Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Corporate governance regulations'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Corporate governance regulations.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
Bassey, David Nkata. "Corporate Governance Implementation in the Nigerian Banking Industry." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5676.
Full textÖstberg, Per. "Corporate disclosure and investor recognition /." Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2005. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/687.htm.
Full textWalker, Andress. "Corporate Governance Strategies to Improve Organizational Performance in the Accounting Industry." ScholarWorks, 2018. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/5806.
Full textBeqiri, Arlinda. "Corporate Governance and Banking Governance within Conventional and Islamic banking systems. : A Cross-case Study between Conventional banks in Sweden and Islamic banks in UK." Thesis, Karlstads universitet, Handelshögskolan, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-47998.
Full textAreneke, Geofry. "Comparative study of the impact of compliance with corporate governance regulations & internal governance mechanisms on financial performance of listed firms in Africa." Thesis, Open University, 2018. http://oro.open.ac.uk/55921/.
Full textBaric, Zeljka. "The Role of Internal Audits within Financial Institutions in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-302317.
Full textJiang, Liangliang. "Empirical essays in corporate governance, regulation and corruption." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2009. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0024962.
Full textGuarniz, Izquierdo Reynaldo Antonio. "The cynicism and Corporate Governance." IUS ET VERITAS, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/122413.
Full textEn este artículo, el autor explica acerca de la adopción de prácticas de gobierno corporativo, la cual depende de una evaluación de costos y beneficios. Las empresas peruanas no asumen dichas prácticas por causa de la falta de incentivos, informalidad y deficiente regulación. Finalmente, el autor concluye que el tratamiento peruano de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo carece de contenido, lo que genera que no sea una prioridad para las empresas.
Smith, G. "Corporate governance : In search of balance between state regulation and self regulation." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517519.
Full textLi, Li, and 李莉. "Bank regulation, corporate governance and bank performance around the world." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43224088.
Full textAkintoye, Simisola Imelda. "Corporate governance regulation and control of fraud in Nigerian banks." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2015. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/11873/.
Full textCairns, Steven. "Changing the culture of financial regulation : a corporate governance approach." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2014. http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/2008505/.
Full textLi, Li. "Bank regulation, corporate governance and bank performance around the world." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43224088.
Full textSchwarz, Sebastian Henner. "Regulierung durch Corporate Governance Kodizes." Doctoral thesis, [S.l. : s.n.], 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=976510898.
Full textMiranda, Tatiana Conceição de. "Governança corporativa numa perspectiva historica = da firma gerencial as corporações financeiras." [s.n.], 2010. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/285653.
Full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T12:12:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Miranda_TatianaConceicaode_M.pdf: 880679 bytes, checksum: e979b463b3705cdbc2208f8552220ef3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010
Resumo: O presente trabalho visa apresentar numa perspectiva histórica as principais transformações ocorridas no plano da governança corporativa americana desde o princípio do século XX até os dias de hoje. Cabe mencionar que além dos recursos históricos, a dissertação traz importantes elementos teóricos que contribuem para o melhor entendimento do tema em questão, como é o caso do tratamento que a Teoria da Regulação Francesa dá às transformações ocorridas no capitalismo no curso do século XX e aos fundamentos teóricos oferecidos pela abordagem da Teoria da Agência. Identificam-se dois modelos de gestão empresarial neste período: um que foi típico do capitalismo gerencial até a década de 1970 e um outro que prevalece desde então até os dias de hoje, caracterizado pela centralidade das finanças. No primeiro modelo de governança, as decisões gerenciais voltadas ao crescimento e longo prazo e ao desenvolvimento de inovações assumiam grande importância, ao passo que no segundo, são os desígnios dos acionistas motivados pelo objetivo da maximização do capital aplicado nas firmas que ocupam uma posição primordial
Abstract: The present work aims to present in a historical perspective the main transformations ocurred on American corporate governancefrom the beginning of the century XX until nowadays. In order to accomplish this task, besides the use of historical sources, the dissertation brings important theoretical elements to the best understanding of the issue. In this regard, it is useful to mention the use of Régulation Theory that helps to understand the changes in capitalism during the twentieth century and theoretical foundations offered by Agency Theory's approach Two models of business administration are identified in this period: one that was typical of the managerial capitalism until the decade of 1970 and another that prevails until present time, characterized by the centrality of financial decisions. In the first corporate governance model, the managerial decisions aiming growth in the long run wereassumed to depend extensively on innovations in a Schumpeterian perspective, while in the second, the primary motivation of shareholders tends to move to maximizing the applied capital in the short run
Mestrado
Historia Economica
Mestre em Ciências Econômicas
Molin, Johan. "Essays on corporate finance and governance." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.], 1996. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/421.htm.
