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Journal articles on the topic 'Criminal elites'
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1
ĆUJIĆ, MIODRAG. "CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW." Kultura polisa, no. 44 (March 8, 2021): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.51738/kpolisa2021.18.1r.1.02.
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The criminal association was a criminal offense of the Joint Plan and Conspiracy, or a special form of Crime against Peace, which was highlighted as such in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In the recent practice of international criminal courts, this institute is used in a certain way, but its function is often subordinated to political abuses. By labeling certain political regimes as a “criminal association” by the so-called international political elites are provided with a wide margin of maneuver to justify their “humanitarian interventions” which are the consequence of a common criminal goal. From the middle of the 20th century until today, it is possible to identify violations of international law that occurred as a result of the activities of a criminal association, which continues with increased intensity. If the covert activities of real criminal associations continue, the main outcome will not be the achievement of world peace, but hegemony. In order to prevent this tendency, it is necessary to redefine the place of the Criminal Association in international criminal law, to point out the permanent cases of their actions, their subjects and the ways in which these same subjects avoid responsibility.
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Trejo, Guillermo, Juan Albarracín, and Lucía Tiscornia. "Breaking state impunity in post-authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 6 (September 11, 2018): 787–809. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343318793480.
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This article claims that cross-national variation in criminal violence in new democracies is highly dependent on whether elites adopt transitional justice processes to address a repressive past. State specialists in violence who repress political dissidents under authoritarian rule often play a crucial role in the operation of criminal markets and in the production of criminal violence in democracy. Some of them defect from the state to become the armed branch of criminal organizations in their deadly fights against the state and rival groups; others remain but protect criminal organizations from positions of state power; and still others use state power to fight criminals through iron-fist policies. When post-authoritarian elites adopt transitional justice processes to expose, prosecute, and punish state specialists in violence for gross human rights violations committed during the authoritarian era, they redefine the rules of state coercion and deter members of the armed forces and the police from becoming leading actors in the production of criminal violence. Using a dataset of 76 countries that transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy between 1974 and 2005, we show that the adoption of strong truth commissions is strongly associated with lower murder rates; we also find that the implementation of trials that result in guilty verdicts is associated with lower homicide rates only when the trials are jointly implemented with a strong truth commission. In contrast, amnesty laws appear to stimulate criminal violence. Our findings are particularly robust for Latin America and remain unchanged even after addressing selection effects via matching techniques.
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Liebertz, Scott. "Political Elites, Crime, and Trust in the Police in Latin America." International Criminal Justice Review 30, no. 2 (December 28, 2017): 175–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1057567717747012.
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This article examines the effect of crime on support for criminal justice systems in Latin America. Scholars empirically demonstrate a strong negative effect of crime on support for institutions and satisfaction with democracy. Others provide thick descriptions of the prevalence of creeping authoritarianism in response to crime—the infamous “mano dura” or “iron fist.” I test the effectiveness of elite political messaging across different countries. In other words, do politicians that promote “iron-fist” policies reassure their intended audience and shore up support for the police and the criminal justice system? Analyzing survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project and Wiesehomeier and Benoit’s expert survey of Latin American political party platforms, I find that elite political opinion about insecurity conditions the effect of crime victimization and fear of crime on mass support for the police and the justice system as well as on perceptions of police and justice system effectiveness. When political elites emphasize mano dura (“iron fist”) solutions, fearful citizens and victims are less critical of the police and the justice system in general.
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Heinz, John P., and Peter M. Manikas. "Networks among Elites in a Local Criminal Justice System." Law & Society Review 26, no. 4 (1992): 831. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3053820.
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Machado, Bruno Amaral, and Maria Stela Grossi Porto. "Social Representations of Homicide Investigations by Judges, Prosecutors and Police: A Case Study from the Metropolitan Area of Brasilia." International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 8, no. 1 (February 18, 2019): 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v8i1.935.
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This article examines homicide in the Metropolitan Area of Brasilia (MAB), analysing social representations from elites in the criminal justice system, including police chiefs, prosecutors and judges. It draws on the theory of social representations (TSR) to explore the imaginaries constructed around the criminal justice system’s inability to adequately investigate the rise in homicides. The representations from focus group participants highlight a lack of resources, infrastructure, equipment and human resources, as well as unsatisfactory working conditions. In seeking to understand and situate themselves in new realities and contexts, these elite criminal justice actors ultimately place themselves within the available reserve of knowledge, in which they claim that ‘nothing works’. Hence, this enables these powerful actors to justify themselves and blame others, while denying their inability to adequately investigate homicides. A hidden rationale emerges that represents the homicide victims of drug crimes and gang feuds as unworthy of investigation.
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Simon, Jonathan. "For a Human Rights Approach to Reforming the American Penal State." Journal of Human Rights Practice 11, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 346–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huz025.
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Abstract Economic arguments seem to be the most promising avenue for driving reform of America’s bloated penal state in the aftermath of mass incarceration. Raising human rights concerns has limited appeal beyond cultural elites and, on occasion, courts, but today reform is coming from elected branches. Talk of human rights for criminals, or human dignity for prisoners, can risk backlash as happened around the death penalty in the 1970s. This essay challenges this conventional account in three ways. First, I argue that historical conditions make the potential for backlash limited. Second, that economic arguments will always be limited by the political and institutional frameworks that define the current meanings of criminal justice; only a human rights approach can drive a truly abolitionist reform agenda, one aimed at rethinking the institutions themselves, not just their budgets. Third, human rights campaigns can, if properly conceived, expand the constituency for deep criminal justice reform.
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Petrunov, Georgi. "Organized Crime and Social Transformation in Bulgaria." European Journal of Sociology 47, no. 2 (August 2006): 297–325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003975606000105.
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The article is focused on one specific aspect of organized crime during the period of social transformation of Bulgarian society. It views the capacity of organized crime to offer additional power resources and encouragement for the political elite, whose power and domination have been threatened by the changes. The analysis is based on the thesis that to sustain and to strengthen their power and domination the elites have applied the strategy of increased secrecy and informality of power sources and of the means of their exertion via the establishment and control of criminal structures. The applied research methods include participant observation, in-depth interviews and document analysis.
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Landau, Simha F., Leslie Sebba, and David L. Weisbu. "Senior Public Figure Offenders and the Criminal Justice System: The Public's Perception." Israel Law Review 35, no. 2-3 (2001): 354–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700012243.
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Public attention is increasingly being focused on law enforcement practices with regard to senior public figures suspected of committing crimes. Indeed, it is only natural for special sensitivity to be shown in relation to the behavior of public figures in general, and senior public figures in particular. Their authority, social connections, and access to material and other state or public resources, locating them with the “power elite” — or at least the “sub-elites”1— provide them with unusual power in modern society. It could even be argued that their position contains a “constant structural temptation” for misuse or abuse of this power. Even if public figures are believed to be honest and of impeccable character, it is clear that they have opportunities for abuse of their authority that must be taken into account by law enforcement agencies. Moreover, public trust is an important asset on the part of public figures and civil servants. Accordingly, it might be argued that the criminal justice system should perceive breaches of this trust as more severe than similar offenses committed by private citizens.
