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Journal articles on the topic 'Cooperation, Punishment, Reputation, Social Dilemmas'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 9 March 2023

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Tan, Shaolin. "Proximity inheritance explains the evolution of cooperation under natural selection and mutation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 286, no. 1902 (2019): 20190690. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.0690.

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In this paper, a mechanism called proximity inheritance is introduced in the birth–death process of a networked population involving the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Different from the traditional birth–death process, in the proposed model, players are distributed in a spatial space and offspring is distributed in the neighbourhood of its parents. That is, offspring inherits not only the strategy but also the proximity of its parents. In this coevolutionary game model, a cooperative neighbourhood gives more neighbouring cooperative offspring and a defective neighbourhood gives more neighbouring de

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Xiao, Erte, and Howard Kunreuther. "Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Social Dilemmas." Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 4 (2015): 670–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002714564426.

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Molho, Catherine, Daniel Balliet, and Junhui Wu. "Hierarchy, Power, and Strategies to Promote Cooperation in Social Dilemmas." Games 10, no. 1 (2019): 12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010012.

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Previous research on cooperation has primarily focused on egalitarian interactions, overlooking a fundamental feature of social life: hierarchy and power asymmetry. While recent accounts posit that hierarchies can reduce within-group conflict, individuals who possess high rank or power tend to show less cooperation. How, then, is cooperation achieved within groups that contain power asymmetries? To address this question, the present research examines how relative power affects cooperation and strategies, such as punishment and gossip, to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. In two studies i

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Quan, Ji, Huiting Guo, and Xianjia Wang. "Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game." Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment 2022, no. 7 (2022): 073402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-5468/ac7a28.

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Abstract The historical behavior of a defector in a group is usually considered in the determination of the intensity of the punishment to be applied to the defector. Because exclusion is a more severe form of punishment, we introduce a conditional punishment that allows punishers to choose between traditional punishment and exclusion. The specific form of punishment is chosen to fit the specific reputation of the defector. A good reputation garners a traditional milder punishment, such as a fine, whereas a bad reputation merits exclusion. The historical behaviors of the individuals in a group

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Bosma, Esmee, and Vincent Buskens. "Individuele verschillen in sociale dilemma’s : Het effect van vertrouwen op straffen in een publiekgoedspel." Mens en maatschappij 95, no. 1 (2020): 29–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/mem2020.1.003.bosm.

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Summary Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods gameThe establishment of cooperation in public goods dilemmas is important to real life problems such as improving the environment. Cooperation is facilitated when people are able to punish uncooperative behavior. Individual characteristics of persons, however, can affect cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishment behaviour in a linear public goods game with peer punishme

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Gintis, Herbert, and Ernst Fehr. "The social structure of cooperation and punishment." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (2012): 28–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000914.

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AbstractThe standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.

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Santos, Miguel dos, Daniel J. Rankin, and Claus Wedekind. "The evolution of punishment through reputation." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 278, no. 1704 (2010): 371–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2010.1275.

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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been su

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Cason, Timothy N., and Lata Gangadharan. "Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment." Experimental Economics 18, no. 1 (2014): 66–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0.

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Duca, Stefano, and Heinrich H. Nax. "Groups and scores: the decline of cooperation." Journal of The Royal Society Interface 15, no. 144 (2018): 20180158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0158.

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Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain

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Kamijo, Y., T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, and Y. Funaki. "Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions." Games and Economic Behavior 84 (March 2014): 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.002.

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Mekvabishvili, Rati. "Decentralized or Centralized Governance in Social Dilemmas? Experimental Evidence from Georgia." Issues in Social Science 11, no. 1 (2023): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/iss.v11i1.21126.

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The vast majority of experimental studies on the effectiveness of punishments in promoting cooperation in social dilemma situation examine decentralized incentive systems where all group members can punish each other. Cross-societal experimental studies suggest that while decentralized incentives can successfully promote cooperation in one society, they fail to do so in another. So, how is social order, as a large-scale cooperation problem among strangers, maintained in such societies? Many modern societies overcome this problem through well-functioning top-down formal enforcement institutions

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Suzuki, Shinsuke, and Eizo Akiyama. "Reputation and the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 272, no. 1570 (2005): 1373–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2005.3072.

