Academic literature on the topic 'Dasein Transcendence'

This paper attempts to reveal the meaning of Heideggerian self on the basis of time. In the course of this, it examines Heidegger’s following terms: time, the self, the world and Being. In the present paper, the notions of anxiety, death, the call, freedom, transcendence, resolution and temporality (time) constitute a frame for articulating the meaning of the authenticity of Dasein. The road to the authentic self is challenging since it is not something already given; rather, the self is something to be accomplished. Dasein must accomplish it by making life its own. To achieve this, the elaboration of the meaning of “the Being of beings” in the exploration of Dasein must be the first step. For it is Dasein who can give an answer to the question of the meaning of “Being”.

Resumo:
 O artigo apresenta a concepção heideggeriana de intencionalidade, à luz da compreensão da transcendência do aí-ser (Dasein) como ser-no-mundo em Ser e tempo. Insiste em que tal concepção só pode ser bem apreendida a partir da intuição fundamental do filósofo sobre o sentido de ser do aí-ser e consequentemente do ser como tal. Trata-se da abordagem do ser-humano como vida fáctica ou existência histórica em contraposição a todo o pensamento metafísico com suas distinções sensível/inteligível e sujeito/objeto.
 Palavras-chave: sentido de ser; pensar fenomenológico-hermenêutico; metafísica; existência histórica; intencionalidade; transcendência
 
 Abstract:
 The article presents the Heideggerian view of intentionality, in the light of the Dasein`s transcendence as Being-in-the-world in Being and Time. It stresses that such a view can only be well grasped from Heidegger`s fundamental insight into the meaning of Dasein`s Being and hence of Being as such. This insight implies the approach of human being as factical life or historical existence in opposition to all metaphysical thinking with its sensible/intelligible and subject/object distinctions.
 Key-words: Meaning of Being; phenomenological-hermeneutic thinking; metaphysics; historical existence; intentionality; transcendence

According to Hans Ruin, there are two ways to approach the examination of freedom in Heidegger’s writings: One can use the notion of freedom as a heuristic concept to interpret the entirety of Heidegger’s work as a philosophy of freedom, which was famously done by Günter Figal, or one can reconstruct Heidegger’s actual use of the notion of freedom. In my paper I’ll focus on the second approach and show that although “freedom” or, rather, “being-free” can already be found in Being and Time, his more elaborate concept of freedom as transcendence is developed in the years 1928-1930. These years are part of a time period in which Heidegger tried to develop his own positive concept of metaphysics. The main texts which show this development are the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and the essay On the Essence of Ground. Based on Aristotle’s twofold metaphysics—consisting of ontology and philosophical theology—Heidegger sketches his own concept of metaphysics. The fundamental ontology which plays the role of ontology is complemented by his cosmological interpretation of theology: metontology. Together, they form Heidegger’s novel notion of metaphysics: the metaphysics of Dasein. Whereas fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of Being, the main subject of metontology is world as beings as a whole. Heidegger develops his concept of transcendence, i.e., metontological freedom, which describes the connection between freedom and world, on the basis of the terms world-projection (Weltentwurf), world-view (Weltanschauung), and world-formation (Weltbildung), each describing an aspect of transcendence.

Abstract This article expounds James K.A. Smith’s pentecostal epistemology, analyzing its characteristics as affective, pretheoretical knowledge and its ambiguous relationship to cognitive, theoretical knowledge, and then correlating this relationship to Smith’s exposition of the problem of incommensurability between pretheoretical transcendence and theoretical immanence. I argue that Smith’s epistemology is partly rooted in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein as being-in-the-world in order to clarify the relationship between the affects and cognition. I then address the problem of incommensurability and argue that Smith’s creational hermeneutic eliminates the problem altogether, healing the ambiguous relationship between affective, pretheoretical knowledge and cognitive, theoretical knowledge that affects his pentecostal epistemology.