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Austen, Ralph A. "Criminals and the african cultural imagination: normative and deviant heroism in pre-colonial and modern narratives." Africa 56, no. 4 (October 1986): 385–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1159996.
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Opening ParagraphIn a previous essay (Austen, 1986a) I attempted to trace a particular type of deviant hero in African history and culture: a ‘social bandit’ or criminal figure identified in the popular imagination with resistance against alien or indigenous oppressive elites. The search proved frustrating within its original terms of reference but it did suggest an alternative paradigm for identifying the entire relationship between cultural norms and criminal behaviour in Africa. The present article attempts to develop this paradigm through the analysis of six African narratives dealing with heroic and/or anti-heroic figures in a variety of contexts.
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Alvarez, Marcos César, and Fernando Salla. "Os novos contornos do bacharelismo liberal: uma análise da trajetória de Candido Motta (1870–1942)." Política & Sociedade 17, no. 39 (November 29, 2018): 86–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-7984.2017v17n39p86.
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A proposta do artigo consiste em analisar alguns aspectos da atuação intelectual e política de membros das elites jurídicas brasileiras na Primeira República (1889–1930), nos quadros do assim chamado bacharelismo liberal. A Antropologia Criminal ou Nova Escola Penal pretendeu inovar no campo tanto do Direito quanto da Medicina no período, o que permitiu a projeção intelectual e política de alguns médicos e juristas defensores dessa “escola”. Apresentamos aqui a trajetória de Candido Motta que, além de contar com relações de pertencimento às elites, conseguiu se projetar como intelectual, professor da Faculdade de Direito em São Paulo e, sobretudo, como político, a partir da condição de um dos principais defensores e disseminadores da Nova Escola Penal em São Paulo.
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Kapitsa, L. M. "SHADOW GLOBALIZATION." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 3(36) (June 28, 2014): 69–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-3-36-69-81.
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The article reviews some development trends brought about by globalization, particularly, a growing tax evasion and tax avoidance, an expansion of illicit financial flows and the proliferation of a global criminal network. The author draws attention to some new phenomena, particularly, cosmopolitanization of some parts of national elites and a deepening divide between national interests and the private interests of elites as a consequence of financial globalization. Modern mass media, both Russian and foreign, tend to interpret globalization processes exclusively from the position of conformism, and for some of the researchers globalization became the "sacred cow", which one may only worship. Critical analysis of the processes associated with globalization is given a hostile reception. In response to criticism of globalization, one can hear the very same argument: "globalization in inevitable!" Such a state of affairs, the very least, causes perplexity. Some of the world development trends been observed over the past years raise serious concerns about the security and welfare of the peoples of the world. One of such trends has been the globalization of shadow economic activities. Methods of fight against the criminal economy been applied in international practice can be grouped into: 1) punitive enforcement (or criminal-legal) methods) and 2) socio-economic methods. As the results of various research works evidence punitive enforcement methods not supported by socio-economic measures not effective enough. Toughening the control over criminal economic activities in the absence of preventive and corrective actions aiming to neutralize institutional, social and other stimuli facilitating criminalization of economic activities can result in large losses of financial assets in the form of mass capital flight
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Putra, David Aprizon. "IMPLIKASI POLITIK PENEGAKAN HUKUM PIDANA DALAM UNDANG-UNDANG NOMOR 32 TAHUN 2009TENTANG PERLINDUNGAN DAN PENGELOLAAN LINGKUNGAN HIDUP TERHADAP UPAYA PENEGAKAN HUKUM LINGKUNGAN HIDUP." AL IMARAH : JURNAL PEMERINTAHAN DAN POLITIK ISLAM 3, no. 1 (July 1, 2018): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/imr.v3i1.2144.
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Abstract: Since 1982 in Law Number 4 of 1982 concerning Environmental Management Principles which was later amended in 1997 to become Law Number 27 of 1997 concerning Environmental Management, legal politics regarding criminal law policy has been carried out. Law Number 32 of 2009 concerning Protection and Management of the Environment (UUPPLH) as the latest generation, has included criminal provisions in Chapter XV, which consists of 23 articles. The results of the study show that criminal law enforcement against formal offenses has a special procedural law, because it relates to the principle of ultimum remedium, meaning that the use of criminal law against formal offenses must wait until administrative law enforcement is declared ineffective. In order to avoid difficulties in enforcing environmental law that is sometimes used by certain elites to seek profits by looking at the gap in the weak regulations in the laws and regulations, the legislation, especially regarding formal law, must be clearly arranged, firm, not multiple interpretations.Keywords: Politic Criminal Law Enforcement, Environmental Law Enforcement
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HAMILTON, TOM. "A SODOMY SCANDAL ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH WARS OF RELIGION." Historical Journal 64, no. 4 (January 25, 2021): 844–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x20000564.
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AbstractThis article uncovers a sodomy scandal that took place in the Benedictine abbey of Morigny, on the eve of the French Wars of Religion, in order to tackle an apparently simple yet persistent question in the history of early modern criminal justice. Why, despite all of the formal and informal obstacles in their way, did plaintiffs bring charges before a criminal court in this period? The article investigates the sodomy scandal that led to the conviction and public execution of the abbey's porter Pierre Logerie, known as ‘the gendarme of Morigny’, and situates it in the wider patterns of criminal justice as well as the developing spiritual crisis of the civil wars during the mid-sixteenth century. Overall, this article demonstrates how criminal justice in this period could prove useful to plaintiffs in resolving their disputes, even in crimes as scandalous and difficult to articulate as sodomy, but only when the interests of local elites strongly aligned with those of the criminal courts where the plaintiffs sought justice.
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Jessee, Erin. "Rwandan Women No More." Conflict and Society 1, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 60–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2015.010106.
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Since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the current government has arrested approximately 130,000 civilians who were suspected of criminal responsibility. An estimated 2,000 were women, a cohort that remains rarely researched through an ethnographic lens. This article begins to address this oversight by analyzing ethnographic encounters with 8 confessed or convicted female génocidaires from around Rwanda. These encounters reveal that female génocidaires believe they endure gender-based discrimination for having violated taboos that determine appropriate conduct for Rwandan women. However, only female génocidaires with minimal education, wealth, and social capital referenced this gender-based discrimination to minimize their crimes and assert claims of victimization. Conversely, female elites who helped incite the genocide framed their victimization in terms of political betrayal and victor’s justice. This difference is likely informed by the female elites’ participation in the political processes that made the genocide possible, as well as historical precedence for leniency where female elites are concerned.
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Lamarque, Hugh. "Profitable inefficiency: the politics of port infrastructure in Mombasa, Kenya." Journal of Modern African Studies 57, no. 1 (March 2019): 85–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x18000630.
