Academic literature on the topic 'Court of arbitration for sport (TAS-CAS)'

Purpose The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), created by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1983, resolves disputes between athletes and national or international sports governing bodies. The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the history and functions of CAS, with a particular focus on the ways in which athletes’ rights are threatened by the IOC’s Code of Sports-Related Arbitration. Design/methodology/approach The author reviews relevant law literature and media sources. Findings The concept of lex sportiva (global sport law), general arbitration practices and controversies concerning CAS’s impartiality are investigated, and the “strict liability” principle that CAS applies to doping allegations is assessed. This analysis points to a long record of inconsistencies and contradictions in the history and function of CAS. The findings lead to questions of arbitration or litigation; confidential or public proceedings; specialist or generalist arbitrators; lex sportiva or international legal principles; precedential or non-precedential awards; and civil or criminal burden of proof. Originality/value These unresolved issues demonstrate how the IOC struggles to maintain supremacy over world sport by promoting sport exceptionalism, and provide possible grounds for athletes’ future challenges to CAS.

The area of anti-doping in sport has always been fascinating, exciting, as well as complicated and controversial. The two latter aspects have been entrenched, in case law and statutory law and the highest Court in sport, namely the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in Lausanne, Switzerland. This court has had the opportunity to develop important principles of sports law. One of these principles is the subject matter of the present case commentary and relates to the principle of self-regulation. In other words, it examines the ability of sporting governing bodies to regulate their sport and concentrates on the legality of such self-regulation. In doing so, this case commentary will also examine the particular importance sports law jurisprudence attaches on the contractual relationship between sporting governing bodies and athletes. Such analysis should help readers understand the nature of regulation in sport, as well as the reasoning behind the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the case under analysis.

AbstractThe Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) jurisprudence on manipulation of sports competitions has vastly evolved from its initial award in RSC Anderlecht in 1998, to now Labuts in August 2020. Alongside, international and national regulations, as well as sporting regulations, including, most recently, the Council of Europe’s Macolin Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, have sought to effectively tackle the omnipresent, ever-growing phenomenon of competition manipulation. Against this backdrop, this article briefly outlines the existing legal landscape on manipulation, followed by a chronological detailing of each CAS issued award. The key aspects of defining such sanctionable behaviour, select issues of standard of proof and types of evidence which are admissible and relied on, as well as the manner and quantum of sanction are then analysed. Ultimately, noting empirical trends across these awards, questions on ne bis in idem, proportionality of sanctions and legal certainty across CAS jurisprudence are raised.

Uporedno-pravna rešenja podstiču arbitražno rešavanje sporova u oblasti sporta, a pravila mnogih međunarodnih sportskih saveza zabranjuju članicama da vode sudske sporove pod pretnjom zabrane nastupa na međunarodnim takmičenjima. Najznačajniji i najpopularniji arbitražni sud za razrešavanje međunarodnih sporova u domenu sporta jeste Arbitražni sud za sport Lozani (The Court of Arbitration for Sport – CAS) sa sedištem u Lozani (Švajcarska). Da bi CAS bio nadležan za rešavanje određenog spora, on mora biti podoban za arbitražu i mora postojati punovažan arbitražni sporazum. Osim toga, za punovažnost odluka CAS-a važe isti procesni zahtevi kao i za odluke državnih sudova: nezavisnost suda, pravo stranke da bude saslušana, pravo na pošteno suđenje, zabrana retroaktivnih pravila i kazni, načelo ne bis in idem, načelo proporcionalnosti u odmeravanju kazne, načelo nezavisnosti sudije, načelo pisanog obrazloženja odluke. Autor u radu razmatra pitanje punovažnosti i obaveznosti odluka koje donosi CAS i mogućnosti njihovog osporavanja pred nacionalnim sudovima, kako nacionalnim sudovima prema sedištu CAS-a tako i nacionalnim sudovima strana u sportu (u postupku izvršenja odluka CAS-a ili nezavisno od toga). Ovo pitanje je posebno razmotreno u svetlu tzv. slučaja Pechstein (tužba Claudie Pechstein protiv International Skating Union za naknadu štete zbog dvogodišnje zabrane takmičenja usled dopinga) koji je svoj epilog dobio presudom nemačkog Vrhovnog saveznog suda (Bundesgerichtshof) od 7. juna 2016. godine, a ticao se upravo punovažnosti arbitražnog sporazuma o nadležnosti CAS-a i priznavanja odluke CAS-a, kao strane arbitražne odluke, od nemačkih sudova.