Depar ting from estimations of existential universes of animals (umwelt) and humans (Lebenswelt and Dasein), this paper observes a number of views on the subjective experience, or modelling systems of reality, developed in the philosophy of nature and culture. The first part examines how the semantic relationships of nonhuman and human organisms with their environments are outlined in phenomenology as a study of individual experience from a subject-oriented perspective. Respectively, animals are admitted to have meaningful relations with actual things in observable reality through an outward extension of their bodies, but they are stated to lack direct access to things in themselves and to their various forms of being, because they cannot transcend the imprisonment in their surroundings. In the second part, exposing the mundane background of semiotic phenomenology, the existence modes of animal and human subjects are considered in terms of being-in-the-world as immanence and being-for-the-world as transcendence. Immanent subjects are seen as existing in their environments and transcendent subjects as being able to go beyond their Lebenswelten. In keeping with positively marked or unmarked interpretations of existence and life in the subjective universes of humans and animals, made by other philosophers and psychologists, the author arrives at a conclusion that the extension of the study of reality and the world might enrich the framework of existential semiotics if the organisms’ relations to the world they dwell in were considered from the viewpoint of their becoming in the world and the becoming of the world as a result of their interactions.

Abstrak: Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah menginterpretasi dan mengafirmasi bahwa Ada (das Sein) dalam “pertanyaan tentang Ada” (die Seinsfrage) dalam pemikiran Heidegger adalah univok sebagaimana konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikiran Duns Scotus. Oleh karena itu, pertanyaan utama yang menuntun artikel ini adalah, bagaimana dapat ditunjukkan hubungan antara konsep Ada itu univok antara Dun Scotus dan Heidegger? Untuk memahami dengan baik tema ini, kita akan mengulasnya dalam empat bagian. Pertama, kita akan berkonsentrasi pada pengertian konsep ekuivok, analog, univok. Kedua, kita fokus pada konsep analogi dan univok dalam pemahaman Abad Pertengahan. Bagaimana Duns Scotus memahami Ada itu univok akan dijelaskan pada bagian ketiga. Kemudian, kita akan mengelaborasi sebuah penafsiran Ada itu univok dalam pemi- kiran Heidegger pada bagian keempat. Pada akhirnya, konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikian Heidegger terletak pada konsepnya tentang waktu.
 
 Kata-kata kunci: Ekuivok, analog, univok, metafisika, Ada, Dasein, In- nerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ekstasis, transendental.
 
 Abstract: The scope of this article is to interpret and affirm that Being (das Sein) in Heidegger’s “question of Being” (die Seinsfrage) is similarly univocal to Duns Scotus’ concept of the univocity of Being. Therefore, the central question which guides this article is, how can it point to the relationship between Duns Scotus and Heidegger in regards to the concept of the univocity of Being? To understand well this theme, we will explain it in four parts. First, we concentrate on the definitions of equivocity, analogy and univocity. Second, we focus on the concepts of analogy and univocity in the Middle Ages. How Duns Scotus understands the univocity of Being will be pointed out in third part. After that, we will elaborate an interpretation of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought in fourth part. In the end, concept of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought is put in his concept of time.
 
 Keywords: Equivocity, analogy and univocity, metaphysics, Being, Dasein, Innerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ecstatic, transcendence.

A Ciência historicamente constitui-se como o padrão hegemônico de apresentação de conhecimentos sobre o mundo. Rigor, procedimento, exatidão e previsibilidade são algumas das características principais que determinaram esse lugar de predominância científica nos dias atuais, em uma construção que, dependendo dos critérios abordados, podem remeter até ao início da cultura ocidental na Grécia Antiga. Ao partir desse entendimento sobre sua hegemonia, o presente artigo aborda o fenômeno Ciência e sua tendência à totalização da imagem do mundo através da tematização, na qual o todo do ente é disponibilizado à subjetividade representativa. Tal objetivo científico de uma unidade na totalidade dos conhecimentos parece esbarrar, no entanto, em outra característica basilar da Ciência, nominalmente, o caráter determinado (particular) de seus objetos. Apresenta-se, portanto, uma possível incoerência entre o objeto e o objetivo científicos. Não obstante, como a determinação do conhecimento é traço constitutivo da Ciência, ao passo que a tendência à totalidade não é exclusividade dela, busca-se a fonte a essa exigência de unidade na própria natureza da razão, o que abre passagem para a pergunta motriz do texto: as ciências particulares podem satisfazer a necessidade da razão em sua exigência de unidade para toda experiência possível? Com isso à vista, o texto apresenta uma alternativa ao entendimento de totalidade, seu status de âmbito transcendente e sua vinculação com o modo-de-ser da existência enquanto Dasein.