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AbstractThis article examines the distribution of power among public, private and criminal interests invested in Mombasa port. It approaches Kenya as a gatekeeper state, in which national elites compete to control the country's points of interaction with the rest of the world. Mombasa's controversial private dry ports are used to highlight (1) how the opportunity to profit from inefficiencies in container storage has been distributed among the political elite, and (2) how the development of the country's principal seaport not only reflects Kenya's underlying political settlements, but is one of the key sites in which those settlements are tested and reshaped. The case exposes a dynamic interaction between Kenya's shifting political settlement on the one hand, and the gate itself – Mombasa port's physical infrastructure and regulations – on the other.
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Kiyani, Asad G. "Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law." AJIL Unbound 109 (2015): 255–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2398772300001550.
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A pattern of affording impunity to local power brokers throughout Africa pervades the application of international criminal law (ICL) in Africa. The International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into Uganda is a notorious but representative example, although similar analyses can be made of the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Libya. In Uganda, only members of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have been indicted for international crimes, even though the United Nations, international human rights groups, and local NGOs have documented years of abuses perpetrated by government troops and local auxiliary units, often against the same populations victimized by the LRA. The ICC is thereby implicated in the power structures and political arrangements of a repressive state that both combats the LRA and often brutalizes the civilian populations of northern Uganda. Inserting itself into Uganda, the ICC becomes a partisan player in the endgame of a civil war that extends back over a generation, and is itself rooted in ethnic and tribal animosities cultivated through 19th century Euro-colonial benedictions of favor. Here, the ICC and the war it adjudicates become surprising bedfellows, repurposed by local elites for the consolidation of domestic power.
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Tiemessen, Alana. "The International Criminal Court and the lawfare of judicial intervention." International Relations 30, no. 4 (July 27, 2016): 409–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117815601201.
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The contentious concept of ‘lawfare’ has proliferated to various foreign policy areas and permeated a discourse on the function and legitimacy of law in conflict. The concept seems particularly apt to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) judicial interventions. In this context, I define lawfare as the coercive and strategic element of international criminal justice in which the ICC’s judicial interventions are used as a tool of lawfare for States Parties and the United Nations Security Council to pursue political ends. I argue that there are two types of political ends being pursued with this lawfare: conflict resolution and politicized prosecutions. First, the ICC’s spokespersons, advocates, and supporting states have cultivated a discourse that justice is a means to peace. As a result, the ICC has been used as a means of intervention in ongoing conflicts with the expectation that the indictments, arrests, and trials of elite perpetrators have deterrence and preventive effects for atrocity crimes. Despite these legitimate intentions and great expectations, there is little evidence of the efficacy of justice as a means to peace. Second, the other manifestation of lawfare represents an abuse or manipulation of the ICC for political gain. Specifically, States Parties have strategically referred their conflict situations to the ICC with the expectation that the referral will result in the removal of their rivals and sanction the impunity of ruling elites. This politicization of international justice has been successful in that most of the ICC’s prosecutions are unjustly one sided. Evidence of politicized prosecutions has damaged the ICC’s credibility as an impartial institution and raises questions about the desirability of state referrals. Consequently, the ICC’s efficacy and credibility are suffering from lawfare.
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Boyle, Michael Shane. "The Criminalization of Dissent: Protest Violence, Activist Performance, and the Curious Case of the VolxTheaterKarawane in Genoa." TDR/The Drama Review 55, no. 4 (December 2011): 113–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/dram_a_00126.
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The arrest of the activist performance collective the VolxTheaterKarawane concretely reveals the discourse of criminalization state authorities used to brutally suppress dissent at the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, Italy. It is one example of the increasingly common strategy of political elites who promote the perception of political protest as a criminal act, a misapprehension that has profound consequences for the future of democracy and dissent in late capitalism.
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Smith, Chris M. "Exogenous Shocks, the Criminal Elite, and Increasing Gender Inequality in Chicago Organized Crime." American Sociological Review 85, no. 5 (August 24, 2020): 895–923. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003122420948510.
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Criminal organizations, like legitimate organizations, adapt to shifts in markets, competition, regulations, and enforcement. Exogenous shocks can be consequential moments of power consolidation, resource hoarding, and inequality amplification in legitimate organizations, but especially in criminal organizations. This research examines how the exogenous shock of the U.S. prohibition of the production, transportation, and sale of alcohol in 1920 restructured power and inequality in Chicago organized crime. I analyze a unique relational database on organized crime from the early 1900s via a criminal network that tripled in size and centralized during Prohibition. Before Prohibition, Chicago organized crime was small, decentralized, and somewhat inclusive of women at the margins. However, during Prohibition, the organized crime network grew, consolidated the organizational elites, and left out the most vulnerable participants from the most profitable opportunities. This historical case illuminates how profits and organizational restructuring outside of (or in response to) regulatory environments can displace people at the margins.
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Milewski, Melissa. "Reframing Black Southerners’ Experiences in the Courts, 1865–1950." Law & Social Inquiry 44, no. 4 (May 27, 2019): 1113–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lsi.2019.5.
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In civil cases that took place in southern courts from the end of the Civil War to the mid-twentieth century, black men and women frequently chose to bring litigation and then negotiated the white-dominated legal system to shape their cases and assert rights. In some ways, these civil cases were diametrically opposite from the criminal cases of black defendants who did not choose to enter a courtroom and often received unequal justice. However, this article draws on almost 2,000 cases involving black litigants in eight state supreme courts across the South between 1865 to 1950 to argue that in both civil and criminal cases African Americans were at times shaping their cases and fighting for their rights, as well as obtaining decisions that aligned with the interests of white elites. Southern state courts during the era of Jim Crow were thus spaces for negotiating for rights and sites of white domination, in both criminal and civil cases.
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Aspan, Zulkifli, and Wiwin Suwandi. "Menjerat Kader, Melepas Partai Politik; Pertanggungjawaban Pidana Partai Politik Dalam Kasus Tindak Pidana Korupsi." Al-Adalah: Jurnal Hukum dan Politik Islam 5, no. 1 (April 30, 2020): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.35673/ajmpi.v5i1.677.
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Amid the resounding steps of the KPK to carry out the law enforcement function of eradicating Corruption, there are still things that feel stagnant. The KPK does not or has not dared to ensnare political parties in corrupt criminal liability, using corruption laws. In each case with dimensions of political corruption, the KPK only ensnares party elites, but does not at the same time demand criminal liability from political parties. In fact, in several cases investigated, the flow of funds flowed into political parties. As a special offense, revising the Corruption Law, by entering the phrase "legal entity", in addition to the phrase "everyone" is needed to find, or build a channel to ensnare political parties in corruption criminal liability. accompanied by state losses and fines. Administrative sanctions can also be applied through freezing through the Kemenkumham or the dissolution of these political parties through the Constitutional Court's path when the KPK's charges and demands can be proven.
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Kimble, Sara L. "Of “Masculine Tyranny” and the “Women's Jury”: The Gender Politics of Jury Service in Third Republic France." Law and History Review 37, no. 4 (September 24, 2019): 867–902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248019000324.