Full textHorn, Roelof Combrinck. "The legal regulation of corporate governance with reference to international trends." Thesis, Link to the online version, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10019/1042.
Full textHorn, Stefan. "Takeover Regulation in Europe An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? /." St. Gallen, 2005. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/02607869001/$FILE/02607869001.pdf.
Full textJuks, Reimo. "Corporate governance and the firm's behaviour towards stakeholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-938.
Full textDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2010; Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser.
Březina, Václav. "Corporate governace a její právní rámec." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-16553.
Full textCarrillo, Giovanna M. "The Impact of Regulation and Governance on the Risk Profile of Banks." Cleveland State University / OhioLINK, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=csu1336449506.
Full textHanke, Philip Cosmo <1983>. "Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2014. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/6692/.
Full textYe, Ana Jin. "Risk-taking by banks, corporate governance and regulation : evidence from EU countries." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/16397.
Full textO objetivo desta dissertação constitui em analisar a relação entre a estrutura acionista dos bancos e o risco tomado. Adicionalmente, é examinado o impacto da regulação bancária nessa mesma tomada de risco. A análise empírica considera uma amostra de bancos dos países da União Europeia, que se encontram atualmente cotados, durante os anos 2011 a 2016. O modelo econométrico usado foi a regressão generalized least squares random effect, uma vez que estamos a considerar um conjunto de dados de painel balanceado. Foi testada a hipótese de que os bancos que apresentam uma estrutura com poucos accionistas têm maior probabilidade em tomar mais risco, comparativamente com os bancos que apresentam uma estrutura accionista mais difusa. Igualmente foi considerada a estrutura do conselho de administração uma variável explicativa do modelo: se um numeroso e independente conselho de administração tem alguma influência na tomada de risco dos bancos. Atendendo à amostra utilizada, verificou-se alguma evidência entre a composição do conselho de administração e a tomada de risco. Por outro lado, relativamente à concentração da estrutura accionista, constatou-se uma evidência reduzida ou mesmo nula no risco. Relativamente ao impacto da intervenção regulatória no risco, não foi igualmente verificada uma significância na relação entre as duas variáveis, isto é, regulação mais rigorosa não influencia o risco que os bancos tomam.
The aim of this dissertation is to study the relationship between banks' ownership structure and its risk-taking behaviour. Additionally, we also examine the impact of the banking regulation in the way that banks take their risk. The empirical analysis considers a sample of listed banks from EU countries, over the period spanning from 2011 to 2016. The econometric model used was a generalized least squares random effect regression, since we are considering a balanced panel dataset. We test the hypothesis that banks with a large shareholder structure have the propensity to take on more risk, when comparing to those who have a more diffuse shareholder structure. We also consider the structure of the board of directors as an explanatory variable in our model: if a bigger board or more independent directors have an influence on the bank risk-taking behaviour. Taking into account the selected sample, we found some evidence that the board of director's structure can influence the bank risk behaviour. On the other hand, to the ownership concentration, little or no evidence was found. Regarding the influence of the regulatory environment in the bank risk, there is no significant relationship between them, i.e. stricter regulation has no effect on how banks take their risk.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Lui, Alison. "Regulation and corporate governance : a case study of the UK banking industry." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2014. http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/18153/.
Full textKerr, Vindel Leroy. "Exploring corporate governance structures and practices in Jamaica : towards policy reform." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2010. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/exploring-corporate-governance-structures-and-practices-in-jamaica-towards-policy-reform(293fd6e3-436c-49d2-8288-74a5bd2d4385).html.
