Academic literature on the topic 'Custozza, Battle of, 1866'

Genesis of phenomenon «battles of monuments» is investigated in the article. Particular historic role of monumental sculpture in ideological propaganda is proved. «Crucial points» of «battles of monuments» in history and modern life are revealed. Ideological component of battle against Soviet symbolics is considered.

In poetry and fiction, Herman Melville explored the epitaphic genre's capacity for destabilizing poetic voice and producing a temporality that is recursive but not necessarily recuperative. The epitaphs of Battle-Pieces (1866) invigorate the form while questioning its ability to memorialize the dead of the American Civil War.

In summer 1866 the Austro-Prussian struggle for supremacy in Germany erupted into open conflict. King Georg V of Hanover sided with other governments loyal to the German Confederation against Prussia, but after initially defeating Prussian forces at Langensalza, he was forced to capitulate. Two days after the battle, on June 29, 1866, the widow of the Hanoverian general Sir Georg Julius von Hartmann told her daughter in no uncertain terms how she felt about the Prussian government and its allies. In her opinion they were nothing more than “robber states” that cloaked their disregard for the Ten Commandments in sanctimonious public displays of piety. “These Protestant Jesuits,” she continued, “offend me more than the Catholic ones. You know that I amGermanwith all my heart and love my Germany, but I cannot consider them genuine Germans anymore because they only want to make Germany Prussian.”

Włodzimierz Ledóchowski, superior general of the Society of Jesus, wielded great influence in the battle against Communism. His belief that there was a link of some degree between Jews and Communism, his work to establish a secretariat in Rome to counter atheistic Communism, and his influence in the development of the papal encyclical, Divini redemptoris, are explored in this article. Convinced that the Russian Revolution was a satanic force out to eradicate Christian society, Ledóchowski made it his life’s work to expose the lies and threats of Bolshevism, culminating in his penultimate Congregation (in 1938) where the superior general discussed techniques that could be used to combat the spread of Communism.

On 7 October 1866, Adolf Pratobevera—a prominent liberal politician and former Justice Minister—wrote in his diary that “politics [is] again in flux, whether this is a blessing? God knows.” Pratobevera was writing just three months after the battle of Königgrätz/Hradec Králové in a period of immense instability and uncertainty for the Habsburg monarchy. Following Austria's military defeat at Königgrätz, the traditional supports of the system—the emperor, the army, and the bureaucracy—were in a weakened state and this dramatically opened the range of possibilities in politics. Indeed, the defeat threw the whole political system into question, a situation that sharply exposed the fault lines and internal political workings of the monarchy. In the period from Königgrätz on 3 July 1866 to the ministerial meeting on 1 February 1867 (when the emperor definitively decided on the dualist structure), all political parties and movements had the opportunity to define their program, to seek possible allies, and to argue their particular vision of the monarchy's political structure.

This paper involves a close reading of Herman Melville's poem “On the Photograph of a Corps Commander,” published in Melville's 1866 collection Battle-Pieces. Realizing that Melville's poem is one of the first descriptions (ekphrases) of a photograph in verse, the paper explores how Melville's poem uses physiognomy to describe the subject of the photograph: an American Civil War general, who is only identified as “the Corps Commander.” In this way, Melville's poem reflects the nineteenth-century philosophical and popular notions of photography. These notions came to regard photography as a Neoplatonic medium capable of recording and revealing the inner character of its subjects. Relying on these conceptions of photography, Melville's poem describes the photograph of the Corps Commander as having the power to reveal the Platonic absolute of American masculinity, and thus it comes to hail the photograph as a semi-sacred image that has the power to draw Anglo-Saxon American men into a common brotherhood.

