Academic literature on the topic 'Coups d’État'
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Journal articles on the topic "Coups d’État"
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De Bruin, Erica. "Preventing Coups d’état." Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 7 (March 7, 2017): 1433–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002717692652.
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Gunn, Christopher. "The 1960 Coup in Turkey: A U.S. Intelligence Failure or a Successful Intervention?" Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 2 (April 2015): 103–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00550.
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Coups d’état were a relatively common means of regime change during the Cold War. From 1945 through 1985, 357 attempted coups d’état occurred in the Third World, and 183 succeeded. The high frequency of coups during this period is unsurprising, especially considering the advantageous position of the military during the rapid and destabilizing pace of modernization and decolonization in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Coups d’état were not exclusive to the Third World, however. They also occurred in members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Surprisingly, however, few scholars have explored why these extra-constitutional regime changes were tolerated, or how they were even possible, within NATO. This article attempts to answer these questions within the context of the 1960 coup in Turkey by closely evaluating the notion that the United States had no knowledge or warning that a coup was about to unfold.
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De Bruin, Erica. "Will there be blood? Explaining violence during coups d’état." Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 6 (June 6, 2019): 797–811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343319839449.
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Although just under half of all coup d’état attempts involve fatalities, there has been surprisingly little attention to the conditions under which coups turn violent. Existing research emphasizes the incentives coup plotters have to avoid bloodshed but does not explain the conditions under which violence nonetheless occurs. This article develops a theoretical framework that predicts that the extent of violence that occurs during coup attempts will vary systematically with central features of incumbent regimes and coup plotters. It then tests these predictions using new data on the fatalities associated with 377 coup attempts between 1950 and 2017. Coups against military regimes are found to be less violent than those against civilian dictatorships. This is because military rulers are better able to estimate the likelihood of the coup succeeding and more sensitive to the costs associated with using violence to suppress a coup. Since their post-coup fates tend to be better than those of other authoritarian leaders, they also have fewer incentives to hang on to power at any cost. The analysis also demonstrates that coups led by senior officers involve less bloodshed than those by junior officers and enlisted men. However, coups against rulers that counterbalance their militaries are no more violent than those against rulers that do not. The results shed new light on the dynamics of coup attempts.
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Houle, Christian, and Cristina Bodea. "Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 3 (May 2017): 382–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343316685140.
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Does ethnic inequality breed coups? The recent literature on civil war shows both that inequality between ethnic groups induces war and, importantly, that civil wars and coups, although fundamentally different, are related. The literature on coups d’état, however, has yet to theorize and test the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. The link is plausible because many coups are ‘ethnic coups’, which depend on the capacity of plotters to mobilize their co-ethnics. We argue that large income and wealth disparities between ethnic groups accompanied by within-group homogeneity increase the salience of ethnicity and solidify within-group preferences vis-à-vis the preferences of other ethnic groups, increasing the appeal and feasibility of a coup. We use group-level data for 32 sub-Saharan African countries and 141 ethnic groups between 1960 and 2005 and provide the first large-N test to date of the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. Between- and within-group inequality measures are constructed based on survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Demographic and Health Surveys. We find strong support for our hypothesis: between-ethnic-group inequality (BGI) increases the likelihood that an ethnic group stages a coup only when within-ethnic-group inequality (WGI) is low. Coups remain frequent in sub-Saharan Africa and coups are the main threat to democracy in the region, by harming democratic consolidation and economic development, and by provoking further political instability. Our work provides a novel rationale to be concerned about ethnic inequality, showing that when ethnic and income cleavages overlap, destabilizing coups d’état are more likely.
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Masaki, Takaaki. "Coups d’État and Foreign Aid." World Development 79 (March 2016): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.004.
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Powell, Jonathan, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel. "Combating Coups d’état in Africa, 1950–2014." Studies in Comparative International Development 51, no. 4 (January 7, 2016): 482–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6.
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Balima, Hippolyte Weneyam. "Coups d’état and the cost of debt." Journal of Comparative Economics 48, no. 3 (September 2020): 509–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.04.001.
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Vlavonou, Gino. "La guerre civile en république centrafricaine." Potentia: Journal of International Affairs 7 (October 1, 2016): 42–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.18192/potentia.v7i0.4426.