This study aims at exhibiting the strong correlation between the question of subjectivity and the question of being. If the question of subjectivity is to be formulated in terms of the relation between the inner realm of consciousness and the outer world, then the question will have an epistemological form and becomes the question of the objectivity of our knowledge. In the dissertation, however, it will be claimed with the German philosopher Martin Heidegger that the critical stand taken against the subject-object schema of the Cartesian epistemology must be of an ontological kind, and should criticize the substantial difference between the two realms of being. v In order to fulfill the aforementioned task, Dasein as the entity which is capable of asking the question of being will be claimed to be the ontological condition of possibility for something like subjectivity. By the help of the phenomenological concept of Dasein, we will claim that the most neutral and basic being-in-the-world of human beings is not cognizing or perceiving things, but caring for them. The last objective we hope to fulfill in this study is to show that the only question of philosophy for Heidegger, i.e., the question of being, can first become comprehensible when the philosopher&rsquo<br>s investigations of the modern philosophy have been well examined. It is our contention that, unless thedead-ends of the modern philosophy of subjectivity is apprehended well enough, the obligation of asking the question of being as such cannot be felt.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1969002 bytes, checksum: c59631bf04059af6bfd0895dca1bd69a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-12-05<br>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES<br>The aim of this work is thematically analyze the concepts of nothing, ontological difference and Dasein transcendence - and its structural developments into the concepts of, and Being destination - as concepts that can converge to a specific current of Western thought that we will cal as negativity thought tradition. This approach frees these concepts from the strict heideggerian´s thought body and allows us to glimpse a tradition that, despite the traditional metaphysical ontology, points to a more radical ontological dimension. This tradition is understood as initiated by Philo of Alexandria, followed by Ammonius Saccas and Jamblico, developed by Plotinus and Proclus and christianized by the mysticism of Dinonisius, the Areopagite and Master Eckhart. From this last on, we can establish a link between this tradition and the Heidegger´s thought. We are not defining a mystical element into the Black Forest philosopher's thought, but providing clues that can harness the existential analytic approach and later developments of Heidegger's thought, the Kehre, with the the thinkers doctrines mentioned above. The links that will be established have convergences which can opening new possibilities up for thinking the collection of ancient ontology destruction, however, demonstrate that these similarities allow to contemplate the deeper dimension and these particular concepts and provide valuable clues for the interpretation not only within the Heidegger's thought, but also within the quoted tradition. It is a phenomenological-hermeneutic task capable of achieving a sense of historical and philosophical concepts, and finally set the parameters to define these points within the philosophy of Heidegger more clearly due to its link with a specific tradition.<br>O objetivo deste presente trabalho é analisar tematicamente os conceitos de nada, diferença ontológica e transcendência do Dasein e seus desdobramentos estruturais com os conceitos de , e destinamento do ser como conceitos que podem convergir para uma corrente específica do pensamento Ocidental que denominaremos de tradição do pensamento da negatividade. Tal abordagem liberta estes conceitos do corpo estrito do pensamento heidegerriano e nos permite vislumbrar uma tradição que, a despeito da ontologia metafísica tradicional, aponta para uma dimensão ontológica mais radical. Esta tradição é entendida como iniciada por Filon de Alexandria, seguida por Ammonius Saccas e Jâmblico, desenvolvida por Plotino e Proclo e cristianizada pelo misticismo de Dionisius, o Areopagita e Mestre Eckhart. Partindo deste último, poderemos estabelecer um vínculo entre esta corrente e o pensamento heideggeriano. Não se trata aqui de delimitar um elemento místico no pensamento do filósofo da Floresta Negra, mas sim de fornecer pistas capazes de atrelar a abordagem da analítica existencial e os desdobramentos posteriores do pensamento de Heidegger, a Kehre, com as doutrinas dos pensadores acima citados. Os vínculos que serão estabelecidos possuem convergências que abrem novas possibilidades para pensarmos a destruição do acervo da antiga ontologia; entretanto, demonstraremos que tais similitudes permitem contemplar a dimensão mais profunda e particular destes conceitos e fornecer chaves valiosas de interpretação para os mesmos não apenas dentro do pensamento heideggeriano, mas também dentro da própria tradição que os funda. Trata-se de uma tarefa fenomenológica-hermenêutica capaz de conquistar o sentido histórico-filosófico destes conceitos e, finalmente, estabelecer os parâmetros para delimitarmos tais pontos dentro da filosofia de Heidegger com mais clareza devido ao seu nexo com uma tradição específica.