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In belle époque France, criminal juries were criticized as too tolerant of crime and too lenient to effectively punish criminals. While the French institution of the jury was under attack by magistrates and other elites, mixed sex juries provided an alternative model. Jury reformers advocated the introduction of mixed-sex criminal juries in France in order to render better verdicts and reduce crime, especially in the areas of infanticide and abortion. The French National Assembly debates over proposed legislation, however, stalled over political concerns with women's truncated citizenship rights. Historical analysis of the types of arguments deployed in this jury reform debate (including archival documents, parliamentary records, and press sources) reveals that reform proponents argued that gender difference-especially in terms of morality and psychology-justified women's admission to juries, particularly in cases of infanticide and abortion. The operation of an unofficial “women's jury” (jury féminin) between 1905 and 1910 in Paris demonstrated women's judicial decision-making capacity. Analysis of this citizens' jury documents the development of a feminist critique of the legal treatment of domestic violence, reproductive freedom, and marriage law publicized in the early twentieth century. This research contribution posits grounds for the re-periodization of feminist legal history as viewed through this case study of women's claims to jury service in Third Republic France.
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Tankebe, Justice, Susanne Karstedt, and Sarah Adu-Poku. "Corruption Intentions Among Prospective Elites in Ghana: An Economy of Esteem." International Criminal Justice Review 29, no. 2 (October 3, 2018): 168–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1057567718799827.
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Besides its multiple harms, corruption undermines the rule of law and impedes the effective functioning of criminal justice institutions. It involves both elites in bending rules and laws as well as police at the bottom of the hierarchy asking for bribes. We analyze corruption intentions within the framework of Brennan and Pettit’s “economy of esteem,” using three main conceptual frameworks: attachment to kinship groups, materialistic orientations, and deterrence. We draw on data from a survey of 530 university students in Ghana to examine predictors of corruption intentions of prospective elites. Our prospective elites were more inclined to resort to influence peddling rather than to pay bribes directly. We find that attitudinal patterns indicative of esteem predict intentions to engage in corrupt exchanges across different agencies and contexts—police, procurement for government, and abuse of power—as well as different types of action, whether bribe payment or nepotism. In contrast, citizenly pride (and self-esteem) motivates integrity across all types of corrupt exchange. Deterrence, in terms of certainty, had a more consistently negative impact on intentions to engage in nepotism than in bribe paying and acceptance, with public procurement being the exception; no effect was found for stigma, and only police nepotism was an exception to the otherwise non-significant effects of severity.
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Cruz, José Miguel. "Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State." Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 04 (2011): 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00132.x.
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AbstractWhy does Nicaragua have less violent crime than Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras? All these countries underwent political transitions in the 1990s. Many explanations point to the legacies of war, socioeconomic underdevelopment, and neoliberal structural reforms. However, these arguments do not fully explain why, despite economic reforms conducted throughout the region, war-less Honduras and wealthier Guatemala and El Salvador have much more crime than Nicaragua. This article argues that public security reforms carried out during the political transitions shaped the ability of the new regimes to control the violence produced by their own institutions and collaborators. In the analysis of the crisis of public security, it is important to bring the state back. The survival of violent entrepreneurs in the new security apparatus and their relationship with new governing elites foster the conditions for the escalation of violence in northern Central America.
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Putra, David Aprizon. "IMPLIKASI POLITIK KEBIJAKAN HUKUM PIDANA DALAM UUPLH." Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum LEGALITY 25, no. 2 (July 14, 2018): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/jihl.v25i2.5998.
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Political Law is one of the discourses that control the existence of law.One of the realm of law that has recently received the spotlight and serious attention. Particularly related to the legal political option is the environment law that increasingly strong day include criminal law enforcement in law enforcement. There are some weak things that then have negative implications, against the enforcement of environmental laws related to the lack of cautious political choice. Since 1982 in Law No. 4 of 1982 on the Principles of Environmental Management which was changed in 1997 into Law No. 27 of 1997 on Environmental Management, the legal politics of criminal law policy has been conducted, that the criminal law policy in the realm of the environment is already a choice of legal politics in the realm of environmental law. Law Number 32 Year 2009 About PPLH as the latest generation, adds Chapter XV of the Criminal Code in its charge of 23 Articles. Law Number 32 Year 2009 contains a much more complete criminal provision than Law Number 23 Year 1997. Although there is still much to be fixed on the provisions of Law Number 32 Year 2009. Base on research shows that there are special procedural laws that regulate formal law enforcement. It is based on the principle of ultimum remedium which means that the implementation of the criminal law must wait until the effectiveness of administrative law is upheld. To minimize obstacles in enforcing environmental laws which are sometimes used by political elites to seek profit, formal laws against environmental crimes should be set up specifically with the Act.
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Parmentier, Stephan, Marta Valiñas, and Elmar Weitekamp. "Restoring justice in Serbia: Reconciliation and restorative justice in a post-war context." Temida 13, no. 1 (2010): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/tem1001023p.
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The debate on how to deal with the past in Serbia is an ongoing one. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia and national criminal justice mechanisms have played an important role in prosecuting offenders. Other transitional justice approaches continue to be discussed. All in all, the Yugoslav and the Serbian cases are similar to other debates about 'dealing with the past' or 'transitional justice', as they are taking place between elites, political, economic, and within civil society, both in the country concerned and at the international level. Likewise the views and expectations of the local populations in any given country are very rarely taken into account. In this paper findings of a population-based research carried out by our research team in Serbia in 2007 are presented. The research was done by means of a quantitative survey across the country on several issues of post-conflict justice, including truth seeking, accountability, reparation for victims and reconciliation.
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Kingston-Mann, Esther. "The return of Pierre Proudhon." Focaal 2006, no. 48 (December 1, 2006): 118–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/092012906780646406.
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This essay in comparative history considers how governing elites and rural publics have interpreted rules of law and criminal behavior in times of radical tenure transformation. During the twentieth century, Russians experienced three state-sponsored attempts at property rights revolution: firstly, the pre-1917 Stolypin Reforms to privatize the ubiquitous peasant communes, secondly, Stalin’s 1930s campaign to forcibly collectivized peasant communes, and thirdly, the 1990s ‘shock therapy’ reforms to replace Soviet collectivism with wholesale privatization. In each case, adherents of the pre-existing property systems were excluded from the decision-making process that established the new one. Russia’s historical experience is viewed in light of the contested emergence of private property regimes during England’s enclosure movement, and during the nineteenth-century Euro- pean settler appropriation of American Indian land as private property—with African-born plantation workers also later claimed as private property. In some cases, resistance was viewed as criminal; in others, it was punishable as treason.
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Denysenko, Vadym. "GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION RELATIONS IN UKRAINE, 2010–2013." Problems of humanities. History, no. 6/48 (April 27, 2021): 408–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.24919/2312-2595.6/48.228528.