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The evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas has been of considerable concern in various fields such as sociobiology, economics and sociology. It might be that, in the real world, reputation plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation. Recently, studies that have addressed indirect reciprocity have revealed that cooperation can evolve through reputation, even though pairs of individuals interact only a few times. To our knowledge, most indirect reciprocity models have presumed dyadic interaction; no studies have attempted analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large communi

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Gächter, Simon. "In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (2012): 26–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11001415.

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AbstractI argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.

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Wen, Yujia, Zhixue He, Chen Shen, and Jun Tanimoto. "Indirect punishment can outperform direct punishment in promoting cooperation in structured populations." PLOS Computational Biology 21, no. 6 (2025): e1013068. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013068.

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Indirect punishment traditionally sustains cooperation in social systems through reputation or norms, often by reducing defectors’ payoffs indirectly. In this study, we redefine indirect punishment for structured populations as a spatially explicit mechanism, where individuals on a square lattice target second-order defectors—those harming their neighbors—rather than their own immediate defectors, guided by the principle: “I help you by punishing those who defect against you”. Using evolutionary simulations, we compare this adapted indirect punishment to direct punishment, where individuals pu

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Macfarlan, Shane J., and Henry F. Lyle. "Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370, no. 1683 (2015): 20150009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0009.

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Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru)

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Uchida, Satoshi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, and Tatsuya Sasaki. "Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory." Games 10, no. 1 (2019): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10010011.

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Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional pu

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Fang, Yinhai, Tina P. Benko, Matjaž Perc, Haiyan Xu, and Qingmei Tan. "Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game." Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 475, no. 2227 (2019): 20190349. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2019.0349.

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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two

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Ge, Erhao, Yuan Chen, Jiajia Wu, and Ruth Mace. "Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment." Royal Society Open Science 6, no. 8 (2019): 190991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.190991.

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Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less cooperation in larger communities where people are less well known to each other. Some argue that institutions are, therefore, necessary to coordinate large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We conducted a donation ga

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Guala, Francesco. "Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, no. 1 (2012): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x11000069.

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AbstractEconomists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental

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Qian, Jun, Xiao Sun, Ziyang Wang, and Yueting Chai. "Negative Feedback Punishment Approach Helps Sanctioning Institutions Achieve Stable, Time-Saving and Low-Cost Performances." Mathematics 10, no. 15 (2022): 2823. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math10152823.

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Sanctioning institutions widely exist in human society. Although these institutions play an important role in the management of social affairs, sanctions are often seen to be costly in terms of both time and money. To enable sanctioning institutions to develop effective sanctions, we propose a negative feedback punishment approach for these institutions that combines the feedback control principle and the negative correlation principle. In the negative feedback punishment approach, the punishment intensity imposed on the group is negatively correlated with the current group cooperation proport

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Schlaepfer, Alain. "The emergence and selection of reputation systems that drive cooperative behaviour." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 285, no. 1886 (2018): 20181508. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.1508.

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Reputational concerns are believed to play a crucial role in explaining cooperative behaviour among non-kin humans. Individuals cooperate to avoid a negative social image, if being branded as defector reduces pay-offs from future interactions. Similarly, individuals sanction defectors to gain a reputation as punisher, prompting future co-players to cooperate. But reputation can only effectively support cooperation if a sufficient number of individuals condition their strategies on their co-players' reputation, and if a sufficient number of group members are willing to record and transmit the r

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Schroeder, K. B., D. Nettle, and R. McElreath. "Interactions between personality and institutions in cooperative behaviour in humans." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 370, no. 1683 (2015): 20150011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0011.

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Laboratory attempts to identify relationships between personality and cooperative behaviour in humans have generated inconsistent results. This may partially stem from different practices in psychology and economics laboratories, with both hypothetical players and incentives typical only in the former. Another possible cause is insufficient consideration of the contexts within which social dilemmas occur. Real social dilemmas are often governed by institutions that change the payoff structure via rewards and punishments. However, such ‘strong situations’ will not necessarily suppress the effec

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Jiang, Luo-Luo, Zhi Chen, Matjaž Perc, Zhen Wang, Jürgen Kurths, and Yamir Moreno. "Deterrence through punishment can resolve collective risk dilemmas in carbon emission games." Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science 33, no. 4 (2023): 043127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/5.0147226.