Full textRuppel, Conrad. "Dimensions of the global financial crisis the future of corporate governance and regulation." Göttingen Cuvillier, 2009. http://d-nb.info/1001110048/04.
Full textDell'Erba, Marco. "The regulation of hedge funds : definition and governance." Thesis, Paris 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA010306.
Full textNo English summary available
Betzer, André. "Corporate governance mechanisms in Europe : an analysis of leveraged buyouts and insider trading regulation /." Berlin : Dissertation.de, 2006. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2832815&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Full textNyaki, Judith V. "A critical analysis of Tanzanian corporate governance regulation and its impact on foreign investment." Thesis, University of Western Cape, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/3326.
Full textThe main objective of this study is to review the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in Tanzania with the focus on corporate governance laws and regulations. The study is intended to discuss the main legal and regulatory framework in Tanzania which plays a part in the corporate governance. The Companies Act No. 12 of 2002 will be reviewed in order to establish which corporate governance principles are provided and to what extent they are effective. The capital markets and securities laws, guidelines on corporate governance in Tanzania with a focus on the listing requirements and other regulations applied at the DSE will also be reviewed in order to establish their effectiveness in attracting investors to the market. Given the comparative value of South Africa and Kenya in SADC and EAC respectively, this work will also discuss the legal and regulatory framework of corporate governance in Kenya and South Africa and compare with those in Tanzania in areas such as shareholders rights; stakeholder’s right; board control and effectiveness and the effectiveness of compliance. Such comparative analysis is done in order to single out areas of focus in legal and regulatory framework in corporate governance law such as companies’ law and stock market and security laws in Tanzania.
Andres, Christian. ""Corporate governance in Germany - an empirical examination of ownership structures, payout policy and disclosure regulation" /." Berlin : Dissertation.de, 2007. http://www.dissertation.de/buch.php3?buch=5288.
Full textAsafo-Adjei, Marang Akua. "Regulation of executive directors remuneration in South Africa : the road to achieving good corporate governance." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/15188.
Full textLi, Tao. "Ownership, privatization and banking regulation : four essays in the economics of transition and development /." Full text available, 2003. http://images.lib.monash.edu.au/ts/theses/litao.pdf.
Full textChulu, Mwaka Judith. "Regulating board-level corporate governance in public companies in Zambia : a multi-method study." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.436303.
Full textFaye, Sainey. "An examination and analysis of bank corporate governance regulation in The Gambia : a grounded theory approach." Thesis, University of Plymouth, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/3155.
Full textDrake, Hannine. "The legal regulation of the external company auditor in Post-Enron South Africa." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/2301.
Full textThe worldwide increase of corporate failures on the scale of Enron and WorldCom has sparked a renewed international trend of corporate governance review. With the external company auditor blamed at least in part for many corporate failures, corporate governance reform also necessitates a review of the statutory regulation of the company auditor. In particular, the lack of auditor independence when auditing clients has been under the legislator’s spotlight. The problems associated with unregulated or poorly regulated auditors are well illustrated by the activities of auditing giant Arthur Andersen. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been promulgated in reaction to corporate failures, imposing many new legislative restrictions on the auditor. The UK has a more tempered, selfregulatory approach. South Africa, following international trends with its recently promulgated Auditing Profession Act and Corporate Laws Amendment Act, has also greatly increased the regulation of auditor independence. The question is now whether these new restrictions in the wake of corporate failures have been the right approach with which to prevent future failures and to provide adequate protection to shareholders. Although the general legislative increase in auditor awareness is welcomed, the efficacy of several provisions in South African legislation can be questioned. Widespread reform has taken place in the appointment and remuneration of the auditor, which now has to be independently determined by the audit committee. In particular, South Africa’s new regulation of non-audit services, and the lack of refined regulation on compulsory auditor rotation as well as the cross-employment of auditors by clients, needs a critical discussion. It is submitted that the discretion of a well-regulated audit committee, combined with increased disclosure and transparency, should be enough to regulate most of the key aspects of auditor independence. Care should be taken to not overlegislate in haste to reform. South Africa needs a flexible and customised approach in this regard.