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La République centrafricaine (RCA) est politiquement instable depuis son indépendance en 1960. Différents coups d’État se sont succédés dont le plus récent date de mars 2013. Du régime autoritaire de David Dacko en 1960, à celui de François Bozizé en 2013, la RCA vit une instabilité politique chronique. Le dernier coup d’État en RCA a plongé le pays dans une nouvelle crise et un niveau de violence qui n’a jamais été atteint auparavant. La question se pose de savoir quels sont les facteurs qui expliquent le déclenchement de la guerre civile en mars 2013 en République Centrafricaine. Au-delà des systèmes et des structures, ce travail replace les élites au coeur du débat et avance que leur rôle est décisif pour surmonter les crises. Ce travail avance qu’il faille associer le faible degré d’assimilation des élites politiques avec le faible leadership du président qui a pris le pouvoir par coup d’État en mars 2013 pour expliquer en partie la guerre civile en 2013.
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Bove, Vincenzo, and Roberto Nisticò. "Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis." Public Choice 161, no. 3-4 (October 10, 2014): 321–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0202-2.
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Powell, Jonathan. "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état." Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 6 (June 6, 2012): 1017–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445732.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Coups d’État"
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Powell, Jonathan M. "Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing." UKnowledge, 2012. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/polysci_etds/3.
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This study develops a leader-centric theory of civil-military relations that expands upon three broad areas of research. Specifically, the study suggests that leaders will evaluate multiple threats to their political survival and will ultimately implement strategy that is most likely to keep them in power. While Downs (1957) has noted such a tendency in democracies, this study expands this rationale to authoritarian regimes by focusing on the primary means of authoritarian removal: the military coup. In contrast to the state-centric nature of traditional international relations theory, this dissertation finds that leaders frequently undermine the power of the state in order to accomplish the self-interested goal of political survival.
First, the study carefully describes a number of coup-proofing strategies that leaders can implement. These are broadly defined in terms of influencing either the military’s willingness or its ability to attempt a coup. In addition to testing the effectiveness of these strategies, this study also theoretically explores the implications of coup-proofing for other political development of the state: interstate and intrastate conflict.
Second, the study considers the influence of coup-proofing on interstate conflict. This study builds on the diversionary literature by investing coup risk as an incentive to use diversionary tactics as well as coup-proofing as a potential disincentive. The latter can both undermine the necessity of diversion as well as military capabilities, making leaders less capable of utilizing international conflict as a political tool.
Third, the dissertation considers the influence of coup-proofing on intrastate conflict. The theory argues that the capability-reducing practice of coup-proofing can have important domestic consequences. Specifically, the practice can increase the mobilizational potential of would-be insurgents, can reduce the mobilizational capacity of the state, and leaders that are particularly fearful of a coup will likely tolerate the rise of an insurgency.
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Matondo, Jean-Clair. "Sociologie des coups d’état en République du Congo de 1958 à 1973." Thesis, Paris 10, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013PA100001.
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République du Congo, l’armée, en tant qu’ensemble de structures et de moyens militaires institutionnellement affectés à la mise en œuvre de la politique décidée par les autorités politiques pour assurer et garantir la défense nationale, est loin d’être l’auteur exclusif des coups d’Etat, même si, systématiquement, elle profite des conséquences politiques attachées à ceux-ci. En réalité, les coups d’Etat y sont la résultante d’une lutte entre plusieurs champs. Dans cette lutte, les acteurs des coups d’Etat, en fonction de leurs corpus idéologiques respectifs, mettent en place des stratégies dont la particularité n’est pas de se limiter au champ bureaucratique mais d’engager également la société appréhendée au regard de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux d’appartenance. Ainsi, mobilisent-ils, non seulement leurs propres capitaux (diplômes, profession), mais aussi les ressources de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux en vue de réaliser la conquête ou la conservation du pouvoir. Par le jeu complexe des solidarités idéologiques, ethniques ou corporatistes, les acteurs politiques tissent des alliances et, selon le cas, participent ou s’opposent à l’exécution des coups d’Etat. Sous ce rapport, les coups d’Etat, qui supposent une importante mobilisation stratégique, politique et matérielle de la part de ceux qui en forment le projet, se confondent à un mode de conquête du pouvoir assimilable formellement à l’élection, et s’inscrivent dans ce que Marcel Mauss nomme les faits sociaux totaux. Les leaders politiques appartenant aux ethnies minoritaires, ne pouvant accéder au pouvoir par voie démocratique, élaborent une