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Journal articles on the topic 'Cooperation incentives'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 2 June 2025

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Micheli, Leticia, Mirre Stallen, and Alan G. Sanfey. "The Effect of Centralized Financial and Social Incentives on Cooperative Behavior and Its Underlying Neural Mechanisms." Brain Sciences 11, no. 3 (2021): 317. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11030317.

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Incentives are frequently used by governments and employers to encourage cooperation. Here, we investigated the effect of centralized incentives on cooperation, firstly in a behavioral study and then replicated in a subsequent neuroimaging (fMRI) study. In both studies, participants completed a novel version of the Public Goods Game, including experimental conditions in which the administration of centralized incentives was probabilistic and incentives were either of a financial or social nature. Behavioral results showed that the prospect of potentially receiving financial and social incentiv

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Yauch, Charlene A., and Daniel O. Navaresse. "Cooperative Research Incentives: Lessons Learned Using Students as Experimental Subjects." Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 49, no. 16 (2005): 1504–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/154193120504901610.

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This paper reviews two experiments in which student volunteers were employed for research on cooperative and competitive behaviors. In both experiments the students were given the opportunity to earn incentive pay; the independent variable was the offering of incentives on either a competitive or cooperative basis. The researchers expected the incentives to influence the students' behaviors but found that some behaviors contradicted the expectations, particularly for the cooperative treatments. In both experiments, limited cooperation occurred despite the incentives offered. This paper present

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Ali, S. Nageeb, and David A. Miller. "Communication and Cooperation in Markets." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 4 (2022): 200–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200296.

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Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has it

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Libby, Theresa, and Linda Thorne. "The Influence of Incentive Structure on Group Performance in Assembly Lines and Teams." Behavioral Research in Accounting 21, no. 2 (2009): 57–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria.2009.21.2.57.

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ABSTRACT: Modern manufacturing settings increasingly rely upon workgroups; however, evidence concerning the best fit among incentive structure, production environment, and group performance has been mixed. Young et al. (1993) examine the effect of group incentives on group performance in cooperative and noncooperative environments. Although theory and evidence from practice indicate that group incentives combined with cooperation should result in higher group performance, their results were contrary to this prediction. To further explore this issue, we examine the effect of individual, group,

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Hackel, Jakob, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, Akira Goto, and Alfred Taudes. "Asymmetric effects of social and economic incentives on cooperation in real effort based public goods games." PLOS ONE 16, no. 4 (2021): e0249217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249217.

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Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a publ

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Dong, Yali, Tatsuya Sasaki, and Boyu Zhang. "The competitive advantage of institutional reward." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1899 (2019): 20190001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0001.

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Sustaining cooperation among unrelated individuals is a fundamental challenge in biology and the social sciences. In human society, this problem can be solved by establishing incentive institutions that reward cooperators and punish free-riders. Most of the previous studies have focused on which incentives promote cooperation best. However, a higher cooperation level does not always imply higher group fitness, and only incentives that lead to higher fitness can survive in social evolution. In this paper, we compare the efficiencies of three types of institutional incentives, namely, reward, pu

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Moser, Karin S., and Katrin Wodzicki. "The Effect of Reward Interdependence on Cooperation and Information-Sharing Intentions." Swiss Journal of Psychology 66, no. 2 (2007): 117–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1024/1421-0185.66.2.117.

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Incentives are central to the reinforcement of behavior. In the context of group work, it is important to distinguish between individual and collective incentives as rewards. High reward interdependence should constitute an incentive for cooperation among group members (e.g., collective vs. individual financial rewards), but experimental studies provide no support for this assumption, whereas some field studies found an increase in information exchange and team productivity. In the two experimental studies presented here (N1 = 46, N2 = 28), high reward interdependence resulted in a higher will

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Kibuchi, Eliud, Patrick Sturgis, Gabriele B. Durrant, and Olga Maslovskaya. "Do Interviewers Moderate the Effect of Monetary Incentives on Response Rates in Household Interview Surveys?" Journal of Survey Statistics and Methodology 8, no. 2 (2019): 264–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jssam/smy026.

