Relevant bibliographies by topics / Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Book chapters
  4. Conference papers
  5. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 9 March 2023
Last updated: 31 July 2025

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Journal articles on the topic "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Tan, Shaolin. "Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1902 (2019): 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.

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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring de
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Xiao, Erte, and Howard Kunreuther. "Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas." Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (2015): 670–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002714564426.

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Molho, Catherine, Daniel Balliet, and Junhui Wu. "Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas." Games 10, no. 1 (2019): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010012.

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Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies i
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Quan, Ji, Huiting Guo, and Xianjia Wang. "Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game." Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2022, no. 7 (2022): 073402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/ac7a28.

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Abstract The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group
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Bosma, Esmee, and Vincent Buskens. "Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel." Mens en maatschappij 95, no. 1 (2020): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm.

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Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishme
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Gintis, Herbert, and Ernst Fehr. "The social structure of cooperation and punishment." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (2012): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000914.

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AbstractThe standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
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Santos, Miguel dos, Daniel J. Rankin, and Claus Wedekind. "The evolution of punishment through reputation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 278, no. 1704 (2010): 371–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1275.

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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been su
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Cason, Timothy N., and Lata Gangadharan. "Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment." Experimental Economics 18, no. 1 (2014): 66–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0.

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Duca, Stefano, and Heinrich H. Nax. "Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, no. 144 (2018): 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain
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Kamijo, Y., T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, and Y. Funaki. "Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions." Games and Economic Behavior 84 (March 2014): 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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BATISTONI, TOMMASO. "Essays on Cooperation: Scales of Interactions, Competition, Punishment." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10281/183610.

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Cooperation is evolutionarily puzzling, as it benefits others but it is individually costly. In order to explain how it can emerge and be maintained over time, therefore, a mechanism is needed for cooperation to be under positive selection. In this dissertation, tree behavioural experiments try to deepen our understanding of three well known mechanisms previously established in the literature: indirect reciprocity, between-group competition and peer-punishment. Chapter 1 expands our understanding of reputation-based indirect reciprocity as a mechanism to sustain cooperation in large groups. It
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Book chapters on the topic "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Putterman, Louis. "When Punishment Supports Cooperation." In Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0002.

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Nosenzo, Daniele, and Martin R. Sefton. "Promoting Cooperation." In Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0006.

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Balliet, Daniel, and Paul A. M. Van Lange. "How (and When) Reward and Punishment Promote Cooperation." In Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0003.

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"Cooperation and Reputation in Dynamic Networks." In Computational Approaches to Studying the Co-evolution of Networks and Behavior in Social Dilemmas. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118762912.ch3.

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Rauhut, Heiko, and Fabian Winter. "Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment." In Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, edited by Ben Jann and Wojtek Przepiorka. De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-012.

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Miltenburg, Nynke van, Vincent Buskens, and Werner Raub. "Endogenous Peer Punishment Institutions in Prisoner’s Dilemmas: The Role of Noise." In Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, edited by Ben Jann and Wojtek Przepiorka. De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-016.

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Jann, Ben, and Elisabeth Coutts. "Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments." In Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, edited by Ben Jann and Wojtek Przepiorka. De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-013.

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Snijders, Chris, Marcin Bober, and Uwe Matzat. "Online Reputation in eBay Auctions: Damaging and Rebuilding Trustworthiness Through Feedback Comments from Buyers and Sellers." In Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, edited by Ben Jann and Wojtek Przepiorka. De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-020.

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Tomasello, Michael, and Josep Call. "Competition and Cooperation." In Primate Cognition, 2nd ed. Oxford University PressOxford, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198910626.003.0002.

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Abstract This chapter reviews the primate research literature on the social economy of cooperation and competition. It covers what primates know about their social relationships, including social evaluation and reputation, and whether their social interactions involve barter, exchange, and reciprocity. Next, the chapter covers prosocial behaviour, including coalitions and alliances, instrumental helping, and food sharing. Some space is also devoted to how individuals respond to unequal food distributions and the actions that they take when their (or others’) expectations are violated or their
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Flache, Andreas, Dieko Bakker, Michael Mäs, and Jacob Dijkstra. "The Double Edge of Counter-Sanctions. Is Peer Sanctioning Robust to Counter-Punishment but Vulnerable to Counter-Reward?" In Social dilemmas, institutions, and the evolution of cooperation, edited by Ben Jann and Wojtek Przepiorka. De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110472974-014.

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Conference papers on the topic "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Smit, Martin, and Fernando P. Santos. "Learning Fair Cooperation in Mixed-Motive Games with Indirect Reciprocity." In Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-24}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/25.

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Altruistic cooperation is costly yet socially desirable. As a result, agents struggle to learn cooperative policies through independent reinforcement learning (RL). Indirect reciprocity, where agents consider their interaction partner’s reputation, has been shown to stabilise cooperation in homogeneous, idealised populations. However, more realistic settings are comprised of heterogeneous agents with different characteristics and group-based social identities. We study cooperation when agents are stratified into two such groups, and allow reputation updates and actions to depend on group infor
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Tebeanu, Ana voichita, and George florian Macarie. "ADDRESSING ETHICAL VALUES IN EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE. AN ESSAY." In eLSE 2018. Carol I National Defence University Publishing House, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.12753/2066-026x-18-156.

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Teaching ethical aspects in the social sciences has always been a challenge, both for the professors and students involved. Ethical values and dilemmas can be presented through educational movies, examples from clinical, organizational or pedagogical practice, or even through personal disclosures offered with 'pros' and 'cons' arguments. In the past few years we took over this challenge, when conducting classes and seminaries at the disciplines "Educational Psychology" and "Foundations of Pedagogy" with first and second year students enrolled in the Teachers' Training Module, at the University
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Reports on the topic "Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas"

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Xiao, Erte, and Howard Kunreuther. Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18458.

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You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas' for particular source types:
Journal articles
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