stratégie de conquête de pouvoir prenant appui sur l’armée. Ainsi, détournée de sa mission traditionnelle de protection du territoire national face aux agressions extérieures, l’armée voit sa valeur opérationnelle diminuéeIn Republic of Congo, the army, as a whole of structures and average soldiers institutionally assigned to the implementation of the policy decided by the political authorities to ensure and guarantee national defense, is far from being the exclusive author of the coups d'etat, even if, systematically, it benefits from the political consequences attached to those. Actually, the coups d'etat are there the resultant of a fight between several fields. In this fight, the actors of the coups d'etat, according to their respective ideological corpora, set up strategies whose characteristic is not to limit themselves to the bureaucratic field but to also engage the company apprehended taking into consideration their ethnic or regional group of membership. Thus, they mobilize, not only their own capital (diplomas, profession), but also resources of their ethnic or regional groups in order to carry out the conquest or the conservation of the power. By the complex play of ideological solidarity, ethnic or corporatists, the political actors weave alliances and, according to the case, take part or are opposed to the execution of the coups d'etat. Under this report, the coups d'etat, which suppose an important strategic mobilization, political and material on behalf of those which form the project of it, merge with a mode of conquest of the power comparable formally to the election, and fit in what Marcel Mauss names the total social facts. The political leaders belonging to the minority ethnic groups, not being able to reach the power by democratic way, work out a strategy of conquest of fascinating power support on the army. Thus, diverted its traditional mission of protection of the national territory vis-a-vis the external aggressions, the army sees its decreased operational value
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Kiddee, Wissarut. "Le coup d’État en Thaïlande : causes, conséquences et effets juridiques d’une pathologie politique." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018TOU10020.
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Depuis l’abolition de la monarchie absolue en 1932, le royaume a connu des situations politiques variées : les activités « contre-révolutionnaires » des royalistes ; l’arrivée au pouvoir des militaires ; l’émergence de nouvelles classes politiques ; les massacres de civils ; les compromis entre les militaires, les royalistes et les progressistes ; l’incertitude sur l’avenir du royaume et de la couronne... L’échec de la transition démocratique thaïlandaise est expliqué généralement par un argument convenu : l’immaturité de la société thaïlandaise ; la démocratie libérale de type occidental ne serait pas appropriée pour le pays, notamment pour des « pauvres ruraux ignorants » ; l’armée est le seul acteur capable d’encadrer le développement d’une démocratie. Pourtant, cette étude présente une explication alternative ; elle démontre que la vie politique du royaume est déterminée par trois axes du pouvoir : les élites traditionnelles, dont la monarchie, l’armée et la haute fonction publique ; c’est cette situation qui explique l’échec du progrès démocratique. Et le coup d’État est la méthode préférée pour protéger le statu quo ; quant à la constitution thaïlandaise est semblable à une « lettre morte » ou à un « instrument de la politique au quotidien » ; elle ne représente plus la norme suprême qui exprime l’idéologie politique du pays ; au contraire, elle est utilisée non seulement pour légitimer a posteriori un coup d’État, mais également pour défendre la domination politique des groupes dominants. Nous pouvons donc conclure que le coup d’État thaïlandais est déclenché par l’armée royale avec l’appui de la monarchie et son réseau de conseillers ; puis, il est justifié par le roi et le judiciaire, en assurant l’impunité de ses auteurs par les lois et la constitutionSince the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932, the kingdom has experienced the various political situations: the ‘counter-revolution’ of the royalists, the dictatorial regime, the emergence of the new middle classes, the massacres of civilians, the political compromise, the uncertainty about the future of the kingdom and the crown… The failure of a transition to democracy is usually explained by the usual arguments: the political immaturity of Thai society, the ‘Western-style liberal democracy’ would not be appropriate for the country especially for ‘the ignorant masses’, the army is the only actor, who capable to promote democracy. However, this study presents an alternative explanation. It demonstrates that the political life of the kingdom is determined by three axes of power: traditional elites, including the monarchy, the army and the senior civil servant. It is this situation that explains the failure of the democratic process. And the coup is the traditional method to protect their status quo. As for the constitution, it is similar to a ‘dead letter’ or an ‘instrument of everyday politics’. It isn’t represented as supreme norm that expresses the country’s political ideology. On the contrary, it is used not only to legitimize a coup, but also to defend the political domination of the traditional elites. We can conclude that the Thai coups are triggered by the royal army with the support of the monarchy. Then, justified by the king and the judiciary, and assuring the impunity by the laws and the constitutions
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N'Gbesso, N'dory Claude Vincent. "Recherche sur la notion de coup d’État en droit public. : Le cas de l'Afrique francophone." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018BORD0308.