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Summary. The research aims at defining the key methods Yanukovych’s regime applied to fight the opposition parties and their top leaders. The research methodology is based on historicism and objectivity principles, comprises general scientific (analysis, synthesis, comparison) as well as specified historic methods (those of diachrony, synchrony, historical genesis and retrospective). The article’s scientific novelty is determined by a system analysis of the methods Yanukovych’s retinue applied against his political opponents highlighting their role in building up the fourth President of Ukraine’s authoritarian rule. Conclusions. The specificity of Ukraine’s political and legislative climate under Yanukovych’s rule has been demonstrated. The patterns of the criminal proceedings against the opposition leaders have been defined and researched. The criminal prosecution against Yuliya Tymoshenko, the Preimer and the leader of Batkivshchyna party, following her government’s management audit, serves as a case of Ukraine’s political field’s prime cleanup. The key phases of the criminal prosecution against Yurii Lutsenko, the Orange Top leader, have been defined. The political repressions of more than twenty Tymoshenko’s supporters, the article suggests, serves as a background for preparing and implementing the tax overhaul project authored by V. Yanukovych and S. Tigipko. The fundamentals of this reform, as well as its reception by Ukrainian business elite, have been analyzed in brief to provide the necessary context, i.e., to demonstrate the roles the agents affiliated with the Regions Party had taken and the methods they applied to break the so-called Tax Maidan and to subsequently persecute its organizers and participants. Specific attention has been paid to the fight Yanukovych’s regime initiated against the radical right and nationalist movement, forging the criminal cases against the members of certain nationalist organizations and movements functioning in Zaporizhzhya and Kyiv regions, i.e., "Tryzub" ("The Trident"), "Ukraine’s Patriot", "Social National Assembly". Restraining the forces opposite to the Regions Party and the regime was done through bribing or granting governmental preferences to the business elites. The secret ledgers of the Regions Party serve as an important source for identifying the officials thus corrupted by the regime. To define the corruption scales and the key bribery initiators identities, a thorough analysis of these ledgers (known as "the spreadsheets") has been provided.
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Elmir, Cládio Pereira. ""A noite dos desesperados": motim no Presídio Central em Porto Alegre." Anos 90 12, no. 21 (January 1, 2005): 535–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.22456/1983-201x.6383.
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Ao descrever a intensa cobertura jornalística realizada sobre um motim ocorrido em Porto Alegre em julho de 1994, o trabalho pretende discutir as contradições e ambigüidades que constituem o discurso sobre o crime e demonstrar as relações desiguais que são estabelecidas entre criminosos, policiais, deputados, elites, jornalistas, o poder executivo estadual, as vítimas e a cidade. Em suma, o artigo intenta realizar a compreensão da lógica que preside a relação entre uma manifestação criminal e a sua veiculação no jornalismo impresso; fugindo esta da mera descrição informativa dos fatos, na medida em que a subjetividade é uma das principais características a regular a construção do texto jornalístico.
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Guzina, Dejan, and Branka Marijan. "Local Uses of International Criminal Justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Transcending Divisions or Building Parallel Worlds?" Studies in Social Justice 7, no. 2 (June 21, 2013): 245–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.26522/ssj.v7i2.1046.
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Transitionaljustice mechanisms and the International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia (ICTY) have had only a limited success in overcoming ethnic divisionsin Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather than elaborating upon the role of local politicalelites in perpetuating ethnic divisions, we examine ordinary peoples’ popularperceptions of war and its aftermath. In our view, the idea that elites havecomplete control over the broader narratives about the past is misplaced. Weargue that transitional justice and peace mechanisms supported by externalactors are always interpreted on the ground in context-specific ways, creatingdifferent citizens’ experiences, “memories” of the war, and their respectivehopes and disappointments in regards to the relationship between peace andjustice in Bosnia. We suggest that analyses of the post-conflict developments inBosnia-Herzegovina must take into account what gives the narratives ofexclusion their power, and what are the objective political, social andeconomic constraints that continue to provide a fertile ground for theirwidespread support.
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Kelly, Robert J., Rufus Schatzberg, and Patrick J. Ryan. "Primitive Capitalist Accumulation: Russia as a Racket." Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 11, no. 4 (December 1995): 257–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/104398629501100406.
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The function and structure of Sicilian institutions provide an historical lesson in how and why the Mafia flourished to the extent that attempts to imprison its leadership have threatened the stability of the very government that is tolling its death knell. Extrapolating from that experience, the work of Follain, Jousten, Varese and others provide the authors with a theoretical framework for understanding the dependency between the liberal democratic system being introduced in Russia today and the current mafia activity in that country. Crime, be it “organized” or not, is not new to Russia. Until ther breakup of the Republics, Western researchers knew little of its nature or its scope. Should the violence associated with Russian crime continue it may overwhelm the entire society or we may see an alliance of wealthy elites and multi-layered criminal conspiracies justaposed but miles apart from the non-criminal, “ordinary” citizens. The authors proffer from their experience in and with Russia several predictions for the future of this new mafia, indeed, for the future of Russian society.
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Telford, Mark, and Sotirios Santatzoglou. "‘It was about trust’– Practitioners as policy makers and the improvement of inter-professional communication within the 1980s youth justice process." Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (March 2012): 58–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2011.00209.x.
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The study of criminal justice policy making is generally approached from the perspective of structural variables (eg social, cultural or economic), or, if inclined towards agency-led approaches, on the policy making activities of ‘elites’. The potential of practitioners to shape policy has been relatively neglected. This paper explores a striking example of practitioner-led criminal justice policy transformation: the decline in the use of custody for juveniles in England and Wales in the 1980s. The focus of the study is on the communicative origins of a philosophical turnaround in youth justice localities through the empowerment of youth justice practitioners. Drawing on empirical sources (including reflective interviews with key participant-observers) the paper explores, in depth, the occurrence and the meaning of local structural transformations. It is argued that the emergence of trust relations between participants in local youth justice processes was the key development behind the transformation of the state of penal culture towards one of ‘communicative rationality’ which, in turn, enabled the dramatic reduction in the use of custody. It is suggested that proponents of more moderate penal policy could draw valuable lessons from this episode.
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KOTECHA, BIRJU. "The Art of Rhetoric: Perceptions of the International Criminal Court and Legalism." Leiden Journal of International Law 31, no. 4 (September 19, 2018): 939–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156518000419.
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AbstractPerceptions of the International Criminal Court have undergone a deep malaise, particularly on the African continent. The frequent target of these perceptions is the Court’s Office of the Prosecutor; its prosecutorial selections have generated the most trenchant criticism of bias. These perceptions, often amplified by political elites and hostile media coverage, risk damaging the Court’s perceived legitimacy among its most essential audience: affected communities. These communities are crucial to the achievement of the Court’s goals, and are those within which justice must be seen to be done. In this light, this article conducts an analysis of the Office’s rhetoric and its ability to persuade affected communities that the Court is politically independent. The article outlines how the Office’s public communications express a key message of legalism; a belief in technical rule-compliance and in law’s superiority to politics. Using a classic Aristotelian framework, I argue that legalism lacks persuasiveness; it makes a weak appeal to the Prosecutor’s reputation, has a limited appeal in eliciting emotional support, and, is not a sufficiently logical explanation of the Court’s independence. In summary, legalism is a weak tactic of legitimation and a well-worn progress narrative. The article’s analysis has implications for other international institutions and the rhetoric they adopt to legitimate their independence. More specifically, the article concludes with recommendations that can help the Office reflect on its rhetoric and thus, develop a meaningful dialogue to those comm unities that are the Court’s raison d’être.