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Collective risk social dilemmas are at the heart of the most pressing global challenges we are facing today, including climate change mitigation and the overuse of natural resources. Previous research has framed this problem as a public goods game (PGG), where a dilemma arises between short-term interests and long-term sustainability. In the PGG, subjects are placed in groups and asked to choose between cooperation and defection, while keeping in mind their personal interests as well as the commons. Here, we explore how and to what extent the costly punishment of defectors is successful in enf

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Yang, Chun-Lei, Boyu Zhang, Gary Charness, Cong Li, and Jaimie W. Lien. "Endogenous rewards promote cooperation." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 40 (2018): 9968–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1808241115.

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Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a fundamental objective in the social and biological sciences. Although providing a punishment option to community members in the public goods game (PGG) has been shown to effectively promote cooperation, this has some serious disadvantages; these include destruction of a society’s physical resources as well as its overall social capital. A more efficient approach may be to instead employ a reward mechanism. We propose an endogenous reward mechanism that taxes the gross income of each round’s PGG play and assigns the amount to a fund; each player th

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Roos, Patrick, Michele Gelfand, Dana Nau, and Ryan Carr. "High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1776 (2014): 20132661. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2013.2661.

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As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that

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Gao, Juan, Yuqing Geng, Xinying Jiang, Jianyi Li, and Yan Yan. "Social dilemma for 30 years: Progress, framework, and future based on CiteSpace analysis." Medicine 103, no. 52 (2024): e41138. https://doi.org/10.1097/md.0000000000041138.

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Social dilemmas have been a popular research topic in the past 30 years, yet there is still a lack of interdisciplinary reviews. This study represents the first attempt to conduct a bibliometric analysis of social dilemma research over the past 30 years, aiming to identify the research status, research hotspots, and future trends in this domain. We conduct an interdisciplinary analysis of 3630 articles from 1993 to 2023 using CiteSpace software. We find that: (1) this research domain exhibits a fluctuating upward trend and possesses evident interdisciplinary characteristics. (2) Collaboration

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Sasaki, Tatsuya, and Satoshi Uchida. "The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 280, no. 1752 (2013): 20122498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2498.

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The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, ‘second-order’ freeriders). We present

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Smaldino, Paul E., and Mark Lubell. "Institutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games." Artificial Life 20, no. 2 (2014): 207–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00126.

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Social dilemmas have long been studied formally as cooperation games that pit individual gains against those of the group. In the real world, individuals face an ecology of games where they play many such games simultaneously, often with overlapping co-players. Here, we study an agent-based model of an ecology of public goods games and compare the effectiveness of two institutional mechanisms for promoting cooperation: a simple institution of limited group size (capacity constraints) and a reputational institution based on observed behavior. Reputation is shown to allow much higher relative pa

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Loukopoulos, Peter, Daniel Eek, Tommy Garling, and Satoshi Fujii. "Palatable Punishment in Real-World Social Dilemmas? Punishing Others to Increase Cooperation Among the Unpunished1." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 36, no. 5 (2006): 1274–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00042.x.

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White, Stephan. "The Evolution of Morality." PARADIGMI, no. 1 (May 2012): 173–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/para2012-001010.

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It seems clear that cooperation when cheating would go undetected - for example, in many-person prisoner's dilemmas or "tragedy of the commons" cases - is a precondition of the functioning of modern social institutions. Such cooperation seems difficult to explain in evolutionary terms, however, since those who are disposed to cheat seem to enjoy a systematic advantage relative to those who are not. Further- more, the appeal to mechanisms for the detection and punishment of noncooperation, since those mechanisms themselves presuppose cooperation, merely pushes the problem one step back. In this

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Eriksson, Kimmo, Per A. Andersson, and Pontus Strimling. "When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation? The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance." Judgment and Decision Making 12, no. 4 (2017): 396–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500006264.

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AbstractExperiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators’ behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceiv

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Li, Xiaopeng, Shiwen Sun, and Chengyi Xia. "Reputation-based adaptive adjustment of link weight among individuals promotes the cooperation in spatial social dilemmas." Applied Mathematics and Computation 361 (November 2019): 810–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.038.