ABSTRACT This article explores the definition of ‘sportswoman’ as put forward in the Caster Semenya case (2019) and the Dutee Chand case (2015) before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). It analyses the structural and discursive factors that made it possible for the CAS to endorse a definition that reduces sex and gender to a matter concerning testosterone. By relying on the concept of intersectionality and analytical sensibilities from Critical Legal Studies, the article shows that framing the cases as a matter of scientific dispute, instead of as concerning human rights, significantly influenced the CAS decisions. Moreover, structural elements of international sports law, such as the lack of knowledge of human rights among CAS arbitrators and a history of institutionalising gendered and racialised body norms through sporting regulations, further aided the affirmation of the ‘testosterone rules’.

In this paper, we examine the scientific, legal, and ethical foundations for inclusion of transgender women athletes in competitive sport, drawing on IOC principles and relevant Court of Arbitration for Sport decisions. We argue that the inclusion of trans athletes in competition commensurate with their legal gender is the most consistent position with these principles of fair and equitable sport. Biological restrictions, such as endogenous testosterone limits, are not consistent with IOC and CAS principles. We explore the implications for recognizing that endogenous testosterone values are a ‘natural physical trait’ and that excluding legally recognized women for high endogenous testosterone values constitutes discrimination on the basis of a natural physical trait. We suggest that the justificatory burden for such prima facie discrimination is unlikely to be met. Thus, in place of a limit on endogenous testosterone for women (whether cisgender, transgender, or intersex), we argue that ‘legally recognized gender’ is most fully in line with IOC and CAS principles.