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Depuis les indépendances, les régimes politiques africains sont demeurés très instables, du fait de la militarisation de ces régimes et des accessions illégales et illégitimes au pouvoir politique. Mais les transitions démocratiques de 1990 ont amorcé un constitutionnalisme nouveau marqué par l’adhésion à la démocratie pluraliste et à l’État de droit. Cependant le coup d'État persiste à être un procédé privilégié d'accession au pouvoir. Cette situation ne saurait laisser indifférent le chercheur. On peut s’interroger sur l’approche que le droit public réserve à la notion de coup d’ÉtatSince independence, African political regimes have remained very volatile, because of militarization of these political regimes, and also illegal and illegitimate accession to political power. But the democratic transitions of 1990 introduced a new constitutionalism with democracy and rule of law. However, the coup d'etat persists in being a privileged way of accession to political power. This situation should interest searchers. We might ask how public law pprehends the concept of a coup d'état
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Khan, Natasha. "Do transitional justice strategies address small island developing states niche conflicts? : preventing the recurrence of coups d’état : study of Fiji." Thesis, University of York, 2015. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/17877/.
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This research, affirms that some mechanisms of the transitional justice approaches can be applicable to SIDS conflict; particularly structural conflicts. The fourth principle of the Joinet/Orentlicher Principles of ‘Dealing with the Past’; the right to non-occurrence of conflict, was utilised as a conceptual framework to research the case of Fiji, as it addresses military and institution reforms; both of which are problematic area in Fiji. Focus groups interviews, semi-structured questionnaires and key informant interviews were used to collect data. The overall research question was: ‘How can transitional justice strategies address conflicts that are distinctive to Small Island developing states?’, and the more specific questions related to amnesty, military reform and prevention of coup d’états in the future. The thesis confirms that many respondents and key informants regard amnesty for coups d’état negatively and unjust. A number of key informants also think that amnesty is bad as it sends the wrong signals to the coup perpetrators and to future generations. Respondents felt strongly (78%) that the coup perpetrators should be held accountable as coups are illegal, but they also acknowledged that the military is too strong and praetorian at this stage in Fiji to be held accountable. Findings also indicate that there were mixed views on military reform. A number of other important reforms were also suggested by the respondents to prevent the reoccurrence of coups in Fiji. These include; education to foster a national identity, and reforms to the rule of law as well as to the judiciary. This thesis concludes that transitional justice mechanisms would be applicable to small island developing states but it would need to be tailored to the country’s specific needs. Additionally, if we are to ensure that another coup does not occur in the future, Fiji has to carry out military reform and revive discussions on amnesty, or such discussions will be driven underground and may fester into future conflicts.
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Amon, Hermann Kouamé. "Les coups d'État dans l'Empire romain de 235 à 284." Thesis, Paris 4, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA040077.
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Au cours du IIIe siècle, l’Empire romain est confronté aux attaques militaires de ses voisins aux niveaux de sa frontière orientale et occidentale. Ces attaques parfois simultanées engendrent une instabilité du pouvoir impérial, caractérisée par la multiplication de coups d’État. L’objectif de cette étude était d’analyser ce phénomène politique de 235 à 284. Les questions essentielles de l’analyse étaient : Qu’est-ce qu’un coup d’État dans le contexte politique de l’Empire romain ? Comment se présente le coup d’État au cours de la période concernée et quels sont ses conséquences dans l’Empire. Ainsi, nous avons démontré à travers une analyse théorique que le phénomène de coup d’État n’est pas spécifique au IIIe siècle de l’Empire mais qu’il est consubstantiel au régime impérial. Après, cette démonstration, nous avons analysé chaque coup d’État et mis en relief leur augmentation avec l’intensification des attaques des ennemis de l’Empire. Pour chaque coup d’État était présenté, le contexte de sa proclamation, son déroulement et l’analyse politique qu’on pouvait en faire. Au terme de toute cette analyse, nous avons présenté les conséquences de ce phénomène politique tant sur la structure politique et militaire mais aussi sur la vie économique, sociale et administrative de l’EmpireDuring the third century, the Roman Empire is faced with military attacks from its neighbors at its eastern and western borders. These simultaneous attacks generate instability for the imperial power, characterized by the increase of political coups. The objective of this study was to analyze this political phenomenon from 235 to 284. Critical analysis questions were: What is a coup in the political context of the Roman Empire? What is the process of a coup during the relevant period and what are its consequences for the Empire? We have shown through a theoretical analysis that the phenomenon of coups is not specific to the third century of the Empire, but it is consubstantial to the roman imperial regime. After this, we have analyzed each coup and highlighted the increase of their occurrence with the intensification of attacks by Rome’s enemies. For each coup analyzed, the context of its proclamation, its development and the political analysis was given. We have presented the consequences of this political phenomenon on both political and military structure and also on the economic and administrative life of the Empire
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Lemercier, Michel. "Etude du changement d’état liquide-solide de solutions retenues au sein de corps poreux." Lyon, INSA, 1994. http://www.theses.fr/1994ISAL0021.
