Relevant bibliographies by topics / Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962

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  2. Dissertations / Theses
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Academic literature on the topic 'Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 13 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962"

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Yang, Andrea. "The Cuban missile crisis, 1962." Government Publications Review 18, no. 5 (September 1991): 562–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9390(91)90159-u.

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Hershberg, James G. "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 1)." Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (April 2004): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/152039704773254740.

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Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S. Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between the United States and Cuba as the two countries' mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible method to resolve the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S. Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own “independent” policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S. Cuban—Brazilian relationship. Thefirst part of this two—part article sets the scene for an in—depth look at the Cuban missile crisis, which will be covered in Part 2 of the article in the next issue of the journal.
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Brenner, Philip. "Cuba and the Missile Crisis." Journal of Latin American Studies 22, no. 1-2 (March 1990): 115–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x00015133.

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On 16 October 1962, President John F. Kennedy learned that the Soviet Union was building bases in Cuba for ballistic missiles that could destroy major US cities. In the days that followed, US officials focused nearly all their attention on strategies for removing the Soviet missiles, on Soviet motives, and on the Soviet Union's reaction to the naval quarantine. Cuba was the locus of this most dramatic superpower confrontation, but Cuban perceptions, motives, and reactions were largely ignored.
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Fernandez, S. J. "Cuban Missile Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A Political Perspective after 40 Years." Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (September 1, 2011): 613–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jar301.

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Hershberg, James G. "The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Part 2)." Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 3 (July 2004): 5–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1520397041447364.

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Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics and diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis and in U.S. Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington and Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available U.S., Brazilian, Cuban, and other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible means of resolving the crisis, sought to broker a formula for U.S. Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own “independent”policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis and the triangular U.S. Cuban-Brazilian relationship. This is the concluding part of a two-part article.
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Perez, Louis A., and Mary S. McAuliffe. "CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962." Journal of American History 80, no. 3 (December 1993): 1164. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2080560.

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Fardella, Enrico Maria. "Mao Zedong and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis." Cold War History 15, no. 1 (November 19, 2014): 73–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.971017.

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Tierney, Dominic. "“Pearl Harbor in Reverse” Moral Analogies in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 3 (July 2007): 49–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2007.9.3.49.

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During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the argument that U.S. air strikes against Soviet missile sites in Cuba would be morally analogous to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 had a major impact on policymaking. The invocation of this analogy contributed to President John F. Kennedy's decision to forgo an immediate attack on the missiles and to start instead with a naval blockade of the island. The “Pearl Harbor in reverse” argument is an example of an important phenomenon that has received little attention in foreign policy analysis—the moral analogy. Fusing together elements of moral and analogical thinking, the moral analogy can be a powerful force in shaping policy preferences, as it was in October 1962.
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Bernstein, Barton J., and William J. Medland. "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Needless or Necessary." Journal of American History 76, no. 3 (December 1989): 992. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2936547.

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Ferris, Jesse. "Soviet Support for Egypt's Intervention in Yemen, 1962–1963." Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (October 2008): 5–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2008.10.4.5.

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Drawing on documents and memoirs in Russian and Arabic, this article tells the unknown story of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the early phases of the Yemeni Civil War, a war that broke out while much of the world's attention was focused on the Cuban missile crisis and the war between India and Pakistan. Egypt's fateful decision to intervene in the conflict was dependent on substantial Soviet backing, which strengthened the relationship between the USSR and Gamal Abdel Nasser's government in Egypt. In response to a plea from Nasser, Nikita Khrushchev authorized the military transport branch of the Soviet Air Force to embark on a clandestine airlift operation ferrying Egyptian troops into Yemen to shore up the new government there.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962"

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Guttieri, Karen Rochelle. "The American political discourse on the Cuban missile crisis." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42067.