Esta tesis pretende investigar si en los laudos que dicta el TAS se aplican los principios jurídicos de la presunción de inocencia, por un lado, y de responsabilidad objetiva, por otro, analizando en qué modo se aplican, cómo resuelve dicho tribunal la contraposición entre ambos principios, y formulando finalmente unas propuestas de cambios que permitan atender al bien jurídico protegido por cada uno de esos principios. Para ello, se elabora un marco teórico en el, en primer lugar, se analiza la evolución histórica de ambos principios, a continuación se expone su concepto según el marco jurídico actual del derecho español, con especial atención a la distinción, para ambos principios, entre el régimen sancionador propio del derecho penal y del derecho administrativo sancionador, así como respecto a si el derecho español admite o no, y en qué casos, la responsabilidad objetiva en materia sancionadora. Seguidamente se realiza una breve referencia al derecho comparado, principalmente ámbito de europeo y suizo, respecto a ambos principios, para pasar a elaborar una definición de cada uno y, como conclusión del marco teórico, se examina a continuación el marco jurídico de relación entre ambos principios. A continuación se realiza un pormenorizado examen y análisis de los laudos que se refieren a cada uno de dichos principios, verificando cómo concretamente los aplica el TAS en los casos a que se refieren los laudos considerados. A continuación se formula una nueva definición de cada principio, partiendo de la definición antes elaborada, pero incorporando las aportaciones jurisprudenciales que resultan del análisis realizado a los laudos del TAS. Para continuar se examina de qué modo y en qué medida y casos el TAS contrapone dichos principios, y qué respuestas ha elaborado para resolver la contradicción entre ambos. Finalmente se sugieren criterios de conciliación de los dos principios, formulando propuestas en relación a la norma sancionadora, los medios técnicos, la práctica probatoria, y los criterios para emisión del laudo, todo ello con la intención de conseguir el objetivo de que los laudos del TAS sean respetuosos con ambos principios.
Aquesta tesi pretén investigar si als laudes que dicta el TAS s’apliquen els principis jurídics de la presumpció d’innocència, per una banda, i de responsabilitat objectiva, per un altre, analitza de quina manera s’apliquen, com resol el dit tribunal la contraposició entre ambdós principis, i formula finalment unes propostes de canvis que permetin atendre al be jurídic protegit per cadascun d’aquests principis. Per a això, s’elabora un marc teòric en el que, en primer lloc, s’analitza la evolució històrica d’ambdós principis, a continuació s’exposa el seu concepte segons el marc jurídic actual del dret espanyol, amb especial atenció a la distinció, per ambdós principis, entre el règim sancionador propi del dret penal i del dret administratiu sancionador, així com respecte a si el dret espanyol admet o no, i en quins casos, la responsabilitat objectiva en matèria sancionadora. Seguidament es fa una breu referència al dret comparat, principalment d’àmbit europeu i suïs, respecte a ambdós principis, per passar a elaborar una definició de cadascun i, com a conclusió del marc teòric, s’examina a continuació el marc jurídic de relació entre ambdós principis. A continuació es fa un detallat examen i anàlisi dels laudes que es refereixen a cadascun dels dits principis, verificant com concretament els aplica el TAS en els casos a que es refereixen els laudes considerats. A continuació es formula una nova definició de cada principi, partint de la definició elaborada anteriorment, però incorporant les aportacions jurisprudencials que resulten de l’anàlisi realitzat als laudes del TAS. Seguidament s’examina en quina manera, mesura i casos el TAS contraposa ambdós principis, i quines respostes ha elaborat per resoldre la contradicció entre ells. Finalment es suggereixen criteris de conciliació d’ambdós principis, formulant propostes en relació a la norma sancionadora, els mitjans tècnics, la pràctica probatòria, i els criteris per dictar el laude, tot això amb la intenció d’assolir l’objectiu de que els laudes del TAS siguin respectuosos amb ambdós principis.
This thesis intends to investigate whether the arbitrations dictated by the TAS apply the principle of presumption of innocence, on the one hand, and strict liability, on the other, analyzing how they are applied, how that tribunal resolves the contradiction between both principles and finally formulates proposals for changes that allow to attend to the legal right protected by each of those principles. To that end, a theoretical framework is elaborated in which the historical evolution of both principles is analyzed first, then the actual concept of both principles under the actual Spanish legal framework is set forth, with special attention given to the distinction, in both principles, between the penalty system corresponding to criminal law and that belonging to the administrative disciplinary law, as well as with respect to whether the Spanish law does or does not admit the strict liability in matters of sanctions, and if so, in which cases. Next a brief reference is made to compared law, mainly of European and Swiss law, with respect to both principles, followed by the elaboration of a definition of each of them and, as a conclusion to the theoretical framework, the legal framework of the relationship between both principles is then examined. The arbitrations that make reference to each one of said principles are then carefully examined and analyzed, verifying how the TAS is actually applying them in the cases referred to in the arbitrations considered. Then a new definition of each principle is formulated, starting from the previously elaborated definition, but incorporating the jurisprudential contributions by the TAS resulting from the analysis done of the TAS arbitrations. It is then examined in what way, to what extent and in which cases the TAS is contrasting both principles, and what answers has the TAS elaborated to resolve the contradiction between them. Finally suggestions of conciliation of both principles are presented, formulating proposals relating the sanctioning rules, the technical means, the evidentiary assessment, and the criteria to dictate the arbitrations, all of it with the aim to achieve that the TAS arbitrations are respectful with both principles.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo estudar a resolução de litígios no âmbito desportivo por meio das arbitragens realizadas pelo Tribunal Arbitral do Esporte (TAS-CAS), examinando-se a estrutura do referido órgão e determinados aspectos vinculados à sua atuação. Assim, procurou-se contextualizar a utilização do processo arbitral para a solução de controvérsias relacionadas à prática desportiva e a criação do Tribunal Arbitral do Esporte, para posteriormente identificar as principais particularidades de seus procedimentos, comparando-os com as disposições da Lei Modelo da UNCITRAL e das regras da Câmara de Comércio Internacional e da Associação Americana de Arbitragem, que também regulam arbitragens internacionais. No tocante à atuação do tribunal, abordou-se a existência de um corpo normativo especificamente relacionado ao desporto, denominado lex sportiva, cuja formação tem sido fortemente influenciada pelas decisões do TAS-CAS. Apresentaram-se, nesse contexto, alguns dos princípios que compõem a lex sportiva e que foram elaborados com a participação do tribunal. Por fim, utilizando-se dos conceitos proporcionados pela Análise Econômica do Direito, buscou-se identificar elementos que podem aumentar ou reduzir os custos de transação nos procedimentos arbitrais que tramitam perante o TAS-CAS, a partir das normas que os regulam, dispostas no seu Code of Sports-related Arbitration.
This work aims to study the dispute resolution within sports, through the arbitrations performed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (TAS-CAS), by examining the structure of said body, as well as certain aspects linked to its acting. Thus, it has been made a contextualization of the use of arbitration proceedings to the settlement of conflicts related to the practice of sports and the creation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, to identify, later, the main peculiarities of its proceedings, comparing them to the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law and of the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration Association, which also regulate international arbitrations. Regarding the activity of the court, it was addressed the existence of a regulatory body specifically related to sports, called lex sportiva, whose formation has been heavily influenced by the decisions of TAS-CAS. Within this context, it were presented some of the principles which compose lex sportiva and which have been developed with the participation of the tribunal. Finally, using the concepts provided by the Economic Analysis of Law, it was sought to identify factors that can increase or reduce the transaction costs in arbitration proceedings before the TAS-CAS, as from the rules which govern it, disposed in its Code of Sports-related Arbitration.