This study is a contribution to the research of the extensive topic of Dostoevsky and Garibaldi and is an analysis of two fragments from Dostoevsky's texts, where he addressed the image of the Italian hero. This image is reflected in the artistic, journalistic and epistolary texts by Dostoevsky, his name is calligraphically printed on the pages of two of the writer's notebooks. The article analyzes an episode from the novel "The Idiot": the story of the liar and braggart General Ivolgin about his wound during the Crimean War that was treated by two outstanding surgeons – the Frenchman O. Nelaton and the Russian N. I. Pirogov. It is shown that the subtext of Ivolgin's story refers to the story of Garibaldi's wound in the battle of Aspromonte and the treatment of his leg by O. Nelaton and N. I. Pirogov, which Dostoevsky and his hero learned about from the newspapers. The European and Russian press, which closely followed the political events in Italy and Europe in the 1860s, created a heroic image of this man. The second reference to Garibaldi is from Dostoevsky's Geneva letter to his niece S. A. Ivanova dated January 1 (13), 1868. It presents a parody sketch of contemporary political events and figures in Italy (Cardinal Antonelli, General Kanzler, the defeat of Garibaldi's army at the Battle of Mentana). They are allegorically transferred to the games and amusements of the younger generation of the Ivanov family, with whom the writer spent the summer of 1866. The article corrects the error made by the publishers of Dostoevsky's letters: the title of "general kanzler" (this is how this phrase was published) never existed — in the Battle of Mentana, the supreme commander of the papal troops, which defeated Garibaldi, was General Hermann Kanzler, who had a German origin and surname. The cases considered indicate a significant interest of the writer in the heroic personality of Giuseppe Garibaldi, his activities and fate.

On June 1, 1866, one thousand heavily-armed Irish-American Fenian insurgents invaded Upper Canada across the Niagara River from Buffalo, NY. The next day near the town of Ridgeway, 800 Fenians battled with 850 Canadian volunteer soldiers, including a small company of 28 University of Toronto students who ended up taking the brunt of the attack. The Battle of Ridgeway (or Lime Ridge or Limestone Ridge) ended with a disastrous rout of the Canadians who in their panicked retreat left their dead and wounded on the field. It was the last major incursion into Canada, the last battle in Ontario and the first modern one fought by Canadians, led in the field exclusively by Canadian officers, and significantly fought in Canada. The Fenian Raid mobilized some 22,000 volunteer troops and resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus in the colonial Province of Canada by its Attorney General and Minister of Militia John A. Macdonald, but the battle which climaxed this crisis is only prominent by its obscurity in Canadian historiography. Almost everything known and cited about Ridgeway springs from the same sources—four books and pamphlets—three of them published in the summer of 1866 immediately after the event and the remaining one in 1910. This dissertation argues that the history of the battle was distorted and falsified by these sources and by two military board of inquiries staged to explicitly cover up the extent of the disaster. This study investigates the relationship between the inquiries and the contemporary author-historians of two of the sources: Alexander Somerville, an investigative journalist in Hamilton, Ontario, a recent immigrant from Britain with a controversial history; and George T. Denison III, a prominent young Toronto attorney, a commander of a troop of volunteer cavalry, a former Confederate secret service agent, author-commentator on Canada’s military policy and presiding judge on both boards of inquiry. This study describes the process by which Ridgeway’s history was hidden and falsified and its possible scope and significance in Canadian historiography. New archival and published sources are identified, assessed and assembled for a newly restored and authenticated micro-narrative of the battle.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