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L'étude du·changement d ' état liquide-solide d'une solution aqueuse d'iodure de potassium et d ' une solution organique d e 1,2 e. T 1 4 chloronitrobenzène retenues au sein de corps poreux réalisée à l 'aide de la technique de calorimétrie différentielle à balayage. Selon la procédure expérimentale mise en œuvre lors du refroidissement, les solutions dont la division est réalisée par imprégnation de corps poreux de texture connue peuvent présenter : - soit un comportement métastable : la rupture de métastabilité entraîne une solidification avec retard du mélange situé à l'extérieur des pore s et du condensat capillaire. - soit une cristallisation à l 'équilibre : la succession des transformations observées indique que la solution dans les pores évolue toujours vers la composition eutectique. La migration, dans son intégralité , du constituant en défaut dans les pores lors du refroidissement, constitue un moyen de maîtriser la composition du condensat capillaire lorsqu'il commence à cristalliser. I l a été ainsi possible d'établir le diagramme de phase des deux mélanges considérés, et retenus dans les plus gros pores de corps poreux donnés. Les courbes d'équilibre obtenues, sont d'allure identique à celles des solutions non divisées et d'autant plus abaissées que la division du condensat capillaire est plus importanteLiquid-solid phase changes of potassium-iodide aqueous solutions and 1,2-1,4 chloronitrobenzol solutions, held inside porous materials, have been studied by using a differential scanning calorimetry technique. Capillary phenomena allow the solutions to fill completely porous material whose pore size distribution is narrow and well known. According to the experimental process used, during a continuous cooling, the solution outside and inside the pores becomes or not a metastable liquid. So crystallisation results from a metastability breakdown or occurs in equilibrium conditions : in this last case, the solution evolves towards the eutectic one as the temperature is lowered. When the whole porous volume cannot be filled with an eutectic solution, the component whose amount is too small with respect to an eutectic solution, migrates entitely inside. The pores. By varying the amount and composition of initial solution, the composition of the capillary condensate which crystallizes inside the largest pores of a given porous material can be adjusted. So it is possible to determine the phase diagram of divided solution under study. Equilibrium curves of divided solutions are similar to those of bulk binary systems. They are all the more shifted towards lower temperatures as the capillary condensate is finely divided
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Néron, Adeline. "La Bioéthique, Science d’État : la fabrique du gouvernement de la morale des corps humains biomédicaux." Thesis, Paris, EHESS, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017EHES0145.
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Cette thèse se situe à la rencontre des Études sur les sciences et des théories biopolitiques. Elle porte sur les relations de savoir et de pouvoir qui animent la bioéthique. Ce champ est saisi comme étant des espaces et temps de négociation de risques d’ordre juridique, social et moral de développements techno-scientifiques. Alors, cette recherche s’intéresse à cette évaluation de possibilités et pratiques biomédicales relevant de donner ou prendre la vie, des organes, des embryons humains, des informations génétiques, du sang ou des cellules. Le Comité de bioéthique du Conseil de l’Europe, le Comité consultatif national d’éthique pour les sciences de la vie et de la santé et les Espaces de réflexion éthique régionaux sont les trois nœuds étudiés. L’institutionnalisation des jugements de valeurs qu’ils permettent de constater est faite d’une circulation multi-scalaire d’experts qui concentre productions et normatisations. Cette circulation forme une communauté épistémique bioéthique, universitaire et administrative. Dans ce mode de gouvernement, les validations professionnelles se confrontent à leurs propres narrations et tentatives de participation élargie à la fabrique bioéthique. En effet, Consultations, États Généraux, Conférences de citoyens et Débats publics essentiellement confirment les accréditations et configurations académiques et régulatrices. De propositions successives de compréhension, l’analyse invite à penser la bioéthique comme étant un domaine scientifique d’Études morales des sciences et techniques. C’est, en outre, cette identification même qui contraste la bureaucratisation de la vertu. C’est disciplinariser des savoirs sur la morale des corps humains biomédicaux qui s’oppose à l’intervention de discipliner individus et populationsThis thesis sits at an intersection of Sciences Studies and Bio-political theories. It concerns the knowledge and power relations that shape Bioethics. This field is considered as spaces and times of negotiation of legal, social and moral risks associated with techno-scientific developments. Hence, the research interest is this evaluation of the biomedical possibilities and practices of giving or taking life, bodies, organs, human embryos, genetic information, blood or cells. The Council of Europe’s Bioethics Committee, the National