Le Tribunal arbitral du sport (TAS), organe de résolution des litiges sportifs par la voie de l’arbitrage, rend des sentences qui, grâce à la pratique du précédent, acquièrent la cohérence nécessaire à la formation d’une jurisprudence. À travers cette jurisprudence, le TAS contribue à l’édification d’un ordre juridique sportif global et autonome. Cette contribution est le résultat d’un double apport, normatif et structurant. D’abord, les règles prétoriennes produites par le TAS et formées essentiellement des principes généraux constamment appliqués par les arbitres, constituent une source de droit à l’intérieur de l’ordre juridique sportif. Certains de ces principes, principalement ceux permettant de protéger la sincérité des compétitions et les droits fondamentaux des athlètes, se démarquent par leur caractère intangible pour former l’ordre public sportif. La mise à l’écart du droit étatique au profit de l’application de ces principes, mais aussi des règlements sportifs, permet d’assurer l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique sportif. Ensuite, ces principes sont un facteur de structuration de l’ordre juridique sportif, dans la mesure où leur intervention favorise la cohérence du système. Cette structuration est le résultat de l’application de ces principes pour contrôler l’exercice par les organisations sportives de leurs compétences réglementaires et disciplinaires et pour délimiter les pouvoirs de chacune des composantes du mouvement sportif. Dans les deux cas, ces principes deviennent des standards communs qui s’imposent à l’ensemble de la communauté sportive
The Court of arbitration for sport (CAS), an arbitration body in sport disputes, passes sentences which, thanks to the practice of the precedent, get enough coherence to constitute a jurisprudence. Through this jurisprudence, CAS contributes in the erection of a global and autonomous sports legal order. This support is the result of a double contribution, normative as well as structuring. First, the pretorian rules generated by CAS and formed mainly by the general principles commonly applied by the judges, constitute a source of law within the sports legal order. Some of these principles, namely those aimed at protecting the fairness of the competitions and the fundamental rights of athletes, stand out with regards to their intangibility to form the sport public order. Discarding state law in favor of the application of these principles as well as of sport regulations, guarantees the autonomy of the sports legal order. Thereafter, these principles are considered as a structuring factor of the sports legal order, in that their intervention favors the coherence of the system. This structuring results from the application of these principles in order to monitor the practices by the sport organizations of their regulatory and disciplinary competences and also to confine the power of each of the components of the sport movement. In both cases, these principles become common standards for the whole sport community to abide by