Pour respecter les droits d'auteur, la version électronique de cette thèse ou ce mémoire a été dépouillée, le cas échéant, de ses documents visuels et audio-visuels. La version intégrale de la thèse ou du mémoire a été déposée au Service de la gestion des documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Le peintre, soldat et mémorialiste Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) entendait faire de son corpus de peintures de bataille et de ses Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851) des témoignages historiques de la période napoléonienne, destinés à la postérité. Or, cette conjugaison entre peintures et mémoires renvoie aussi à la dualité médiale de la propagande napoléonienne, qui diffuse un récit unique des événements militaires à l’aide d’organes d’information inédits tels que les Bulletins de la Grande Armée. Ce récit, déjà médiatisé comme étant historique, est repris en images par le mécénat impérial. Ce mémoire vise à démontrer comment Lejeune contribue à ce récit historicisant, d’abord à un niveau individuel en construisant son identité par rapport à sa participation aux guerres napoléoniennes, puis aussi à un niveau étatique. Son Bivouac d’Austerlitz, présenté au Salon de 1808, est une commande du gouvernement. Il sera question de la façon dont ce tableau de Lejeune s’insère d’abord dans sa carrière, ensuite dans son corpus de peintures de bataille, puis finalement dans le récit napoléonien sur Austerlitz. La forme épisodique du tableau, empruntée à la ligne narrative du 30e bulletin de la Grande Armée, où Napoléon rapporte la victoire d’Austerlitz, peut s’expliquer par la complémentarité voulue entre récit textuel et visuel. Ce tableau contribue ainsi à la construction historique de la bataille. Au milieu des transformations profondes du monde académique et de la hiérarchie des genres, la dualité peintre-soldat de Lejeune répond en tous points à la vocation historique attribuée à la peinture sous Napoléon.
Painter, soldier, and memorialist Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) conceived his battle paintings and his memoirs, Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851), as historical testimonies of the Napoleonic period, destined for posterity. This twinning of paintings and memoirs mirrors the duality of Napoleonic propaganda as a whole, which disseminates a single version of military events with the help of unprecedented information tools such as the Bulletins de la Grande Armée. This written narrative, already thought of as historical, is picked up again in the paintings commissioned by the government. This master’s thesis argues that Lejeune contributes in a unique way to this historical narrative, first at an individual level by constructing his identity from his participation in the Napoleonic wars, and also at a state level. His Bivouac d’Austerlitz, presented at the 1808 Salon, was commissioned by the government as part of a larger order. It is shown that this painting fits first into Lejeune’s career, then into his cycle of battle paintings, and finally into the narrative of Austerlitz that Napoleon himself promoted. The episodic form of this painting can be explained by the deliberate pairing of written and pictorial narratives, which borrows from the 30th bulletin de la Grande Armée where Napoleon recounts the victory at Austerlitz. This painting thus contributes to the historical construction of the battle. As deep transformations threatened the academic genre hierarchy at the turn of the nineteenth century, the duality of Lejeune’s persona as soldier and painter helped promote the historical function given to paintings under Napoleon.