Bavoso, Vincenzo. "Explaining financial scandals : corporate governance, structured finance and the enlightened sovereign control paradigm." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2012. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/explaining-financial-scandals-corporate-governance-structured-finance-and-the-enlightened-sovereign-control-paradigm(9ba15ea7-692c-4fd2-bff3-d5e6a06f5bff).html.
Full textRibeiro, Leonardo de Lima. "O modelo brasileiro de private equity e venture capital." Universidade de São Paulo, 2006. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12139/tde-02042006-163402/.
Full textThe outstanding success attained by Private Equity and Venture Capital (PE/VC) in fostering the U.S. entrepreneurial sector has encouraged several countries to import it. However, PE/VC was tailored to perform in the American institutional environment. As Gompers and Lerner (1999) state, the degree to which the U.S. venture model will - or can - be successfully adapted to other countries is a particularly interesting question. To answer this question we conduct an empirical study with all the 65 PE/VC management firms with offices in Brazil. The survey was conducted at the end of 2004 and attained a response rate of 100%. For this reason the results are fully representative. The analysis aims at the industry's size and structure. Relates them to institutional factors. It reveals a PE/VC industry whose size is heavily limited by the Brazilian institutional idiosyncrasies. At the same time, Brazil's lack of transportation, energy and telecommunications' infrastructure and security provides opportunities for PE/VC type of investments. As a main finding, this work identifies differences and similarities between the American and the Brazilian PE/VC models. The similarities are: (i) PE/VC firms are mainly independent and manage capital from institutional investors; (ii) capital is heavily concentrated regionally as well as in few management firms; (iii) investments are made within a close range from management firms; (iv) software and IT are the preferred sectors; and (v) managers are highly qualified. The main differences suggest that the model has adapted to the new environment: (i) in line with a lack of high-expectation entrepreneurship, there is a tendency to invest in more advanced stages; (ii) since credit is scarce, few LBOs take place; (iii) lack of sector specialization suggests few opportunities within each sector; (iv) management firms concentration in the financial cluster suggest a quest for commercial partners and strategic buyers for portfolio companies (IPO is a quite rare exit mechanism); and (v) Brazilian PE/VC regulation recognizes the inefficiency of the legal system and obliges the use of arbitration. Among the differences, the lack of trust between investors and managers should change as the industry evolves and managers gain reputation.
Strohm, Christiane. "United States and European Union auditor independence regulation : implications for regulators and auditing practice /." Wiesbaden : Deutscher Universität-Verlag, 2006. http://www.springerlink.com/content/q67226/.
Full textKöhler, Matthias [Verfasser], Reint [Akademischer Betreuer] Gropp, and Falko [Akademischer Betreuer] Fecht. "Integration, Regulation, and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector / Matthias Köhler. Reint Gropp. Falko Fecht." Kiel : ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, 2010. http://d-nb.info/1007380926/34.
Full textOkoye, Ngozi. "The personality of company directors as a behavioural risk contributor in the corporate governance process : regulatory intervention as a risk management mechanism." Thesis, University of Dundee, 2012. https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/df19fdec-d5ed-4120-af7b-bed15a89c861.
Full textDavidsson, Marcus, Camilla Johansson, and Johanna Nilsson. "Påverkar regleringar styrelsenätverket? : En studie av Svensk kod för bolagsstyrnings påverkan på det svenska styrelsenätverket." Thesis, Linnaeus University, Linnaeus School of Business and Economics, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-5865.
Full textBakgrund: Under senare år har de börsnoterade bolagens styrning kommit att intressera samhället. Ett viktigt fenomen i bolagens styrning är styrelserna. Under de senaste 15 åren har omfattande regleringar införts för att klargöra och definiera hur styrelserna i de börsnoterade bolagen skall sättas samman och arbeta.
Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om, och i så fall hur, det svenska styrelsenätverket förändras efter utvecklandet och implementeringen av en reglering. Vår ambition är att ge förklaringar till varför eventuella förändringar sker.
Avgränsning: Studien har utgått från Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning som ett fall av reglering för att se hur denna har påverkat styrelsenätverket.
Metod: En social nätverksanalys av styrelseledamöternas nätverk har genomförts. Studien omfattar bolag noterade på en svensk reglerad marknad med säte i Sverige.