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Abstract As citizens around the world become ever more reluctant to respond to survey interview requests, incentives are playing an increasingly important role in maintaining response rates. In face-to-face surveys, interviewers are the key conduit of information about the existence and level of any incentive offered and, therefore, potentially moderate the effectiveness with which an incentive translates nonproductive addresses into interviews. Yet, while the existing literature on the effects of incentives on response rates is substantial, little is currently known about the role of intervie

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Ludwiczak, Agata, Zoe Adams, and Magda Osman. "Actions Do Not Always Speak Louder Than Words." Experimental Psychology 69, no. 3 (2022): 155–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169/a000555.

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Abstract. Financial (dis)incentives (e.g., bonuses, taxes) and social incentives (e.g., public praise) have typically been proposed as methods to encourage greater cooperation for the benefit of all. However, when cooperation requires exertion of effort, such interventions might not always be effective. While incentives tend to be highly motivating when choosing to exert effort, evidence suggests that they have less of an effect on behavior during effort execution. The aim of this exploratory study was to incorporate these insights into empirical investigation of the effects of social incentiv

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10

Bigoni, Maria, Margherita Fort, Mattia Nardotto, and Tommaso G. Reggiani. "Cooperation or Competition? A Field Experiment on Non-monetary Learning Incentives." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 15, no. 4 (2015): 1753–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0109.

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Abstract We assess the effect of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes based on grading rules on students’ effort, using experimental data. We randomly assigned students to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between paired up students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a baseline treatment in which students can neither compete nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation, whereas cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the

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Abdalla, Alaeldin, Xiaodong Li, Ziyang Song, and Fan Yang. "Incentive mechanisms for managing local subcontractors in international construction projects." Journal of Project Management 8, no. 4 (2023): 239–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5267/j.jpm.2023.6.002.

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In the domain of international construction projects, managing supply chains presents distinct challenges due to the intricate task of coordinating multiple stakeholders within diverse cultural, economic, and regulatory contexts. Prior research highlights the significance of incentive mechanisms and collaborative procurement practices, yet the effectiveness of these strategies in augmenting performance for international projects has not been extensively examined. This investigation explores the effects of financial and non-financial incentives on the performance of global construction projects

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Wang, Song, Yang Zhao, Lanfeng Liu, and Fuhua Huang. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Multitask Cooperation in Logistics Supply Chain." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (March 5, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6683240.

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This paper studies the incentive mechanism of multitask cooperation in logistics service supply chain (LSSC) by building a dynamic incentive model. Research shows the following: (1) the implicit reputation in dynamic cooperation can effectively improve system incentive effectiveness; (2) the difference in the contribution of different logistics cooperation to the performance of the LSSC has a significant impact on the incentive effect; (3) when two kinds of cooperation tasks have complementary relationships, both the LSP’s choice of logistics tasks and the incentives will simultaneously act on

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13

Fang, Yinhai, Tina P. Benko, Matjaž Perc, Haiyan Xu, and Qingmei Tan. "Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game." Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 475, no. 2227 (2019): 20190349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0349.

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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two

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Juma, Raymond W., Anish M. Kurien, and Thomas O. Olwal. "Energy-Efficient Coalition Games with Incentives in Machine-to-Machine Communications." Journal of Computer Networks and Communications 2019 (June 16, 2019): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3217369.

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The need to achieve energy efficiency in machine-to-machine (M2M) communications has been a driver of the use of coalition game-based cooperative communication schemes. The proposed schemes have shown good energy-efficient performance results in the recent past. However, sustaining cooperation amongst coalition games of M2M devices from different network-operating authorities requires appropriate incentives. A review of the literature demonstrates that a limited number of contributions have considered the use of coalition games with incentives in M2M communications. In this paper, an energy-ef

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Chen, Xiaojie, Tatsuya Sasaki, Åke Brännström, and Ulf Dieckmann. "First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 12, no. 102 (2015): 20140935. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.0935.