Consultative Ethics Committee on Life and Health Sciences and the Espaces de réflexion éthique (Regional Offices for Ethics) are the three knots studied. The institutionnalisation of value judgments these reveal lies on a multi-scalar circulation of experts that concentrates productions and normatisations. This circulation shapes a university- and administration-based bioethical epistemic community. In this mode of government, professional validations are confronted with their own narratives and initiatives of broader participation in Bioethics making. Indeed, consultations, États Généraux, citizens’ conferences and public debates essentially confirm academic and regulatory accreditations and configurations. From successive propositions of comprehension, the analysis invites consideration of Bioethics as a scientific field of Moral Studies of Sciences and Technology. Moreover, it is this identification that contrasts the bureaucratization of virtue. It is disciplinarizing knowledge on biomedical human bodies’ morality that is an opposition to the intervention of disciplining individuals and populations
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Serém, Rúben. "Conspiracy, coup d’état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939) : history and myth in Francoist Spain." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/622/.
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This thesis deconstructs the bases of enduring Francoist myth that General Queipo de Llano heroically conquered Seville with a handful of soldiers. Having established the full ramifications of that conquest, it goes on to assess the political, social, economic and cultural implications of the Spanish Civil War in Seville, the largest urban centre to fall to the military rebels at the beginning of the conflict. Chapter I examines the nature and infrastructure of the military conspiracy against the democratic Republic developed in response to the Popular Front electoral victory of February 1936. Chapter II scrutinises the career of General Queipo, in particular his metamorphosis from a marginal figure in the conspiracy into a rebel secular saint. Chapter III dismantles the legend that Queipo directed a small group of soldiers that miraculously conquered Seville and examines how the myth was exploited to legitimise political repression. Chapter IV demonstrates how the bloody pacification of Seville by nearer to 6,000 men exemplified the conspirators’ determination to eliminate the Republic by extreme violence. It shows how the use of the most brutal methods of colonial war was employed against civilians all over rebel-controlled territory. Chapter V analyses the painful transition from insurrection to civil war from a novel perspective: fundraising campaigns. It quantifies the devastating consequences of Nationalist economic repression. Finally, Chapter VI demystifies the legend of a Catholic Church persecuted by a ‘Judeo-Masonic’ conspiracy. It concludes that anticlericalism was a popular form of protest that pre-dated the establishment of the II Republic by analysing/quantifying patterns of religiosity, revealing that only 1.44% of the local population regularly attended Church in 1930s Seville; and investigating the development of the Catholic Church into the main cultural institution in Nationalist Spain that sanctified the transformation of myth into History.
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Kantola, Dunja. "Honduras - In the aftermath of the coup d’état : A case study on the development of the regime five years after the coup occurred." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-26461.
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In 2009, Honduras was affected by a military coup, where the former president Manuel Zelaya was deposed. The coup was supported by the National Congress and the Supreme Court, with the arguments that the action was a necessary act for defending and maintaining the democracy in the country. It is therefore interesting to see what type of regime that has emerged afterwards. The study is analysed by Robert Dahl´s theory about polyarchy and Joakim Ekman´s theory about hybrid regimes since Honduras shows tendencies towards both types of regimes in the present state. The study has three different perspectives regarding the empirical data to obtain a comprehensive picture as possible of what kind of regime that Honduras is considered to be today. The material consists of the national constitution to get a glimpse of the formal aspects of the political shape in the country as well as reports provided by international organizations to get the view from the outside world but the primary material is from interviews with people determined important by the positions in the Honduran civil society. The results display that Honduras has significant democratic elements; free elections and a constitution that recognizes the basic liberties, which according to Dahl meets up with the criteria of a democratic polyarchy. However, the lack of accountability for government institutions, corruption and violations against freedom of speech - where the most affected groups are journalists, human right defenders and indigenous people, indicates that Honduras have more similarities to that what Joakim Ekman refers to as a hybrid regime.