Slutsats: Studien påvisar att införandet av en styrelsereglering inte behöver leda till förändringar i styrelsenätverket. Däremot kan hotet om att en reglering skall införas utgöra ett starkt instrument, för att åstadkomma förändringar i styrelsenätverket.
Leblanc, R. "Canadian regulation of director nomination and assessment." Thesis, Українська академія банківської справи Національного банку України, 2007. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/60685.
Full textThis Canadian corporate governance policy, entitled “National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines,” (the “Policy”) is reflective of policies within a number of jurisdictions.
Dudová, Tereza. "Správa a řízení společností (corporate governance) a její vztah ke kvalitě auditu." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-264186.
Full textWaddington, Nigel. "The regulation of corporate governance in Europe : The emerging EU regime and Europeanisation in Germany and the UK." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.505487.
Full textMwanawasa, Chipokota. "A case analysis of the viability of the current regulation and enforcement mechanisms of corporate governance in Zambia." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/20789.
Full textStagniūnaitė, Jovita. "Bendrovių valdymo teisinis reguliavimas." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2008. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2007~D_20080125_131725-74646.
Full textActual concept of corporate governance that emerged in USA in the 9th decade, has reached more significant attention in Europe only in the 10th decade, after a wide range of company crises in Great Britain. Since than an active improvement of legal regulation in the sphere or corporate governance is taking place in the whole EU. Corporate governance is being examined not only in the narrow perspective, as administration and control of company’s activities, exercised by its shareholders, management and supervisory bodies, but also in a broad sense - as miscellaneous relationship between different individuals concerned about company’s activities, regulated by peremptory legal rules, acts of recommendatory character and company’s inner documents. Relationship among these individuals, their rights, duties and balance of interests depend on the system of corporate governance excising in the country. What type of corporate governance system was chosen, what is corporate bodies’ formation order, determined functions and responsibility for improper exercise of obligations, in most cases depend on the historical past of the country, the size of the companies and legislator’s ability to respond the changing business’s conditions in nowadays world. Trying to evaluate advantages and disadvantages of different legal regulation in the sphere of corporate governance, experience of other countries, in particular case experience of EU member states – Austria, Great Britain, Poland, France... [to full text]
Івасів, І. Б. "Розвиток глобального регулювання корпоративного управління в банках." Thesis, Українська академія банківської справи Національного банку України, 2010. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/61871.
Full textCalsavara, Vanessa Remesik. "A evolução das práticas de governança corporativa nas empresas brasileiras de capital aberto." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/11282.
Full textApproved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-11-12T12:38:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Vanessa_Calsavara_Governança_Corporativa - versao biblioteca.pdf: 1579981 bytes, checksum: b99d25c679b322c95aa63616014653cf (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-12T12:38:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Vanessa_Calsavara_Governança_Corporativa - versao biblioteca.pdf: 1579981 bytes, checksum: b99d25c679b322c95aa63616014653cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-21
O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar se houve evolução nas práticas de governança corporativa entre os anos de 2005 a 2012 nas empresas brasileiras que abriram capital entre 2004 e 2006, e se esta evolução ocorreu no sentido de melhoria das práticas de governança. Busca-se também entender se esta evolução ocorreu continuamente em todo o período estudado ou se somente nos primeiros anos após seu IPO. Também busca-se compreender se a evolução ocorreu somente nos requisitos mandatórios por lei ou se houve uma real mudança de cultura nas empresas após abrirem seu capital. Para mensurar a qualidade das práticas de governança foi utilizado o Corporate Governance Index – CGI desenvolvido por Leal e Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) para avaliar as práticas de governança em empresas brasileiras. O índice é composto de 24 questões binárias, e considera-se uma evolução nas práticas quanto mais o índice da empresa se aproxima dos 24 pontos. O índice foi calculado ano a ano para o período e empresas estudadas. Em seguida, o índice foi dividido em duas partes, questões diretamente relacionadas a leis e regulamentações e questões não diretamente relacionadas a leis e regulamentações. Utilizando os testes estatísticos T-student e W de Kendall, comprovou-se estatisticamente que houve evolução nas práticas de governança corporativa entre os anos de 2005 a 2012, entretanto, prova-se estatisticamente que esta melhora está concentrada no período de 2005 a 2008, sendo que não foi constatada uma alteração significativa nas práticas no período de 2009 a 2012. Identificou-se também que houve uma evolução positiva nas práticas de governança não diretamente relacionadas a leis e regulamentações entre os anos de 2005 a 2012, entretanto, quando retira-se deste teste as questões que foram indiretamente impactadas por mudanças nas instruções da CVM que ocorreram no período, encontra-se uma piora nas práticas de governança entre 2005 e 2012. Estes resultados sugerem que as empresas estão trabalhando em um movimento de 'check the box' das boas práticas de governança, cumprindo o que é mandatório por lei e regulamentações, e questiona se as evoluções de leis, regulamentações e códigos de boas práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil estão cumprindo o seu objetivo final de desenvolver uma cultura de boa governança nas empresas brasileiras.