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Social institutions often use rewards and penalties to promote cooperation. Providing incentives tends to be costly, so it is important to find effective and efficient policies for the combined use of rewards and penalties. Most studies of cooperation, however, have addressed rewarding and punishing in isolation and have focused on peer-to-peer sanctioning as opposed to institutional sanctioning. Here, we demonstrate that an institutional sanctioning policy we call ‘first carrot, then stick’ is unexpectedly successful in promoting cooperation. The policy switches the incentive from rewarding t

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Sharipov, Sh I., Sh S. Muduev, and B. Sh Ibragimova. "Government incentives to the agricultural consumer cooperation development at the regional level." Regional Economics: Theory and Practice 18, no. 10 (2020): 1946–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/re.18.10.1946.

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Subject. This article examines the state of the Republic of Dagestan's agribusiness, and the development of the system of agricultural consumer cooperation in this region, in particular. Objectives. The article aims to identify problems of agricultural consumer cooperation development in Dagestan, and develop mechanisms for the public stimulation of cooperative structures in the region. Methods. For the study, we used statistical and logical analyses. Results. The article substantiates measures to stimulate the development of agricultural consumer cooperation, including through the effective u

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McAuliffe, William H. B., Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, and Michael E. McCullough. "Cooperation and Learning in Unfamiliar Situations." Current Directions in Psychological Science 28, no. 5 (2019): 436–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721419848673.

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Human social life is rife with uncertainty. In any given encounter, one can wonder whether cooperation will generate future benefits. Many people appear to resolve this dilemma by initially cooperating, perhaps because (a) encounters in everyday life often have future consequences, and (b) the costs of alienating oneself from long-term social partners often outweighed the short-term benefits of acting selfishly over our evolutionary history. However, because cooperating with other people does not always advance self-interest, people might also learn to withhold cooperation in certain situation

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18

Sukanta, I. Wayan, Anik Yuesti, and Putu Kepramareni. "The Influence of Financial Incentives and Non Financial Incentives to Job Performance: Motivation of Work as A Variable of Modernation in Employee Cooperation of Save Loans (Ksp) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar Oleh." International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review 9, no. 07 (2018): 20886–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr/2018/9/07/552.

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of financial incentives on job motivation, the influence of non-financial incentives on job motivation, the influence of financial incentives on job performance, the influence of non-financial incentives on job performance, and the influence of work motivation on job performance in the Cooperative Savings and Loans (KSP) Mitra Sari Dana Denpasar. This research is a quantitative research using primary data obtained from the questionnaire and measured by using Likert scale. The population of this research is employees at Savings and Loans Coo

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Lin, Kuan-Ju, and Yahn-Shir Chen. "Does Industry Cooperation Policy Matter? Evidence from Five Prefectures in Japan." Sustainability 12, no. 9 (2020): 3627. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12093627.

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Taiwan and Japan initiated an industrial cooperation policy and incentive measures in 2011. Five Japanese prefectures in the Tokai Region actively communicated and cooperated with Taiwan after 2011. This motivated us first to address the economic and trade ties between Taiwan and Japan. Second, we compared and analyzed effects of the industrial cooperation policy on the five prefectures, their willingness to cooperate with Taiwan, and the topics brought up by the industry cooperation. Main results indicate that the policy offers positive incentives for industries and enterprises, and the coope

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20

Fischer, Doris. "The Impact of Changing Incentives in China on International Cooperation in Social Science Research on China." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43, no. 2 (2014): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261404300204.

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Over the past three decades, China's fast economic development has induced considerable changes in China's university and research institution landscape, research financing and academic career incentives. This paper argues that these changes have affected the motivation and the ways in which Chinese scholars engage in international research cooperation. Most recently it has been observed that strong pressures on scholars and scientists – especially at leading academic institutions – to excel in international publications while simultaneously fulfilling their obligation to generate income for t

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21

Long, William J. "Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation." International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 1 (1996): 77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600932.