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Dantas, Monica Duarte. "O Código do Processo Criminal e a Reforma de 1841: Dois Modelos de Organização dos Poderes." História do Direito 1, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/hd.v1i1.78722.
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Em 1842, parte das elites de São Paulo e Minas Gerais pegou em armas contra as chamadas reformas conservadoras, com destaque para a Lei de 3 de dezembro de 1841 que reformava o Código de Processo Criminal de 1832. A se considerar os documentos produzidos à época, a referida reforma tinha papel central no descontentamento dos rebeldes. Dado o ineditismo de um movimento armado contra um diploma que alterava normativas atinentes à organização judiciária e à ordem do processo, o presente texto visa a discutir as inovações trazidas pelo projeto de Código elaborado pelos deputados em 1831, profundamente emendado pelos senadores ao longo de um ano, sancionado em 29 de novembro de 1832 e que, passados nove anos, foi objeto de uma reforma que trazia importantes alterações no edifício jurídico construído em inícios da década anterior. Mediante a análise dos diplomas e, claro, das alterações propostas e efetivadas ao longo desse período, defendemos que a Reforma de 1841 implicou muito mais do que uma simples centralização do Judiciário, impondo, em verdade, uma nova forma de relação entre os poderes constituídos.
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Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. "And Justice for Some: Race, Crime, and Punishment in the US Criminal Justice System." Canadian Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (May 28, 2010): 457–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423910000120.
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Abstract. Criminal justice policy in the US has long been exceedingly responsive to public opinion. Unfortunately, public attitudes towards justice in the US are severely bifurcated along racial lines, such that Whites see a system that is “colour-blind” and Blacks perceive one that is severely biased against them. In this paper, we explore the magnitude of this racial cleavage and, more importantly, demonstrate how it impacts differential reactions to events (such as accusations of police brutality) and policies (such as capital punishment) in the justice domain. To the degree that elites base policies on (mainly White) majority preferences, such policies are unlikely to be responsive to the racial discrimination that is a part of the current criminal justice environment.Résumé. La politique pénale aux États-Unis répond énormément à l'opinion publique. Malheureusement, les positions populaires envers la justice américaine sont radicalement divisées suivant l'appartenance raciale. Aux yeux des Blancs, le système est essentiellement neutre envers les groupes raciaux différents, mais les Noirs le perçoivent comme étant fortement entaché de discrimination contre eux. Dans cet article, nous considérons l'étendue de cet écart racial et, surtout, nous démontrons comment ces perceptions entraînent des réactions différentes envers les événements (comme les accusations de brutalité policière) et envers les politiques publiques (comme la peine capitale) dans le domaine de la justice. Dans la mesure où les élites fondent les politiques sur les préférences de la majorité (surtout blanche), il est peu probable que ces politiques puissent remédier à la discrimination raciale qui fait partie du système pénal actuel.
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Hitchcock, David. "“Punishment Is All the Charity that the Law Affordeth Them”: Penal Transportation, Vagrancy, and the Charitable Impulse in the British Atlantic, c.1600-1750." New Global Studies 12, no. 2 (August 28, 2018): 195–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2018-0029.
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Abstract This article examines the policy of penal transportation to the colonies which underpinned the first British Empire in the Atlantic. It argues that the transportation and indenture of the criminal poor came to be justified by empire’s architects as a charitable reprieve from a life course of decaying indigence and idleness. “Charity” of this nature serviced the needs of the British imperial state and its elites, particularly the need for the malleable biopower of indentured labor, but also the demand for increasingly rigorous carceral control. Transportation also created a clear distinction between the poor so reprieved and those still deserving of traditional relief at home. The article names these justifying discourses of judicial punishment-as-charity as “welfare colonialism.” We might view this regime as an early forerunner of the terrible paternalisms of “philanthrocapitalism,” and its operation as fundamental to the first British “Empire of Charity.”
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Evans, Allison D., and Rudra Sil. "The Dynamics of Labor Militancy in the Extractive Sector: Kazakhstan’s Oilfields and South Africa’s Platinum Mines in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 6 (October 16, 2019): 992–1024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414019879715.
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This article investigates why, in two very different regimes, similarly high levels of labor militancy are evident in Kazakhstan’s oilfields and South Africa’s platinum belt. It also explores the common dynamics leading up to the massacres at Zhanaozen (2011) and Marikana (2012). The hypothesis-generating most different systems comparison highlights the challenges of labor relations where extraction at fixed sites combines with volatile prices and shareholder pressures in a globalized economy to raise the stakes for business, labor, and state. Also significant are blockages in existing channels for bargaining linked to quiescent unions. These jointly necessary conditions account for increased militancy in extractive industries in Kazakhstan and South Africa. To account for the Zhanaozen and Marikana massacres, timing and sequence are considered. Both standoffs came later in the strike wave, prompting impatient state and business elites to criticize the protests as “criminal” acts, and priming security personnel to employ violent repression.
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Kim, Hun Joon. "Structural determinants of human rights prosecutions after democratic transition." Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 2 (March 2012): 305–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343311431600.
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Over the last three decades, a growing number of countries have experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democracy, and the new governments have been increasingly expected to address past human rights violations. While the academic literature on the impact of human rights prosecution is relatively well developed, the literature on the causes of such prosecution is still sparse. Why do states pursue criminal prosecutions against former state officials on the charge of human rights violations? This article answers this question by testing three key theories: the balance of power between old and new elites, transnational advocacy networks, and the diffusion theory. I conduct a cross-national study of 71 countries that were in a state of democratic transitions between 1980 and 2006, using a new dataset on domestic human rights prosecutions. I find strong evidence to support the transnational advocacy networks and diffusion explanations. First, active domestic and international human rights advocacy for individual criminal accountability is a key factor guaranteeing persistent and frequent human rights prosecutions. My study further shows that domestic advocacy plays a crucial role in criminal prosecutions of high-profile state officials while international pressure is more effective in promoting prosecutions of low-profile officials. Second, the diffusion theory is also supported since the occurrence of human rights prosecution in neighboring countries is a relevant factor. Interestingly, transitional countries are most sensitive to trials occurring in culturally or linguistically similar countries and this supports the constructivist norm diffusion theory, which focuses on the role of identity and communication in the diffusion process. However, I find that the power balance explanation, which has been the prevailing explanation, is valid only for the immediate use of human rights prosecutions.
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Naseer, Noreen. "Law, Rights, and the Colonial Administrative System: A Critical Note on the Frontier Crimes Regulation (1901) in the FATA, Pakistan." Review of Human Rights 1, no. 1 (December 15, 2015): 24–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.35994/rhr.v1i1.70.