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Kiyonari, Toko, and Pat Barclay. "Cooperation in social dilemmas: Free riding may be thwarted by second-order reward rather than by punishment." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 4 (2008): 826–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0011381.

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Henrich, Joseph, and Michael Muthukrishna. "The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation." Annual Review of Psychology 72, no. 1 (2021): 207–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-081920-042106.

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Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique social psychology requires accounting not only for the breadth and intensity of human cooperation but also for the variation found across societies, over history, and among behavioral domains. Here, we introduce an expanded evolutionary approach that considers how genetic and cultural evolution, and their interaction, may have shaped both the reliably developing features of our minds and the well-docu

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Battu, Balaraju, and Narayanan Srinivasan. "Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games." Royal Society Open Science 7, no. 5 (2020): 191567. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191567.

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Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and presti

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Chowdhury, Sayantan Nag, Srilena Kundu, Matjaž Perc, and Dibakar Ghosh. "Complex evolutionary dynamics due to punishment and free space in ecological multigames." Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 477, no. 2252 (2021): 20210397. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2021.0397.

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The concurrence of ecological and evolutionary processes often arises as an integral part of various biological and social systems. We here study eco-evolutionary dynamics by adopting two paradigmatic metaphors of social dilemmas with contrasting outcomes. We use the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games as the backbone of the proposed mathematical model. Since cooperation is a costly proposition in the face of the Darwinian theory of evolution, we go beyond the traditional framework by introducing punishment as an additional strategy. Punishers bare an additional cost from their own resource

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Berger, Ulrich, and Hannelore De Silva. "Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information." PLOS ONE 16, no. 6 (2021): e0253344. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344.

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Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obt

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Arai, Sakura, John Tooby, and Leda Cosmides. "Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners." PLOS ONE 17, no. 4 (2022): e0267153. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153.

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Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. These estimates should reflect default assumptions about relational mobility: the probability that individuals in one’s social world will have the opportunity to form relationships with new partners. This prior probability can be updated by cues present

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Selterman, Dylan. "Altruistic Punishment in the Classroom: An Update on the Tragedy of the Commons Extra Credit Question." Teaching of Psychology 46, no. 2 (2019): 153–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0098628319834208.

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A world-famous classroom exercise gives students the choice between 2 points (the communal option) or 6 points (the overconsumption option) of extra credit toward an assignment in their course, but if more than 10% choose 6 points, no one receives any points. In the current variation, students ( N = 795) were also given a third option—to sacrifice their own potential points to take away points from another randomly selected student who chose 6 points. Across seven course sections, 19 students chose this option based on the concept of “altruistic punishment,” with many expressing concern about

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Sun, Wenwen. "The Civil Law Regulatory Path of Internet Rumor Governance in the Context of Big Data." International Journal of Education and Humanities 11, no. 2 (2023): 235–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ijeh.v11i2.13833.

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Relying on the Internet, network rumors have the characteristics of fast spreading speed, great influence and strong harm, which will have a certain impact on people's production and life, therefore, they have also entered the vision of the government governance, but the delineation of the boundaries between the governance of network rumors and the protection of the freedom of expression has caused a lot of social controversy. At present, China's network rumor governance system faces legal dilemmas such as low legal status, legislative gaps, lagging legislation, fragmentation of the legal syst

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Morrison, Umor Iwele. "The workplace and evolving ethics for worthwhile productivity in the education sector." GPH-International Journal of Educational Research 8, no. 01 (2025): 302–13. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14674704.

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Abstract This paper focused on the workplace and evolving ethics for worthwhile productivity with a focus on education. This becomes necessary because the education sector is bedevilled with several breaches ranging from insubordination, neglect of duty, physical confrontation, litigation, contempt of duty, examination fraud, misappropriation of funds, witch-hunting, the illegality of different magnitude and other forms of breaches. The paper explained basic concepts such as ethics, workplace ethics, leadership ethics, employees’ ethics, and morality. The project is that ethics are unive

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Madziba, Nkobi. "Shifting Global Power: A Comparative Analysis of Soft Power in the US and China." Inverge Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 2 (2024): 36–45. https://doi.org/10.63544/ijss.v3i2.79.