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22

Penny, Gopal, Michèle Müller-Itten, Gabriel De Los Cobos, Connor Mullen, and Marc F. Müller. "Trust and incentives for transboundary groundwater cooperation." Advances in Water Resources 155 (September 2021): 104019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.advwatres.2021.104019.

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23

Ravenhill, John. "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives." Asian Survey 35, no. 9 (1995): 850–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2645786.

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Tabellini, Guido. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, no. 3 (2008): 905–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.905.

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Ravenhill, John. "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing Incentives." Asian Survey 35, no. 9 (1995): 850–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.1995.35.9.01p00542.

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Wang, Shengxian, Xiaojie Chen, and Attila Szolnoki. "Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation." Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation 79 (December 2019): 104914. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2019.104914.

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27

Okada, Isamu, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Fujio Toriumi, and Tatsuya Sasaki. "The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation." PLOS Computational Biology 11, no. 5 (2015): e1004232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004232.

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Zhao, Hui Yue, Xia Qiu, Yan Hong Lu, and Qi Wang. "A Correlation Game Analysis between Regional Trade and Environmental Cooperation." Advanced Materials Research 1010-1012 (August 2014): 1939–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.1010-1012.1939.

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With the development of economic globalization and Industrial modernization, the problems of Environmental pollution and pollutants transponder have become diverse and serious. Under the premise of the "super national organizations absent, cooperation is considered the key to solve the global environmental predicament effective means. Through the game theory to establish the regional trade and environment related analysis framework, which proved the mechanism not only could ensure international trading profits, at the same time, it can effectively solve the hitchhike behavior in the process of

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Thye, Shane, Edward J. Lawler, and Jeongkoo Yoon. "The Formation of Group Ties in Open Interaction Groups." Social Psychology Quarterly 82, no. 2 (2019): 158–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0190272518813562.

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We examine how task jointness and group incentive structures bear on the nature and strength of the affective and cognitive ties that people forge to a group. The argument is that affective group ties have stronger effects on social order than cognitive group ties. There are two general hypotheses. First, joint tasks generate stronger cognitive and affective ties to groups, whereas group incentives generate cognitive but not necessarily affective ties to the group. Second, affective ties more effectively solve two fundamental problems of social order in groups: (1) sustaining membership (also

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Mekvabishvili, Rati. "Decentralized or Centralized Governance in Social Dilemmas? Experimental Evidence from Georgia." Issues in Social Science 11, no. 1 (2023): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/iss.v11i1.21126.

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The vast majority of experimental studies on the effectiveness of punishments in promoting cooperation in social dilemma situation examine decentralized incentive systems where all group members can punish each other. Cross-societal experimental studies suggest that while decentralized incentives can successfully promote cooperation in one society, they fail to do so in another. So, how is social order, as a large-scale cooperation problem among strangers, maintained in such societies? Many modern societies overcome this problem through well-functioning top-down formal enforcement institutions

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Changhui, Cao, and Zhang Lingzhen. "A Study of BOPS Cooperation Strategy of Online and Dual-Channel Retailers Considering Consumers' Heterogeneous Buying Behavior." Journal of Business and Marketing 2, no. 1 (2025): 154–59. https://doi.org/10.62517/jbm.202509121.

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For the BOPS cooperation strategies of online and dual-channel retailers, the game model is constructed under three scenarios of online retailers' online-only sales, opening offline channels, and cooperating with dual-channel retailers, and the optimal scope of BOPS cooperation among retailers is analyzed. The study shows that online and dual-channel retailers have incentives to implement BOPS cooperation when the product waiting cost is small; when the product waiting cost is large, online retailers should choose dual-channel sales online and offline.

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Krzesinski, Anthony. "Robust Cooperation in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks." International Journal of Information, Communication Technology and Applications 1, no. 1 (2015): 83–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.17972/ajicta2015114.