L’Amérique centrale, théâtre des dernières batailles rangées de la guerre froide, est aujourd’hui la région la plus violente au monde, selon les Nations unies. Notre étude s’intéresse à la forme de guerre irrégulière livrée par l’État guatémaltèque contre sa propre population pendant la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle. À la lumière de rares témoignages d’exécutants et d’archives militaires et policières, nous examinons un mécanisme clandestin de répression dont les trois principales composantes – les enlèvements, la torture et les exécutions sommaires – pouvaient s’abattre sur toute personne soupçonnée, à tort ou à raison, de conspirer contre un statu quo d’exclusion. Au moment de leur articulation, ces moyens répressifs ont constitué un dispositif qui, à partir de 1966, s’est avéré d’une redoutable efficacité. Arme de prédilection des adeptes de la guerre antisubversive pendant plus de vingt ans, le dispositif permettait, telle une chaîne de production, l’accumulation des renseignements jugés indispensables à cette forme de guerre, ainsi que les cadavres dont l’absence éternelle ou la présence outrageuse sur la place publique servaient d’avertissement funeste à l’ensemble du corps social. Où chercher les origines d’un tel dispositif? À partir des ouvrages de référence cités dans le manuel de guerre contre-subversive de l’armée guatémaltèque, la réponse à cette question nous fera découvrir des parachutistes français pour qui la défaite militaire en Indochine et en Algérie pendant les années 1950 n’était pas une option et pour qui la victoire justifiait absolument tous les moyens. Le penchant de ces pionniers de la guerre hors-norme pour les cours magistraux, les entrevues et les articles, nous a permis d’étudier les méthodes qu’ils préconisaient et de repérer leurs traces au Guatemala. Alors que la guerre qui avait servi de prétexte au maintien du dispositif est terminée, sa très réputée efficacité assure encore aujourd’hui sa pérennité auprès de ceux qui peuvent s’offrir le service. En ce sens, la contre-insurrection se poursuit, et ce, malgré l’absence depuis une quinzaine d’années d’un conflit armé. Cette thèse aborde l’histoire de la guerre irrégulière et son déroulement au Guatemala. Les archives et les témoignages à notre disposition contredisent le déni des crimes commis dans les villes et les campagnes guatémaltèques, dont le génocide de 1982. Finalement, certains signes avant-coureurs indiquent que la violence et l’impunité actuelles au pays pourraient mener à la répétition de tels crimes à l’avenir.
Central America, said to have harboured the Cold War’s last pitched battles, is the world’s most violent place today, according to the United Nations. This dissertation studies the form of irregular warfare that the Guatemalan state waged against its own population during the second half of the twentieth century. Through an analysis of a few extant perpetrator accounts as well as military and police sources, this study sheds light on the three main modes by which the Guatemalan government acted against individuals justly or falsely suspected of conspiring against an exclusionary status quo: kidnapping, torture and summary executions. Combined, these three separate acts constituted a covert apparatus of repression which, beginning in 1966, proved immensely efficient. As the weapon of choice for the practitioners of counterinsurgency warfare for over twenty years, the apparatus, not unlike a production line, allowed for the accumulation of intelligence that was essential for the prosecution of this kind of war, as well as the bodies that, in their perpetual absence or desecrated presence in the public domain, served as a deadly warning to the entire social body. Yet, what are the origins and history of this apparatus of state terror? Starting with the cited references in the Guatemalan military’s counter-insurgency field manual, the answer to this question led to French paratroopers for whom military defeat in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s was not an option, and for whom victory justified all means necessary. The penchant of the pioneers of this form of no-holds-barred warfare for lectures, interviews and articles allowed us to study the methods they encouraged and to identify their tell-tale signs in Guatemala. While the war that justified the existence of this apparatus has ended, its reputable efficiency has allowed it to persevere among those who can afford to pay for its services today. In this sense, if the war has been formally over in Guatemala for over fifteen years, the counter-insurgency continues. This dissertation traces the roots of irregular warfare and how it played out in Guatemala. Historical sources, including state records and perpetrator accounts, make denial of the crimes committed in urban and rural settings, including genocide in 1982, ring hollow. Finally, present warning signs indicate that on-going violence and impunity in the country could lead to the repetition of such crimes in the future.