The objective of the study is to analyze the evolution of corporate governance practices between 2005 and 2012 of Brazilian companies that went public between the years 2005 and 2012, if the positive evolution happens. This study also tries to understand if this evolution happened just in the first years after the IPO or during the whole period, and if the evolution is limited to minimum mandatory requirements imposed by regulation or reflects a real behavioral transformation. The developed Corporate Governance Index – CGI, (Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva, 2007) to evaluate the corporate governance practices in Brazilian companies was used to measure the corporate governance practices. The index is composed by 24 binary questions, and the highest is the sum better is its practices. The index were calculated year by year for the studied period to all the companies. After this, the questions, which compose the index, were divided into two blocks, such as questions direct related to laws and regulations, and the non directly related ones. The evolution in corporate governance practices was proved to be statistically significant between the years 2005 and 2012, using Student´s t and Kendall´s W statistical method, however, this evolution occurred between the years 2005 and 2008, but there is no statistically significant evolution between the years 2009 and 2012. There was also a positive movement in the corporate governance practices non directly related to laws and regulations between the years 2005 and 2012, however, a negative evolution is found when the undirected impacted through changes in CVM´s instructions questions were not considerated. The present results suggest the evolution in corporate governance practices appears to be the result of a box-checking exercise of mandatory fields, and suggest a lack of behavioral change in corporate leaders; questioning the main objective of laws, regulations and codes which is the development of a good practice corporate governance culture.
Torpey, John F. "The Influence of Regulatory Oversight on Environmental, Social, and Governance Ratings." Franklin University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=frank1586421855928535.
Full textRibeiro, Victor Bourroul Holloway Ribeiro. "A regulação descentralizada da governança corporativa: uma análise da criação dos segmentos de listagem do mercado organizado de valores mobiliários administrado pela Bovespa." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13695.
Full textRejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Boa tarde Victor Seu trabalho não condiz ao padrão. 1.FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS 2.ESCOLA DE DIREITO DE SÃO PAULO Qualquer dúvida estou à disposição. Att. Suzi 3799-7876 on 2015-05-06T17:42:57Z (GMT)
Submitted by Victor Bourroul Holloway Ribeiro (victor.holloway@outlook.com) on 2015-05-06T19:20:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Victor_Ribeiro-20150505.pdf: 1569735 bytes, checksum: 5e0fd4561bd7139ce19ee3654a4c8a31 (MD5)
Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2015-05-06T19:36:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Victor_Ribeiro-20150505.pdf: 1569735 bytes, checksum: 5e0fd4561bd7139ce19ee3654a4c8a31 (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-06T19:40:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Victor_Ribeiro-20150505.pdf: 1569735 bytes, checksum: 5e0fd4561bd7139ce19ee3654a4c8a31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-07
The goal of this research is to analyze in a decentered regulation perspective the creation of Brazilian premium Corporate Governance segments. The goal of analyzing the creation of Brazilian premium Corporate Governance segments includes the description of the phenomenon by recognizing factors that led companies to change their behavior and the prescription of a normative argument formulated from the recognition of those factors. In the Corporate Governance literature, regulation is usually defined as a state-centered conception. Researches about premium Corporate Governance segments (Novo Mercado, Level 1 and Level 2) created by São Paulo Stock Exchange – Bovespa often adopt the state-centered definition of regulation. As opposed to a mandatory state regulation, these premium segments were classified as a private and self-regulatory phenomenon, conducted by the market. This analysis was followed by a normative argument that prescripts contractual or self-regulatory arrangements for policy makers with intention to promote specific Corporate Governance rules. However, the