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Consider a mobile ad hoc network where the nodes belong to different authorities. The nodes must be given incentives to spend their resources (battery power and transmission bandwidth) in forwarding packets that originate at nodes belonging to another authority. This can be done by assigning a credit balance to each node: when a node acts as an originating node it uses its credits to pay for the costs of sending its own traffic; when a node acts as a transit node it earns credits by forwarding traffic from other nodes.This paper presents a credit-based incentive scheme which assists nodes when

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Li, Zeyuan, and Xiaoying Zhao. "Incentives and constraints: An optimization mechanism for improving the performance of farmland protection entities." PLOS One 20, no. 6 (2025): e0320750. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0320750.

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Farmland is the most crucial resource for food production, and implementing farmland protection is a long-term strategy to achieve the sustainable use of this vital resource. Farmland protection is not only a priority for policymakers but also requires the cooperation of management departments and policy implementation bodies. Within China’s “county-township-village” farmland protection organizational structure, the current pressing issue is how to align the performance of grassroots governments using an incentive-constraint system and guide village-level cooperation to effectively implement f

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Tian, Kun, Xintian Zhuang, and Beibei Yu. "The Incentive and Supervision Mechanism of Banks on Third-Party B2B Platforms in Online Supply Chain Finance Using Big Data." Mobile Information Systems 2021 (May 18, 2021): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/9943719.

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The incentive and supervision design of cooperation between banks and B2B platforms was studied under the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing model. Under the assumptions of B2B platform risk, neutrality, and risk aversion, a principal-agent model for cooperation was established between banks and B2B platforms. Its purpose was to expand and compare the models by adding supervision variables. It also helps to analyze the effects of risk aversion coefficients on effort level, fixed payment, incentive coefficients, and the impact of bank income. This paper has analyzed the banking syste

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Wan, Zhongjun. "Research on Cooperation Incentives for Emergency Logistics Capacity Reserve from Humanitarian Organization Perspective." Journal of Innovation and Development 3, no. 1 (2023): 142–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/jid.v3i1.8436.

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Recently, catastrophic events have occurred frequently, seriously threatening the safety of people's lives and property. The uncertainty in the demand for emergency logistics resources poses a huge challenge for emergency stockpiling. From the perspective of humanitarian organizations, cooperation with third-party logistics providers for emergency logistics capacity reserve can improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of reserve. However, in practice, there is a lack of unity of purpose, capacity mismatch and information asymmetry between the two rescue parties, which makes cooperative emerg

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Hattori, Keisuke. "Environmental innovation and policy harmonization in international oligopoly." Environment and Development Economics 18, no. 2 (2012): 162–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x1200040x.

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AbstractThis paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly and lack of regulatory commitment, and compares the incentives under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. We examine whether policy coordination (choices of policy instruments or policy harmonization) encourages environmental innovation when firms have strategic innovation incentives that may influence future regulation. In a case where policies are non-cooperatively set by governments, qu

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Rodrigues, Maíra R., and Michael Luck. "Effective Cooperations Through Non-Monetary Exchanges: A Computational Framework." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 23, no. 03 (2014): 1450002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843014500026.

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Today there is an increase in the number of cooperative initiatives in different domains to make tools and data available to global communities free or charge. Such cooperative systems are open, heterogeneous, dynamic, and lack a formal payment system. Incentivising cooperation in these scenarios is essential to maintain their effectiveness. Therefore, there is a recognised need to move away from an ad hoc approach to one in which cooperation is supported and encouraged. The agent-oriented paradigm has been advocated as a natural way to design and implement systems that are distributed and het

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Moura, Dulcineia Catarina, Maria José Madeira, Filipe A. P. Duarte, João Carvalho, and Orlando Kahilana. "Absorptive capacity and cooperation evidence in innovation from public policies for innovation." International Journal of Innovation Science 11, no. 1 (2019): 2–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijis-05-2017-0051.