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This thesis examines and critiques the American political discourse on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The event itself is past, yet words used to describe and explain the missile crisis capture and give meaning to the experience. The meaning of the crisis begins in a basic sense, then, with the discourse. The increasing availability of material evidence has reinvigorated the discourse on the missive crisis. Where relevant, recent evidence will be employed to critique previous and recent interpretations of the this seminal event. Consensus and debate are both to be found in the discourse on the Cuban crisis. First, there is a large body of shared understanding, or conventional wisdom, on the crisis. Secondly, there is disagreement as to the meaning of the crisis in recent manifestations of the discourse. The essay will use a propaganda model lo examine the politically necessary mythology embodied in the conventional wisdom. This thesis will use a tendency analysis approach to organize the debate on the missile crisis, along the lines of ideological schools of thought, and within the context of a larger American nuclear debate. The propaganda and the tendency analyse models complement the general approach of discourse. These models have been developed specifically for the study of politics, yet the methodology of each is statement analysis; as such these models are rooted in language, ana so conform with the general discourse approach. Security is the common referent of both the conventional wisdom and the current debate. In particular, the President, as the custodian of nuclear weapons, is the principle actor responsible for national security. The powerful image of the President dominates the conventional wisdom, and retains significance in the contemporary ideological debate on the lessons of the missile crisis. The nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the President endows him with great, but double-edged power. The paper concludes with some general observations on the special significance of Presidential leadership as represented in the discourse on the missile crisis, and as necessitated in confronting crises in general. First, in crisis, there is little time for the President to make difficult decisions. Secondly, there may be greater devolution of authority to the military forces deployed to convey the credibility of American deterrence. As such, the subordination of force to policy must remain sound. The image of the President is, of necessity, an image which combines prudence and strength. Manufactured images are not enough however. Policy must be tested in terms of its alleged purpose. Likewise, doctrine must be evaluated in terms the purpose of the policy it is designed to support.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate
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Fetter, Randolph Robert. "The Kennedy Administration's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis." Instructions for remote access. Click here to access this electronic resource. Access available to Kutztown University faculty, staff, and students only, 1987. http://www.kutztown.edu/library/services/remote_access.asp.

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Young, John M. "When the Russians blinked the U.S. maritime response to the Cuban Missile Crisis /." Washington, D.C. : History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1990. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/23093171.html.

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Charney, Sean S. "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 a case study of the tailored use of instruments of national power /." Quantico, VA : Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA490816.

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Jacobs, Matt D. "The unforeseen consequences of informal empire the United States, Latin America, and Fidel Castro, 1945-1961 /." View electronic thesis (PDF), 2009. http://dl.uncw.edu/etd/2009-1/jacobsm/mattjacobs.pdf.

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Ismajlov, Rufat. "First day of the Cuban Missile Crisis: Airstrike, Invasion or Blockade? : Analysis of the Inter- and Intragroup conflicts inpolitical decision making outcome by U.S. government with regard to the situation in Cuba, during October the 16th 1962, within Bureaucratic Politics Approach." Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-5309.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis has been considered by political scientists and historians as one of the most critical point in U.S. – Soviet relations during the Cold War and probably the only case of the possibility of the nuclear exchange was on highest level. The Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be a part of continued political game of the ideological struggle between the leaders of United States and Soviet Union. However, the fact of the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba created situation for U.S. government to decide what course of actions should be taken and not escalate a further confrontation, which could lead to a mutual nuclear exchange. The suggestions to such course of actions were coming from different members of the Executive Committee of the National Council or EXCOMM, which did make impact on U.S. president’s decision making in relation to Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962.  The focus of this study relied on outcome of the decisions taken on secret meetings within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EXCOMM (included U.S. president as member of this committee) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The results of this study show if inter – and intragroup conflicts within EXCOOM made such impact on decision making outcome.
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Rossodivito, Anthony M. "The Struggle Against Bandits: The Cuban Revolution and Responses to CIA-Sponsored Counter-Revolutionary Activity, 1959-1963." UNF Digital Commons, 2014. http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/508.

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Following the 1959 victory of the Cuban revolution, the United States government along with the CIA and their Cuban émigré allies immediately undertook a campaign of subversion and terrorism against the Cuban revolution. From 1959 until 1963 a clandestine war was waged between supporters of the revolution and the counter-revolutionary organizations backed by Washington. This project is a new synthesis of this little-known story. It is an attempt to shed light on a little known aspect of the conflict between the United States government and the Cuban revolution by bringing together never-before seen primary sources, and utilizing the two distinct and separate historiographies from the U.S. and Cuba, concerning the clandestine struggle. This is the story of Cuba’s resistance to intervention, the organization of the counter- revolution, and finally how the constant defeat of CIA plots by the Cubans forced changes in U.S. strategy concerning intervention in Cuba and in other parts of the developing world that would have far-reaching and long-last effects.
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Erb, Lisa Anne. "The Cuban Missile Crisis : was Kennedy's way the best way? /." 1989. http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/ugtheses/20/.