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With these regulations, the colonial administration consolidated the long-term basis of their power and institutionalised an oppressive administrative-judicial system. For this purpose they also engaged local elites and customs. The administrative-judicial system introduced on the Northwestern border was different from the criminal and civil laws introduced elsewhere in British India. In 1947, when British colonial governance ended and the tribal areas became part of Pakistan, the oppressive colonial system of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) continued. It is still in force to the present day. In this article, I discuss the control structure of the administrative-judicial system that was imposed through these crime regulations in the FATA. I argue that these regulations are against fundamental rights prescribed in Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973 and the UN Human Rights Charter. I also highlight the plight of tribal people suffering politically, socially, and economically due to these undemocratic and discriminatory regulations, which are unduly unjustified and defended by a group of people with vested interests.
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Tanjevic, Natasa. "Society as a victim of bearers of economic and political power." Temida 14, no. 2 (2011): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/tem1102023t.
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In the transition countries, politics and economics are so connected and interrelated that many individuals who take high governmental positions or who have economic power abuse their status in order to make huge profits and commit criminal acts without impunity. The aim of this paper is to indicate the basic characteristics of this kind of crime and its negative consequences to the society as a whole. The abuse of economic and political power results in increasing economic inequalities, decreasing chances of entering foreign direct investments, and falling economic growth. Besides, this contributes to creating fertile soil for populism and supporting political elites that are not committed to building rule of law, stable democratic society and fair market economy. As a result, citizens? confidence in the state and its institutions weakens, while the normative system of values in the society is jeopardized. In this way, the society becomes the victim of irresponsible individuals, and of those who abuse their economic and social power.
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Pingree, Raymond J., Martina Santia, Kirill Bryanov, and Brian K. Watson. "Restoring trust in truth-seekers: Effects of op/eds defending journalism and justice." PLOS ONE 16, no. 5 (May 21, 2021): e0251284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0251284.
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A healthy democracy requires trust that people can be impartial in important truth-seeking institutions including journalism, justice, and science. Recently some U.S. elites have adopted alarmingly extreme rhetoric against truth-seekers, denouncing mainstream journalism as fake news, criminal investigations as partisan witch-hunts, climate science as a hoax, and career civil servants as a deep state conspiracy. In response, some news organizations have taken the unusual step of publishing op/eds defending these institutions. Two experiments tested effects of such op/eds. In study 1, participants spent twelve days using a purpose-built news portal containing real, timely news with random assignment to the availability of real, timely op/eds defending impartiality of truth-seekers. These op/eds increased trust in truth-seeking institutions and increased the belief that people can serve as impartial professionals. Study 2 replicated this with a laboratory experiment assigning video op/ed exposure instead of text op/ed availability while adding several outcomes.
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McCoy, Alfred W. "Covert Netherworld: An Invisible Interstice in the Modern World System." Comparative Studies in Society and History 58, no. 4 (September 27, 2016): 847–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417516000451.
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AbstractThis essay explores a domain of geopolitical conflict called “covert netherworld” that has been a seminal in world politics for the past half century and likely to become more central in the century to come. During the Cold War and its aftermath, covert netherworlds formed worldwide through confluence of four essential elements: reliance of modern states oncovert methodsfor power projection at home and abroad; the consequent emergence of aclandestine social milieupopulated by secret services and criminal syndicates; a complementaryillicit economic nexusthat sustains non-state actors and sometimes state security; and finally,spatial dimensionsthat range from a narrow criminal or covert milieu to entire countries or continents. When these elements align, this netherworld can attain the sheer geopolitical power to shape the course of national and international events. To lend substance to these generic elements, the essay explores three arenas of widening geographical scope. At thelocallevel in the southern Philippines, a regional netherworld fostered Islamic insurgency and state counterinsurgency, whilenationalelections were sustained by an illegal lottery, shaping the character of an emerging polity. At thetransnationallevel, France's postcolonial hold on the West African region dubbed Françafrique constrained corruption within state-mediated circuits and entrenched elites at both ends of this bilateral exchange. By contrast, U.S. covert operations in Afghanistan and Central America had divergent outcomes influenced by their degree of congruence with the narcotics traffic, demonstrating that the covert netherworld can exercise sufficient autonomy to be treated as a significant factor in world politics.
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Wasserstrom, Robert. "Maldición de la abundancia,pueblos aislados y economía extractiva en Perú y Ecuador." Antropología Cuadernos de investigación, no. 16 (July 30, 2016): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.26807/ant.v0i16.22.
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En Ecuador y Perú, se incrementan los contactos entre los grupos indígenas aislados y la gente de afuera. Cuando menos en el pasado reciente, estos contactos ocurrieron principalmente a raíz de la exploración petrolera que se llevaba a cabo en varias zonas de la región amazónica. Sin embargo, es un error considerar a las empresas como principales protagonistas de los problemas surgidos en muchas zonas de la cuenca amazónica. Al contrario, aquí se examina el tema del contacto desde la perspectiva de la “maldición de los recursos,” es decir, como consecuencia de un sistema elaborado por las elites nacionales para apropiarse de la riqueza petrolera “sin el consentimiento de los ciudadanos”. En este sistema, las empresas petroleras – sean privadas o públicas – funcionan principalmente como agentes o como cómplices, pero raramente como protagonistas de las políticas extractivas. También se documenta el reducido papel actual de la industria petrolera en los territorios de pueblos aislados, sobre todo en Perú, donde estos pueblos ahora enfrentan algunos peligros más graves como el negocio criminal de la madera, la coca y el oro.
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Richardson, Tanya. "The Regional Life of Geopolitical Conflict: The Case of Odes(s)a Oblast." Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 46, no. 3 (August 12, 2019): 263–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04603004.
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When the events known as the “Russian Spring” began in the aftermath of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution in February 2014, Odessa oblast seemed like it would be particularly vulnerable to separatist activity. This paper offers a tentative explanation for why Odessa oblast escaped war in the 2014–15 phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. To do so, it chronicles events in Odessa oblast between fall 2013 and spring 2015 drawing on secondary sources such as news articles, blogs, social media posts, YouTube footage, official statements, and reports. Odessa-based elites’ decision to support Ukrainian sovereignty was an important factor hindering the realization of a Donetsk or Luhansk scenario. However, the weak Oblast Administration in the spring of 2014 and the upcoming mayoral elections created a volatile environment that various individuals (oligarchs, politicians, criminal networks) exploited to maintain or enhance their influence in the region. The internationalization of the conflict in the spring of 2014 presented Odessans with stark existential choices which undermined the city’s violence-avoiding dispute resolution techniques and culminated in the violence on May 2.
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Sheverdyaev, Stanislav, and Alina Shenfeldt. "Evolution of the Concept of Political Corruption in Western and Russian Political Science and Law." Russian Law Journal 7, no. 2 (May 30, 2019): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2019-7-2-53-80.