Books on the topic "Coups d’État"
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Varol, Ozan. The Democratic Coup d'État. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190626013.001.0001.
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The term “coup d’état,” --French for stroke of the state--brings to mind coups staged by power-hungry generals who overthrow the existing regime, not to democratize but to concentrate power in their own hands as dictators. We assume all coups look the same, smell the same, and present the same threats to democracy. It’s a powerful, concise, and self-reinforcing idea. It’s also wrong. The Democratic Coup d’État advances a simple yet controversial argument: Sometimes a democracy is established through a military coup. The book covers events from the Athenian Navy’s stance in 411 BC against a tyrannical home government to coups in the American colonies that ousted corrupt British governors and to twentieth-century coups that toppled dictators and established democracy in countries as diverse as Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, and Colombia. Connecting the dots between these neglected events, the book tackles several baffling questions: How can an event as undemocratic as a military coup lead to democracy? Why would imposing generals—armed with tanks and guns and all—voluntarily surrender power to civilian politicians? What distinguishes militaries that help build democracies from those that destroy them? Varol’s arguments made headlines across the globe in major media outlets and were cited critically in a public speech by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey.
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Varol, Ozan O. Hogan’s Heroes. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190626013.003.0004.
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This chapter defines the key terms used throughout the book: military, military coup, and popular revolution. The military, also known as the armed forces, is the state institution responsible for defending a nation’s borders. Importantly, the military is a separate institution from the state’s security forces. Although journalistic and historical accounts often conflate the military with the security forces, they serve distinct functions. Although most nations employ various measures to keep the military subservient to the civilian government, those measures are effective only if the military chooses to follow them. When the military disregards those measures and unleashes its coercive power against the sitting head of state, the result is a coup d’état. The definition of a coup ordinarily requires that its perpetrators come from a state institution such as the domestic military. Although many features of coups are also present in revolutions and popular movements, the definition of a military coup excludes these events because they are perpetrated by the masses, not members of the military.
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Haldon, John, and Nikos Panou. Tyrannos basileus. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199394852.003.0007.
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This chapter shifts the focus to the Eastern empire, examining the evolution of perceptions of tyranny in Byzantium from the late Roman period to the eighth century. The chapter shows that these constitute the inverse of crucial concepts in Byzantine imperial ideology, particularly with regard to issues of religious orthodoxy, moral integrity, military efficiency, and administrative competence. Furthermore, it argues that the nature and scope of these perceptions can be better understood when examined in conjunction with the discourse of tyrannicide and usurpation as deployed in a broad spectrum of historical, hagiographic, and propagandistic works. The discussions commonly surrounding cases of legally precarious coups d’état offer insights into when, how, and why political actors came to be considered as tyrants in the first centuries of the Byzantine millennium.
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Retallack, James. Suffrage Reform as Coup d’État. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199668786.003.0008.
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In the period 1894 to 1902 Saxons demonstrated that the expansion of voting rights could be slowed and actually reversed. This chapter shows how right-wing politicians, statesmen, municipal councilors, and others used a perceived crisis following political assassinations in mid-1894 to refocus middle-class fears on the “threat” of socialism. At the national level, calls for a coup d’état against the Reichstag dovetailed with less dramatic calls to action against Social Democracy. When these appeals yielded meager results, Saxons responded by passing a reform of their Landtag’s suffrage in 1896: it replaced a relatively equitable system with unequal three-class voting. Socialists disappeared from the Landtag, and the Reichstag elections of 1898 were unexciting. In the period 1898–1902 Saxon Conservatism reached the zenith of its power. But Social Democratic outrage over “suffrage robbery” had already planted the seeds of a political reversal.
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Hamel. Histoire de Robespierre et du coup d’État du 9 Thermidor, Tome III. Nouveau Monde, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.14375/np.9782369434108.
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Varol, Ozan O. The Glorious Coup. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190626013.003.0009.
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This chapter discusses a 1688 conspiracy cultivated by military officers that culminated in a coup d’état against England’s King James II, popularly known as the Glorious Revolution. The soldiers who deserted James II joined the invading Dutch forces of William of Orange to topple the king. The coup was largely the product of a Protestant crisis of conscience among those of England’s military elite who remained faithful to the Church of England in the face of an absolutist Catholic King James II. The coup brought enduring changes to the social, religious, and political fabric of England, as its empire transitioned from absolute to constitutional monarchy.
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American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels' Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État. Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.