Cotutelle de thèse avec l'Université de Montpellier
Pourquoi des États créent-ils des forces expéditionnaires bi/multi-nationales ? Pourquoi celles-ci ne sont pas utilisées au final ? L’objectif de cette thèse est d’apporter une explication à ce paradoxe, illustré parfaitement par la brigade franco-allemande et les groupements tactiques de l’Union européenne. Bien que ces deux unités ne soient pas les seules en Europe pouvant être qualifiées de forces expéditionnaires, nous avons décidé de choisir ces deux cas d’études, afin d’analyser également à travers les mesures relatives à celles-ci, les processus décisionnels tant en France qu’en Allemagne. Nous nous sommes par conséquent focalisés sur ces unités et sur les politiques d’alliances à l’origine de celles-ci. Concrètement notre recherche s’inscrit dans la lignée des travaux portant sur les alliances, mais également au sein du champ de l’analyse comparée de la politique étrangère. L’explication théorique développée pour expliquer les décisions étudiées s’appuie sur la théorie des rôles de Kal Holsti. Selon nous les décisions ne sont prises que par un groupe limité d’acteurs et résultent des rôles auxquels ces derniers adhèrent pour leur pays. Des arrangements institutionnels, ainsi que des conflits et des rapports de force modèrent ces rôles. Par ailleurs, en cas de décision ayant une portée institutionnelle, on constate une dépendance au sentier vis-à-vis d’anciennes mesures. Les décisions en faveur de la brigade franco-allemande et des groupements résultent in fine de la domination des rôles de promoteur du renforcement des capacités militaires européennes et d’allié fidèle, parmi les acteurs à l’origine de ces décisions. D’autres rôles présents en France et en Allemagne tendent au contraire à freiner l’emploi de ces unités, en particulier celui de grande puissance (pour la France) et celui de puissance civile (pour l’Allemagne). Plusieurs rôles coexistent en effet au sein de chaque appareil décisionnel et chacun voit son poids en termes d’influence fluctuer. Ceci résulte de la variation selon les décisions étudiées des acteurs impliqués, ainsi que des luttes et des rapports de force entre eux. Notre thèse se divise en sept chapitres. Dans les trois premiers, nous reviendrons sur la littérature consacrée aux forces étudiées et aux alliances, sur notre méthodologie, ainsi que sur les relations internationales en Europe des trente dernières années. Les parties suivantes traitent de l’évolution de la brigade franco-allemande en force expéditionnaire, de la création des groupements tactiques, des choix de partenaires au sein de ceux-ci et enfin du non-emploi de ces troupes militaires. Ces différentes thématiques constituent les quatre chapitres empiriques de notre recherche. En conclusion de celle-ci, on peut estimer que les chances de déploiement des unités étudiées dans les années à venir demeurent plutôt faibles. L’explication théorique développée pour ce travail et basée sur la théorie des rôles offre également un outil de compréhension du fonctionnement des appareils politico-militaires français et allemands. Validé pour cette analyse, il lui reste désormais à être testé sur d’autres cas d’étude et États.
Why do states create bi/multinational expeditionary forces? Why have not they been used yet? The objective of this PhD dissertation is to explain this paradox, which is well exemplified by the Franco-German brigade and the European Union Battle Groups (EUBG). Although these two units are not the only ones in Europe that can be qualified as expeditionary forces, we chose these two case studies to analyze, among others, the decision-making processes in both France and Germany. We have therefore focused on these two units and on the alliance policies that are at the origin of these units. In practice, our research builds on the work on alliances and the field of comparative foreign policy analysis. The theoretical framework developed to explain the foreign policy decisions is based on the theory of roles by Kal Holsti. Our findings indicate that these decisions are made only by a limited group of actors and result from the roles those actors assume for their country. Institutional arrangements, as well as conflicts and power struggles, moderate these roles. In addition, there is strong evidence for path dependency in cases where decisions have an institutional scope. The decisions in favor of the Franco-German brigade and the EUBG ultimately resulted from the role of a promoter of reinforced European military capabilities and the role of a faithful ally, which dominated among the actors behind these decisions. Other roles present among the French and German decision-makers tend, on the contrary, to slow down the use of these units. This is particularly true for the role of a great power (France) and the role of a civilian power (Germany). Several roles coexist indeed within each state and each sees its amount of influence fluctuate. This variation in roles’ influence depends on the actors involved, as well as on power struggles and relations. Our dissertation is divided into seven chapters. In the first three we will return to the literature on expeditionary forces and alliances, to our methodology, and to the international relations in Europe over the past thirty years. The following chapters deal with the development of the Franco-German brigade as an expeditionary force, the creation of battle groups, the choice of partners within them, and finally the non-employment of these military troops. These are the four empirical chapters of our research. In conclusion, we estimate that the probability of deployment of the studied units in the coming years remains rather low. Relying on role theory, our theoretical explanation serves as a tool for understanding the functioning of the French and German political-military decision-making structures. While validated for this analysis, this theoretical framework now has to be tested on other case studies.