assumption of a state-centered regulation was contested by a decentered perspective. The decentered perspective argued that not only states are increasingly involved in complex collaborations and delegations with non-state actors to exercise regulation, but also non-states actors are regulating, setting standards, gathering information and enforcing rules. To handle those complex regulatory events, Julia Black formulated the concept of decentralized regulation, which was grounded on systems theory and the governance literature. Regulation in a decentering perspective is implemented by a network of interdependent state and non-state actors. Embracing Julia Black’s concept of decentralized regulation, the present research describes the creation of Brazilian premium Corporate Governance segments and formulates a normative argument deriving from the decentered perspective. Based on the results, the research concludes that the creation of Brazilian premium Corporate Governance segments did not involve just the parties of the Participation Agreement. Instead, it involved many interdependent state and non-state actors, which shared many mechanisms for the application of the regulation. Therefore, it is not possible to indicate the self-regulation and private legal instruments as the only factors that led companies and shareholders to alter their behavior and to adopt specific Corporate Governance rules. Accordingly, the normative argument that follows this analysis, rather than the prescription of self-regulation, is the prescription of the mobilization of the regulatory power fragmented among many state and non-state actors.
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar pela perspectiva da regulação descentralizada a criação dos segmentos de listagem do mercado de valores mobiliários administrado pela Bovespa. O objetivo de analisar a criação dos segmentos de listagem inclui a descrição do fenômeno para apontar fatores que levaram as companhias e controladores a alterarem seus comportamentos e a construção de um argumento normativo formulado a partir do reconhecimento desses fatores. No debate sobre regulação da Governança Corporativa, o conceito de regulação normalmente assume uma definição centrada no Estado. Grande parte da análise da criação dos segmentos de listagem do mercado administrado pela Bovespa seguiu essa perspectiva. A criação dos segmentos de listagem, então, foi classificada como um fenômeno autorregulatório, privado e de mercado. Dessa análise seguiu a formulação de um argumento normativo, o qual prescreveu o uso da autorregulação a atores que visassem estabelecer regras específicas de Governança Corporativa. Contudo, a perspectiva da regulação descentralizada questionou o pressuposto da centralidade do Estado no conceito de regulação. A perspectiva da regulação descentralizada sustentou que não só atores estatais estão cada vez mais envolvidos com atores não estatais em complexas colaborações e delegações para o exercício da regulação, como também sustentou que atores não estatais exercem regulação, incluindo, a formulação, monitoramento e enforcement de regras. Para lidar com essa complexidade dos fenômenos empíricos regulatórios, Julia Black, baseando-se na teoria dos sistemas e na literatura de Governança, formulou o conceito de regulação descentralizada. Pelo conceito de regulação descentralizada, a regulação é exercida por uma rede de atores interdependentes, estatais e não estatais, que utilizam mecanismos legais e extralegais para o exercício do poder e do controle. Diante disso, adotando esse conceito de regulação descentralizada de Julia Black, o presente trabalho pretendeu descrever a criação dos segmentos de listagem e formular um argumento normativo baseado nessa descrição. Como resultado da pesquisa realizada, foi possível concluir que a criação dos segmentos de listagem não se restringiu às partes que celebraram o Contrato de Participação, mas envolveu diversos atores, estatais e não estatais, os quais tinham uma relação de interdependência entre si e compartilharam diversos mecanismos no exercício da regulação. Com isso, não se pode resumir os fatores que fizeram com que companhias e controladores alterassem seus comportamentos e adotassem algumas regras de Governança Corporativa à voluntariedade e ao aspecto autorregulatório. Desta análise segue que, se é possível apontar para um argumento normativo do caso da criação dos segmentos de listagem, o argumento normativo não é a prescrição da autorregulação, mas sim a prescrição do uso do poder regulatório fragmentado entre diversos atores, estatais e não estatais.