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Beranová, Monika. ""Special Relationship" v době vlády Harolda Macmillana (1957-1963)." Master's thesis, 2017. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-267767.

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This thesis analyzes key moments from the tenures of Harold Macmillan as British Prime Minister and John Fitzgerald Kennedy as President of the United States. The United Kingdom and the United States had a Special Relationship between them, which was based upon their close political cooperation. Macmillan and Kennedy deepend this relation by their personal friendship, which played a major role in the course of finding solutions to the conflicts they had to face in the context of the Cold War, when there was a real possibility of nuclear annihilation. The analysis shows that the Special Relationship in the years 1957-1963 went through several dynamic developments, however it never lost its unique status. Despite initial distrust between the two countries immediately following the Suez Crisis, both politicians always managed to find a compromise solution. Thanks to their friendship and deep personal respect, they managed to always unite, even during times of gravest peril. A typical example of the personal relationship is the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Kennedy kept in touch via telephone with Macmillan and often asked him for advice. By virtue of this contact, Macmillan became one of the President's principal advisors in the course of the crisis. The Special Relationship between the two countries did...
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Fiala, Jaroslav. "Zahraniční politika Spojených států amerických vůči Kubě v letech 1958 - 1965." Doctoral thesis, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-352230.

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The thesis deals with the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba in the years 1958-1965. It analyses sources of U.S.-Cuban hostility at the beginning of the Fidel Castro era. It shows, how the U.S. foreign policy and the beginning of Cold war contributed to polarization as well as radicalization of politics in Cuba. Thus, it analyses the change of a local conflict into the "international civil war". The aim of the thesis is to argue that Cuba influenced the global balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States at the beginning of 1960's. The introductory chapters summarize the causes of the Cuban Revolution, the U.S. policy toward friendly dictators, mainly toward Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Next part deals with the guerilla warfare against Batista and the extent of U.S. influence on this insurrection. The thesis uses a multi-archival research of the U.S. as well as Czech and British sources. The comparison of sources shows the extent of independent Cuban actions and helps to comprehend the logic of the Eastern-European foreign policy. The thesis further analyses the U.S. reaction on Cuban Revolution as well as causes and consequences of the Cuban Missile crisis. Moreover, it deals with the possibilities of improvement in the U.S.-Cuban relations. Last but not least it also analyses the...
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Books on the topic "Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962"

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James, Walker. October dawn: A novel based on the Cuban Missle Crisis. Nashville, Tenn: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 2001.

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The Cuban missile crisis. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1996.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Heinemann Library, 2004.

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John, Griffiths. The Cuban missile crisis. Vero Beach, FL: Rourke Enterprises, 1987.

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Griffiths, John. The Cuban missile crisis. Vero Beach, FL: Rourke Enterprises, 1987.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Gareth Stevens Publishing, 2014.

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Schier, Helga. The Cuban Missile Crisis. Edina, Minn: ABDO Pub. Co., 2008.

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Clinton, Susan. The Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Childrens Press, 1993.

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Gow, Catherine Hester. The Cuban Missile Crisis. San Diego, CA: Lucent Books, 1997.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis. Milwaukee, WI: World Almanac Library, 2002.

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Book chapters on the topic "Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962"

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James, Alan. "The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)." In Peacekeeping in International Politics, 300–301. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21026-8_50.

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Rawnsley, Gary D. "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Two Colossi, A Trembling World." In Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda, 109–43. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24499-7_5.

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Powaski, Ronald E. "John F. Kennedy, the Hawks, the Doves, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962." In American Presidential Statecraft, 11–65. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-50454-4_2.

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Miller, Nicola. "The Real Gap in the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Post-Cold War Historiography and the Continued Omission of Cuba." In War and Cold War in American Foreign Policy 1942–62, 211–39. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403913852_9.