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Karakatsanis, Neovi M., and Jonathan Swarts. American Foreign Policy Towards the Colonels' Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
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Hamel. Histoire de Robespierre et du coup d’État du 9 Thermidor, Tomes I et II. Nouveau Monde, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.14375/np.9782369434092.
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Stein, Elizabeth Ann. Information and Civil Unrest in Dictatorships. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.35.
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Considering incidents that make headline news internationally, given the modern information and communication technology revolution, the facility of citizens to rapidly mobilize represents a considerable threat to autocratic survival. While the speed with which popular movements emerge has increased exponentially, and the news of their existence spreads faster and farther, civil unrest has threatened the stability and survival of dictators for centuries. The paranoia and machinations of dictators depicted in films, such as the portrayal of Ugandan dictator Idi Amin in The Last King of Scotland, while sensationalized, capture the astounding array of threats with which unelected leaders must concern themselves. On the one hand, they must worry about insider threats to their standing, such as conspiratorial plots from people within the dictator’s own circle or mutiny among government soldiers. On the other hand, dictators also must monitor threats originating from non-regime actors, such as new alliances forming among once-fragmented opposition groups or the possibility of sustained insurgency or a popular revolution. From force to finesse, autocratic leaders have developed a broad and evolving range of tactics and tools to diminish both internal and external domestic threats to their reign. The success of dictators’ endeavors to insulate their regimes from forces that might challenge them depends on accurate and reliable information, a resource that can be as valuable to the leader as would a large armory and loyal soldiers. Dictators invest significant resources (monetary as well as human capital) to try to gather useful information about their existing and potential opponents, while also trying to control and shape information emitted by the regime before it reaches the public. New information and communication technologies (ICTs), which have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention since the beginning of the 21st century—present both risks and rewards for dictators; inversely they also create new opportunities and hazards for citizens who might utilize them to mobilize people opposed to the regime. While civil unrest could encompass the full range of domestic, nonmilitary actors, there also needs to be a specific focus on various forms of mass mobilization. Historically, more dictators have been forced from office by elite-initiated overthrows via coups d’état than have fallen to revolution or fled amid street protests. Civil unrest, in its many forms, can affect autocratic survival or precipitate regime breakdown. While mass-based revolutions have been a relatively rare phenomenon to date, the actions of many 21st-century dictators indicate that they increasingly concern themselves with the threats posed by popular protests and fear its potential for triggering broader antigovernment campaigns. The ease of access to information (or the lack thereof) help explain interactions between authoritarian regimes and citizens emphasizes. The role of information in popular antigovernment mobilization has evolved and changed how dictators gather and utilize information to prevent or counter civil unrest that might jeopardize their own survival as well as that of the regime.
Book chapters on the topic "Coups d’État"
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Tanneberg, Dag. "Does Repression of Campaigns Trigger Coups d’État?" In The Politics of Repression Under Authoritarian Rule, 121–62. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35477-0_5.
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Ferrara, Federico. "The logic of Thailand’s royalist coups d’état." In Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, 71–85. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315151328-6.
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Aslan, Ömer. "External Support and Military Coups D’état During the Cold War." In The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan, 39–106. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66011-0_2.
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Aslan, Ömer. "Introduction: Military Coup D’état as a Two-Level Game." In The United States and Military Coups in Turkey and Pakistan, 1–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66011-0_1.
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Chen, Pei-Hsiu. "The Vulnerability of Thai Democracy: Coups d’état and Political Changes in Modern Thailand." In Contemporary Socio-Cultural and Political Perspectives in Thailand, 185–207. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7244-1_12.
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Bento, António. "Ernst H. Kantorowicz (1895–1963) and Gabriel Naudé (1600–1653): From ‘Mysteries of State’ to ‘Coups d’État’." In Rewriting the Middle Ages in the Twentieth Century, 13–25. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/m.rmatc-eb.5.105100.
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Kasekamp, Andres. "Coup d’État." In The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia, 98–106. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403919557_9.
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Kitts, Miles. "Military Coups d’état and the Distribution of Domestic Institutional Political Power Within Democracies: The Case of Post-1789 France." In Guns & Roses: Comparative Civil-Military Relations in the Changing Security Environment, 53–73. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2008-8_4.
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Swale, Alistair D. "The Meiji Coup d’État." In The Meiji Restoration, 57–86. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230245792_3.
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Albanese, Giulia. "The Coup d’État Policy." In The March on Rome, 1–16. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge studies in fascism and the far right: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315115481-1.
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