On the 19th of September, 1863, occurred the battle of Chickamauga,* in which my regiment took a conspicuous part. The close of our own share in this contest is, as it were, burnt into my memory with every least detail. It was about...

In this chapter, the authors provide readers with some critical genealogical insights in order to argue that many of the twenty-first-century conundrums that confront the EJI’s consciousness-raising efforts about forgotten lynching legacies can be traced back to the time of the Reconstruction (1866–1877) and post-Reconstruction years. This was a time when anti-lynchers had to battle “unreconstructed” Southern defenders of white supremacy as well as some of their Northern allies.

This chapter highlights William T. Sherman’s return to Washington. The arrival of “the Vandal Sherman,” as he described himself, plus his troops loud in threats that his Washington critics would have them “to reckon with,” had led to significant developments even before his return. There had also been some wild talk, probably exaggerated in the re-telling, of overthrowing the government. Edwin M. Stanton, perhaps sensing a matter he could exploit to his disadvantage, ordered both Ulysses S. Grant and Sherman to testify before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War on the issues surrounding the ill-fated Memorandum of Understanding reached between Sherman and Joseph E. Johnston. In retrospect, the Committee’s failure to embarrass Sherman serves to underline the complete failure of Congress at this date to make any mark on Reconstruction policy. The ensuing great battle over this issue in 1866–67 would emerge as the defining, momentous political contest of these years, and Sherman would be dragged unwittingly into its margins.

This chapter focuses on the founding of Polish-language periodicals — first Jutrzenka (1861–3) and then Izraelita (1866–1915) — which was one of the most visible achievements of the new integrationist movement. The most active members of this new group were Marcus Jastrow and Daniel Neufeld, who was editer-in-chief of Jutrzenka. Even though it was active only for a short time, Jutrzenka and the writers associated with it wielded considerable influence. Their influence extended to bringing about a realignment of the attitude of the modernizing camp towards the hasidim; in particular, it was not until the 1860s that hasidism was recognized as a major ideological problem and perceived to be the most serious enemy in the battle to emancipate and modernize Jews in Poland. Neufeld and other Jutrzenka writers argue that the hasidim needed to be educated and that learning would bring about the ultimate solution to the problem, i.e. the disappearance of hasidism. But, alongside the voices of criticism, Jutrzenka's writers increasingly expressed the positive features of hasidism, particularly their unrivalled unity, their caring for their families, their concern for religious education, and their wholehearted espousal of their ideology. Ultimately, the reassessment of attitudes towards the hasidic movement among the moderate integrationist camp brought immediate, direct results in the pre-uprising period of Polish–Jewish fraternity and had a lasting effect.

On September 15, 1869, Massachusetts governor Andrew appointed seven members to the state board of health. The men appointed to that board had a new vision of medicine and the roles of science and the state in protecting health. For these men, medicine should do more than just cure; it must also prevent illness. Their understanding of illness was expansive, and it led them to a concern about filth and pollution. They also came to believe that for science and medicine to perform their new role in society, they needed the backing and power of the state. On September 22, the board met for the first time, electing George Derby as secretary and Henry Ingersoll Bowditch as chair. Bowditch was a logical choice for chair. In addition to being one of the region’s leading doctors, he came from a respected Boston family, and he held the professorship of clinical medicine at Harvard School of Medicine. He was vice president of the American Medical Association (later he would be president) and the author of several scientificjournal articles. Bowditch served as a medical volunteer to the Union army and lost a son in battle. Moreover, it had been his idea to form a state board of health. In a speech before the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1862, Bowditch argued that medicine should serve the people. To do so required the creation of a state board of health, “one that eventually will be of more service . . . to the inhabitants of this state . . . by [its] united and persistent efforts to increase the state authority.” Bowditch was not the only one to advocate for a state board. Dr. Edward Jarvis, a well known sanitary reformer, had as well, and along with Bowditch, he pushed the idea, only to have it fail in the legislative house in April of 1866 as “inexpedient,” despite Governor Andrew’s endorsement. Three years later, a typhoid epidemic in western Massachusetts encouraged state representatives from the Connecticut River Valley and farther west to back a bill for a state board.