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"THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 1962." In The Routledge Atlas of Russian History, 140. Routledge, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203074473-140.

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"4. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis." In Command in Crisis, 87–137. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.7312/bouc90694-006.

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Dylan, Huw, David V. Gioe, and Michael S. Goodman. "The CIA and Cuba: The Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis." In The CIA and the Pursuit of Security, 112–26. Edinburgh University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474428842.003.0007.

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This chapter is concerned with the some of the CIA’s operations against Cuba. It examines the ill-fated invasion at the Bay of Pigs by CIA backed and trained Cuban exiles, and how the failure impacted the agency. President Kennedy chose to fire the Head of the CIA and his deputy Allen Dulles and Charles Cabell. This occurred a short while before another, far more serious, crisis. In October 1962 reconnaissance aircraft provided evidence of a Soviet missile base on Cuba. This prompted the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the crisis the CIA was called on to provide intelligence on matters of the highest significance, and to do so it used the material provided by a Soviet source, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Documents: Report on the Cuban Operation; The Inspector General’s Survey of the Cuban Operation; Oleg V. Penkovskiy.
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Lupton, Danielle L. "A Reputation for Irresolute Action." In Reputation for Resolve, 115–40. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501747717.003.0006.

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This chapter studies how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President John F. Kennedy, looking at Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to evidence made available from declassified and translated Soviet archives, as well as information drawn from additional sources, Kennedy quickly formed a reputation for irresolute action largely because of his repeated failure to back up his strong rhetoric with firm action and his wavering support of the Bay of Pigs invasion early during his tenure. While Kennedy rather quickly established a poor reputation for resolve, it was difficult for him to alter this reputation. Throughout the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and during the early stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev continued to doubt Kennedy's firmness and determination, despite the president's repeated attempts to signal his resolve. Declassified Soviet documents further indicate that Kennedy was able to change this negative perception of his resolve during the Cuban Missile Crisis only by presenting a consistently resolute position and altering his signals of strategic interest. Thus, it was Kennedy's communication of high strategic interest in Cuba combined with his resolute behavior during the missile crisis that enabled him to alter his poor reputation.
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Shnookal, Deborah. "Conclusion." In Operation Pedro Pan and the Exodus of Cuba's Children, 213–22. University Press of Florida, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5744/florida/9781683401551.003.0008.

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This book concludes that by the time the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962, Operation Pedro Pan had largely served its purpose in the U.S. covert action program and propaganda war against the Cuban revolution. The cancellation of direct flights between the United States and Cuba and Washington’s policy to keep Cuba isolated meant that the children’s reunification with their families was made very difficult and delayed. While Cuban parents may have had many motives in sending their children as unaccompanied minors to Miami, the author argues that, in general, U.S. government political objectives overrode humanitarian concerns for the children’s welfare and Cuban family reunification. She concludes that Operation Pedro Pan was largely unjustified and based on a fabricated Cold War scare about patria potestad that manipulated Cuban parents’ fears and resulted in the unnecessary separation of thousands of Cuban children from their families—in many cases for several years and, in some cases, with tragic consequences.
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Zagare, Frank C. "A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis." In Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies, 61–82. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831587.003.0005.

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This chapter surveys and evaluates previous attempts to use game theory to explain the strategic dynamic of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, including, but not limited to, explanations developed in the style of Thomas Schelling, Nigel Howard, and Steven Brams. All of these explanations are judged to be either incomplete or deficient in some way. Schelling’s explanation is both empirically and theoretically inconsistent with the consensus interpretation of the crisis; Howard’s metagame theory is at odds with the contemporary understanding of rational strategic behavior; and Brams’s theory of moves explanation is inconsistent with the full sweep of the events that define the crisis. As game theory has evolved, so have the explanations fashioned by its practitioners. An additional purpose of this chapter is to trace these explanatory refinements, using the Cuban crisis as a mooring.
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Reports on the topic "Cuban Missle Crisis, 1962"

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Werder, Karl K. Continuing Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962,. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada338555.

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Miro, Ramon. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962: Comparative Perspectives of the United States and the Soviet Union. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, April 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada299884.

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