudia Kasper. "Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation." Biology Letters 5, no. 4 (May 14, 2009): 462–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2009.0204.

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Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.

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Yang, Jie, Hongming Xie, Guangsheng Yu, Mingyu Liu, and Yingnan Yang. "Operational and relational governances of buyer–supplier exchanges." Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 32, no. 8 (January 17, 2020): 1783–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/apjml-03-2019-0181.

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PurposeThis study examines the operational and relational governances as antecedents of cooperation commitment in buyer–supplier exchanges. It also assesses the impact of cooperation commitment on operational performance.Design/methodology/approachPath analysis was performed on the data collected from manufacturers.FindingsThe results of this study show that both operational and relational governances exert impact on cooperation commitment, which, in turn, is associated with operational performance improvement.Originality/valueFirst, this is the first study employing the reciprocity theory to theorize the conceptual framework of the governance antecedents of cooperation commitment and operations excellence effect. Second, the study highlights how the research framework can enrich the reciprocity theory in exploring the mechanisms of the operational and relational governances of buyer–supplier exchanges and their impact on the commitment to the cooperation. Third, this study extends the reciprocity theory to examine in detail how cooperation commitment exerts impact on the operational performance.

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Sousa, David Naves, Luís Correia, and Leonel Garcia-Marques. "The importance of memory for the success of cooperation under ecological adversity." Adaptive Behavior 28, no. 4 (September 4, 2019): 293–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1059712319872518.

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While cooperation maximizes collective welfare, selfishness maximizes short-term individual benefits. Why should any organism cooperate? Selfishness seems to be favored by natural selection. While this presents a classical dilemma in many fields, cooperation is observed at all levels of biological organization. By preserving the common good, cooperation may guarantee better survival chances for all. Evolution and maintenance of cooperation are possible by a combination of multiple mechanisms including reciprocity, which in primates and particularly in humans is largely dependent on memory and the ability to exchange social information, a function of language. In this article, we present a multi-agent model developed with the aim of evaluating the importance of memory in cognitive and social adaptations for cooperation based on reciprocity when populations are under ecological stress. We show that in a society under ecological pressure, the reciprocity network permitted by collaborative memory promotes cooperation.

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Thomas, Matthew Gwynfryn, Ting Ji, Jiajia Wu, QiaoQiao He, Yi Tao, and Ruth Mace. "Kinship underlies costly cooperation in Mosuo villages." Royal Society Open Science 5, no. 2 (February 2018): 171535. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.171535.

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The relative importance of social evolution theories such as kin selection, direct reciprocity and need-based transfers in explaining real-world cooperation is the source of much debate. Previous field studies of cooperation in human communities have revealed variability in the extent to which each of these theories explains human sociality in different contexts. We conducted multivariate social network analyses predicting costly cooperation—labouring on another household's farm—in 128 082 dyads of Mosuo farming households in southwest China. Through information-theoretic model selection, we tested the roles played by genealogical relatedness, affinal relationships (including reproductive partners), reciprocity, relative need, wealth, household size, spatial proximity and gift-giving in an economic game. The best-fitting model included all factors, along with interactions between relatedness and (i) reciprocity, (ii) need, (iii) the presence of own children in another household and (iv) proximity. Our results show how a real-world form of cooperation was driven by kinship. Households tended to help kin in need (but not needy non-kin) and travel further to help spatially distant relatives. Households were more likely to establish reciprocal relationships with distant relatives and non-kin but closer kin cooperated regardless of reciprocity. These patterns of kin-driven cooperation show the importance of inclusive fitness in understanding human social behaviour.

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Lubell, Mark, and John T. Scholz. "Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic." American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (January 2001): 160. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2669365.

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Chaudhuri, Ananish, Barry Sopher, and Paul Strand. "Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity." Journal of Economic Psychology 23, no. 2 (April 2002): 231–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-4870(02)00065-x.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Cooperation and reciprocity'

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