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his article uses soft power, a country's capacity to influence others by attraction as opposed to coercion, to examine how the dynamics of global power are changing. China's strategic use of soft power shows it is making substantial progress towards becoming another superpower, perhaps pushing the international order towards a bipolar system, even while the United States remains the only hegemon in the existing unipolar world order. China's ability to cultivate a more appealing image on the international scene is credited with its success. This is made possible by its recently acquired economi

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Okada, Isamu. "Two ways to overcome the three social dilemmas of indirect reciprocity." Scientific Reports 10, no. 1 (2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-73564-5.

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Abstract Indirect reciprocity is one of the main principles of evolving cooperation in a social dilemma situation. In reciprocity, a positive score is given to cooperative behaviour while a negative score is given to non-cooperative behaviour, and the dilemma is resolved by selectively cooperating only with those with positive scores. However, many studies have shown that non-cooperation with those who have not cooperated also downgrades one's reputation; they have called this situation the scoring dilemma. To address this dilemma, the notion of justified punishments has been considered. The n

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Dasgupta, Nayana, and Mirco Musolesi. "Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems." Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 39, no. 1 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-025-09698-5.

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Abstract Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-h

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Samu, Flóra, and Károly Takács. "Evaluating mechanisms that could support credible reputations and cooperation: cross-checking and social bonding." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376, no. 1838 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0302.

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Gossip is believed to be an informal device that alleviates the problem of cooperation in humans. Communication about previous acts and passing on reputational information could be valuable for conditional action in cooperation problems and pose a punishment threat to defectors. It is an open question, however, what kind of mechanisms can make gossip honest and credible and reputational information reliable, especially if intense competition for reputations does not exclusively dictate passing on honest information. We propose two mechanisms that could support the honesty and credibility of go

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Wei, Xiang, Peng Xu, Shuiting Du, Guanghui Yan, and Huayan Pei. "Reputational preference-based payoff punishment promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas." European Physical Journal B 94, no. 10 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00212-w.

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Mohlin, Erik, Alexandros Rigos, and Simon Weidenholzer. "Emergence of specialized third-party enforcement." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120, no. 24 (2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2207029120.

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The question of how cooperation evolves and is maintained among nonkin is central to the biological, social, and behavioral sciences. Previous research has focused on explaining how cooperation in social dilemmas can be maintained by direct and indirect reciprocity among the participants of the social dilemma. However, in complex human societies, both modern and ancient, cooperation is frequently maintained by means of specialized third-party enforcement. We provide an evolutionary-game-theoretic model that explains how specialized third-party enforcement of cooperation (specialized reciprocit

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Podder, Shirsendu, Simone Righi, and Francesca Pancotto. "Reputation and punishment sustain cooperation in the optional public goods game." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376, no. 1838 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0293.

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Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public goods game. The introduction of the ‘Loner’ strategy' allows players to withdraw from the game, which leads to a cooperator–defector–loner cycle. While pro-social punishment can help increase cooperation, anti-social punishment—where defectors punish cooperators—causes its downfall in both experimental and theoretical studies. In this paper, we introduce social

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Mizuno, Keiko, and Hiroshi Shimizu. "Exploring Undermining Cooperation Effect of Punishment in Social Dilemma Contexts." Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science 14, no. 2 (2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2023.113.

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Previous research on social dilemmas indicates that the introduction and subsequent removal of punishment mechanisms may diminish trust among participants. Yet, empirical evidence concerning the behavioral consequences of punishment elimination on cooperation remains scarce. This study presents the concept of the Undermining Cooperation Effect of Punishment (UCEP) to operationalize the decrease in cooperation following punishment removal, in contrast to a control group never subjected to punishment. We sought to evaluate whether punishment precipitates UCEP empirically. Our pre-registered expe

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Alfimtsev, A. N., S. A. Sakulin, V. E. Bolshakov, N. V. Bykov, M. S. Tovarnov, and N. S. Vlasova. "Method for solving social dilemmas based on multi-agent learning and reputation." Neurocomputers 1 (2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.18127/j19998554-202201-01.

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Many real-world problems contain social dilemmas that express contradictions between individual and public interests. Such tasks can be solved using deep multi-agent learning. This article focuses on reputation-based social dilemma solving and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Target of the work is the development of a method for solving social dilemmas based on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. A method for solving social dilemmas based on deep multi-agent reinforcement learning is proposed. The difference between the method and the known analogs is based on the use of the agent's re

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