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to better understand whether firm cooperation and absorptive capacity foster success in seeking public financial support for innovation activities and, by doing so, how they contribute to innovation output.Design/methodology/approachThe authors therefore extend the existing literature focusing on the effects of cooperation and absorptive capacity on specific public financial support for innovation activities in Portuguese firms from local or regional government, central administration and the European Union by using available data from the Community Innovati

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Bravo, Giangiacomo, Flaminio Squazzoni, and Károly Takács. "Intermediaries in Trust: Indirect Reciprocity, Incentives, and Norms." Journal of Applied Mathematics 2015 (2015): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/234528.

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Any trust situation involves a certain amount of risk for trustors that trustees could abuse. In some cases, intermediaries exist who play a crucial role in the exchange by providing reputational information. To examine under what conditions intermediary opinion could have a positive impact on cooperation, we designed two experiments based on a modified version of the investment game where intermediaries rated the behaviour of trustees under various incentive schemes and different role structures. We found that intermediaries can increase trust if there is room for indirect reciprocity between

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Marinich, Eric. "Accounting Information Aggregation and Managerial Cooperation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 32, no. 3 (2019): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-17-033.

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ABSTRACT Managers in decentralized organizations often face incentives against cooperation. In these situations, accounting information can increase cooperation when it reveals the cooperativeness of other managers' prior actions. The extent to which accounting information reveals other managers' prior actions, however, can depend on its aggregation. This study provides theory-consistent experimental evidence of the effects of accounting information aggregation on managerial cooperation when managers face incentives against cooperation. Based on the psychology theory of non-consequential reaso

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Tan, Hsin Wei. "Navigating Transboundary Pollution: Economic and Game-Theoretic Approaches to International Environmental Cooperation." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 175, no. 1 (2025): 64–68. https://doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/2025.21980.

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This paper examines the economic and game-theoretic approaches to transboundary pollution, focusing on the dynamics of international cooperation to address shared environmental challenges. Transboundary pollution, often framed within game theory as a "Prisoner's Dilemma," presents nations with a choice between cooperation for mutual environmental benefit or defection, risking greater harm. By analyzing public goods models, the study highlights the complexities of collective action, including the free-rider problem, where some nations may benefit from others' efforts without contributing. Throu

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Naranjo-Gil, David, Gloria Cuevas-Rodríguez, Álvaro López-Cabrales, and Jose M. Sánchez. "The Effects of Incentive System and Cognitive Orientation on Teams' Performance." Behavioral Research in Accounting 24, no. 2 (2012): 177–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-50098.

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ABSTRACT Organizations are adopting team-based structures to promote cooperation and coordination of actions and, thus, enhance performance (Libby and Thorne 2009; Chenhall 2008). However, team-based structures do not automatically improve performance. The economics literature suggests that working in teams may impair performance because of the potential conflict between individual and group incentives. In contrast, the organizational behavior literature argues that working in teams may enhance performance via members' collectivist cognitive orientation. This paper analyzes how both the econom

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Huang, Xiaohui, Juan He, and Lin Mao. "Carbon Reduction Incentives under Multi-Market Interactions: Supply Chain Vertical Cooperation Perspective." Mathematics 12, no. 4 (2024): 599. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math12040599.

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The greening trend in consumer markets and the marketization and financialization of carbon emission rights have begun to revitalize carbon assets. However, solitary efforts and the spillover of environmental protection effects still hamper enterprises’ enthusiasm for carbon emission reduction. To tackle this challenge, two vertical cooperation mechanisms, cost cooperation and alliance cooperation, are proposed. The mathematical models and solutions are developed for both of the two mechanisms, and their values and applicability are explored, respectively. In addition, the impact of fluctuatio

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Kelly, Khim, and Patricia Mui-Siang Tan. "The Effects of Profit-Sharing Contract and Feedback on the Sustainability of Cooperation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 22, no. 1 (2010): 251–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2010.22.1.251.