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silvio Moreira Barbosa Junior.pdf: 458094 bytes, checksum: 12f90be7301736f9b6f3e79d4952c0ad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-23<br>This work follows the way in wich Martin Heidegger surpasses the proposition of a Phylo sophic Antropology through his project of a Fundamental Ontology. The Phylosophic Antropology he has in sight is the one of Max Scheler, and the specific problem from wich he takes over is the constitution of a unitary idea of man. Through the analisys of existence, Heidegger shows that so the detrmined object determined by the Phylosophic Antropology, the man, as the way of adressing the question about it, wields within the domain of Traditional Metaphysisc and, by this interven tion, are not capable to offer the desired unity. The modus operandi of Phylosophic Antropology underlines a indetermined character of the questio about man that it ignores on it importance, dealing this indetermination of what man is as an obstacle to be overcomed. This work stabilishes this indetermination, made present in the question for the unity of man with the structural unity of Dasein put uncoverd in anguish. Through this relation it s shown not only the reason why Phylosophic Antropology can not offer a unitary idea of man, but also the way in wich Fundamental Ontology overdoes the proposal of a Phylosophic Antropology<br>Este trabalho acompanha o modo pelo qual Martin Heidegger supera a proposta de uma antropologia filosófica a partir do seu projeto de ontologia fundamental. A antropologia filosófica que tem em vista é a de Max Scheler, e o problema específico do qual parte é o problema em se constituir uma idéia unitária de homem. Através da analise da existência, Heidegger mostra que tanto o objeto determinado pela antropologia filosófica, o homem, quanto o modo de dirigir a pergunta sobre ele, exercem-se dentro do âmbito da metafísica tradicional e, em decorrência disto, não são capazes de oferecer a unidade almejada. O modo de operar da antropologia filosófica evidencia um caráter indeterminado na pergunta sobre o homem, que ela ignora em sua importância, tratando a indeterminação do que seja o homem como obstáculo a ser superado. Este trabalho relacionará esta indeterminação, feita patente na pergunta pela unidade do homem, com a unidade estrutural do Dasein posto a descoberto na angústia. Através desta relação fica patente não só porque a antropologia não pode oferecer uma idéia unitária de homem, como o modo pelo qual a ontologia fundamental supera a proposta de uma antropologia filosófica

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese completa.pdf: 3201456 bytes, checksum: acff3e662990cfae13fd8cf1f622e459 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-08-14<br>nenhum<br>Há muito tempo que a verdade do ser não é pensada. Na verdade, o que existe tornou-se simplesmente elaboração de sistemas técnicos. Concepções decisionistas costumam fundar a legitimidade das normas, confirmando a tese do positivismo lógico de que as normas são preposições deônticas às quais não cabe qualquer discussão. O ambiente jurídico encontra-se deficiente com tal restrição, tendo em vista a retidão ou inflexibilidade do raciocínio aplicado. Ao contrário, o ser humano é livre a interrogar a sua própria existência e, ao questionar a si próprio, não consegue deixar de interrogar aquilo que serve de base para todos: o próprio ser. A essência do homem é constituída do desocultamento da verdade do seu ser, o que lhe compete por respeitar sua própria dignidade. Assim, o direito, descoberto no homem e na comunidade a partir dele constituída, é um dos modos do ser do homem que é alcançado, no seu verdadeiro conteúdo, colhido pela raiz.

‘Temporality, transcendence, and freedom’ considers Dasein’s place within time and space. Time is a result of Dasein striving to impose order and significance on an apparently hostile environment. The past informs the opportunities to be found in the present and the future. As such, time makes living in the world possible. Dasein’s sense of time allows it to transcend the world and transcend temporality by actualizing its own purposes and constructing its own encounters. This ability to view the entities as possibilities rather than sheer actualities relies on the freedom that Dasein has. Thus, Dasein asks for the grounds of things because ‘to exist is already to philosophize’.