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As a result of intensive international debate and the adoption of a number of renowned international anticorruption conventions and initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s, the issue of corruption has become a convenient theme for different kinds of generalizations in social sciences. However, national legislation does not reflect these developments in its legal regulation due to conservatism inherent in jurisprudence. One of the most evident gaps in this respect is the sphere of political corruption. While political science and political economy for decades have been successful in explaining political processes in different countries as corrupt conspiracies of political elites, business structures, and other actors in the political process, legal science has kept itself separate from such problems and prefers to deal with individual acts of corruption. But if for criminal law such an approach seems logical due to the methodology of the criminal law, for other branches of law which set forth a systemic view on social processes – primarily administrative and constitutional – there seems to be an omission.Nowadays, there is a quite favourable environment for the development of a consistent legal understanding of anticorruption in Russia. This has become possible thanks to current Russian administrative reforms, when the need for a highly professional bureaucracy led to a greater demand for various anticorruption mechanisms. The next possible step in Russia may be an attempt to ensure the effectiveness of well-proven anti-corruption methods of the political system as a whole.In this article we propose a brief background to the evolution of the concept of political corruption in Western and Russian political and legal science, which entails the necessity of complex scientific legal synthesis on this issue, allows to discuss the existing methodological potential and creates new opportunities to build up appropriate systemic legislative models.
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Fatic, Aleksandar. "Corruption, corporate character-formation and "value-strategy"." Filozofija i drustvo 24, no. 1 (2013): 60–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1301060f.
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While most discussions of corruption focus on administration, institutions, the law and public policy, little attention in the debate about societal reform is paid to the ?internalities? of anti-corruption efforts, specifically to character-formation and issues of personal and corporate integrity. While the word ?integrity? is frequently mentioned as the goal to be achieved through institutional reforms, even in criminal prosecutions, the specifically philosophical aspects of character-formation and the development of corporate and individual virtues in a rational and systematic way tend to be neglected. This paper focuses on the ?internalities? of anti-corruption work with special emphasis on the pre-requisites that need to be ensured on behalf of the social elites in order for proper individual and collective character-formation to take place throughout the society. The author argues that a systematic pursuit of socially recognized virtues, both those pertaining to society as a whole and those specific to particular professions and social groups, is the most comprehensive and strategically justified way of pursuing anti-corruption policy, while institutional and penal policies can only serve an auxiliary role. The pursuit of institutional and criminal justice policies against corruption in a society that is subject to increasing relativism with regard to values and morality is at best ineffective, and at worst socially destructive. Thus the paper suggests a re-examination of the social discourse on the level of what the author calls ?value strategy? and the gradual building of a plan to create and solidify specifically designed features of ?corporate character? for key sectors of the society. This approach can serve as the main long-term strategy to improve the public profile of integrity and reinforce morality in both the public and civil sectors.
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Alvarez, Linda. "No Safe Space: Neoliberalism and the Production of Violence in the Lives of Central American Migrants." Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 5, no. 1 (September 30, 2019): 4–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/rep.2019.23.
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AbstractThis paper explores the ways in which neoliberal policies enacted by elites across the Northern Triangle have led to increased violence in Central America, a lived experience that continues as individuals migrate to Mexico and the United States. In this work, I examine how neoliberal polices in the region have created limited economic opportunities and means of subsistence for the poor in Central America, as well as the rise of extra-legal actors and criminal enterprises. Together these conditions leave Central Americans with no choice but to migrate north. This paper then explores the violence migrants experience as they move through Mexico. In this stage of the journey, migrant bodies are objectified and then commodified as cheap labor for the global market as well as local economies of violence. Lastly, I discuss the multiple zones of violence that migrants experience at Mexico's border with the United States. This project relies on in-depth, semi-structured interviews (n = 99) with Central American migrants over the course of 4 years (2014–18). Ultimately, I find that for Central American migrants, violence can be a seemingly inescapable reality as neoliberal forces maintain and normalize violence in order to preserve an established social order at the expense of these migrants.
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Fortner, Michael Javen. "The Carceral State and the Crucible of Black Politics: An Urban History of the Rockefeller Drug Laws." Studies in American Political Development 27, no. 1 (April 2013): 14–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x13000011.
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While scholars have illuminated the effects of mass incarceration, the origins of the criminal justice policies that produced these outcomes remain unclear. Many explanations obscure as much as they reveal—in great measure because they either ignore or minimize the consequences of crime. Emphasizing the exploitation of white fears, the construction of black criminality, or the political strategies of Republican political elites, prevailing theories ignore black crime victims. In order to excavate the historical roots of the modern carceral state, this study traces the development of New York State's Rockefeller drug laws. Rather than beginning in Albany, this history focuses on Harlem, a community hit hardest by rising crime rates and drug addiction. Drawing upon a variety of primary sources, this study traces how African American activists framed and negotiated the incipient drug problem in their neighborhoods and interrogates the policy prescriptions they attached to indigenously constructed frames. It describes how middle-class African Americans facing the material threats of crime and crime-related problems drew upon the moral content of indigenous class categories to understand these threats and develop policy prescriptions. It reveals how the black middle class shaped the development of this punitive policy and played a crucial role in the development of mass incarceration.
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Kostic, Roland. "Transitional justice and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Whose memories, whose justice?" Sociologija 54, no. 4 (2012): 649–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/soc1204649k.
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This paper shows that transitional justice initiatives such as the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission for Srebrenica and the establishment of accurate statistics on deaths during the conflict have had only a limited impact on inter-group reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Popular attitudes towards these initiatives are captured in surveys conducted in 2005 and 2010. The results are not surprising given that the absence, due to the level of external regulation and control, of a politics of post-Dayton state-building means that domestic politics takes place in an arena of dealing with the past. The international community legitimised the three prevalent conflict narratives as a way of achieving a peace settlement in Dayton. These communal narratives were used in the peace-building phase by the local elites to defend concessions gained during negotiations and to oppose changes imposed by external supervisors of the Dayton Peace Accords. This has transformed the debate over the recent conflict from a transitional process of coming to terms with the past to a permanent state of affairs. This process precludes reconciliation in terms of mutual acknowledgment of suffering and a nuanced understanding of the causes and dynamics of the violent conflict.
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Teran, Marcela. "Berta Vive!" Soundings 78, no. 78 (August 1, 2021): 96–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/soun.78.07.2021.
Full textAbstract:
For many years Berta Caceres - Honduran environmental defender, Indigenous community leader and co-founder of COPINH (Council of Popular and Indigenous Organisations of Honduras) - campaigned against the construction, without consent, of the Agua Zarca dam in Lenca territory, by private energy company DESA. In 2016 she was assassinated. Since then there has been a long struggle to bring those responsible to justice. In 2018, seven men were found guilty of planning and carrying out the assassination, but records showed they were following orders from higher up the food chain. In July 2021, DESA president David Castillo was found guilty of being a 'co-conspirator' in the assassination. Others involved, including Daniel Atala and other members of his wealthy family, are yet to be investigated. In Honduras, a culture of impunity, corruption and violence prevails, which links the state, the army, the business world and criminal networks. Although those who resist are frequently killed, the resistance continues. Within this grim picture, 'clean energy' and 'development' often act as shiny eco-covers for elites amassing profit without regard to the rights of Indigenous people. It needs to be more widely recognised that green capitalism is not a solution for the climate crisis: it is merely a form of neo-colonialism.