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ABSTRACT: This study experimentally examines how the size of a profit-sharing contract offered to a pair of employees and a feedback system that provides information on individual employee cooperativeness affect the sustainability of cooperation. Both the larger profit-sharing contract and the feedback system do not provide explicit economic incentives for cooperation. We find that when there is no feedback system, a larger profit-sharing contract increases the sustainability of cooperation as well as employees’ self-reported reciprocity to the experimental firm and trust in fellow employee. I

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Ghidoni, Riccardo, and Sigrid Suetens. "The Effect of Sequentiality on Cooperation in Repeated Games." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 4 (2022): 58–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200268.

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Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequential play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with intermediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooperation rate by around 40 percentage points, whereas with very low or very high incentives to cooperate, cooperation rates ar

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Husain1, Wisal Abdullah, Alaa Nabeel Al-Heali2, and Safaa Nayyef Abdul Jabbar3. "INTERNAL MARKETING AS AN ENTRANCE TO ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT/ APPLIED RESEARCH IN AL-FURAT STATE COMPANY FOR CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES." iraqi journal of market research and consumer protection 16, no. 1 (2024): 233–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.28936/jmracpc16.1.2024.(20).

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The research was conducted at Al-Furat General Chemical Industries Company (one of the formations of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals) with the aim of analyzing the relationship between internal marketing variables (employee recruitment, training, incentives, management support, clarity of marketing information) and the possibility of achieving the principles of sustainable human development (empowerment, social justice and equity)., cooperation, sustainability, safety and job stability) through an opinion poll that was distributed to a random sample of forty employees in that company. We

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Gibson, Dustin G., Adaeze C. Wosu, George William Pariyo, et al. "Effect of airtime incentives on response and cooperation rates in non-communicable disease interactive voice response surveys: randomised controlled trials in Bangladesh and Uganda." BMJ Global Health 4, no. 5 (2019): e001604. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001604.

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BackgroundThe global proliferation of mobile phones offers opportunity for improved non-communicable disease (NCD) data collection by interviewing participants using interactive voice response (IVR) surveys. We assessed whether airtime incentives can improve cooperation and response rates for an NCD IVR survey in Bangladesh and Uganda.MethodsParticipants were randomised to three arms: a) no incentive, b) 1X incentive or c) 2X incentive, where X was set to airtime of 50 Bangladesh Taka (US$0.60) and 5000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX; US$1.35). Adults aged 18 years and older who had a working mobile p

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Buckley, David T., and Clyde Wilcox. "Religious Change, Political Incentives, and Explaining Religious-Secular Relations in the United States and the Philippines." Politics and Religion 10, no. 3 (2017): 543–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755048317000050.

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AbstractThe interactions between religious and secular elites differ across societies, and those interactions may evolve differently even in the face of similarly controversial issues. What explains variation in relations between religious and secular elites in comparative settings? We highlight the links between religious change, political incentives, and the level of conflict or cooperation between religious and secular actors in public life. We illustrate distinct patterns of religious-secular relations with a paired comparison of two democracies with an intertwined history: the United Stat

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Shevchenko, Tetiana, Kirsi Laitala, and Yuriy Danko. "Understanding Consumer E-Waste Recycling Behavior: Introducing a New Economic Incentive to Increase the Collection Rates." Sustainability 11, no. 9 (2019): 2656. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11092656.

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Consumer electronics are made of a wide range of materials, including precious metals and critical minerals with limited global reserves. Ensuring the recycling of these materials is essential for future use, especially since many renewable energy solutions are based on them. In addition, improper end-of-life treatments of these products cause harm to the environment and human health. This study explores the incentives that have been used to increase consumer collection rates for end-of-life electrical and electronic equipment (EoL EEE). Based on extensive global literature reviews, we propose

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Evsiukova, Tamara Gennadievna. "INCENTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERSECTORAL COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE." Economy, labor, management in agriculture, no. 7 (July 1, 2022): 114–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.33938/227-114.

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